

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST
4 March 1973

CIA's Schlesinger Begins Streamlining Operations

By Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writer

The new director of the Central Intelligence Agency has begun the long-promised reorganization of the vast U.S. intelligence community with an eye toward streamlining his own agency and bringing military intelligence under closer civilian control.

At the peak of the Vietnam war, the U.S. intelligence community employed 150,000 persons and spent \$6 billion a year, a growth that led to duplication, inter-agency bickering and jurisdictional jealousies that horrified President Nixon.

In his first month as director, James R. Schlesinger has moved three choices of his own into top jobs at the CIA, forced out two members of the old guard and set about the task of bringing under CIA control the three other federal services that with the CIA make up the bulk of the U.S. intelligence network.

This description of Schlesinger's first month as CIA director came from an authoritative source, who said that Schlesinger is acting on the personal instructions of the President. It was Schlesinger who directed a massive study of the intelligence community when he was a member of the Office of Management and Budget in 1971, just before he became chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Parling of the Defense Department's intelligence activities began even before Schlesinger moved into the CIA. Manpower at the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the intelligence branches of the four armed services had climbed above 100,000 persons at one point. In addition, 50,000 others were scattered through 10 other agencies.

One source on Capitol Hill said that \$1 billion had been cut from the budget of the Defense Intelligence Agency alone, a figure that was disputed in size only by another source.

"It wasn't that much of a cut," the source said, "but it was a god-sized bite."

Since becoming director, Schlesinger has made five

key moves in his attempts to strengthen the CIA, which one source said was suffering from "aging and bureaucratization."

Schlesinger appointed William E. Colby as deputy director of plans, which is the CIA title for the man who heads the agency's covert espionage operations or "department of dirty tricks." Now 53 years old, Colby was at one time head of the U.S. pacification program in South Vietnam.

Colby replaced Thomas Karamessines, who had wanted to retire two years ago but who stayed on at the insistence of the White House. One published report said that Karamessines had been fired by Schlesinger, but sources close to the CIA insisted this was incorrect.

The new CIA director also pulled a pair of generals out of the Pentagon to serve on the newly formed Intelligence Resource Advisory Committee. They are Army Maj. Gen. Daniel O. Graham and Air Force Maj. Gen. Lew Allen, both of whom have served in military intelligence and knew Schlesinger who had admired them since his own days with the Rand Corp.

"Jim [Schlesinger] is a takeover kind of guy," one source said, "and these appointments bring in men he feels comfortable with, who will back him up when the going gets tough."

The going is expected to get tough quite soon, since it is understood that Schlesinger plans a complete overhauling of the CIA. One source described the CIA as an "old boy network" that had been allowed to grow unchecked since it was created by President Truman in 1947. The CIA now employs 15,000 persons and has a budget of \$600 million a year.

Schlesinger has already forced two old CIA hands into early retirement. One is Bronson Tweedy, former deputy to Schlesinger's predecessor, Richard M. Helms. The other is Thomas Parrott, a deputy to Tweedy who had been at the CIA since 1961.

Schlesinger is said to believe that the CIA must

shift gears now that there is a cease-fire in Vietnam. He is said to think that the Middle East should now be the focus of CIA attention, particularly since the Soviet Union is understood to be moving some of its activities out of the Mediterranean and into the Persian Gulf.

The new CIA director is also said to believe that the CIA ought to change its role with the changing times. One source said that Schlesinger believes the CIA must begin to gather more intelligence about international crime, terrorism and narcotics traffic.

"The international terrorist movement is something that Schlesinger feels should be watched far more closely," the same source said. "There are some people in intelligence who say it's going to take a major effort to keep these terrorists out of the U.S., to keep them from assassinating public figures right here on American soil."

Schlesinger is also said to be concerned about public opinion of the CIA and the role of espionage in an increasingly critical world society.

"I think Jim would like it if the American public had a greater understanding of the need for intelligence," one source said. "I don't think he believes he can get the job done right if there is hostility and opposition to the CIA because it's thought to be a nest of spies."

Richard Helms' departure from the CIA was said to be as much of a sign of change at the CIA as Schlesinger's arrival. Helms presided over the CIA for the past seven years, during which time the United States was caught in a series of intelligence failures.

The loss of the Pueblo, the loss of a U.S. reconnaissance plane in North Korea right after the Pueblo disaster, the abortive raid on the Son Tay prisoners-of-war camp in North Vietnam are all cited as failures of U.S. intelligence. The lack of intelligence about North Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1970 and of its offensive in South Vietnam a year ago are also cited as examples of an intelligence community grown too bureaucratic.

While Helms was admired for his tough-mindedness, he was also viewed with suspicion by the Nixon White House for his independence and his alliances in Washington society.

His power base in Congress, his friendship with Washington columnists and his socializing at Georgetown cocktail parties were all frowned upon in the White House, where a low profile is admired more than

NEW YORK TIMES
1 March 1973

C.I.A. HEAD NAMES ESPIONAGE CHIEF

Colby Becomes Director of Clandestine Operations

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 28—James R. Schlesinger, the new director of Central Intelligence, has named William E. Colby, former head of the American pacification program in South Vietnam and a long-time intelligence operative, as director of clandestine operations.

Knowledgeable sources reported today that Mr. Colby, 53 years old, assumed his new top-level job this week. Formally known inside the agency as the deputy director of plans, Mr. Colby will be in charge of all C.I.A. espionage activities and covert operations, widely known in Washington as the "department of dirty tricks."

Mr. Colby's previous position, executive director of the agency, a post combining the functions of the inspector general and controller, has been abolished by Mr. Schlesinger, the sources said, as part of his revamping of the agency.

Two Generals Chosen

It was also disclosed that Mr. Schlesinger has chosen two highly regarded major generals for his new Intelligence Resource Advisory Committee.

Through this committee Mr. Schlesinger is expected to seize over-all bureaucratic and financial control of the United States intelligence community, which is estimated to spend \$6-billion annually.

Through this committee Mr. Schlesinger is expected to take over bureaucratic and financial control of the United States intelligence community, which is estimated to spend \$6-billion annually.

The generals selected for the committee are Maj. Gen. Daniel O. Graham of the Army, who is director of estimates for the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Maj. Gen. Lew Allen of the Air Force, deputy commander for satellite programs.

General Graham, whose promotion to major general becomes official tomorrow, has been a sharp critic of the C.I.A.'s Office of National Estimates, one of the top intelligence review groups in the nation.

Many Are Alarmed

His appointment has alarmed many intelligence officials, who view it as the beginning of an attack on what some have called a liberal bias in the agency's intelligence estimates. In a recent syndicated column, for example, Joseph Alsop criticized what he called the "special historical bias" of the analysts under the leadership of the former Director of Central Intelligence, Richard M. Helms, who was named Ambassador to Iran last January.

Mr. Alsop's column then went on to note that Mr. Schlesinger

WASHINGTON POST
23 February, 1973

Joseph Alsop

The CIA Analysts: Changes at the Top

"is even bringing in from the Defense Department the most pungent and persistent critic of the C.I.A.'s estimating-analyzing hierarchy."

"This detested figure is, in fact, to be named the new head of the hierarchy, unless present plans are changed," the column said.

Intelligence sources said that the unidentified critic of the agency mentioned in Mr. Alsop's column was General Graham, who became well known to officials in the agency after serving a tour with it as a colonel.

Another Appointment

It could not be learned whether General Graham will be named head of Mr. Schlesinger's Intelligence Resource Advisory Committee, although official sources inside the C.I.A. did confirm that he and General Allen would be joining the director's staff. Agency assignments have never been publicly announced by the Government.

Another member of that staff, it was disclosed, will be Dr. Jack Martin, who until early this year was serving with the White House's Office of Science and Technology.

The sources said that the intelligence committee had replaced the C.I.A.'s National Intelligence Program Evaluation staff, which was headed by Bronson Tweedy and Thomas Parrott, two key aides to Mr. Helms who, The New York Times reported last week, were ordered to retire by Mr. Schlesinger.

The Times also reported that Thomas H. Karamessines, Mr. Colby's predecessor as director of the clandestine services, had been ordered to retire by Mr. Schlesinger. Agency officials disputed that account today and said that Mr. Karamessines had in fact requested retirement last year but had been asked to stay on.

Mr. Karamessines has been in ill health for some time.

The appointment of Mr. Colby, a Princeton graduate who began his intelligence career with the Office of Strategic Services in World War II, was more favorably received by many senior intelligence officials.

"He's the classic old espionage type," one intelligence analyst said of Mr. Colby. "The kind of guy who never attracts attention."

Other sources questioned whether Mr. Schlesinger's appointment of Mr. Colby would lead to a widely expected shake-up of the clandestine services, which attained notoriety in 1967 with the disclosure that it was secretly subsidizing the National Student Association.

New brooms, as the say is, sweep clean. The new director of the Central Intelligence Agency, James R. Schlesinger Jr., is an obviously vigorous broom. Normally, therefore, the large number of impending changes in the CIA's top personnel would not be of much significance to anyone outside the CIA itself.

This is emphatically not true, however, of the change in leadership that can be expected in the agency's huge hierarchy of estimators and analysts. These are the people charged with giving meaning to the CIA's vast daily income of raw data. Theirs is a crucially important job. For it is of no great use merely to know, for instance, that the Soviets have a huge missile called the SS-9. Defense policy-makers also need to know the missile's main characteristics, and therefore its probable purposes.

The government, of course, contains other estimators and analysts outside the CIA—in the Defense Department, for instance. But the CIA hierarchy is the largest and the most powerful of all. And it customarily provides the chairman of the Board of National Estimates, at present CIA veteran John Huizenga.

The point of this long explanation is, quite simply, that the CIA's estimating-analyzing hierarchy has long had a "line" of its own, which might even be called a marked historical bias. An extreme case is one of the very top men, reportedly soon to depart, who was aggressively and successively wrong about the Soviet re-invasion of Hungary; about the Soviet missiles in Cuba; and about the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Departing CIA Director Richard Helms is far too wise and tough-minded a man not to have observed this peculiar historical bias in so large a group of his former colleagues and subordinates. To give one example, he has always taken the Soviet military build-up on China's northern border with the utmost seriousness. He has always regarded it, in fact, as the very opposite of a mere empty and expensive parade of Russian might. In contrast, the CIA estimating-analyzing hierarchy long dismissed the Soviet military build-up as "strictly defensive," and has only partly retreated from that view to this day. Thus in 1969, the official national estimates downgraded the Soviet build-up so completely that the facts had to be brought to the attention of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger by a

dissident China-specialist, who was about to retire from the State Department. Whereupon the Soviet build-up became the mainspring of President Nixon's intricate balance-of-power diplomacy.

It may be asked, then, why Helms, as CIA director, so long tolerated the bias of his analysts and estimators. The answer appears to be that Helms, a great bureaucrat if ever there was one, had an institutional need of another kind.

His estimating-analyzing hierarchy had always been broadly gloomy about the Vietnamese war, albeit grossly erroneous in several key factual estimates about Vietnam. At the opening of President Nixon's first term, a violent attack on the CIA was developing from the left, both in Congress and in the press. The attack from the left was parried, and then caused to cease, by letting it be known—quite truthfully—that the CIA's Vietnam projections had always been the most pessimistic that were made in the government. The factual errors were not mentioned, of course.

This role of the estimating-analyzing hierarchy as the CIA's shield on the left is most unlikely to have escaped President Nixon's sharp eye. It is an informed guess, in fact, that while the President always much admired and thoroughly trusted CIA Director Helms, he strongly objected to the special historical bias of Helms' estimators and analysts.

As a new broom, therefore, Helms' chosen successor had the President's backing and encouragement. Without explicit faith the sweeping clean could hardly be done so thoroughly by new broom Schlesinger. Reportedly, CIA Director Schlesinger is even bringing in from the Defense Department the most pungent and persistent single critic of the CIA's estimating-analyzing hierarchy. This detested figure is, in fact, to be named the new head of the hierarchy, unless present plans are changed.

This bold stroke is even capable of producing a considerable political rum-pus. Among the leftwing Democrats in the Senate, in academic-intellectual circles, and indeed in the newspaper business, there are a great many people with a longing for reassurance. They long to be told that the historical process, so harsh for so many millennia, has been miraculously defanged in the age of the H-bomb.

Rightwing tampering with "impartial judgment" will no doubt be charged. But about those "important judgments," the Czechs and the Hungarians know better.

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WASHINGTON STAR
6 March 1973

Ex-CIA Aide Is Praised By President

Thomas H. Karamessines has retired from a key post at the Central Intelligence Agency after getting high praise from President Nixon and presidential assistant Henry A. Kissinger.

After more than 30 years of government service, Karamessines retired at the end of last month. He was deputy director for plans.

The agency provided letters showing the praise for Karamessines shortly after The Star-News reported that he had been "fired" by the new CIA director, James R. Schlesinger.

Schlesinger himself joined in the written remarks about Karamessines' service. The director spoke of "great devotion and professionalism."

The President's letter, dated two days after the story was published, said that Karamessines had handled "some of our government's most sensitive tasks . . . in a thoroughly professional manner."

Kissinger, in a letter dated four days before the story had appeared, said Karamessines had "handled the most delicate missions with the utmost discretion," and declared that the retirement "is a hard blow."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 February 1973

Why Mr. Helms left CIA

By Benjamin Welles

The Central Intelligence Agency — bellwether of the six federal agencies comprising the intelligence "community" — is changing the guard.

Richard M. Helms, director for the past six years and the first career intelligence officer to reach the top, has been named United States Ambassador to Iran. James R. Schlesinger, a Nixon protege who has been head of the Atomic Energy Commission for the past 18 months, will soon replace Mr. Helms.

The ouster of Helms reflects President Nixon's determination to reorganize the vast, costly federal bureaucracy. No single fiefdom has been more elusive than the intelligence community—not only because of the entrenched power of its barons but because of their skill in hiding their size, budgets, and activities from the public behind a veil of "national security."

The ever-smiling Helms, for example, has long been viewed by veteran Washington bureaucrats as a peer. Named director of Central Intelligence in 1966 by Lyndon Johnson, Helms quietly set to work consolidating his own power and repairing the damage done the CIA's image by the Bay of Pigs and other flascos.

He began trimming "fringe" activities, cultivating columnists and newsmen, and developing a power-base in Congress—notably among the aging hawks in control of appropriations and armed services. He even won praise from a frequent critic of the CIA — Chairman Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Such adroit maneuverings might, in the Kennedy-Johnson era, have won White House approval and, simultaneously, a measure of autonomy. In the hypersuspicious Nixon entourage, however, they merely aroused suspicion.

"In this administration," remarked a veteran intelligence expert, "the guy who works for Nixon and who gets on well with Fulbright is rare."

There were other signs that Helms was not regarded, and possibly did not wish to be regarded, as a member of the Nixon "team." When he and his socially active wife began appearing frequently in the society columns there were grumbles that the President's chief intelligence adviser was hobnobbing with the "Georgetown cocktail set." In contrast to the Johnson days when Helms was virtually always invited to the policy-setting White House Tuesday lunches along with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, and Gen. Earl "Buzz" Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs under Nixon, Helms has been reporting through Kissinger. Moreover, there has been criticism of Helms's "perfunctory" handling of major intelligence problems in White House meetings.

All this has gradually confirmed President

Nixon's suspicions that what was needed was a tough-minded "manager" to pull together the huge, sprawling intelligence community. Besides the CIA with its \$600 million budget and its 15,000 employees the community includes the Defense Department's Defense Intelligence Agency; the code-cracking/National Security Agency; the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Pentagon spending on intelligence — which includes electronic intercepts and spy satellites — approximates \$3 billion yearly. Add to this \$2 billion more spent every year by overseas commanders who insist on aerial reconnaissance, local code-cracking and even some spy running to ascertain what's "over the hill" in front of their forces. Meager intelligence before the 1970 irruption into Cambodia, before the abortive Sontay raid, and especially before Hanoi's offensive last March, has led the administration to charge that the intelligence mountain too often labors and brings forth a mouse.

Soon after taking office President Nixon had his OMB assign one of its key officials, James Schlesinger — a former Rand systems analyst — to survey the whole field of intelligence and propose reforms. His key recommendation was to separate the director of central intelligence (DCI) from day-to-day operations and move him into, or near, the White House as an intelligence "czar." However, Henry Kissinger saw this as a threat to his position; while Helms, a veteran of clandestine operations, saw it as a maneuver to cut him off from his "troops" and turn him into a senior paper shuffler.

The upshot, announced by the White House Nov. 5, 1971, in a communique so opaque as to defy comprehension, was a characteristic bureaucratic compromise. Helms was given "enhanced" authority — but no greater control over resources.

"Presidential authority means nothing in government without control of resources," Helms once told an interviewer. "The CIA spends 10 percent out of every intelligence dollar and the Pentagon 80 cents. I can't order the rest of the intelligence agencies how to spend their funds. I can only lead by persuasion."

Evidently Mr. Nixon disagrees. He has already shown that he means business by naming "managers" to trouble spots: Elliot Richardson as Secretary of Defense; Kenneth Rush as Deputy Secretary of State; Roy Ash as director of OMB; Caspar Weinberger Secretary of HEW.

By naming Schlesinger, the man who drafted the reforms, as head of the CIA — and by implication of the entire community — Mr. Nixon appears to be implying that he wants action.

The next article will discuss some of the major problems facing Mr. Schlesinger.

Mr. Welles, for many years on the staff of the New York Times, is now an independent commentator on what goes on in Washington.

TIME
5 MAR 1973
Spy No. 1

Shortly after President Nixon named former CIA Director Richard Helms as Ambassador to Iran, his Soviet counterpart in Tcheran, Vladimir Erofeyev, was at a formal dinner party with Iranian Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida. "What do you think about the United States sending you a spy as ambassador?" Erofeyev asked Hoveida. "Well," replied the Prime Minister coolly, "they are at least sending us their No. 1 spy. You can't be more than spy No. 10."

Minutes later, the Russian ambassador discovered an excuse to leave the dinner party.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
24 February 1973

Top-Level Shakeup in CIA Revealed

By FRANK VAN RIPER

Washington, Feb. 23 (NEWS Bureau) — Central Intelligence Director James R. Schlesinger, active with blank-check authority from President Nixon, is conducting a top-level shakeup of the CIA that has so far seen a number of the nation's top spymasters retired or forced out.

Knowledgeable sources told THE NEWS today that among those on their way out at the supersecret agency are Thomas H. Karamessines, chief of all clandestine services, and Laurence Houston, CIA general counsel. It could not be determined whether either of these men actually has been, or will be, fired by Schlesinger. But sources predicted that both men would soon submit their resignations or apply for retirement.

Anxious to Retire

As head of "clandestine services"—the euphemism for undercover espionage and sabotage—Karamessines was said to have been liked by his men. He is reported to have been seriously ill recently and anxious to retire.

Both Karamessines and Hou-

ston—as well as several other top level CIA officials—are nearing the agency's mandatory retirement age of 60.

White House sources would not comment on the shakeup beyond saying that "the president placed no restrictions on Schlesinger. He just told him to go in and run the place. There have been a whole handful of resignations."

Following persistent reports of White House displeasure over alleged unrestrained growth of the CIA bureaucracy, Schlesinger's predecessor, Richard M. Helms, was eased out last year. He subsequently became ambassador of Iran. The President then named Schlesinger, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, to replace him.

Sources close to the intelligence community viewed the CIA

shakeup as a strong indication that Nixon put Schlesinger in the job to prune the agency's multi-layered hierarchy quickly. One former agent termed the action "a very healthy sign."

"The first thing it does is to clean up the entire nest of Ivy Leaguers who have been running the place for years," he said.

Inferior Work Seen

Critics of the agency, including former agents, have charged that the intelligence community has grown so unwieldy in the last 10 years that the U.S. is now getting an intelligence product that is inferior to what it got a decade ago with fewer agents and less sophisticated spying equipment.

Sources close to the Senate armed services committee on central intelligence noted that in recent days "there has been some inclination from the administra-

tion that there would be some changes in the top CIA jobs."

The resignation of even a few top-level agency figures is significant because of the repercussions each departure will have on scores of people in what one source termed "the unofficial CIA pecking order."

Feeling Shock Waves

Already the shock waves are being felt in the agency, as at least two aides close to Helms who worked in his office are reported to be leaving.

Administration sources, while confirming Schlesinger's blanket authority to run the spy shop as he wants, noted that Schlesinger has not sought to conduct a mass "purge" of the CIA but rather to east several high-level types

out and let their subordinates follow them out the door voluntarily.

HERALD, Miami
6 February 1973

CIA's Helms Keeps Mum at Hearing

By JAMES MCCARTNEY
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — After 26 years with the CIA, Richard Helms is the nation's preeminent, most experienced spy.

And Monday he lived by the code of the spy to the bitter end.

Eased out, without explanation, after 6½ years as head of the CIA, Helms had the first opportunity of his career to tell all at a public hearing. But in the grand tradition of the CIA, he chose to keep his mouth shut.

HELMs has been banished by the Nixon Administration to the U.S. ambassadorship in Iran — apparently to give the job to a Nixon loyalist.

He told Sen. J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that he didn't intend to start talking now.

"I think if I should talk it would be a bad example for those still in the agency," he said.

But he did go as far as to say that none of his boys had any part in the Watergate affair — that, he said, involved some ex-CIA agents, with no remaining connections.

"I had no control over anyone who left," he said.

Two former CIA agents participated in the celebrated Watergate raid on Democrat-

ic National Committee headquarters in Washington, E. Howard Hunt Jr. and James McCord Jr.

Helms also said that the CIA had not cooperated with International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. (ITT) for "espionage purposes" in Chile — as suggested last year by the so-called "Anderson papers."

IN FACT, he said the CIA had the same kinds of relations with many corporations overseas as it had with ITT in Chile — and he wouldn't describe those relations as "espionage."

He called them relationships for "exchanging information."

The Anderson papers reported regular contacts between ITT and a CIA official in Washington in an apparent attempt to prevent a communist government from taking over in Chile.

But on the whole, Helms had little to say about his activities at the CIA — and

nothing at all to say about the reasons for his departure.

And the often-acerbic senators of the Foreign Relations committee, who have often delighted in the past needling the Nixon Administration, treated Helms with kid gloves.

HIS APPOINTMENT to the Iranian ambassadorship,

Hearing

far from the seats of power he has occupied for so long, was greeted, by and large, as though it were a promotion.

The session was, in fact, the first time that Helms has ever testified in public before a congressional committee. He has often briefed senators behind closed doors.

Fulbright chided Helms a bit about the Iranian appointment. "I have a feeling," he said, "you know more about the CIA than Iran — is that a fair statement?"

Helms seemed amused. "Mr. Chairman," he replied, "you know as much about Iran as I do."

Senators of both parties praised Helms for doing an "objective" job in preparing reports.

The unanswered, and unasked, question at the hearing was why, if Helms had done so well, he had been demoted. Some administration officials, at least, believe that the White House has been unhappy with Helms' independence at the CIA.

SOME BELIEVE that the

administration would like reports more in keeping — or supportive — of its policies.

No senator asked Helms about that, but reporters cornered him in a hallway after the hearing and popped the question.

"That," he said, "is cocktail party chatter."

"The CIA has established a tradition of fair and honest reporting. And presidents know that and all presidents appreciate the need for that."

But is he concerned that the tradition might now be imperiled?

"I don't know," he said. "We'll have to wait and see."

Helms' successor at the CIA, James Schlesinger, was a budget expert at the White House before he was appointed head of the Atomic Energy Commission last year.

He was scheduled to testify at an open hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee two weeks ago but at the last minute plans were changed. The open hearing was canceled. Schlesinger testified behind closed doors.

NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1973

Institutional Dirty Tricks

By Jeremy J. Stone

WASHINGTON — Most people believe that the function of the Central Intelligence Agency is to collect intelligence. In fact, however, as many as one-third of its 18,000 employees are occupied with political operations. The Bay of Pigs, the Iranian and Guatemalan coups, the effort to overthrow the Albanian Government in 1949, the secret war in Laos and other lesser known operations have been run by the C.I.A.'s Directorate of Plans.

It is hard to argue that the overthrow of a foreign government is "related to intelligence" or an activity done for the "benefit of the existing intelligence agencies." The courts may some day just throw out C.I.A.'s Directorate of Plans.

There are evidently a series of secret directives approved by the National Security Council in 1948 and thereafter authorizing such special operations of all kinds provided they were secret and small enough to be plausibly deniable by the Government. But even this authority is periodically exceeded because many of the operations are too big to hide, much less to deny when they fail.

C.I.A.'s operations are certainly having an unfortunate effect on American political life. The Watergate trial is an example of the problems that result when C.I.A. graduates enter political life with skills and hardened attitudes to which American society is unexpectedly vulnerable. But there are

other examples. Not long ago, the C.I.A. brought suit against Victor Marchetti, a former employee, to prevent him from disclosing—evidently in a work of fiction—facts about C.I.A. clandestine operations. The court order demanded that he submit his work to C.I.A. for clearance. This is prior restraint of publication, a most dangerous precedent against freedom of the press.

Even as an instrument of national policy narrowly conceived, C.I.A.'s Directorate of Plans may be a net liability. C.I.A. advocates press upon Presidents plans which they feel obliged to approve: the Bay of Pigs was an example. Agents engaged in these operations in the field are notoriously hard to control and, inevitably, they give off political signals which may or may not be authorized—one rarely knows.

One of the most famous of the C.I.A. political operations resulted in the infiltration of the National Student Association and about 250 other American domestic groups. The C.I.A. official who sold the whole program to Allen Dulles, and set it in motion, was Thomas W. Braden. On Jan. 6, in a syndicated column he now writes, Mr. Braden called for a C.I.A. housecleaning and noted: "The times have changed and, in some ways, they now more nearly approximate the time when the C.I.A. was born. The need then was for intelligence only." He felt the purchasing of loyalty had lasted longer than the necessity for it. This view, when expressed by Mr. Braden, makes one wonder if there continues to be a na-

tional consensus in support of this ongoing bureaucracy—the Directorate of Plans.

Much about the C.I.A. has had a distorting effect upon American democracy. Congressional oversight has been close to nonexistent: even the membership is secret of one such Congressional committee. The unprecedented, and quite unnecessary, secrecy about the C.I.A.'s over-all budget has led to burying the agency's budget in the accounts of other budgets; this violates Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution, under which "a regular statement and account" of Government expenditures is to be published from time to time.

But most important, the C.I.A.'s Directorate of Plans is designed to do things which the American democratic system might well not approve, things which it cannot discuss, things which the Government is afraid or ashamed to have known. Such things should only be done as a last resort, as an alternative to overt military action in a situation that presents a direct threat to U.S. security. We ought not institutionalize "dirty tricks."

The C.I.A. has a new director in, James Schlesinger, and the time to re-examine these issues is clearly upon us. Shall we have an agency designed to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries for another quarter-century? Or shall we return to a foreign policy which the public and the Congress can debate, monitor and control?

Jeremy J. Stone is director of the Federation of American Scientists.

BALTIMORE SUN
18 FEBRUARY 1973

Team players strengthen State Department's voice

By JAMES S. KEAT

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Quiet diplomacy has ended another cold war, this one within the U.S. Government.

The State Department has broken its long silence on international economic affairs. What's more, it is speaking out in firm tones with some unaccustomed tough language.

What the department said last week was not so important as the fact it spoke out at all. When Charles W. Bray 3d, the department spokesman, pointedly warned West Europeans about the coming trade and monetary talks, he was echoing the words of Treasury officials.

And that was just what was remarkable. At least throughout the first term of the Nixon administration, the State Department has been at odds with other departments concerned with international economics, the Treasury and the Commerce Department.

The policy disputes between them were so serious two years ago that John B. Connally, then the Secretary of the Treasury, moved in and pushed the State Department out of the field for all practical purposes.

The diplomats of the State Department, conscious of the political impact of U.S. pressure on economic issues, often wanted to go slow. The Treasury, and more often the Commerce Department, advocated a belligerent stance. In Washington parlance, it was another clash between the "hawks" and the "doves." And, as it usually goes in Washington, the "hawks" won out.

But as the second Nixon term begins, the lineup is different. George P. Shultz is Secretary of Treasury and has been designated the Presidents' principal aide on all economic matters. William J. Casey moved from chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission to the newly upgraded post of under secretary of state for economic affairs.

And William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, has survived both his old adversaries in this field, Mr. Connally and Maurice H. Stands, former Secretary of Commerce.

Observers of the games bureaucrats play often place too much importance on personalities in analyzing power relationships in the capital. In this case, knowledgeable officials say the personalities explain a lot.

Some ascribe the new tone to Mr. Casey's arrival. The former New York corporation lawyer was a forceful chairman of the SEC and accomplished several important reforms in a tenure of only 10 months. His appointment to the State Department post was a signal it would play a more active role in international economic affairs.

Other officials say the key is the relationship between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Rogers. Unlike Mr. Connally and Mr. Stands, both are team players.

The two men are said to work well together.

Mr. Rogers, aides say, was involved in the secret planning of last week's devaluation of the dollar. Officials at the State Department are, for the first time in years, consulting their opposite numbers in the Treasury before acting on topics of common interest.

The result is that the State Department not only has found its voice on economic matters again but is realying the same message as the Treasury. It was no accident that diplomatic correspondents reported a hint that Washington's attitude on keeping 300,000 U.S. troops in Europe had some relationship to the fate of the trade and monetary negotiations.

Two days later, Mr. Rogers denied there was any "linkage" between the issues, but he added that the "health of our economy" has some influence on "congressional attitudes about continuing our presence in Europe."

Mr. Schlesinger of CIA

By Benjamin Welles

James R. Schlesinger, newly named head of the Central Intelligence Agency, comes to the job unhampered by previous intelligence experience — unlike his predecessor, Richard M. Helms, a life long veteran of clandestine operations.

Mr. Schlesinger is a tall, craggy, systems analyst with a habit of working in his shirt-sleeves. If, while conferring with his colleagues his shirttail hangs out — as it often does — it bothers him not. Calm, relaxed, analytical, he can lose himself in a problem while the hours slip by.

Those who knew Schlesinger in his OMB (Office of Management and Budget) days — where he drafted for President Nixon a plan to reorganize the national intelligence community — praise his ability to spot the weakness in an argument or structure — and quickly find ways to strengthen it. He has already begun to humanize the secrecy-shrouded Atomic Energy Commission, and in his next post he is expected to rid the CIA and its sister intelligence agencies of their accumulated fat and improve their product.

"I predict he's going to drop some of the veteran cold warriors from World War II or the Korean days and promote younger men," said one of his closest associates. "He'll leave day-to-day operation in their hands and concentrate on matters of Cabinet-level importance. Each time he goes to the White House you can bet he'll know his subject from A to Z."

The three areas that Mr. Schlesinger is expected to focus on include first the CIA's clandestine operations — still reportedly absorbing about \$400 million of its \$600 million budget and more than half of its 15,000 employees. Others are scientific research and the voluminous, often controversial, national intelligence estimates. The latter, insofar as they forecast Soviet and Chinese capabilities and intentions, have an immense impact on presidential budgetary and defense policies.

In recent years the CIA, which alone is authorized to conduct espionage abroad and, occasionally, to topple unfriendly governments, has had its funds for "CS" (clandestine services) appreciably slashed. Such paramilitary CIA operations as the "secret" war in Laos, begun on President Kennedy's instructions in 1962, now are drawing to a close; and the weekly meetings of the Forty Committee, the supersecret White House panel headed by Kissinger that passes on all covert operations sufficiently important to embarrass the United States Government if disclosed, are said to be desultory, indeed.

"Intelligence gathering has shifted from the spy in a foreign cabinet to the orbiting satellites that collect hundreds of photographs plus telemetric intercepts," said a

qualified source. "But there's a danger. I can show you photographs of Washington down to the minutest details of the White House lawns — but you still won't know what's going on inside the heads of the policymakers."

The brilliant high-resolution photographs of Russian and Chinese missile silos, nuclear plants, airfields, and submarine pens that are collected day after day (when the weather permits) by \$20 million satellites orbiting around the earth every 90 minutes 100 to 130 miles up make possible the SALT agreements. The U.S. and the Russians, who too have their satellites, each know what the other has; now and a-building. But whereas capabilities can often be ascertained through satellites — intentions require spies. In CIA jargon this is called "hum-int" — human intelligence.

Some experts even question whether the U.S. intelligence community has anything "downstream" — in development — to replace the spy satellites should the Russians or Chinese one day shoot them down or otherwise eliminate this vital security safeguard. Apparently the community is fearful of seeking fresh funds lest Congress or the OMB cut back the funds already allocated: \$1 billion yearly for spy satellites and as much for global code-breaking.

Mr. Schlesinger is expected, finally, to take a hard look at the overt — or evaluation — side of his CIA. Part of it, the Office of National Estimates, produces yearly for the President studies ranging from a quick analysis of the latest Central American flare-up to the massive survey, completed every September, of Soviet strength and likely actions.

Periodically domestic politics impinge on intelligence evaluations. Secretary Laird told Congress flatly in 1969, for instance, the U.S.S.R. was going for a "first strike capability"; i.e., had succeeded in MIRVing its giant SS-9 missiles — giving each component warhead the same independently targetable capability as have the U.S. Polaris and Poseidon missiles. CIA disputed this at the time — and still does — but none the less Kissinger sided with Laird's effort to pry more defense funds from Congress.

Whether Mr. Schlesinger can now insulate the CIA from administration pressure and keep its reporting honest remains to be seen. He comes to his task, however, with full Nixon backing; with no ties to the cold war; with few contacts in the press and with little interest in the social blandishments of the "Georgetown cocktail set."

Mr. Welles, for many years on the staff of the New York Times, is now an independent commentator on what goes on in Washington.

Kissinger's New Assignment

By James Reston

WASHINGTON, March 6 — Henry Kissinger is now quietly reorganizing his White House staff and, on instructions from the President, is preparing for an intensive period of negotiations on U.S. relations with Western Europe, Japan and the Middle East.

His assignments from the President in the last couple of years have carried him into spectacular journeys to Peking, Moscow, Paris, Saigon and Hanoi, and transformed him from a Harvard professor into a world figure, but the days of spectacles are over for the time being, and the days of careful and patient thought about the monetary crisis, the energy crisis and the Mideast crisis are now at the top of Washington's foreign affairs agenda.

Kissinger is now preparing for these European and Middle Eastern talks — which are connected, because the Arab-Israeli conflict and the energy

WASHINGTON

crisis affect Europe as well as the United States — as carefully as he prepared his assignments to Peking and Moscow.

He has more things to deal with now, so he has to delegate more authority. He will have a new assistant on international economic affairs, who will be appointed in the next few weeks. Helmut Sonnenfeldt will be his principal deputy for European and Soviet affairs, unless he is transferred to Treasury. Richard T. Kennedy, a retired Army colonel, will be his assistant on all National Security Council affairs, and his deputy on all questions will be Brig. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, who has replaced Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Haig, now Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

Kissinger, of course, is merely a servant of the President, and has never pretended that he was anything else, but his job is now changing. He has established a close personal relationship with Chou En-lai in Peking and Le Duc Tho in Hanoi, and will probably have to keep in touch with both of them.

For example, the North Vietnamese have been putting arms into South Vietnam in violation of agreements Kissinger made with Le Duc Tho, and Kissinger will probably have to deal personally with this violation.

Also, somebody in the Nixon Administration has to supervise the agreements to exchange diplomatic missions between Peking and Washington, and nobody knows more about this than Kissinger. The Chinese left it to Kissinger to draft the communiqué about their last meeting in Peking and changed only three words. It was not Kissinger, but the Chinese, who suggested that China have an offi-

WASHINGTON STAR
7 March 1973

CHARLES BARTLETT

Reviving the State Department

cial mission in Washington, much to Kissinger's surprise.

Meanwhile, Kissinger has been accepted in Hanoi as the first high official from the West to visit the North Vietnamese capital, so he will have to maintain these contacts with Asia, while turning his mind to the President's new concerns in Europe, Japan and the Middle East.

All Kissinger needs in this situation is for somebody to invent the 48-hour day. He is being told by his friends that he should quit while he is ahead, that he has nowhere to go now except down. He is being hounded by the newspapers, the magazines and the book publishers to write books for millions, but he is staying on and reorganizing his staff and turning to the problems of the future.

Meanwhile, he is going off for a couple of weeks to rest, and put his mind to the new tasks the President has given him.

It will be interesting to see what he does with this new assignment. In Asia, he argued for compromise, for an end to ideology, for withdrawal from Vietnam, for accommodation with China, the Soviet Union and Japan, and for a new order and balance of power in the world.

In Europe, there are new problems of money, trade, technology and military security.

In the Middle East, there is a fundamental question: Should the United States take the lead in pressing for a compromise between Israel and the Arab states, and if it does, should Washington guarantee the security of Israel and put American soldiers on its borders?

These are the coming questions in Washington: What is U.S. policy about the dollar, about our troops in Europe, about our support of Israel and our need for oil from the Arab states, about how long we will keep over a quarter of a million men west of the Elbe, about American trade, balance of payments, deficits, unemployment, wages, prices, the balance of power abroad and the balance between the rich and the poor at home?

For the last couple of years, Kissinger has merely been asked to concentrate on China and the Soviet Union, and he has done it very well; but now he is being asked to deal with the more complicated problem of the United States, and he is withdrawing to think about it, and reorganizing his staff to deal with it.

His record with Chou En-lai in Peking and Le Duc Tho in Paris and Hanoi is pretty good, but now he has to think about Heath, Pompidou and Brandt in Europe, and Wilbur Mills and others in the Congress, and that may not be so easy, even for Kissinger.

It may not work out, but the White House intends at least to try to give the State Department a larger, more visible role in the policy-making of the second term.

Henry Kissinger, whose shadow has obscured the department, is now looking for ways to increase its participation and prominence. This is not an exercise in self-effacement but a pragmatic response to a new phase of foreign relations in which the Nixon policies will mature and flourish more certainly if they take root in the career institution that will be around after the Nixon-Kissinger team has left town.

One sure way to bring the State Department's bureaucracy into closer rapport with the White House would have been the assignment of Nixon people to head the department's bureaus. This is such an obvious way of enlarging the President's faith in the department that it seems ironic that it isn't being done and that the assistant secretary roles are being filled once more from the ranks of the career service.

The reason is that the White House talent search did not turn up Nixon loyalists with qualifications for these jobs. The most obvious source of the missing talent was the Kissinger staff but Kissinger himself refused to have aides like Helmut Sonnenfeldt lofted into these roles. He did not want to let it appear that he

was reaching out with his people for a wider range of influence at a moment when he saw the wisdom of bringing the National Security Council and the State Department into

a closer balance of power.

But the new Nixon men, Kenneth Rush and William Casey, have been placed at the top of the State Department. Rush's background of European experience and Casey's credentials in finance will enable them to expand the department's influence in these key areas. Meanwhile, Secretary Rogers will have the highly visible task of endeavoring to sell the Indo-Chinese assistance program.

Kissinger is expected to keep unchanged the National Security machinery which he fabricated in response to the President's desires for a more formalized approach to decision-making. His new network of interagency committees, from the Interdepartmental Group to the Special Action Group, appear to meet the need for cross-fertilization of the advice that goes to the President. They involve the bureaucracy in shaping policy while they leave its timing and execution to the White House.

It may prove easier to accord the career officials greater influence with the President than it will be to make the State Department look more influential. This is because Rogers appears so content with the role as he is playing it and so loath to

immerse himself in the substance of developments. What changes occur may be barely visible until Rogers steps down, presumably, to be succeeded by Rush in early September.

Rogers will also deter the process because he discourages close dealings between the Kissinger staff and the country desk level of the bureaucracy. Reportedly fearful of being undercut, he attempts to restrain the intercourse to exchanges of memoranda at the top levels so his bureaucracy is denied its opportunity to secure a closer understanding of the President's needs.

Moreover, the career officials will not acquire influence easily, even under the new ground rules, because they have not yet learned to give the President the kind of papers and recommendations that he wants. In fact it is reliably said that Nixon's mistrust of the bureaucracy has been more intensified than mollified by his experiences to date. He still finds it hard to learn from the professionals where he should be headed in a given situation.

But the department has been struggling hard to make itself more relevant, and important reforms have been accomplished under Rogers. The lid of secret dealings is off, the election is over and the moment is ripe for a new test of the department's potential.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
12 March 1973

Washington Whispers®

Friction between the Central Intelligence Agency and military intelligence officers has not been eased by the change in command at the CIA. A Defense Department source commented: "We thought the variance between CIA and Defense intelligence estimates would narrow with the appointment of James R. Schlesinger as the new Director at CIA. But the gap has actually widened and the trend is disturbing."

WASHINGTON POST

5 March 1973

Report Urges USIA to Reflect Detente

By Dusko Doder

Washington Post Staff Writer

Major changes in the policies of the United States Information Agency designed "to reflect and encourage" East-West detente have been proposed in a report submitted to Congress today.

Despite President Nixon's rapprochement with China and the Soviet Union, the report in effect acknowledges that the USIA continued Cold War propaganda under Frank Shakespeare, a political conservative who was replaced as USIA director in January.

The report was prepared by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information led by Frank Stanton, vice chairman of the Columbia Broadcasting System. The five-man presidentially appointed commission is charged with overseeing USIA operations.

With some 10,000 employees in more than 100 countries and fueled by a \$200 million annual budget (which is now being cut back) USIA promotes the U.S. image and viewpoint abroad through a variety of means, including Voice of America radio.

The basic thrust of these proposals is that the USIA, which as the report put it, has been "sliding downhill" for several years, should overhaul its policies, methods, approaches as well as the contents of its messages to successfully "convey this new atmosphere of improved relations between the U.S. and two historically hostile powers to the rest of the world."

The report attacking Shakespeare's tenure at USIA may turn out to be Stanton's swan song. He has been head of the advisory board for nine years and his third term has just expired but there is some question whether Mr. Nixon will appoint him to a fourth term.

In a look at other U.S. propaganda outlets, a special presidential commission chaired by Milton Eisenhower has submitted to the White House a report on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, two U.S.-financed radios based in Munich. They broadcast to Eastern Europe and Soviet Union respectively. The Soviet bloc has long regarded them as principal sources of Cold War tension.

The Eisenhower report is reliably reported to favor a continued role for

the two stations, but under greater supervision, to include annual reviews of the compatibility of their performance with U.S. national interests.

Both reports indicate that an effort is under way to restructure U.S. propaganda activities overseas and bring the battle for men's minds "in line with Mr. Nixon's policies."

The Stanton report, made available here by congressional sources, said, "Just as crisis tends to feed on crisis, so detente can generate detente without creating an exaggerated euphoria built upon unrealistic expectations that ignore the indispensable necessity of a solid security system."

A shift away from Cold War policies, the report said, would help perpetuate detente by reiterating and emphasizing the more pacific means of resolving international political and economic disputes and conflicts by overcoming and undermining psychological obstacles and barriers, and by reducing the animosities and hostilities that have accumulated over the years."

It urged that "more sensitive and substantively knowledgeable information programs" be devised, particularly

for the Soviet Union, China and other Communist nations.

The White House had ordered some changes in VOA broadcasts to the Soviet Union and China before Mr. Nixon's visits there last year.

One subsequent White House instruction contained in June 29 memorandum by Maj. Gen. Alexander Haig, then the President's deputy national security adviser, instructed USIA to continue "eschewing polemics, not seeking quarrels and not attempting to magnify small incidents in your broadcasts to the Soviet Union."

These instructions, however, created considerable confusion in the agency whose tone was set by Shakespeare, a former CBS executive and long time supporter of Mr. Nixon. Shakespeare, a hard-line anti-communist, became USIA director after he successfully put the Nixon image on television during the 1968 campaign. Shakespeare is reported to have repeatedly taken actions that ran counter to White House strategies. His replacement, James Keogh, Mr. Nixon's special adviser and speechwriter, is fully clued in to the President's thinking.

The report urges the President "to define tightly and precisely" what is expected of

the USIA. It blames the administration for the agency's decline, which it said was caused by executive budget cuts as well as its exclusion from the top decision-making machinery.

The reduced funding, it continued, "has slowly impaired and eroded the agency's capabilities" and "raised serious questions about the efficacy and further need" of the USIA.


As the report was being printed last week, the new director ordered new cuts on Feb. 27 in USIA personnel by eliminating 288 positions already scheduled and budgeted for the fiscal year 1974, which will start July 1. The agency has been hit by rising costs and a steady drop in the size of its staff. More than 2,000 U.S. and foreign employees have been dismissed or retired over the past five years.

The report said that the VOA "is falling seriously behind the rest of the world" in its ability to reach foreign audiences.

The Stanton commission made a series of proposals for policy and organizational changes, stressing the need for incorporating the agency director into the top decision-making establishment.

PARADE • FEBRUARY 18, 1973

WALTER SCOTT'S Personality Parade



Q. If Richard McGarrah Helms is going to be 60 on March 30, 1973, and the Central Intelligence Agency of which he was director makes retirement mandatory at 60, why didn't Nixon let Helms remain as head of the CIA

until the end of March? Why did he have to step him down to such a job as Ambassador to Iran? Surely that is no way to treat a man who has given the government 30 years of service. Or is it?—L.D., McLean, Va.

A. Here again is a case of a man who has not been too popular with the current White House palace guard. Helms was a Lyndon Johnson appointee, an intelligent, moderate, well-bred gentleman, well-liked by the press to which occupation as a young man he once belonged. Undoubtedly, President Nixon feels better having as head of the CIA a conservative of his own selection, James Schlesinger.

WASHINGTON STAR
25 February 1973

3 Arms Officials Resigning

By OSWALD JOHNSTON
Star-News Staff Writer

At least three front-line officials in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are resigning in what some observers describe as a deliberate administration purge of the agency most closely associated with last year's strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union.

According to informed sources close to the agency, the three officials — all Democrats and all associated with disarmament policies since the early 1960s — were recently informed that their resignations, routinely submitted to President Nixon after his reelection, had been accepted.

The three officials, according to these reports, are:

- Lawrence D. Weiler, counselor to the ACDA director and associated with the agency since its beginning.

- James F. Leonard, assistant director and chief of the agency's international relations bureau.

- Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr., assistant director and chief of ACDA's science and technology bureau.

Leonard, a foreign service officer, will presumably be reassigned within the State Department, with which ACDA is affiliated. The other two men are supergrade Civil Service employees.

The White House has not commented on the ACDA shakeup, and disarmament officials yesterday were tight-lipped. There would be no comment, one official remarked, "until the dust settles."

Just how much dust is being kicked up is still not clear.

According to one account, the White House intends to make sure every top grade slot in the arms control agency is filled by a "loyal" supporter of administration policies in the strategic disarmament field.

Proponents of this view noted that the agency is having its \$10 million budget slashed by a third, and is losing 12 employees and most of its research funds in the coming fiscal year.

President Nixon has already made it plain that the chief negotiator in the next phase of the SALT negotiations with the Russians will not be associated with the arms control agency.

The SALT negotiator, Gerard Smith, setpped down as ACDA director when he resigned from government service early this year. His designated successor on the negotiating team is career diplomat U. Alexis Johnson, who has long experience haggling with the Soviets but little expertise in the disarmament field.

Taken together, these moves indicate a clear intention by the administration to gather all the authority for future disarmament negotiations into its own hands and remove the disarmament agency from a first-line role.

The arms control agency was created early in the Kennedy administration, and for that reason alone is thought to be held suspect by White House loyalists. Smith, however, was a Nixon appointee and his position as both chief SALT negotiator and ACDA director in Nixon's first term is believed to have shielded some

of the men whose resignations are now being accepted.

No successor to Smith has been named, and it is understood that his deputy director, Philip J. Farley, has been asked to stay on as acting director at least until a successor is confirmed in the office.

Whether Farley would then join the others in resigning is unclear. But most of the officials bearing the title assistant director or its equivalent are thought to be on the White House list for replacement.

One other probable target of the shakeup is William W. Hancock, general counsel of the agency and another Democrat. Assistant director Robert H. B. Wade of the economic affairs bureau is a Republican and is believed likely to survive. Neither of these men has been mentioned specifically in the official reports of the ACDA purge at present circulating in Washington.

Ever since its creation in 1961, ACDA has been identified with the orthodox nuclear disarmament theorists who hold that nuclear stability is best achieved by limiting the nation's strategic strength to the minimum number of warheads and missiles that will assure destruction of the enemy's cities in a retaliatory second strike.

This doctrine, known as "assured destruction," has been

in large part abandoned by Nixon himself and by his top adviser, Henry A. Kissinger. Both claim they favor a strategic capability more flexible than would be possible under the strict doctrine of a massive second strike attack on population centers.

The assured destruction doctrine is anathema to Pentagon theorists. Critics of SALT I's allegedly excessive concessions to the Soviets such as Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., blame most of its weaknesses on the heavy ACDA participation in the negotiations.

It is unclear how much of this ideological dispute lies behind the administration's recent moves against ACDA. By reducing the agency's budget and influence and by purging disarmament-oriented Democratic holdovers, the White House seems to be acting out the misgivings of Jackson and the Pentagon.

At the same time, sources close to the SALT I negotiations stress that every substantial decision in the talks was taken directly by Nixon and Kissinger and that Smith's delegation, which included representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as ACDA reported daily by cable and special telephone lines when the negotiating sessions were in progress.

WASHINGTON POST
BOOK WORLD
18 FEB 1973

CIA

"GARBAGE?" "... latrines of government spewing forth?" Such imagery! And, from a retired bureaucrat yet. John Bross's fetching attack (Book World, Jan. 28) on my book *CIA: The Myth and the Madness* sweetened my Sunday.

Judging from the tenor of Bross's letter and Tom Ross's review (Book World, December 31) methinks my scribbles about the CIA pricked a balloon or two.

I mean, why would a fellow obviously living in genteel retirement sputter so vigorously if the old order of things from which he no doubt derives meaning for his life's endeavors were not challenged?

And, in Ross's case, could it be that he is piqued because his pet

thesis that CIA is a monstrous invisible government was debunked?

But let's cut out the cute talk. Both Bross and Ross in all their adjectival splendor failed to address the gut issue plaguing intelligence today—gross inefficiency. They both tiptoed around the issue—Ross, hoping that Marchetti will affirm his soggy thesis of conspiracy, and Bross, defending from the pasture his former leader, Mr. Helms—who, we might remind Bross, was fired recently by the President (in that patrician "old school way" of letting Dick "slip out gracefully," of course). So it seems that someone agreed with my characterization of

Helms.

C'mon Bross, take off those rose-tinted glasses! CIA lies smoldering with deadwood, groans with inertia and writhes like an overdue addict for a jolt of change. And you know it. Don't strain your lungs coughing about unsung successes or praising the gentlemanly cool of unchallenged allegations.

Ross, ole buddy, give up the warcy of conspiracy. CIA ain't what it used to be, and you know it as well as I do.

PATRICK J. MCGARVEY
Upper Marlboro, Maryland.

NEW YORK POST
2 February 1973



Max Lerner

WHAT INTELLIGENCE?

As my readers know, I waste my time shamelessly and incorrigibly on political suspense novels. A year or two ago I read one that seemed a bit amateurish and clumsy but held me all the way through.

It was "The Rope Dancer," by Victor Marchetti, and it was a hair-raising account of double-spy shenanigans inside the CIA. What made it the more hair-raising was that Marchetti had been a middle level employe of that mystery agency, and the publishers more than implied that he knew what he was talking about.

Since the character who served as the main foil to the hero was the Director of the CIA, and since he turned out to be a Soviet spy, you rubbed your eyes when you got through, and asked, "What goes on here?" There were few wickednesses in the calendar of political sins that the CIA in the story didn't practice.

The Director-Spy, a slippery bureaucratic smoothie, could have been meant as a portrait of the actual Director. I knew Richard Helms very slightly, although I might have known him better if he had not barely escaped being my student at Williams College.

It was impossible for me to picture him in the role Marchetti had assigned to his Director. But so much else in the novel seemed authentic that the wild possibility might never quite get out of the addled and credulous noodle of the suspense reader.

Now Helms is out, having been re-routed as Ambassador to Iran, and the new Director—James Schlesinger—is an alumnus not of Williams but of the hard college that Richard Nixon runs for his White House assistants.

And Marchetti? Poor Marchetti is all strapped up like a mummy in a legal strait jacket, and can't get out to write another suspense novel without submitting it to his former employers for clearance. Ken McCormick, editor at Doubleday, has written feelingly about his plight.

It seems that when Marchetti got into the CIA labyrinth he took monastic vows, if not for poverty then at least for literary chastity and obedience. Now the federal courts won't let him out of the agreement he signed so unwarily 15 years ago, and the Supreme Court has refused to review their decision.

So there he is, unable to mine his past, because the federal courts see no crucial First Amendment freedoms involved in the case of secret intelligence. Evidently once you have signed away your literary freedom as a spy, it stays signed away. An ex-novelist will have no trouble becoming a spy, and may even find it a familiar metier; but an ex-spy can't become a novelist without keeping the Agency as editor and censor.

Maybe Marchetti is lucky at that. In every political suspense story I have read a really high class spy can't resign from his profession: he knows too much that isn't healthy to know.

The British writers have two ways of

disposing of their ex-spies. Either they betray and kill them when they come in out of the cold, or else they send them off into the embraces of a mistress.

As for myself I recognize that an imperial republic must have a spy set-up. I don't know how good the American set-up is: probably not as good, man for man, dollar for dollar, as the Israeli or the Chinese.

But there are three things that dismay me about it. One is its cost, which is staggering, although just how staggering it is only a few people know, because to reveal it would reveal too much.

A second is the taboos we throw around it, on secrecy and controls. Even the courts, as the Marchetti case shows, give it a wide berth. Only the President doesn't, as witness Mr. Nixon's changing of the guard at the CIA because—so the Washington scuttlebutt goes—Richard Helms showed more independence than the President thought appropriate.

* * *

The third is semantic. It is a curious fact that the word "Intelligence," in American governmental agencies, applies only to secret intelligence about foreign countries, to help us in the strategies we apply to them in war and peace. And all the time what we need badly is a different kind of intelligence—the knowledge of what strategies to use in approaching our own knottiest problems—group tensions, addiction, crime, prison management, mental diseases, alienation.

I can't pretend to prescribe for our espionage establishment. But I have some notions—which I shall set down in my next piece—of what we can do to garner the best intelligence we can ferret out on our domestic ills and strategies.

Tuesday, Feb. 27, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

Court to Study Suit On CIA Fund Secrecy

By John P. MacKenzie
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to decide whether a taxpayer has the right to challenge in court the secrecy of the Central Intelligence Agency budget.

Government lawyers, insisting that the courts should not even consider lawsuits demanding CIA budget disclosure, persuaded the high court to review a decision that a Pennsylvania taxpayer was entitled at least to a day in court on the question.

The high court also:

- Rejected without comment the petitions of Texas and Georgia to reconsider the Jan. 22 ruling striking down anti-abortion laws and dismissed an appeal which contended that the Constitution guarantees the "right to life" of the unborn.

- Agreed to hear three labor

cases, including a coal company's argument that the United Mine Workers must submit to arbitration rather than strike over a mine safety issue.

- Agreed to decide whether federal courts have the power to intervene in matters covered by state criminal trespass laws when no state prosecution is pending.

- Agreed to decide whether the 1968 federal narcotic law giving treatment to some offenders is unconstitutional because it denies treatment to persons convicted of two prior felonies.

The CIA case involves a complaint often made by citizens and some members of Congress—that the public has no way to control the agency's receipt or use of public money.

William B. Richardson, a resident of Greensburg, Pa., decided to do something about it. He sued in federal court to

enforce Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution, which provides:

"No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."

The CIA Act of 1949 exempted the agency from ordinary budget requirements and has been the authority for concealing CIA funds in the appropriations for other departments. Richardson said the CIA law clashed with the Constitution.

Richardson, 53, a law school graduate, is employed as an investigator for the Westmoreland County (Pa.) public defender's office.

A district court judge agreed with the government that Richardson lacked legal standing to bring the suit because his grievance was not

unique to him but was shared generally with other citizens.

The Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this ruling. Without reaching the basic question of disclosure, the court of appeals said Richardson had a right to take the government to court over it.

Petitioning the high court, Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold called the ruling "a serious departure" from decisions designed to keep taxpayer litigation under control.

Griswold said the constitutional provision had always been considered a restriction against the Executive Branch, not Congress. He cited World War II expenditures for atomic bomb development and other congressional acts as examples of necessary secret statutes.

Lawyers for the American Civil Liberties Union replied that the meeting of the constitutional provision can never be settled in court if the government's theory of legal standing is correct.

POST, W. Palm Beach
17 January 1973

'The Russians Are Watching'

By SUSAN HIXON
Post Staff Writer

Ever feel like you're being watched?

You are, according to Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, former executive director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

At least once every two weeks, he told the Society of Four Arts yesterday, a Russian spy satellite flies over the United States and photographs every inch of the country.

"The film is probably more than 25 miles long," he said. "If there were a Russian version of Eastman Kodak, I'd sure like to own stock in it."

Kirkpatrick, now a professor of political science at Brown University, was executive director of the CIA from 1962 to 1965.

"No one thinks about Russian espionage anymore," he said. "The press calls this a period of 'detente' — agreement. And there are recent trade agreements between the two countries."

"But it's quite consistent with Russian policy for them to sign an agreement with us. However, they'll continue to employ their intelligence network in this country."

Kirkpatrick's words were quiet, but forceful.

"You'll never hear about Russian spy networks in this country, until one of them is destroyed. You'll never hear at all about the ones that are successful," he said.

The Russians, according to Kirkpatrick, have the largest intelligence network in the world — a "vacuum organization."

There are two types of Russian spies in this country, he told the audience, those who are here legally, and those who are operating illegally.

"You may wonder why we let people in this country if we know they are part of the intelligence operation," he said.

"Well, it's easier to follow those people you already know are agents," Kirkpatrick explained, "rather than have them hire someone you don't know."

Many members of the Russian intelligence are just sent to watch the other members, he added. "You'll find that in Russian intelligence, the job of one-third of the employees is to watch the other two-thirds."

He told of a Soviet agent who was arrested for trying to buy the plans for a Navy F14 aircraft from a Grumman Corp. employee.

"The agent could have saved his money," Kirkpatrick said. "The plane had been thoroughly written up in all the technical journals."

American newspapers and magazines are a great source of information for Soviet spies, he commented.

"Or an agent could back a truck up to the government printing offices and have all the pamphlets and booklets he wants."

"In a way, there's no reason for the Soviets to have agents here. The United States is the most open country in the world."

If this all sounds distinctly un-James Bondish, Kirkpatrick said that's because "espionage is distorted by fiction and mythology."

"Very few people get exciting jobs with the CIA," he said. "Most of the work is really routine. The danger involved isn't nearly as great as the novels portray."

In fact, he added, the CIA probably wouldn't hire someone who was looking for danger and excitement.

There's really no place for a James Bond in the CIA, Kirkpatrick said.

NEW YORK TIMES
6 March 1973

C.I.A. Will Curb Training It Provides Police Forces

By DAVID BURNHAM

The new director of Central Intelligence has informed Congress that the agency has decided to curb the training it has been providing local police departments in the United States.

The director, James R. Schlesinger, announced the new policy in a letter to Representative Chet Hollifield, Democrat of California, who is chairman of the House Government Operations Committee.

"In keeping with the sensitivity of this matter I have directed that such [training] activities be undertaken in the future only in the most compelling circumstances and with my personal approval," Mr. Schlesinger wrote.

The Central Intelligence Agency acknowledged last month that it had provided training to policemen from about a dozen city and county police forces about techniques to detect explosives and wiretaps, conduct surveillance of individuals and maintain intelligence files.

The acknowledgment of the domestic police training activities came after Representative Edward Koch, Democrat of New York, wrote the C.I.A. last Dec. 28 questioning whether such training did not violate the 1947 legislation creating the intelligence group. This law states, "The agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions."

In disclosing the C.I.A.'s statement that it had trained domestic police departments, Mr. Koch called upon Mr. Hollifield's committee and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights to investigate whether these activities violated the law.

Mr. Schlesinger's brief letter did not attempt to define "the most compelling circumstances" that would lead him to authorize the agency to provide a local police agency with special training.

But Mr. Hollifield, in a statement in yesterday's Congressional Record, said that they might involve "foreign criminals or international drug traffickers."

Mr. Hollifield, though arguing that the C.I.A. should not be absolutely barred from conducting such training, said he did not agree with the C.I.A.'s contention that the training was authorized under the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968.

"The sensitive nature of the agency's work, and the mandate of its enabling legislation to refrain from engaging in domestic law enforcement activities, would seem to compel a reconsideration of the recently publicized activities in question," the California Democrat wrote Mr. Schlesinger.

Mr. Hollifield also questioned the C.I.A.'s statement to Mr. Koch that the training was always given at the request of the local agencies. "There may be some arguments as to whether the initiative in every single case was local, since the agency may have offered some suggestions of its own or may have had some requests routed through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration," he said.

Mr. Koch's initial request to the C.I.A. was prompted by an account in The New York Times about 14 New York policemen who had been given training in the handling and processing of intelligence information.

NEW YORK TIMES
8 March 1973

LAWYER FOR NIXON TOLD F.B.I. HE GAVE FUNDS TO SEGRETTI

Gray Tells Panel Kalmbach
Said He Paid \$30,000
at Request of Chapin

DATA GIVEN SENATORS

Recipient Reportedly Ran
Covert Sabotage Drive
Against Democrats

By JOHN M. CREWDSON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 7 — Herbert W. Kalmbach, President Nixon's personal lawyer, told agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation last year that he had paid between \$30,000 and \$40,000 in Republican party funds to Donald H. Segretti, a 31-year-old lawyer who reportedly ran a covert political sabotage operation for the Republican party during last year's Presidential election campaign.

According to information supplied today by the acting F.B.I. director, L. Patrick Gray 3d, to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mr. Kalmbach, who has a large private law practice in the Los Angeles area, told Federal agents that Dwight L. Chapin, who was then Mr. Nixon's appointments secretary at the White House, had gotten in touch with him in August or September, 1971.

The disclosure was the first official confirmation of reports that Mr. Segretti had been given Republican campaign money and by whom, and that he had been recruited by an Administration official.

Segretti Was Named

In Mr. Gray's words, Mr. Kalmbach told investigators that he had been "informed" by Mr. Chapin that Mr. Segretti was about to be released from the Army and that "he may be of service to the Republican party."

Mr. Gray continued: "Mr. Chapin asked Mr. Kalmbach to contact Segretti in this regard, but Mr. Kalmbach said he was not exactly sure what service Chapin had in mind. He said he did not press Chapin in this regard.

"He did contact Segretti and agreed that Segretti would be

paid \$16,000 per year plus expenses, and he paid Segretti somewhere between \$30,000 and \$40,000 between Sept. 1, 1971, and March 15, 1972."

Mr. Gray's disclosure was made in an extension of his testimony last week before the committee, which is holding hearings on his nomination to be director of the F.B.I.

In the document presented to the committee for the record, Mr. Gray quoted Mr. Kalmbach as saying that he [Kalmbach] maintained no record of his disbursements to Mr. Segretti, received no reports as to what the money was being used for, and had no idea how he received his instructions.

The nature of the operation reportedly conducted by Mr. Segretti during last year's primary campaign has never been entirely clear, although a number of his friends and acquaintances have said that he offered them jobs "spying" on Democratic candidates on behalf of the Republicans. A few have acknowledged receiving money from him in return for information on the movements and public speeches of various Democratic candidates.

Chapin Termed 'Contact'

Mr. Chapin and Mr. Segretti were undergraduates together at the University of Southern California in the early nineteen-sixties. Mr. Chapin has been identified in news reports as Mr. Segretti's "contact" at the White House. Mr. Segretti's telephone records showed at least one telephone call last year to Mr. Chapin's unlisted home telephone in suburban Bethesda, Md.

Mr. Chapin has since resigned from the White House staff amid reports that he was being forced out because of his alleged connection with the operation that Mr. Segretti was reported to have headed. White House spokesmen have denied that version of his resignation, and have characterized news reports to that effect as "hearsay, character assassination, innuendo and guilt by association."

Mr. Chapin could not be reached for comment on Mr. Gray's disclosures. He is now an executive for United Air Lines in Chicago at a reported \$70,000-a-year salary. Mr. Segretti has refused to speak with newsmen since his reappearance following the November election after he had disappeared from public view for a month.

Mr. Kalmbach also could not be reached for comment.

Mr. Gray's testimony also disclosed that Mr. Kalmbach had told agents that the money he used to pay Mr. Segretti had come out of Republican party campaign funds that were obtained from contributors before April 7, 1972. The payments were usually in cash, but might have included "an occasional check," he said.

April 7 was the effective date of the Federal Election Campaign Act. Thereafter political

organizations were required to file periodic reports with the General Accounting Office describing all receipts and expenditures.

Payments Recalled

Mr. Kalmbach told the F.B.I. that he specifically recalled one payment of \$5,000 and another of \$20,000 "to cover Segretti's expenses," Mr. Gray said, adding that Mr. Kalmbach denied any knowledge of "what Segretti was doing to justify these expenses or to earn his salary."

Until February, Mr. Kalmbach acted as an unofficial Republican fund-raiser. He was replaced at that time by Maurice H. Stans, who resigned as Secretary of Commerce to become the official finance chairman.

Mr. Segretti was interviewed by the F.B.I. three times last June, following the arrest of five men with electronic bugging equipment inside the Democratic national headquarters at the Watergate office building here.

Mr. Gray has said that the F.B.I. was initially led to Mr. Segretti through the telephone records of E. Howard Hunt Jr., who pleaded guilty to charges of conspiring to tap telephones at the Watergate in the recent criminal trial. Four other men pleaded guilty to the same charges and two others, both employees of the Committee for the Re-election of the President at the time of the break-in, were found guilty.

On Aug. 18, 1972, Mr. Segretti appeared before a Federal grand jury investigating the Watergate case, but he was not among those indicated. The F.B.I. dropped its investigation of his activities at that point because, according to Justice Department sources, it was believed that he had violated no Federal laws.

However, the Justice Department's Fraud Division has recently begun looking into the possibility that Mr. Segretti may have violated a Federal statute that prohibits the distribution of unsigned or falsely attributed campaign literature.

Reports Sent Nixon Aide

Mr. Gray told the committee today that he had included the F.B.I. account of Mr. Segretti's interview in a batch of 82 reports he sent to the White House counsel, John W. Dean 3d, the man appointed by President Nixon to determine through a separate investigation whether any Administration employees were involved in the Watergate episode.

Mr. Nixon told a news conference after the Dean investigation was complete that he was satisfied that no one "presently employed" in the White House was involved in the bugging.

Senator Sam J. Ervin Jr., Democrat of North Carolina, asked Mr. Gray today about news reports that White House staff members had shown Mr. Segretti a copy of the F.B.I. report a few days before his grand jury appearance and "coached" him on his testimony.

Mr. Gray said that, upon reading the reports, he had

called Mr. Dean and was "satisfied with his answer when he said that he did not do this, that he did not even have the F.B.I. reports with him in Miami." Mr. Dean was in Florida for the Republican National Convention at the time.

Ronald L. Ziegler, the President's press secretary, said today that no White House official had used confidential F.B.I. files to help prepare any witnesses for questioning by the grand jury.

Mr. Gray also disclosed that among the reports of F.B.I. interviews sent to Mr. Dean were three relating to members of the Nixon campaign organization who had specifically asked to talk to F.B.I. agents out of the presence of re-election committee lawyers.

In a memorandum written by Mr. Gray to Mr. Dean last July, it was stated that an unspecified number of Nixon campaign workers had gotten in touch with the F.B.I. for additional interviews, presumably because they felt inhibited by the lawyers.

Senator John V. Tunney, Democrat of California, asked Mr. Gray whether "any attempts were made to retaliate against" the three individuals. "I don't think John Dean would do that," Mr. Gray replied. "He's the counsel to the President."

Report on Tapped Phones

Mr. Gray also said that one of the reports sent to Mr. Dean was an account of an F.B.I. interview with Alfred C. Baldwin 3d, a former F.B.I. agent who monitored the tapped telephones from a motel room across the street from the Democratic national headquarters.

Mr. Gray said that the Baldwin report contained information on the nature of the conversations overheard, "not who did what to whom, but I believe that there were some names in there."

The contents of the conversations were barred from being introduced into evidence at the criminal trial by a Federal appeals court decision.

Senator Tunney criticized Mr. Gray for his willingness to turn over such information to Mr. Dean, but Mr. Gray replied that the documents had been passed along "within the official chain of command of the United States Government—it's not turning them over to third parties."

"I think we need to get John Dean down here," said Senator Tunney, who plans to introduce a motion to call Mr. Dean as a witness. Mr. Ervin said today that he also would vote to call Mr. Dean. Other Democratic Senators, including Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, Birch Bayh of Indiana and Philip A. Hart of Michigan, are expected to support it.

"As I understand it, Mr. Dean was omnipresent in this case," Mr. Tunney said, noting that Mr. Dean had also sat in on 14 F.B.I. interviews with White House personnel and had directed the opening of a safe in the White House office of Hunt, a former part-time consultant there.

WASHINGTON POST
8 March 1973

FBI Chief Says Nixon's Aides Paid Segretti

By Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Nixon's personal attorney and his White House appointments secretary arranged for the payment of more than \$30,000 in campaign funds to Donald H. Segretti, an alleged political saboteur, according to FBI records.

This FBI information about Herbert W. Kalmbach, the President's personal attorney, and former presidential appointments secretary Dwight L. Chapin was supplied yesterday to the Senate Judiciary Committee by acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray III during his confirmation hearings.

In a written statement supplied to the Senate committee, Gray said: "Mr. Kalmbach said that in either August or September, 1971, he was contacted by Mr. Dwight Chapin and was informed that (Army) Capt. Donald H. Segretti was about to get out of the military service and that he may be of service to the Republican Party."

Gray's statement provides the first official confirmation that Kalmbach and Chapin—two persons close to President Nixon—were involved in a well-financed political operation with Segretti, now an attorney in California.

The Washington Post last Oct. 10 quoted Federal law enforcement sources as saying that Segretti was one of more than 50 undercover agents who conducted a campaign of political spying and sabotage against Democratic presidential candidates. Five days later, The Post identified Chapin as a Washington contact for Segretti's clandestine activities. A day after that the newspaper quoted investigators as saying that the FBI had "determined that Kalmbach himself either authorized or actually made payments" to Segretti.

Following publication of that information, The Post was criticized on Oct. 16 by spokesmen for the White House, the President's re-election committee and the Republican National Committee—all of whom accused the newspaper of reporting "innuendo," "hearsay" and "third-hand information."

According to the written material supplied yesterday to the Senate by Gray, Kalmbach "said he merely acted as a disbursing agent for Segretti's salary and expenses and he has no idea how Segretti received his instructions or whom he reported to. . . . He said he had no knowledge of what Segretti was doing to justify these expenses or to earn his salary."

Gray's written statements came as answers to questions asked earlier in the confirmation hearings.

In another written answer supplied yesterday, Gray said that an FBI check of telephone records showed that Segretti was in touch with the published telephone

number of the White House, Chapin's residence and the home and office of Watergate bugging conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr., who was at the time a White House consultant.

In response to Chapin's request, Kalmbach, an attorney with offices in Newport Beach, Calif., "did contact Segretti and agreed that Segretti would be paid \$16,000 per year plus expenses and he paid Segretti somewhere between \$30,000 and \$40,000 between Sept. 1, 1971, and March 15, 1972," Gray said.

Kalmbach "was asked how much was in the fund he used to pay Segretti and he did not answer this question," Gray said.

Kalmbach was a deputy manager of the President's re-election finance committee at the time he made the disbursements to Segretti. Kalmbach has been one of the President's chief fund-raisers for years, second only to former Commerce Secretary Maurice H. Stans, according to Republican sources.

Federal sources told The Post last fall that Kalmbach was one of five persons who controlled disbursements from a cash fund kept in Stans' safe at re-election headquarters here. At least \$235,000 of this cash was paid to Watergate bugging conspirator G. Gordon Liddy while he was finance counsel to the Nixon re-election committee.

Liddy, Hunt and five other men were either convicted or pleaded guilty at the Watergate bugging trial in January. The seven are awaiting sentencing, which is expected to be imposed this month.

Gray's statements on Kalmbach, Chapin and Segretti were on two typewritten pages, along with a page dealing with telephone records. In the statement, Gray said that Kalmbach "stated he was acquainted with Liddy but had only limited contact with Liddy. Such contacts took place in connection with Liddy's work as legal counsel to the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President." Kalmbach also said that he had no knowledge of the Watergate

bugging.

Kalmbach was questioned by the FBI on Sept. 4, 1972, during the period when White House counsel John W. Dean III was receiving regular reports on all major interviews conducted in the Watergate investigation.

During his press conference last week, President Nixon said that "the investigation conducted by Mr. Dean . . . indicates that no one on the White House staff, at the time he conducted the investigation—that was last July and August—was involved or had knowledge of the Watergate matter."

The President's remarks apparently referred solely to the bugging of Democratic headquarters and not to a broader campaign of political espionage and sabotage from which the Watergate bugging stemmed, according to federal investigators.

When Chapin's involvement in Segretti's activities became known last October, White House sources said it was inconceivable that Chapin could have acted without the approval of the White House chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman.

Both Chapin and Kalmbach are extremely close to Haldeman. As President Nixon's appointments secretary, Chapin reports directly to the President and Haldeman. Chapin's resignation from the White House staff, effective last month, was announced by the White House several weeks ago. White House spokesmen have denied published reports that Chapin's departure is related to his involvement with Segretti.

During his initial testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee considering his nomination to be FBI director, Gray said the FBI had not investigated Segretti's political activities once it was determined he had no role in the bugging of Democratic headquarters.

Gray said that Justice Department and FBI attorneys determined that Segretti's clandestine political activities did not appear illegal and that the FBI pursued only those leads related to the immediate conspiracy to bug and burglarize the Democratic headquarters.

In a written answer on Segretti's telephone calls, Gray said records show that during the 10-month period from August, 1971, to June, 1972, about 700 long distance calls were charged to Segretti. Gray said earlier in the hearings that not all these calls were checked by the FBI.

At least 12 persons have told various newspapers that they were either approached by Segretti to do political spying or were actually hired and paid small amounts of money by Segretti to spy or conduct disruptive activities against

8 March 1973

the Democrats.

In its first story mentioning Chapin, Oct. 15, The Post quoted at length from several interviews with Lawrence Young, a friend of Segretti and fellow California attorney. Young said Segretti had told him that White House appointments secretary Chapin and Watergate bugging conspirator Hunt were his two Washington contacts for his spying and sabotage activities.

Young also reported that Segretti told him that:

On Aug. 19, two days before the Republican National Convention, Segretti went to Miami Beach, where presidential aides showed him copies of two interviews he had with the FBI, including one that was not yet 24 hours old.

The aides briefed him on what to say when testifying the following Tuesday before the federal grand jury investigating the Watergate bugging in Washington.

Democratic senators on the Judiciary Committee have tried during Gray's confirmation hearings to determine if these allegations are correct. Gray said that he gave FBI reports of Segretti's interviews to John W. Dean III, the President's counsel, who conducted an internal White House investigation of the Watergate.

Gray said that after he read the story about Segretti allegedly seeing his FBI reports, he called Dean and, using "obscenities," asked if Dean had given the reports to Segretti.

Dean denied that he had given the reports to Segretti, Gray said, so he dropped the subject and did not ask Dean if he knew how the reports might have gone to Miami Beach, if, in fact, they did.

Democratic senators have criticized Gray for not pursuing the subject. Gray said that he knew one part in the allegation was untrue, namely, that Segretti had been interviewed in August. Gray said that Segretti was only interviewed by the FBI in June and that a grand jury subpoena was served on him in August.

At the White House yesterday, press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said that since Dean would be the only person in a position to supply the FBI reports to Segretti, that he would deny that any other White House aide furnished any FBI material to Segretti.

Ziegler also said yesterday that Dean sat in on interviews only after individual White House staff member's requested his presence. Among the interviews Dean attended was one with Kathleen Chenow, an ex-secretary in the White House who was interviewed at the White House months after she had resigned from her job there.

Miss Chenow told The Post

last year that a member of Dean's staff, Fred Fielding, flew to Europe and brought her back to the White House for her interview with the FBI.

Miss Chenow, who told the FBI of a unique White House telephone used by Hunt and billed to her home, told a reporter last year that she did not know why Dean attended her FBI interview and that she made no request that he be present. Nor did she understand why she was contacted in Europe by Dean's staff, instead of by the FBI, she said.

On Oct. 17, The Washington Post was the subject of separate attacks by White House press secretary Ziegler, presidential campaign manager Clark MacGregor and GOP national chairman Robert J. Dole. The three variously accused The Post of printing "political garbage," "unsubstantiated charges" and "hearsay information" in its reporting on Segretti, Kalmbach and Chapin. Neither Ziegler, MacGregor nor Dole would substantively discuss the contents of The Post's accounts, or related reports by The New York Times and Time Magazine.

Ziegler told a White House briefing on Oct. 17 that "I will not dignify with comment stories based on hearsay, character assassination, innuendo or guilt by association," adding: "That is the White House position; that is my position."

GOP national chairman Dole accused The Washington Post of "conducting itself by journalistic standards that would cause mass resignations on principle from the Quicksilver Times"—a local underground newspaper. "Thus far there have been enormous headlines about political disruption and very little proof," he said.

MacGregor, the President's campaign manager at the time, said the accounts of involvement in undercover campaign activities by Presidential aides were inspired by "George McGovern and his partner in mud-slinging, The Washington Post."

After a preliminary investigation by the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), the subcommittee chairman, reported earlier this year that his staff had determined that a widespread political spying and sabotage campaign was conducted during the 1972 presidential election and it involved White House aides and associates of the President.

Last month, the full Senate authorized a sweeping investigation into the conduct of the 1972 presidential election by a seven-member select committee headed by Sen. Sam J. Ervin (D-N.C.). The probe is expected to focus on the Watergate bugging conspiracy and related acts of political spying.

Hunt Sought Legal Aid of Nixon Staff

By Bob Woodward
and Carl Bernstein

Washington Post Staff Writer

Watergate bugging conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. asked an intermediary to contact John W. Dean III, President Nixon's White House counsel, in the days following the June 17 Watergate break-in to assist Hunt in obtaining legal advice, according to reliable federal investigative sources.

Hunt made the request of Robert F. Bennett, president of a Washington public relations firm that employed Hunt in late June when he was in California and being sought by as many as 150 FBI agents, the sources said. He did not place the call himself because he did not want to be traced to California, the sources said.

Bennett, a Republican who helped in the President's fund-raising effort and heads Robert R. Mullen & Co., never called Dean, the sources said. The reason he did not make the call could not be learned yesterday.

In the course of the Watergate investigation, the sources said, Bennett told Assistant U.S. Attorney Earl J. Silbert, the chief prosecutor in the case, about Hunt's request.

These sources variously described Silbert's reaction as one of "astonishment" and "deep concern" upon learning that Hunt would presume that he could get legal assistance in the Watergate case from the White House.

According to the sources, Silbert was particularly concerned about the report because Dean was conducting an investigation of the Watergate incident for the White House at the direction of the President. In addition, Dean was

the official who coordinated all requests by the prosecutors and the FBI to interview presidential aides and provide information relating to the probe.

Hunt served as a White House consultant at least until March, 1972, and had an office in the Old Executive Office Building (the White House office complex) at the time of the June 17 Watergate break-in.

The federal investigation sources said that Silbert checked into the matter and found no other connection between Dean and Hunt. It is not known how far the matter was pursued by Silbert.

Reached last night, Silbert said that he would neither confirm nor deny reports on the matter. Bennett also declined to comment.

In a related matter, Thomas Lumbard, a former Treasury and Justice Department attorney who did volunteer work for the Nixon re-election committee last year, has told The Washington Post that Dean worked closely with G. Gordon Liddy, who also was convicted in the Watergate bugging conspiracy.

Lumbard said in several interviews last year that prior to the Watergate break-in, "Liddy and Dean would talk about coordinating the action by Nixon and the Committee for the Re-election of the President. Their job was to see that everyone kept their noses clean on finances."

According to Lumbard, "Dean was the lawyer for the President in campaign finance work at the White House and Liddy was his counterpart in the Committee for the Re-election of the President."

Lumbard said that Liddy recruited him in March, 1972, to provide volunteer legal counsel on finance matters. He said that he worked about one day a week in the White House office building for about eight weeks last spring.

"So Dean was investigating a friend and coworker," Lumbard said. "It's like a criminal lawyer saying, 'I've investigated this matter and my client is not guilty.'"

WASHINGTON POST
21 February, 1973

Hunt Linked to Dita Beard Challenge

By Bob Woodward
and Carl Bernstein

Washington Post Staff Writers

Charles W. Colson, special counsel to President Nixon, sent Watergate bugging figure E. Howard Hunt Jr. to Denver last March to interview International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. lobbyist Dita Beard, according to Colson's own sworn testimony.

Sources close to the Watergate investigation said that Colson's testimony was given in a secret deposition to federal investigators during the Watergate probe last year.

At the time of the Denver trip, Hunt was working as a White House consultant, a position for which he had been hired on Colson's recommendation. Colson, in other sworn public testimony relating to the Watergate incident, has said that Hunt was not working for him as late as March, 1972, when the visit to Mrs. Beard occurred.

The federal investigators did not ask Colson the purpose of the interview. Other Republican sources said that it was to obtain information to challenge or discredit a controversial memo attributed to Mrs. Beard that alleged that there was a direct connection between the settlement of antitrust cases by the Justice Department and ITT's offer to help bring the 1972 GOP convention to San Diego.

Colson, who is out of the country on White House business, could not be reached for comment yesterday, and the White House had no immediate response.

Hunt traveled to Denver under the assumed name of Edward Hamilton, an alias he used during the Watergate conspiracy, the federal sources said.

Republican sources said that Hunt wore an inexpensive wig during the interview with Mrs. Beard early in the week of March 19. A similar wig of dark brown or reddish color was found in one of the two

rooms rented by the Watergate conspirators at the Watergate Hotel before the June 17 break-in.

In a telephone interview yesterday, Robert D. Beard, 24, the son of Mrs. Beard, said that a "mysterious" man wearing a cheap wig and make-up visited his mother last March to discuss the ITT controversy. At the time Mrs. Beard was at the Rocky Mountain Osteopathic Hospital in Denver being treated for a heart ailment.

"From pictures I've seen, the visitor could have been Howard Hunt," Beard said. "But I couldn't tell. The man refused to identify himself. He seemed to have inside information about what would happen next . . . but it was of relatively little value to us."

Beard described the visitor as "very eerie, he did have a red wig on cockeyed like he put it on in a dark car. I couldn't have identified my brother if he was dressed like that."

A two-week investigation by The Washington Post shows that Hunt's trip was part of an effort by Colson to discredit the Dita Beard memo. The work by Hunt and Colson led at least in part to Mrs. Beard's statement issued March 17, charging that the memo was a "forgery" and "a hoax."

That statement, issued simultaneously by David W. Fleming, Mrs. Beard's lawyer, and Senate Republican Leader Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, came as a total surprise since it was the first time in a three-week-old controversy that Mrs. Beard's authorship of the memo had been directly denied.

The alleged memo was reported by syndicated columnist Jack Anderson more than two weeks before the denial. It linked the antitrust settlement to ITT's offer of a \$400,000 "guarantee" to help support last year's Republican National Convention.

From federal and Republican sources, the following sequence of events has been pieced together:

As the ITT controversy blossomed in March, 1972, the

Washington office of ITT hired Intertel, a private investigations firm, to check into Mrs. Beard's background and the authenticity of the controversial memo.

Intertel, working with only a copy of the memo, was able to establish that it was probably prepared on a typewriter in Mrs. Beard's office, but that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to conclusively establish whether it was genuine or a forgery.

Bernard Goodrich, a spokesman for the ITT office, acknowledged last week that the Intertel investigation was inconclusive. "At no time did they give us a report to show, it was forgery," Goodrich said.

Intertel, regarded one of the best private investigative firms, also does work for billionaire Howard Hughes and corporations in his financial empire.

The Hughes Interests are represented in Washington by Robert R. Mullen & Co., a public relations firm where Hunt was employed as a writer. Robert F. Bennett, president of the Mullen firm, learned from his contacts in the Hughes empire that Intertel was probing the Dita Beard memo.

According to one account, Bennett was told that Intertel had determined the memo was a forgery and that somehow word should be passed to the White House.

By another account, Bennett was told that Intertel's findings were inconclusive, meaning that the way was clear for someone to come forward and label the memo a forgery.

In any case, Bennett then told Hunt that the nature of the Intertel findings, whatever they were, should be passed to Colson.

During this period, the White House was growing increasingly concerned about the impact of the ITT allegations, and had launched a major effort to discredit columnist Jack Anderson and the memo.

At this point, Colson ordered Hunt to Denver to interview Mrs. Beard. "Colson

didn't want anything to backfire, one Republican source said.

Meanwhile, Bennett was acting as a go-between between Colson and Fleming, Dita Beard's attorney, to arrange for the release of Mrs. Beard's March 17 statement calling the memo a "forgery."

Colson wanted to avoid any direct contact between the White House and Mrs. Beard or her representative as the controversy became more politically sensitive. One Republican source said that it was Colson who got Sen. Scott to read Mrs. Beard's statement on the Senate floor.

Fleming said in several recent telephone interviews that Colson and Hunt were not involved in issuing the statement. He did, however, acknowledge that he talked with Bennett about the matter. Bennett said last week that he would have no comment on the subject.

Mrs. Beard's March 17 statement said: "I did not prepare it (the memo) and could not have." Without giving a reason for her assertion, Mrs. Beard continued: "I have done nothing to be ashamed of and my family and I— and in a greater sense the whole American government—are the victims of a cruel fraud."

Columnist Anderson testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that Mrs. Beard confirmed the authenticity of the memo line-by-line with his associate, Britt Hume, during a Feb. 24 interview at her home.

In another sworn deposition taken in a civil suit filed by the Democratic Party in connection with the Watergate case, Colson said under oath that Hunt worked for him only for a few weeks in the summer of 1971.

"Well, initially when he came to the White House staff he was reporting to me. That lasted only for a few weeks," Colson said. Following those few weeks, Colson said in that deposition, Hunt was "at that point not under my supervision" and worked elsewhere in the White House.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, March 8, 1973

Chilean Break-ins Reflect Watergate

By Jack Anderson

Senate investigators suspect that the same Mission Impossible team arrested at the Watergate may also have broken into the Chilean Embassy several weeks earlier. And three Chilean diplomats in New York City, the investigators discovered, have been victims of similar, mysterious break-ins.

In a memo intended for the eyes only of senators investigating ITT's operations in Chile, staff director Jerry Levinson reported: "A source with excellent contacts in the Cuban community told the subcommittee staff that Frank Sturgis had told other people that he and Martinez and Gonzalez, two other Watergate defendants, had broken into the embassy to photograph documents."

Levinson was cautious, however, about implicating ITT in the alleged Chilean caper. "The staff of the subcommittee," he reported, "has developed a number of leads suggesting a relationship between ITT and the team which was arrested at the Watergate." But he stressed "that the case outlined in this memorandum is circumstantial and that there is no hard evidence of ITT involvement."

Suspicious Case

Here, however, is the circumstantial case, which the subcommittee staff has pieced

together from jigsaw pieces of intelligence: "Government and non-government sources alike have told us that the Cuban exile community has a pool of talent which was trained by the CIA and is available for 'dirty tricks.' This talent has been used at one time or another by a number of federal agencies for missions of questionable legality inside and outside of the United States.

"Federal sources report the Cubans to be absolutely loyal, fanatically anti-Communist and willing to take any risk. It is also likely that when 'teams' were assembled for operations, only one or perhaps two members knew who had requested and was financing the operation.

"Washington business and political sources report that about eight months before the Watergate arrest, E. Howard Hunt let it be known around the city that he had a 'team' available for 'Mission Impossible' assignments and that the team would be willing to work for private clients.

"It is possible that E. Howard Hunt, acting as the contractor for the 'team,' had more than one client and that a second client was ITT, which was interested in obtaining information about its negotiations over the fate of its investment in the Chilean Telephone Company. The members of the team may have been recruited, thinking they were doing a patriotic thing to

block a 'Communist' government.

"ITT is the only likely contractor for operations against the Chileans. It claims to have an investment worth \$153 million in the Chilean Telephone Company; it knew that documents were leaking from its files; it asked the Chilean government to move negotiations from Santiago to Washington."

ITT and Watergate

We reported last week on other strange links between the ITT and Watergate scandals. We noted, for example, that acting FBI chief L. Patrick Gray and convicted Watergate felon E. Howard Hunt had been involved in an abortive effort to discredit the famous Dita Beard memo, which tied a \$400,000 political pledge from ITT with a settlement of its antitrust troubles.

The Washington Post reported that Hunt, apparently disguised in an askew red wig, went to Denver to talk to Mrs. Beard about renouncing the memo. We reported that Gray, meanwhile, turned the original memo over to ITT for its experts to try to discredit.

Gray refused to comment when we called the FBI for his response. Questioned by senators under oath, however, he testified that he had not turned the memo over to ITT directly but had delivered it to White House aide John Dean. It was the White House, in

other words, that not only dispatched the bewigged Hunt to Denver but also passed the document to ITT.

This makes the story even more sordid. It shows that the White House, while denying any involvement with ITT, was working closely with the giant conglomerate to discredit the Dita Beard memo.

The Chilean Embassy burglary was investigated by the FBI, which dismissed it as routine. But Senate investigators disagree. "Careful investigation of the circumstances leads us to the conclusion," Levinson wrote, "that it was not routine.

"Valuable office equipment and cash were left untouched. The Ambassador's office and the office of the First Secretary were both searched and files were inspected. The thieves walked past several more attractive offices to get to the First Secretary's office, suggesting they knew where they were going." The burglarizing of the New York apartments of Chilean diplomats were described in the memo as "similar clean break-ins."

Footnote: Jerry Levinson refused to comment on his memo, which he said wasn't intended for publication. An ITT spokesman called the allegations about Hunt "absolutely and totally untrue." He said ITT had never hired Hunt for any purpose.

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WASHINGTON POST
22 February, 1973

Dash Named Watergate Unit Counsel

By Carl Bernstein
and Bob Woodward

Washington Post Staff Writers

Professor Samuel Dash of the Georgetown University Law Center, a former Philadelphia district attorney and an expert on electronic eavesdropping, yesterday was named counsel of the select Senate committee that will investigate the Watergate bugging and related allegations of political espionage and sabotage in the 1972 presidential campaign.

Dash, 47, was hand-picked for the job by Sen. Sam Ervin (D-N.C.), who will serve as chairman of the special seven-member Senate committee that will conduct the investigation.

Dash said last night that he views the Watergate investigation as "the most important ever undertaken by the Senate

because it goes to the heart of the democratic process."

In an interview with Washington Post staff writer John Hanrahan, Dash said he does not view the probe as a "witch-hunt, or an effort to get anybody." Rather, he said, he plans to be "objective and dispassionate. We must see what stones need to be overturned and must not be afraid to go after whoever we find under them."

News reports have linked the names of top Nixon administration figures to allegations of political espionage and sabotage conducted on behalf of the President's re-election.

Because of the complexity of the Senate investigation, Dash expressed doubt that public hearings will be held until at least late April.

He said he hopes that other investigative agencies will turn over information they have

gathered, but added: "I expect we'll have to do much of the investigating on our own because our investigation goes far beyond" the scope of the recent Watergate bugging trial.

The selection of Dash was unanimously approved yesterday by the four Democrats and three Republicans on the committee during a closed-door meeting.

Capitol Hill sources described the session as harmonious and reported that Ervin was formally designated chairman and Sen. Howard Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) vice chairman of the committee by unanimous votes.

As counsel of the select committee, Dash will coordinate a far-ranging \$500,000 investigation authorized by the full Senate last month. The Republican minority on the committee still has not settled on a choice of minority counsel for the probe, sources re-

ported yesterday.

After the three GOP committee members have made their choice, probably after consultation with the Senate Republican leadership, that nomination is expected to be approved by the full committee with no Democratic opposition.

In turning to Dash to coordinate the Senate investigation, Ervin picked a former prosecutor who is one of the nation's leading exponents of criminal justice reform and a recognized expert on political espionage.

In 1957, Dash conducted a nationwide study of electronic eavesdropping, which led to his authorship of a book called "The Eavesdroppers," published by Rutgers University Press in 1959.

Dash, in testimony before a Senate subcommittee in 1959, said that he found illegal wiretapping by law enforcement agencies in every major city he studied. As a former prose-

cutor, he had favored the use of wiretapping in some cases if strictly court controlled.

In July, 1971, he sharply criticized then Attorney General John N. Mitchell for authorizing "a lawless system of law enforcement," according to a United Press International report at the time.

Last night, Dash described those remarks about Mitchell as "a lawyer's criticism," and said they were not political in nature. He said he foresees no conflict between the criticism and conducting impartially the

investigation, in which Mitchell is likely to figure. According to news reports, Mitchell and other presidential aides approved the disbursement of funds that financed undercover activities against the Democrats in the 1972 campaign.

Dash, in his 1971 remarks, had singled out for particular criticism Mitchell's contention that court authorization is unnecessary for wiretaps in national security cases. On June 19, 1972, the Supreme Court ruled that Mitchell's contention

was unconstitutional, and ordered an end to wiretaps not specifically authorized by the courts.

Ironically, the court's decision came two days after five men were arrested inside the Watergate headquarters of the Democratic Party during a mission to wiretap and bug the Democrats' offices.

Last month, seven men — including two former White House aides and the former security coordinator of President Nixon's re-election committee — were convicted or

pleaded guilty to all charges stemming from the incident.

According to federal investigators, the Watergate bugging stemmed from a widespread campaign of political espionage and sabotage that was conceived in the White House and directed by presidential aides at the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

Both the White House and the President's re-election committee consistently have denied any official involvement in the bugging of the Democrats' headquarters.

WASHINGTON STAR
15 February 1973

U.S. Passes Watergate Buck

By BARRY KALB
Star-News Staff Writer

The government says it would love to turn over certain documents from the Watergate trial to a special Senate committee investigating the same thing, but doesn't think it can legally do so.

Rather than flatly refuse a Senate request for the information, however, the government — acutely aware of the publicity surrounding the case — has thrown the matter into the lap of Chief Judge John J. Sirica of U.S. District Court, who presided over the recent trial.

Asst. U.S. Atty. Earl J. Silbert, who headed the successful prosecution of the seven Watergate defendants, filed a "motion" yesterday noting that Sen. Sam J. Ervin, D-N.C., who will head the Senate investigation, has requested certain documents.

In a letter sent to Sirica on Monday, a copy of which is attached to the government papers, Ervin asks for "copies of the minutes of the grand jury convened to consider matters relating to the break-in of the Watergate, as well as the sealed portions of the trial transcript."

The government has "no objection" to the release of the grand jury minutes, Silbert says in the papers, and then goes on at length to say why:

"Indeed, because there are those who have publicly ques-

tioned the integrity of the investigation and prosecution of the Watergate case, and because of the unique nature of this case, the United States favors their disclosure to the committee so that the nature of the investigation, previously disclosed only through the necessarily limited forum of a jury trial, will be subject to scrutiny and thereby aid the ends of justice, and so that the facts uncovered by the investigation will be available to a committee of a publicly elected body."

"However," the papers continue, "... we feel obliged ... to point out to the court for its guidance the limitations imposed by the law with respect to disclosure of grand jury minutes."

There are, Silbert wrote, only three known circumstances under which grand jury testimony can be disclosed: To government attorneys for use in performance of their duties; to the defense upon a showing that grounds for dismissal of the indictment may exist because of actions before the grand jury; or by order of the court "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding."

None of these situations seem to apply in the case of a congressional investigating committee, the papers say. "There is no precedent for such a release. In fact, our research has not uncovered

any case in which the issue has been raised or resolved."

Therefore, although the papers are labeled as a "motion," no request is made as is usually the case in a motion. Rather, the matter is left up to Sirica to decide.

Silbert also made no objection to turning over portions of the sealed trial transcript, and apparently found no problem in doing so. He suggested only that a list of names Sirica referred to the prosecution during the trial for possible grand jury action be kept secret in order to protect the privacy of those on the list.

It is a difficult situation, because everybody, with the possible exception of the defendants, seems sincerely interested in cooperating with the Senate investigation.

Sirica made it clear several times during and after the trial that he was not satisfied with the government's presentation of the case and stated flatly that he did not feel all the facts had been brought out. It was in this vein, he said, that he gave the prosecution that secret list.

If for no other reasons than those stated in the motion, the government is anxious to make it clear that it is cooperating fully.

Silbert had been agonizing for days over the problem realizing that the government's refusal to turn over the requested document would probably result in further

charges that the investigation had been a whitewash.

The Senate is gearing up for a full-scale probe of the Watergate affair — the break-in and bugging of Democratic National Committee headquarters — and allegations that the Nixon administration was waging a large-scale campaign of political sabotage and espionage against Democratic candidates.

A select committee of four Democrats and three Republicans, headed by Ervin, was established Feb. 7 for just this purpose, with orders to report back to the Senate within one year. Illegal or unethical practices by any political figure, including Democrats, will be a target for the committee's investigation.

Just when the committee will begin holding hearings has not yet been decided, but it is not expected to start before the middle of next month.

The White House yesterday denied a report that convicted Watergate defendants E. Howard Hunt Jr. and G. Gordon Liddy received information from national security wiretaps from members of the White House staff while the two were working as White House consultants.

The denial followed a story in yesterday's Washington Post, quoting informed sources and saying that the two received such information during parts of 1971 and 1972.

27 February, 1973

Newsman Subpoenaed For Watergate Notes

Republican attorneys in the civil suits arising from the Watergate bugging yesterday issued subpoenas seeking testimony and notes from 11 reporters and officials of The Washington Post, The Washington Star-News, the New York Times and Time magazine.

Kenneth Wells Parkinson, attorney for the Committee for the Re-election of the President, said subpoenas were also issued for Walter Sheridan, a former Justice Department aide who did investigative work for the Democrats; Paul W. Leper, a D.C. policeman, and Frank Wills, a building guard at the Watergate.

Three civil suits grew out of the arrest of five men who, along with two others, were subsequently convicted or pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy, burglary and illegal wiretapping and eavesdropping at the Democratic National Headquarters in the Watergate.

In one suit, former Democratic Party Chairman Lawrence F. O'Brien is seeking \$3.2 million in damages from two of the Watergate defendants and from Maurice Stans, the former Commerce secretary and finance chairman for the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

In the other two suits, Stans is suing O'Brien for \$5 million for libel and \$2.5 million for willful and malicious abuse of process.

Subpoenas were issued yesterday for Katharine Graham, publisher of The Washington Post; Howard Simons, The Post's managing editor, and Post reporters Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward and former reporter Jim Mann.

Also subpoenaed were reporters Jeremiah O'Leary, James Polk, Patrick Collins and Joseph Volz, all of the Star-News, John Crewdson, of The New York Times, and Dean Fischer, of Time.

Benjamin C. Bradlee, executive editor of The Post, said it would be up to lawyers to determine what response The Post will make to the subpoenas.

Charles B. Seib Jr., managing editor of the Star-News, said his newspaper expects to consult with lawyers before deciding on a response.

James C. Goodale, a senior vice president of The New York Times, said, "we're obviously against the production of notes" but that The Times also had not determined what response to make. Henry Anatole Grunwald, managing editor of Time, could not be reached last night.

Thursday, March 1, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

Watergate Suit Amended, Asks \$6.4 Million

By Lawrence Meyer

Washington Post Staff Writer

Lawyers for the Democratic National Committee filed an amended version of their Watergate bugging suit against officials of President Nixon's re-election committee and others, doubling the \$3.2 million sought last fall and adding two more defendants in the action.

In addition, a memorandum filed with the suit yesterday asserted that the Democrats will explore the possible involvement of several former and current top administration officials, including John Mitchell, John Ehrlichman and H. R. Haldeman.

The new version of the suit—originally filed in June asking \$1.1 million in damages, amended in September asking \$3.2 million and now asking \$6.4 million—adds the names of Jeb Stuart Magruder and Herbert L. Porter, both former officials of the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

Maurice Stans, finance chairman of the re-election committee, again is named as a defendant, along with former committee treasurer Hugh W. Sloane Jr. The seven men, including former White House aides E. Howard Hunt Jr. and G. Gordon Liddy, who either pleaded guilty or were convicted on charges of conspiracy, burglary and illegal wiretapping and eavesdropping stemming from the June 17 break-in at the Democrat's Watergate headquarters also are named in the amended suit.

Robert S. Strauss, the new chairman of the Democratic National Committee, was added as a party bringing the action in the amended version.

The new version charges that the defendants "employed" Liddy, Hunt and former committee security director James W. McCord Jr., who was one of the seven convicted on criminal charges, to carry out "information-gather-

ing operations by any means available," including burglary and illegal wiretapping and eavesdropping.

The new amended version charges that Magruder, Porter, Stans and Sloan "are responsible for the action of their employees and agents," Liddy, Hunt, McCord and the four men arrested with McCord inside the Democratic headquarters.

Porter and Magruder were quoted in a statement released by the re-election committee yesterday as saying, "Our addition as defendants in the suit months after the incident is simply a smoke-screen. Neither of us had advance knowledge of the Watergate incident. . . . Each of us has testified to that effect at least twice—before the federal grand jury convened to investigate the case and before the trial of the seven defendants in the case. Those who filed this suit are simply trying to get sensational news from dilatory court actions."

In addition to exploring the "possible involvement" of White House aides Haldeman and Ehrlichman and former Attorney General Mitchell, the memo filed with the suit lists these other officials whose "possible involvement" will be explored: Charles W. Colson, a White House aide; M. Douglas Caddy, a friend of Hunt; Dwight Chapin, President Nixon's former appointments secretary; Morton B. Jackson, a Los Angeles lawyer; Herbert Kalmbach, President Nixon's personal lawyer; Frederick C. LaRue, Robert Mardian, Robert C. Odle Jr., Glenn J. Sedam, all present or former committee officials; William E. Timmons, White House congressional liaison; Kenneth Clawson, deputy director of communication; and Donald Segretti, described by federal sources as a key figure in an alleged espionage campaign against the Democrats.

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Feb. 19, 1973

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

By Jack Anderson

Thai Connection

A report now in preparation will charge that the U.S. isn't really trying to cut off drug smuggling from Thailand, because Thai leaders are too deeply implicated and might retaliate by closing U.S. military bases.

The report will be submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Rep. Lester Wolff, (D-N.Y.), who has been investigating the drug problem in Southeast Asia.

He came back from an inspection tour last year to report that some top Thai officials were operating a fleet of trawlers, which was moving tons upon tons of opium to Hong Kong for shipment to American addicts.

He is now back from another tour of Southeast Asia, where he found the Thai smuggling operations relatively unchanged. The Thai opium, he will charge, is handled by dealers who are virtually immune from legal interference. They include some of the most powerful men in the

country, who the U.S. doesn't wish to offend.

He also has proof, he will say, that illegal drug labs are still operating in Thailand, despite State Department denials. His report will also be critical of the government's strategy of buying up opium crops. The practice does little to stop drug smuggling and is excessively expensive, he will charge.

The report will claim that most of the money allocated for the war on drugs has gone into cutting off the Turkish opium supply, with little left to fight smuggling in other areas. Meanwhile, the "Thai Connection" blossoms like a poppy in the sun.

Wolff will point out, for instance, that the U.S. sends millions to keep 45,000 military men in Thailand but can't scrape up enough money to keep more than 35 narcotics agents to protect the nation against Asian drug smugglers.

Finally, the report will recommend that American aid to Thailand be shut off unless the country cooperates in smashing the drug smugglers.

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WASHINGTON POST

3 March 1973

Watergate Case Notebooks Missing

By Carl Bernstein
and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers

A notebook and an address book that Watergate bugging conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. said were left in his White House office have never been received by the FBI, according to federal investigators.

Hunt's attorney, William O. Bittman, said yesterday that "the entire circumstances of their disappearance are peculiar."

Bittman said both items contained names and addresses, and that federal prosecutors had told him they hoped the books might lead investigators to other persons involved in the Watergate conspiracy.

According to testimony at the Watergate trial, items in Hunt's office were removed by White House aides two days after the June 17 break-in at

Democratic headquarters and given to President Nixon's counsel, John Wesley Dean III.

More than a week later, Dean turned over to the FBI all the material except unspecified items that he said were classified, according to federal investigators. The notebook and address book were not included in the material received by the FBI, the investigators said.

The purported existence of the two items came to the attention of investigators on Oct. 11, when Hunt filed a motion in U.S. District Court contending that the search of his office by White House aides was illegal.

In a sworn affidavit filed with the motion, Hunt demanded the return of the contents of his office, including one "Hermes" notebook and one "Name-Finder" notebook

containing "personal information..."

When investigators realized they had received no such notebooks in the material furnished by Dean, Assistant U.S. Attorney Earl J. Silbert reportedly contacted officials at the White House.

"The White House claimed they never saw the notebooks," one federal investigator familiar with the matter said. "We didn't know what to think. We still don't."

According to Bittman, he intended to call Dean and other members of the White House staff as witnesses in a pretrial hearing on Hunt's motion demanding the return of the notebooks.

"At that time we thought the FBI had them and had used them in their investigation," Bittman said. "I was going to argue that the government's whole case was tainted

because their information had come from material (the notebooks) obtained in an illegal search. I was going to call Dean and other people at the White House to show that Hunt was still using his office in June and that he had not abandoned his property in the White House."

The White House has repeatedly said that Hunt last worked there on March 29 and—based on that contention—federal prosecutors argued that Hunt's belongings represented "abandoned property" that was legally confiscated on June 19.

Bittman said the issue came moot, however, "when we found out the FBI never got the notebooks. When we asked to examine the contents of the search they weren't there. All I can say is... that the whole thing was very strange. I don't know where they went."

The role of White House counsel Dean, who conducted an investigation that President Nixon said absolved all current administration officials from involvement in the Watergate bugging, has become an issue in the confirmation hearings of Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray.

In its Feb. 12 issue, Newsweek magazine quoted "a source close to the Watergate defense" as saying that Dean "actually removed documents" from Hunt's office that "might have led the G-men to administration topsiders." The same report said Dean received orders "to try to prevent federal investigators from tarnishing any figures in the President's inner circle."

HOUSTON POST

19 FEB 1973

CBS claims dolphins in naval intelligence

NEW YORK (U) —CBS said Sunday a Navy-trained dolphin has been used to place a detection device in a foreign harbor to find out what kind of atomic fuel the Russians are using in their nuclear submarines.

Newsman Morley Safer said on the Columbia Broadcasting System's "60 Minutes" program that the planting and retrieving operation is one of a number of tasks being done by the Navy's "biological weapons system" of trained dolphins, whales and sea lions.

Safer said the dolphin that placed the detecting device went back weeks later and retrieved it "for American intelligence analysis." He gave no further details.

CBS said the Navy has classified almost all information on its \$30-million sea mammal program "top secret."

The head of the program, Harris Stone, special assistant for intelligence for the Bureau of Naval Operations, said in an interview on the program that reports of a "kamikaze porpoise" trained to carry explosives and "go

out and blow up submarines" was nothing but "science fiction."

CBS said, however, that it had learned that "the Navy's dolphins have been trained to attack enemy divers, to ward off sharks, to place explosives and monitoring devices on ships..."

The Pentagon had no comment on the CBS report.

However, the Defense Department disclosed last Sept. 5 that the Navy had trained whales to recover such objects as torpedoes from the ocean floor. A 1,200-pound whale and a 5,500-pound killer whale were used in that test off Hawaii, where they dived to a depth of 1,654 feet.

The Navy previously had experimented with porpoises and sea lions to detect enemy mines and frogmen.

James Fitzgerald, identified as a pioneer in dolphin research for the intelligence community and the Navy, told CBS that researchers have been able to program dolphins "and keep them un-

der control for distances up to several miles.

"As an operating vehicle," Fitzgerald added, "you can carry a payload of the order of 100 pounds... You can deliver and retrieve objects, place and position them, you can use acoustics homing, acoustics beam riding, you can use a radio-link or you can have an inertial device in the gadget that they're towing which can tell them to go right or left or they're on course."

Fitzgerald and diver Ray Harmon told of dolphins programmed to deploy themselves around a ship for its protection against enemy divers.

Fitzgerald said a dolphin can, after detecting a swimmer near the ship, go to the ship and pull an alarm, then force the swimmer to surface and "capture him for interrogation."

Harmon told of playing the role of enemy diver in one such operation.

"I was a subject for the mock invasions," Harmon

said. "We would try and penetrate the dolphin perimeter that they had set up. They would pick us up without fail, run us to the surface on their noses and corral us into an area — without getting up a sweat."

Harmon said the dolphins surfaced the divers by making them "so uncomfortable... to be where you are, they will make you move in any direction they want you to."

Their methods, he added, include pulling off face masks, tearing regulator hoses and pulling off swimfins.

WASHINGTON POST
6 March 1973

The Watergate Subpoenas

Attorneys are going to court today in an effort to win a delay in the return dates of subpoenas which would require reporters and executives of four publications (including this one) to make available massive amounts of material and information—some of it highly confidential—in connection with their coverage of the so-called Watergate Case. The ultimate objective of the attorneys is to persuade a Federal District judge to quash the subpoenas altogether, on grounds that compliance with their incredibly sweeping demands is barred by the First Amendment. It will hardly surprise you to learn that this newspaper is in agreement with the arguments its legal counsel will be making to the court, and it is not our purpose here to pursue this argument or to plead with the judge as to how to rule. We would, however, like to set down what we believe to be the heart of this matter.

By way of background, the subpoenas in question grow out of a civil suit for damages filed by the Democratic Party against the Committee to Re-Elect President Nixon and a countersuit for libel filed on behalf of Mr. Maurice Stans, former Secretary of Commerce in the Nixon Administration and financial chief of the Nixon campaign. The Democrats are claiming the damages as a consequence of the break-in at Party headquarters at the Watergate, and Mr. Stans is arguing that the attempt to pin the blame on him for this is libelous; in other words, what we have in these civil suits is a partisan political shoving match.

If the legal action is political in its origins, it is very nearly ludicrous with respect to the character and the targets of the subpoenas which have been served at the request of counsel for Mr. Stans. Why, for example, are this newspaper's publisher and managing editor included among those ordered to give testimony in this matter and also to bring a mind-boggling collection of material along with them, while in the case of the three other publications involved (Time Magazine, the New York Times, and the Washington Star-News) only the staff members who reported and wrote the stories on the Watergate affair have been called? One can only guess at the answer, but our guess is that Mr. Joseph Alsop had it about right in a column on the opposite page yesterday. It was his supposition that these "dragnet" subpoenas could not have been issued by the Republicans without at least implicit White House sanction and that somewhere at the bottom of it all is a spirit of reprisal on the part of the White House which, in turn, derives from the attention given during the fall election campaign by the press in general, and this newspaper in particular, to the Watergate and related reports of political espionage and sabotage.

If that were all there were to it, of course, it would amount to nothing more than a petty act of revenge.

But that is not all there is to it, as Mr. Alsop also pointed out:

"The dragnet subpoenas amount to a demand for full disclosure of the inner workings of the newspaper business, including reporters' sources . . . the subpoenas will rightly be resisted up to the Supreme Court, if necessary, but at heavy expense for all the incidental costs of resistance. For these reasons, the dragnet subpoenas constitute an unquestionable, gross and unjustifiable invasion of the freedom of the press."

That is exactly our view of it; whatever the relative consequence of this partisan exchange of civil suits, the constitutional issue raised by these subpoenas is as clear and as profound as any that has yet been forced by a court test, despite the great flood of subpoenas against newsmen in the last few years. In fact, nothing could better illustrate the crucial significance of confidential relationships between reporters and sources in investigative reporting than the Watergate stories first broken in this newspaper. For one thing, in almost every case there was necessarily heavy reliance on anonymous sources—on information that could not be attributed by name to the informants for all the obvious reasons which cause investigators, prosecutors or others in such sensitive situations to consider their careers and their welfare when revealing information which is certain to embarrass if not incriminate people of power in high places.

What is more, just about every allegation in these news stories that bore on the criminal case just tried was subsequently confirmed by court proceedings—so that there is no question here of irresponsible or reckless reporting, even if that had strict legal relevance. On the contrary, what the public got was an accurate account of the particular nature and workings of the campaign to re-elect the President. It got this account despite the best efforts of the White House and the President's campaign managers to delay investigations and to suppress the facts. And it got this account only because sources were willing to talk in confidence to reporters, secure in their faith that these confidences would be respected. That is the nub of the threat posed by these subpoenas: if judges and prosecutors and defense lawyers can force reporters to reveal their confidential sources and make public information not published (because very often it was given on that condition) then the flow of information from confidential sources will dry up and a vital source of news—which is to say, information—which the public is entitled to know about will disappear.

It would be the height of irony if out of the reporting of the Watergate story—which was something of a classic of its kind for the enterprise and energy that went into it, for its caution with fact and its care—should come a court ruling or an ultimate court opinion which would make this sort of news reporting incredibly more difficult if not impossible.

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, March 3, 1973

Watergate Conspirator Posts \$100,000 Bond, Quits D.C. Jail

By Lawrence Meyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

James W. McCord Jr., the former security director for President Nixon's re-election committee who was convicted in the Watergate bugging trial in January, posted \$100,000 bond yesterday and was released from the D.C. jail.

McCord, who has been imprisoned since his conviction, left the U.S. District Courthouse yesterday without speaking to reporters. Bernard Shankman, one of McCord's lawyers, said the money for his bond was put up by "friends."

As McCord was being released pending his sentencing, his lawyers filed a motion asking for a new trial on the grounds that Chief U.S. District Judge John J. Sirica committed nine errors in the course of the three-week trial.

In a separate but related matter, attorneys for the Democratic National Committee in a civil suit stemming from the bugging and break-in of its Watergate headquarters, asked U.S. District Judge Charles R. Richey to order the White House, the Justice Department and other government agencies to turn over documents relating to the incident.

According to informed sources, McCord posted \$100,000 with a surety company, which in turn gave him bond as Sirica required on Feb. 5.

One other of the seven Watergate defendants, former White House aide E. Howard Hunt Jr., also posted \$100,000 after pleading guilty to charges of conspiracy, burglary, illegal wiretapping and eavesdropping.

McCord was convicted along

with G. Gordon Liddy, also a former White House aide and finance counsel for the Committee for the Re-election of the President. Liddy is being held in the federal penitentiary at Danbury, Conn., pending sentencing.

The remaining four defendants, who are all from Miami, pleaded guilty during the trial. They are in D.C. Jail also awaiting sentencing. Sirica is expected to sentence all seven men before the end of the month.

McCord's motion for a new trial, filed by Shankman and Gerald Alch, charges that Sirica's conduct of the trial "reflected an extension of the judicial role of the Court in the area of prosecution and investigation."

Throughout the trial, Sirica expressed his intention "to get to the bottom" of the Watergate case. He pursued this intention by questioning all five defendants who pleaded guilty as well as two key prosecution witnesses.

McCord's motion alleges that Sirica also erred in reading to the jury a portion of his examination of one witness after the judge had questioned him out of the jury's presence.

Other alleged errors cited in the brief included Sirica's failure to question each prospective juror individually to see if their judgment had been prejudiced by pretrial publicity and his refusal to grant a mistrial after five defendants had pleaded guilty.

The other alleged errors concern Sirica's instructions to the jury, interruptions he made during opening and closing statements by defense law-

yers, and his refusal to allow Alch to argue that McCord had a legal right to bug the Democrats.

In the civil suit, brought by the Democratic National Committee and others against re-election committee finance chairman Maurice H. Stans, McCord, Hunt, Liddy and other committee officials, lawyers for the Democratic Party yesterday asked the Court to order the committee to open its financial records for inspection as part of the suit.

In addition, the Democratic Party lawyers are seeking documents from the White House, the Justice Department and the United States attorney for the District of Columbia.

From the White House, the Democrats are seeking "all reports, memoranda and other documents prepared by John Dean III or by any other member or members of the White House staff . . . in relation" to the Watergate break-in.

Dean, counsel to President Nixon, conducted an investigation after the incident that, the President said, concluded that no one then employed at the White House was involved in the Watergate incident.

In addition, the Democrats asked the White House to turn over any other reports in their possession concerning the Watergate incident, any inventory of objects left by Hunt in the Executive Office Building, any documents that contain information Hunt obtained concerning any elected Democratic official or party officer, and any reports, memos or other documents prepared by any White House official concerning political espionage "or

similar activities" conducted by Hunt, Liddy or others.

From the Justice Department, the Democrats are seeking the results of its investigation, including anything describing "the possible involvement of past or present members of the White House staff" in the Watergate incident or other political espionage directed against the Democrats.

The U.S. attorney is asked to turn over minutes of a grand jury investigation that led to the indictment of the seven men. In addition, telephone records, credit card records, financial and travel records for the defendants and committee officials are sought.

In addition to asking the Nixon re-election committee to disclose all contributions of more than \$100 made between Dec. 31, 1971, and June 30, 1972, and committee expenditures, the Democrats are seeking records of transactions between Robert L. Vesco and the re-election finance committee or anyone acting for either party.

Vesco, the subject of a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation, gave a secret \$200,000 contribution to the re-election committee April 10. The \$200,000 contribution and another \$50,000 that he gave was returned to Vesco last Jan. 31.

WASHINGTON POST
16 February, 1973

Rand Corp. Admits Delay in Putting Pentagon Papers in Control System

By Sanford J. Ungar
Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES, Feb. 15 — The Pentagon Papers were at the Rand Corp. for over a year before they were entered into its "top secret control system" in May, 1970, Rand officials acknowledged in federal court here today.

Testifying as a prosecution witness in the trial of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr., Richard Best, Rand's top security officer, conceded that this delay was in apparent disregard of Defense Department and Rand Corp. regulations for the handling of classified materials.

Ellsberg, serving as an official courier, had brought portions of the then-top secret Pentagon Papers from Rand's Washington office to its headquarters in Santa Monica, Calif., on March 3 and Aug. 28, 1969.

But another prosecution witness, Rand consultant Richard H. Moorsteen, testified that it was he who entered them into the defense contractor's security system — and only on May 20, 1970.

Moorsteen said it was on that day that Ellsberg, still working at Rand, "came across the hall to my office with a substantial amount of material" (the Pentagon Papers)

in his hand and said, "Would you like these?"

Within an hour, Moorsteen said, after he had called then Rand president Henry S. Rowen and security officers, Jan Butler, Rand's top secret control officer, "came by with a little cart and picked them up from me."

During the interval between the papers' arrival in Santa Monica and the day Moorsteen turned them over to Miss Butler, the prosecution contends, Ellsberg removed them from Rand and, with the help of Russo and others, photocopied them at a Los Angeles address.

ACCESS TO PAPERS AT RAND OUTLINED

By MARTIN ARNOLD
Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, Feb. 16—A former friend and colleague of Daniel Ellsberg at the Rand Corporation testified today that he knew of no "special arrangement" at Rand regarding the Pentagon papers.

The Government witness in the trial of Dr. Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr. was Richard H. Moorsteen, now a Rand consultant and also a foam rubber manufacturer in San Diego.

Mr. Moorsteen did say that only a "narrow" list of people had access to the papers at Rand—five persons in all—but that nonetheless as far as he was concerned the papers were always within the regular security machinery.

It is the contention of the defense that the copy of the Pentagon papers that Dr. Ellsberg in turn later copied and helped make public was in fact the private papers of three Defense Department officials who had sent them to Rand for storage, but who gave Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Moorsteen primary access to them. They were not in the regular Rand security system, the defense says.

A Model Employee

Mr. Moorsteen, however, testified that this was not his understanding. He depicted himself as a rather model Rand employee, a bit roughish perhaps, who came to work late—"tenish," he said laughingly—and who broke a few minor security regulations, all about as serious as a schoolboy caught smoking. Otherwise, he was very "meticulous" in handling classified documents.

He implied, without actually saying so, that his friend Dan Ellsberg was not quite such a good boy while at Rand.

Mr. Moorsteen is a tall, thin man in his late 40's with black hair. He has black-rimmed glasses, and he wore a tweed jacket, flannel slacks, a red tie and a red and white striped shirt.

The three Defense Department officials who sent a copy of the papers to Rand for storage were Paul C. Warnke, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, and two of his top assistants, Leslie Gelb and Morton H. Halperin, and it was they who gave Dr. Ellsberg special access to their copy.

Access Given in Letter

In a letter written on Oct. 6, 1969, to Henry S. Rowen, president of Rand, a letter now in evidence, Mr. Halperin and Mr. Gelb also granted access to their copy of the papers to Mr. Moorsteen.

But Mr. Moorsteen swore today that he never knew of the existence of that letter. He learned months later from Rand's top security control officer, Jan Butler, that he had access, he said, in a contradic-

Official Secrets

By Anthony Lewis

LONDON, Feb. 18—Alan Grimwood, a postal clerk in Chingford, Essex, wrote to the local paper the other day to explain that slow service in the town post office was caused by a shortage of help. When his letter was published, he was accused of violating the Official Secrets Act.

The Sunday Times of London got hold of a report by consultants to the British Railways Board raising the idea of a drastic cut in rail services. When the paper ran a story, detectives from Scotland Yard visited the editor and said that he might have committed a crime.

To Americans brought up in the tradition of free speech, those incidents must seem absurd—worthy of a banana republic, as a British legal journal said. Obviously, we would say, nothing like that could happen in the United States. But it could.

At this very moment the United States Government is trying to create its own replica of Britain's much-hated Secrets Act, making it a crime to publish the most trivial fact of official life without permission. That is the purpose, and would be the result if it succeeds, of the prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo.

The charges in the Ellsberg-Russo trial of course relate not to something trivial, like a village post office, but to the Pentagon papers. People may therefore assume that there must be a law directly covering the alleged conveying of that official history of the Vietnam war to the press.

But there is no such law. Congress has never been willing to pass a statute plainly and squarely forbidding leaks to the press by Government officials. The Justice Department instead is trying to bring the facts of this case under three other statutes.

The first is the Espionage Act. As its name indicates, this law is directed generally at espionage, not leaking. The particular section invoked against Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo has been used in the past against persons alleged to have passed information to a foreign agent. There is of course no such charge against these defendants; the Justice Department is trying to persuade the courts that mere disclosure of defense information is enough to constitute a crime under the Espionage Act.

Second, Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo are charged with violating the general Federal statute against conspiracy. This section of the criminal code was recently described by the Chief Judge of the Federal District Court for Northern Illinois, William J. Campbell, as the "darling of the lazy or publicity-

AT HOME ABROAD

seeking prosecutor;" he urged its repeal.

Specifically, Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo are accused of conspiring to "defraud the United States" by "impairing, obstructing and defeating its lawful governmental function of controlling" classified information. In other words, instead of a specific statute, we have a vague creature called a "lawful governmental function" against which it is a crime—a bootstrap crime—to conspire.

Third, the Pentagon papers defendants are charged under the general statute against stealing Federal property. The "property" supposedly involved is not the volumes of war history themselves but the information they include.

If the courts accept this ingenious legal theory, it will then potentially be a crime to acquire any information from the Government, however trivial, without the specific approval of some official. The United States will then indeed have an Official Secrets Act on exactly the model of the British law regarded as so sweeping and silly that an official committee has recommended its reform.

It is no accident that the Federal statute books lack any clear, direct law against publishing official information. Congress has had ample opportunity to pass such an act. It has not done so, and the reason is easy enough to understand. Leaking is a widespread phenomenon, deeply rooted in the American system of government, and using the criminal law to stop it would raise grave difficulties.

The Justice Department's attempt to construct a law against leaking from existing statutes, without fresh Congressional consideration, raises very great dangers of centralized information control. There is one particular danger that ought to be understood by the press.

If the Nixon Administration prevails with its theory that Government information is "property," or otherwise gets and sustains a conviction against Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo, then leaking will be a crime. Under the Supreme Court decision in the Caldwell case last year, reporters may be forced to testify about alleged crimes. That means that any leak disliked by some future Administration could lead not only to investigations of the press but to forced testimony—or jail terms.

The American press has been generally complacent so far about the prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo. If it understood the implications, I do not think it could be.

tion to the defense's contention.

He testified under cross-examination by Charles R. Nelson and Leonard I. Weinglass, defense attorneys, that on May 20, 1970, Dr. Ellsberg's last day at Rand, Dr. Ellsberg brought

the papers into his office and asked him if he wanted them and that he had replied, "I said I'll check," and that he had immediately called Mr. Rowen. This call, he said, led to the papers' being injected into Rand's security system.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 March 1973

Ellsberg Witness Asserts Military Falsified Reports

By MARTIN ARNOLD

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, March 6—A Central Intelligence Agency analyst testified today at the Pentagon papers trial that he had attended conferences, in Saigon and Hawaii and at the agency, in which the military purposely diminished estimates of enemy strength in Vietnam.

The witness, Samuel A. Adams, said that there were "political pressures in the military to display the enemy as weaker than he actually was."

He did not say why, but the defense contends that this was done to make it appear that the Army was winning the war.

Mr. Adams said that the monthly estimates of the enemy's military strength, called the order of battle, were prepared for the press and for the White House and that they were so inaccurate that after the enemy's Tet offensive in 1968, two official sets of estimates had to be put together each month, one by the Army, the other by the agency.

The Adams testimony pertains to a 1968 Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, eight pages of which are among the 20 "top secret-sensitive" documents in this case.

A Government witness, Lieut. Gen. William G. Depuy, assistant to the vice chief of staff of the Army, has testified that disclosure of those eight pages damaged the national defense, was of advantage to a foreign nation and could have helped Hanoi during the Vietnam war.

An example of the information that could have helped Hanoi, General Depuy said, was the American estimates of the enemy order of battle.

Mr. Adams said that he believed the memorandum, written after the early Tet offense in 1968, "would be virtually useless" to a foreign nation.

The memorandum gave the enemy order of battle at 240,000 troops, which Mr. Adams said "was not the best estimate of how many foemen there were."

He told the jury that an order of battle was "our estimate of how many badies there are against us."

Harvard Graduate

Mr. Adams, 38 years old, is a direct descendant of his colonial namesake. He is a Harvard graduate who attended Harvard Law School for two years and who served as a

Navy officer for "three years, four months, eleven days" before joining the C.I.A. in March, 1963.

He is a tall, slightly pudgy man, and he was wearing a blue suit and a red tie when he testified. The tails of his white shirt hung out as he told the jury, "I'm a researcher and not a spy, which is why I can come up here and talk."

He said that between October, 1965, and April, 1972, he worked almost exclusively in the agency doing research on the Vietcong, both at the agency offices in Langley, Va., and in Vietnam, "trying to dope out what made those guys tick, keep going in face of what we could throw at them."

At one point, Mr. Adams used a green marking pen to show upon a large pad on an easel how the military subtracted various "components" of the enemy — the guerrilla forces, for instance — "purposely" to lower the order of battle estimates.

He said that at the various conferences held at the agency and in Hawaii and Saigon, which he called "the Pentagon East," the "intelligence community" debated with the military the accuracy of the order of battle estimates.

At one such conference, he said, the Army's top public relations general was present, which "was unusual." Also attending, Mr. Adams said, were representatives of Gen. William C. Westmoreland, then commanding officer of the Army in Vietnam, and of the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department.

Mr. Adams was questioned by Charles R. Nesson, a Harvard law professor who is one of the defense attorneys. The analyst said that in view of the damage the enemy inflicted during the 1968 Tet offensive, the Army's official order of battle estimates were "inherently unbelievable" and that "it is my belief the 240,000 figure was purposely low."

He said that he based that belief on his own studies, based on information from captured enemy documents, among other things, and "from statements by General Westmoreland, where he said at a news conference [in November, 1967] that the enemy is running out of men, more specifically out of guerrillas."

The order of battle referred to in the 1968 joint Chiefs of one quoted by General Deputy said:

"The enemy has been hurt badly in the populated lowlands, is practically intact elsewhere. He committed over 67,000 combat maneuver forces plus perhaps 25 per cent, or 17,000, more impressed men and boys, for a total of about 84,000. He lost 40,000 killed, at

NEW YORK TIMES
8 March 1973

ARMY IS DEFENDED ON ITS TROOP DATA

By MARTIN ARNOLD

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, March 7—

The Government attempted today at the Pentagon papers trial to shore up the accuracy of the Army's estimates of enemy troop strength in Vietnam and at the same time to discredit a Central Intelligence Agency analyst who challenged those estimates.

Thus the Government found itself fighting in court to give credence to statistics that the Government itself stopped using after the Tet offensive in 1968.

The issue was the Order of Battle, the estimates that an army gives of the number of troops opposing it in combat.

Yesterday, Samuel A. Adams, the analyst, who was the third defense witness, testified that there were "political pressures in the military to display the enemy as weaker than he actually was." The defense contends that this was an effort to make it appear as if the Army was winning the war.

Mr. Adams said that after the Tet offensive in 1968, two Orders of Battle were prepared each month, one by the Army and one by the Central Intelligence Agency. The latter was used by the Government because it was more accurate, he said.

Today, on cross-examination, David R. Nissen, the chief prosecutor, asked Mr. Adams whether it was not true that he objected to the Army's Or-

der of Battle in 1967 and that the national intelligence estimates of that year still supported the Army.

der of Battle in 1967 and that the national intelligence estimates of that year still supported the Army.

Yes, the analyst agreed, that was true.

Mr. Nissen asked if Mr. Adams's complaints about the Order of Battle had been in "your organization" heard by "very competent and senior people" who were apparently willing to go along with the Army's figures.

Again, Mr. Adams agreed that this was true, but he reiterated that the national intelligence estimates changed "after the Tet offensive" to use the C.I.A. figures, not the Army's.

Mr. Adams was asked what he meant by "political pressure" and whether "the President" or other high-ranking officials were forcing the use of lower Order of Battle estimates, and he answered that he had "heard discussions of that."

He said that on "two occasions I was told in private by [Military] officers that what I was espousing was true" but that in public the officers kept repeating the lower Order of Battle estimates.

Mr. Adams said that he knew not only from his own C.I.A. studies, but also from the Army's use of figures that the Army was fabricating the Order of Battle figures. This was done, he said, by not putting into them all the components that the agency used.

He gave this example. The Army's criteria for adding enemy troops to the Order of Battle were information contained either in captured enemy documents or in prisoner of war interviews.

But, he said, "pilots flying over an area would report anti-aircraft flak, but the military wouldn't put it [the anti-aircraft troops below] in their Order of Battle because there was no captured document or prisoner of war report."

"It was my feeling that if you see someone shooting at you, you put it in the Order of Battle," he added.

To show the various enemy forces that the agency considered part of the proper Order of Battle, Mr. Adams wrote them out yesterday on a large piece of paper on an easel, and this led to the judge's admonishing one of the defendants, Anthony J. Russo Jr.

Mr. Adams had written on the paper, for the jury to see, the following components: main/local forces, combat support, irregulars and political cadre.

During a court recess, Mr. Russo added a fifth item, "the people." Mr. Nissen complained, and Federal District Court Judge William Matthew Byrne Jr. asked who had added an item.

"I wanted to flesh it out," Mr. Russo said.

"This case is not being tried in a humorous vein," Judge Byrne replied.

"I apologize to the court," said Mr. Russo.

The judge then told him that if he did such a thing again he would not get off with a sim-

WASHINGTON POST

9 March 1973

Joseph Alsop

Analyzing the CIA's Analysts

Unwittingly, the country has just been given a prime sample of the garbage that people like Daniel Ellsberg have been peddling as historical truth. The garbage sample also shows why President Nixon has put in James Schlesinger Jr. as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to effect a forceful clean-out in some areas.

The particular pail of garbage served up at Ellsberg's trial was the testimony of Samuel Adams, an ex-CIA analyst and estimator. Adams darkly testified that in 1968, "there were political pressures from the military to display the enemy as weaker than he actually was." Normally, one must add, nothing could be more stale than an old row about just how many North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops were in the field in 1968.

This particular old row is worth examining, however, because it tells such a lot about what may be called the Ellsberg-type in government, and also about the operations of a crucial but obscure part of our government. The story begins, then, in late 1965 or early 1966, when President Lyndon Johnson declared, in effect, "Now we're in a guerilla war, I want someone to tell me just how many guerillas there are."

No one in the U.S. government has ever thought of responding to this kind of presidential command with bleak honesty, by saying: "I'm sorry, Mr. President, we just don't know." At that time, of course, no one did know, for at that time in Vietnam, our forces

were not fighting guerillas—which is how you find out how many there are. We were instead fighting the enemy's big units, a necessary first stage.

Nonetheless, an incomparably ridiculous estimating process at once began among the civilian analysts in the CIA, and also among the military analysts in Saigon and the Pentagon. The system, in both cases, was to start with the ideal "table of organization" imposed by Hanoi in the South. This indicated the numbers of guerillas Hanoi regarded as desirable at every level, hamlet, village, district and finally province.

With some difficulty, the numbers of hamlets, villages and districts in South Vietnam were ascertained. Multiplications were then made, on the basis of the ideal table of organization. The military analysts' result was 180,000 guerillas. The CIA result was 300,000 guerillas. This was because the CIA analysts, anti-war and anti-military, too, insisted upon including a huge number for the almost purely imaginary "secret self defense forces."

The first sequel was one of the most ludicrous bureaucratic wars in the often-ludicrous history of the intelligence bureaucracy. Meetings were held on both sides of the Pacific, as Adams indicated at the Ellsberg trial. Charges were hurled at the military by the civilians, and vice versa. Apparently, Adams participated. So did one of the men CIA director Schlesinger has now brought into the agency from outside, Maj. Gen. Daniel Graham—but Graham was on the side of comparative common sense.

One has to use the word "comparative," because of the second sequel. After the Tet offensive in 1968, the task of fighting guerillas was belatedly taken in hand in Vietnam. It soon

became apparent that the number of guerillas had been enormously exaggerated. This was shown in other ways, too, such as the heavy, steadily increasing use of North Vietnamese replacements at all levels in the Vietcong military apparatus. North Vietnamese would never have been used in this manner, if southerners had been obtainable.

By agreement, therefore, the CIA and the army quietly reduced the guerilla total on the official "order of battle" to only 60,000 men. Thus the military analysts had been wrong by a factor of three, and the CIA analysts had been wrong by a factor of five. It is at least better to be wrong by three instead of five—which is why the Adams testimony is garbage.

The foregoing, one must add, was only one of the passionate errors that the CIA analysts produced in the Vietnamese war. Another specimen was the famous estimate that Hanoi was putting only minimal supplies through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. This estimate was later shown to be wholly false by the CIA itself.

These errors resulted, in turn, from a peculiar historical bias. Here consider the former colleagues of Samuel Adams, who were obstinately wrong about the Soviet re-invasion of Hungary, about the Soviet missiles in Cuba, and about the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia—all, presumably, because they did not wish to believe that such dreadful things could happen. It can be seen, then, why CIA Director Schlesinger has been given a job to do.

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NEW YORK TIMES
23 February 1973

Fingerprints Found on Papers, Witness Tells Ellsberg Trial

By MARTIN ARNOLD
Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, Feb. 22 — Decmer E. Hippensteel, a retired F.B.I. agent, testified today that he had found the fingerprints of Daniel Ellsberg, Anthony J. Russo Jr., Lynda Sinay Resnick and Dr. Ellsberg's son, Robert, then 13 years old, on the Pentagon papers that were removed from the Rand Corporation.

The Government is contending that Mr. Russo, Dr. Ellsberg's codefendant in the Pentagon papers trial, and Mrs. Resnick and Robert Ellsberg were "persons not entitled to receive" the Pentagon papers and two other top-secret documents involved in this trial, but that they did receive them from Dr. Ellsberg.

Dr. Ellsberg made copies of

the documents in Mrs. Resnick's advertising office in October, 1969, and she and Vu Van Thai, former South Vietnam Ambassador to the United States, have been named as co-conspirators in this case, but not co-defendants.

More Testimony Tuesday

Mr. Hippensteel is scheduled to testify again on Tuesday about Mr. Thai's fingerprints being on the documents, if by that time the Government can get past the legal technicalities that so far have kept Mr. Thai's name out of this trial.

Tuesday's testimony will conclude, for the time being, the Government's case against Dr.

Ellsberg and Mr. Russo, who are accused of eight counts of espionage, six counts of theft and one count of conspiracy.

The defense would like to keep Mr. Thai's name in particular out of the case because it does not want the jury to be reminded that Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo are accused of showing the papers to a foreign national.

The defense will start on Tuesday to present its case to the jury. This will start with an opening statement by Leonard I. Weinglass, an attorney for Mr. Russo, who reserved his right to open when the trial first started.

ple "warning."

Judge Byrne said that Mr. Russo was also being unfair to his co-defendant, Daniel Ellsberg, who was being "put in jeopardy." All this occurred before the jury returned from the recess.

The cross-examination of Mr. Adams will continue tomorrow morning.

The next defense witness is scheduled to be McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson for national security affairs, who is now president of the Ford Foundation.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 February 1973
**2 COUNTS DROPPED
IN ELLSBERG CASE**

By United Press International
LOS ANGELES, Feb. 26 — Federal District Court Judge Matthew M. Byrne dropped one espionage charge each against Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo today, but he declined to order a directed verdict of acquittal in the Pentagon papers trial.

After brief testimony from a final prosecution witness tomorrow, the lawyers for Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo are to start presentation of their case, with 35 witnesses to be called over a seven-week period.

The two counts of the indictment that Judge Byrne ordered stricken dealt with disposition of the papers concerning the evolution of the Vietnam war. He ruled, in effect, that the prosecution had not proved its case in those counts so far as criminal intent was concerned.

Judge Byrne's ruling left 13 counts remaining against the defendants, charging conspiracy, theft of government documents and espionage.

Judge Byrne rejected defense arguments that the testimony of 10 Government witnesses was not sufficient to prove its case.

The defense had contended that information in the Pentagon papers was stale, that the Government had no right to control dissemination of the documents and that Dr. Ellsberg had personal, privileged access to the study.

The defense case will begin with testimony from Rear Adm. Gene Larocque, retired, head of the Center for Defense Information, a private Washington group that studies dissemination of information on defense matters to the public.

The second defense witness will be Samuel A. Adams of Leesburg, Va., an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency, who has submitted a memorandum declaring that testimony of an Army general about the sensitivity of papers leaked by Dr. Ellsberg was inaccurate.

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Feb. 28, 1973

U.S. 'Needed' Papers, Ellsberg Defense Says

By Sanford J. Ungar
Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES, Feb. 27—Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr. disclosed the top-secret Pentagon Papers because the documents were "needed by the country" in evaluating the war in Vietnam, one of their attorneys told a jury in federal court here today.

Launching the defense case in the Pentagon Papers trial, Leonard I. Weinglass insisted that Ellsberg and Russo had committed no crime at all by their acts.

Indeed, Weinglass told the jury, "It is the government which bent the law" by charging Ellsberg and Russo with conspiracy, espionage and theft of government property.

He promised that the defense will present "a long list of knowledgeable and expert people" as witnesses to support that view and to explain the "relatively simple" issues in the controversial case.

Most of those witnesses, he said, will be former officials of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and retired military men who will contend that the Pentagon Papers had absolutely no relationship to the "national defense."

Sources close to the defense said that among the prospective witnesses are John Kenneth Galbraith, former U.S. ambassador to India; Theodore Sorenson, White House counsel to the late President John F. Kennedy; and Morton H. Halperin, who was deputy assistant secretary of defense in the Johnson administration and worked on the National

Security Council staff early in the Nixon administration.

But Weinglass told the jurors they would also hear from people currently in government, including Rep. Paul N. (Pete) McCloskey, Jr. (R-Calif.) and Samuel A. Adams, analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.

The defense attorney began his opening to the jury only moments after the prosecution formally rested its case against Ellsberg and Russo this morning.

The final prosecution evidence came from an FBI fingerprint expert, who testified that he had found on the Pentagon Papers the fingerprints of Vu Van Thai, a former South Vietnamese ambassador to the United States and a close friend of Ellsberg's while both were working at the Rand Corp. in Santa Monica.

U.S. District Court Judge W. Matt Byrne Jr. permitted the testimony about Thai—named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the case—only after chief prosecutor David R. Nissen produced a properly authenticated set of the former diplomat's fingerprints.

An earlier set had been rejected by the judge, and the new fingerprints were flown here from Saigon over the weekend.

Weinglass, his characteristically shoulder-length hair cropped short for the occasion, spoke to the jury in slow, unemotional tones from a lectern in the middle of the courtroom.

He made it clear from the outset that the defense would not dispute the essential fact at the heart of the prosecution

case—that Ellsberg and Russo photocopied the Pentagon Papers at the office of Lynda Sinyay, a Los Angeles advertising woman, in October, 1969.

But Weinglass insisted that the papers and other top secret documents covered by the indictment do not fall into the "very limited and narrow" category of information whose disclosure is banned by the Federal Espionage Act, information "relating to the national defense."

What military information is contained in the documents was either "stale" or already "in the public domain" in 1969, he contended.

But the real importance of the Pentagon Papers, he told the jury, was found in the "insights" they contained about "how and why" the United States became involved in Vietnam—what they told about "the political and social revolution" in Vietnam and about the "troublesome role" of the United States there.

"All of this information was necessary to the ongoing debate about Vietnam" in 1969, when Ellsberg and Russo photocopied the papers, he said.

Sounding a common defense theme in the case, the attorney also contended that the documents were "improperly classified top secret" even though they contained information that did not require classification.

As for the theft charges, Weinglass asserted that the defense could show that the Pentagon Papers were not "government property" at all, but belonged to three retiring Defense Department officials.

WASHINGTON POST

1 March 1973

Witness Says Papers 'Utterly Useless'

By Sanford J. Ungar
Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES, Feb. 28—The first defense witness in the Pentagon Papers trial, a retired admiral, testified today that disclosure of the top-secret documents could not have caused "injury to the United States" or "advantage to a foreign nation."

Rear Adm. Gene LaRocque said that operational plans discussed in the papers were "hopelessly out-of-date and utterly useless" by the time Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr. photocopied the documents in late 1969.

But when he was asked to describe the subject of one of the operational plans, Admiral LaRocque invoked its security classification as a reason for not doing so.

"No sir, I'm not at liberty to discuss that," the witness told Leonard I. Weinglass, Russo's attorney, who questioned him about "Operational Plan 32" of U.S. Pacific Forces. "That's a top secret document."

(An essential part of Ellsberg's and Russo's defense, against charges of conspiracy, espionage and theft of government property is their claim that the Pentagon Papers were improperly classified top secret.)

LaRocque, who retired last April after 31 years in the Navy, is director of the Center for Defense Information in Washington, an independent research organization which studies military issues.

The former commander of a destroyer division and, a guided missile cruiser and once a lecturer on strategic planning at the Naval War College, he is Ellsberg's and Russo's answer to Lt. Gen. William G. dePuy, assistant to the Army vice chief of staff.

DePuy, as a prosecution witness, told the jury that the U.S. "national defense" could have been seriously affected by disclosure of one of the documents duplicated by Ellsberg and Russo, a 1968 report by Gen. Earle C. Wheeler, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assessing the results of the Vietnamese Communists' Tet offensive.

But LaRocque disagreed in every detail.

He testified that the Wheeler report was probably "of little use" to foreign intelligence analysts, and he characterized the document as a brief in support of a request for more ground troops by Gen. William C. Westmore-

land, then U.S. commander in Vietnam.

The retired Navy officer observed that another report, written by Westmoreland and released publicly by the Government Printing Office in early 1969, contained "more extensive" information on the military situation in Vietnam than the classified documents disclosed by Ellsberg and Russo.

Like some of the other military officers who have appeared in the case, LaRocque kept his eyes almost constantly trained on the jury box and gesticulated with his hands, as he tried to reduce complex technical concepts to everyday vocabulary.

As he testified, the jurors were permitted for the first time to read copies of one volume of the Pentagon Papers.

Some jurors seemed so absorbed in their reading that U.S. District Court Judge W. Matt Byrne Jr. had to interrupt them and remind them to listen to the testimony.

The questioning of LaRocque was suspended before chief prosecutor David R. Nissen began his cross-examination because defense attorneys had not yet made their complete exhibit list available to the prosecution. Byrne ordered that they do so by Thursday morning.

At a hearing later in the day, the judge again refused

to permit the prosecution to use the military pay scale as its proof that the Pentagon Papers were government property worth more than \$100.

Nissen claimed this was appropriate evidence because a number of military officers worked on the Defense Department task force that compiled the Pentagon Papers.

The theft statute under which the defendants are charged requires that the property allegedly stolen be worth at least \$100.

Byrne's ruling left the government without any evidence on that point, but the judge nonetheless rejected a new defense motion to dismiss the theft counts in the indictment.

NEW YORK TIMES
2 March 1973

Bid Made to Blunt Ellsberg Witness

By MARTIN ARNOLD
Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, March 1—

The chief prosecutor in the Pentagon papers trial set out today to undercut the first defense witness, who had testified against the prosecution argument that publication of the papers had damaged the national defense or proved helpful to the enemy.

Developing a battle of words and wits, the prosecutor, David R. Nissen, cross-examined retired Rear Adm. Gene LaRocque.

Admiral LaRocque is now the director of the Center for Defense Information, a private organization that collects defense information and disseminates it to the public. He had formerly commanded ships and had been on the planning directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was called as a defense witness to rebut the testimony of two generals.

They had testified to the effect that disclosure of the Pentagon papers and other documents in this case had damaged the country's national defense and could have been helpful to Hanoi during the war in Vietnam.

Purpose of Center

On Tuesday and yesterday he had testified on direct examination that both those propositions were wrong. A short man, wearing a pale blue suit, the admiral has a habit of taking off his glasses, leaning forward in the witness chair and squinting at his questioners, as if to say that no normal man could doubt either his word or his judgment.

Mr. Nissen started off the cross-examination today by implying that the Center for De-

fense Information was somehow unpatriotic. His first question, for instance, asked the admiral if "the purpose of the center" was not "to challenge the national defense of the Government."

It is "to explain the national defense," the admiral replied.

Does not the center take positions in opposition to the defense policies of the country? Mr. Nissen asked.

The center makes "objective" studies of the country's defense policies and weapon systems and "makes both sides [of the questions] available to the public," Admiral LaRocque answered.

The prosecutor then asked the admiral if it was not true that the center opposed nuclear aircraft carriers, the Navy shipbuilding program, foreign military assistance and foreign aid, and the admiral answered that the center "is not opposed to any of those programs."

Preparation of Witness

A witness is allowed to refer to notes when he is testifying, and seldom, if ever, does a witness testify without first having been prepared by attorneys, often for hours on end.

Admiral LaRocque had been prepared by the attorneys for Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr., who are accused of six counts of espionage, six counts of theft and one count of conspiracy.

Mr. Nissen asked the admiral about every telephone conversation and meeting he had had with defense attorneys or consultants; he asked him about the notes he used during his testimony, and about a weighty notebook called "Trial Notebook for Witness Preparation" that the defense has prepared for its witnesses to read.

"I see many pages with handwriting on the back," Mr. Nissen said, as he and the admiral looked over the notebook together before the jury. "There's two pages [of handwriting]," the admiral said.

Notes Destroyed

The implication of Mr. Nissen's cross-examination was that the admiral and the defense had done many clandestine things together to prepare for this case. At one point Mr. Nissen asked the admiral what documents he had carried out here from Washington.

"I brought along a copy of the Constitution of the United States," the admiral replied. At another point, the admiral did admit that he had flushed some of his notes on the case down a toilet bowl. Mr. Nissen pounced on this, and asked him if he always flushed his writings away.

He answered: "Any notes I make, from my long experience in the Navy, you learn to tear them up in little pieces and flush them down the toilet."

NEW YORK TIMES
3 March 1973

ELLSBERG TRIAL HEARS M'CLOSKEY

By MARTIN ARNOLD
Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, March 2—Representative Paul N. McCloskey testified today at the Pentagon papers trial that disclosure of one of the volumes of the papers "could not have been used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation."

The California Republican was the second witness in behalf of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr., and he was allowed to testify as a former Marine colonel and as a member of Congress on whether the national defense had been damaged.

But United States District Court Judge William Matthew Byrne Jr. refused to let him testify at length on the Government's system of classifying documents.

Mr. McCloskey is a member of the House Committee on Government Operations and chairman of its Subcommittee on Government Information. As subcommittee chairman and as an outspoken critic of the war in Vietnam, he has, he testified, been studying the Government's policy on classifying information.

He said that he believed the Freedom of Information Act should be overhauled.

He said under direct examination by Charles R. Nesson, a defense attorney, that the Pentagon papers volume about the first Marine landing in Vietnam came to his attention in the spring of 1971, and that he read it then.

"There is nothing in this volume that could have been used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of a foreign nation," he said.

Mr. McCloskey, in a sense, is the first celebrity witness at this trial, and the 10 women on the jury beamed at him when he appeared in the courtroom.

View on National Defense

Earlier, Rear Adm. Gene LaRocque, retired, the first defense witness, said under cross-examination that "nothing the United States did in Vietnam or happened to it in Vietnam in any way had any bearing on the United States' national defense." He reiterated his view this way:

"Nothing the United States did in Vietnam had any relation to the national defense."

Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo are on trial on six counts of espionage, six of theft and one of conspiracy. To prove espionage, the Government must first prove that their actions damaged the national defense.

All of the documents in this case pertain to America's involvement in Vietnam, and two Army generals have testified for the Government that disclosure of those documents did damage the national defense.

Admiral LaRocque, now director of the Center for De-

NEW YORK TIMES
21 February 1973

Secrets of Freedom

By C. L. Sulzberger

Democratic governments are puzzled by contradictions between the desire to inform their populations freely and completely while preserving from public disclosure legitimate secrets deemed essential to national security in a nuclear-missile world.

The inherent contradictions can never satisfactorily be resolved. France, for example, has kept on the books for more than a century and during three republics statutes that would be considered repressive censorship by many Americans. West Germany, with relatively recent memories of dictatorship, tends to lean over backwards in favor of freer news media.

The British, most governable of democratic peoples because they are both pragmatic and patriotic by long tradition, have been trying to elaborate safeguard legislation for more than sixty years. The so-called Official Secrets Act actually comprises three separate laws of 1911, 1920 and 1939. It bans disclosure of information "prejudicial to the safety or interests of the state" or possession of any official document by anyone who "has no right to retain it."

This strict interpretation has sometimes produced such ridiculous exaggerations as preventing press mention of King Edward VIII's romance when the whole world knew about it. The London Sunday Telegraph won an action brought against it by the Government for publishing a patently overclassified report. Now a quiet inquiry is under way on whether modifications of existing law are desirable.

The U.S. Government has had little success in its own attempts to bridge the gap between public freedom and national security. Despite the First Amendment to the Constitution which prohibits any law abridging press freedom, two attempts were made (in 1798 and 1918) to legislate against revealing what was officially deemed secret by banning violations as "sedition."

Under existing statutes, as interpreted by the courts, the Government has occasionally attempted to prosecute disclosures of classified information as "espionage." This is manifestly absurd. Nevertheless, it is obvious certain secrets such as names of undercover agents abroad, movements of atomic submarines, the exact design or specification of some weapons, or the targeting program of strategic arms should not be public property.

A new effort to face this problem is now being prepared by the executive branch, which has an interagency committee representing the Depart-

fense Information in Washington, was asked by Mr. Nissen to suppose that the United States troops had been defeated in Vietnam. Would not that, he was asked, bear on the national defense?

"I cannot speculate about that," he said, adding, "The troops of the United States were not defeated in Vietnam."

He said that the United States had two "sets" of armed

forces, one to defend the United States and its territories, and one that is deployed by the President around the world for other purposes. By his definition, only the former force is used for national defense, he said.

Then Leonard I. Weinglass, a defense attorney, asked him on redirect examination for the basis of his opinion that

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ments of Defense, State and Justice; the White House, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence and National Security Agencies, seeking to agree on revision of protective laws.

Their ideas are to be included in a complex legal reform bill which, if drafted in time, is to be presented to Congress next month. The problems involved are so complex that few observers expect legislative approval in much less than three years.

The Justice Department wants to simplify existing procedures by: (1) having less official information classified; (2) insisting on swifter declassification procedures; (3) creating an administrative set-up to deal with violations of classification. The criminal laws are being re-examined with respect to security leakage. Point (3) of the program is being studied by the interagency committee which is headed by John Eisenhower.

The Administration is understandably touchy about relations with the news media, which it is often accused of curbing—and it is not the first Administration to suffer from such reproaches. It also acknowledges that the habit of classifying official documents has been grossly exaggerated.

Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst recently told me: "Our laws are often taken advantage of by bureaucrats to conceal mistakes under wrongly used classification stamps. It is necessary to define more precisely the areas of real security and then to enact specific laws to protect these; but in accordance with First Amendment safeguards of a free press."

Judgments involved concerning "real security" and total "freedom" enter a gray area of dispute in which even different executive departments disagree. The Pentagon has rigid ideas of defining matters to be considered of paramount national interest.

Congress will have an excruciatingly difficult time in deciding what may properly be termed secret and how it should be kept. In an era of electronic bugging devices, copying machines and tape recorders it is harder to insure against leakage and in an American society where all forms of censorship are repugnant it is a delicate task to except certain types of information.

All one can hope is that when the legislature has finally acted, the United States will find it is leaning neither toward excessive restrictions nor toward total license that could destroy freedom's capacity to defend itself.

nothing that had happened in Vietnam involved the national defense. He answered:

"On the basis of our statement of purpose in Vietnam by President Johnson, who said we were there to help South Vietnam. McNamara clearly indicated it was a Vietnamese war. General Wheeler said the purpose of North Vietnam was to take over South Vietnam."

Mr. Nissen had asked the

NEW YORK TIMES
5 March 1973

Ellsberg Trial: Now the Focus Is on Secrecy

By MARTIN ARNOLD
Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, March 4—

From the start, many constitutional authorities have seen the Pentagon papers trial as a major test of the Government's authority over information and the public's access to it. But until Friday, when defense testimony began on the Government's system of classifying secrets, the crucial First Amendment implications of the case had been somewhat obscured. They had been touched upon by lawyers for Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr. in their opening statements to the jury. Now, in the coming days, the defense will open as broad an attack against the classification system as the trial judge will allow.

The First Amendment arises in this case in the Government's melding of the classification system, as defined by an Executive order, with the Federal espionage, theft and conspiracy statutes. The Government has never attempted this marriage before, and many lawyers believe that if the defendants are convicted, and that conviction is upheld, it will set legal precedents that could give the Government a degree of control over information that it never had before.

World War II and the cold war, the Korean war and the Vietnam war have so accustomed Americans to the concept of Government secrets and have so popularized the phrase "top secret," for instance, that many

persons apparently believe there are laws governing what the Government labels top secret information. But there is no such law.

Congress has never passed an official secrets act making it a crime to disclose or publish any matter classified as top secret, largely because its validity under the First Amendment might be questionable, but also because of the possibility that such a law would permit the Government to hide embarrassing information merely by stamping it "top secret."

The Atomic Energy Act, controls dissemination of what is called "restricted" information on nuclear matters and a Federal statute controls the disclosure of communications intelligence, that is military codes, but Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo are not accused of either, and the judge has ruled the communications code statute out of this case.

The defendants are accused of six counts of espionage, six of theft and one of conspiracy. The Espionage Act, as its name implies, is directed at espionage, not at leaking information, and the particular section invoked against the defendants has been used in the past only against persons alleged to have to a foreign country information that would damage the national defense.

In this case, however the Government is in essence trying to convince the judge and the jury that the disclosure of documents marked "top secret" is damaging to the national defense and helpful to a foreign country merely because they are marked "top secret."

This concept of top secret designations rests not on law, but on Executive Order 10501, which was issued by President Eisenhower on Nov. 5, 1953, and has since been superseded by an act issued by President Nixon, but was in effect at the time that Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo allegedly committed the crimes.

The Government goes even further in its theft charges. It contends that because the information contained in the Pentagon papers was classified top secret under Executive Order 10501, it owns that information, and that the information itself, as distinct from the paper it was printed on, was therefore subject to theft.

In the conspiracy count, the Government contends that the defendants conspired to "defraud the United States" by "impairing, obstructing, and defeating its lawful governmental function of controlling the dissemination of classified Government studies, reports, memoranda and communications."

Again, there is no statute that defines the classification of documents as a "lawful Government function" and again the Government has never made such a contention in any previous case. If it is upheld in this case, the Justice Department could then invoke the general conspiracy laws against Government officials and newsmen who act together to publicize classified matter.

Since the trial judge has refused thus far to allow the "right to know" issue to be raised before the jury, it must be done indirectly, and that will be through the defense attack on the classification system, which will take place this week if all goes as scheduled.

Thus, the defense will try to present testimony to show that the classification system is of this phase of the trial.

overbroad, and that once a document is classified it is seldom declassified, despite the passage of time and events.

The defense will also seek to introduce evidence to the effect that responsible Government officials, from the President down, regularly leak "top secret" information to the news media when it suits their purpose to do so, and they are not arrested when they do.

Many of the documents in this case were classified under the doctrine of derivative classification, and that is not even mentioned in Executive Order 10501, let alone in any statute. It is merely in the Defense Department regulations, and it works with a pyramid-like effect.

That is, derivative classification is a doctrine that provides that if you produce a study or a report that is based on just one sentence of research that has previously been classified, then that report must also be classified.

The defense will not contend that the executive branch does not have the right to classify documents; it will argue only that the documents in this case were not properly classified and that such classification has nothing to do with the statutes under which Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo were indicted.

The Government has acknowledged that it is trying to skirt the First Amendment issues in this case and so far the trial judge has not allowed much testimony that touches on those issues. But he has said that he will allow testimony on whether the particular documents in this case were, one, properly classified at the time that the offenses were allegedly committed and, two, whether they were indeed classifiable.

That is only the beginning of this phase of the trial.

NEW YORK TIMES
6 March 1973

ELLSBERG JUDGE BARS A DEFENSE

By MARTIN ARNOLD

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, March 5—

The judge in the Pentagon papers trial ruled out today the "justification defense," under which the defendants would have argued that the motivation for disclosing the secret study of United States involvement in Vietnam was to get information to Congress.

However, Federal District Judge William Matthew Byrne Jr. told Charles R. Nesson, a defense lawyer, to prepare a memorandum of law on the matter, indicating that he might allow the defense at a later time.

The "justification defense," which is widely accepted in some cases but rare in this type of trial, holds that any civil committed by the defendants was not as great as the evil that was avoided because of their acts.

Mr. Nesson gave two examples. One was a case in which survivors in a lifeboat were acquitted of cannibalism after they ate their fellow passengers to avoid starvation.

The other involved the hypothetical situation of a man who was walking down the street and saw a woman being raped. Nearby was a blind person with a cane. The man grabbed the cane from the blind person, thus committing a crime, and beat up the rapist.

"Would not the grabbing of the cane fall under the justification defense?" Mr. Nesson asked the judge.

In this case, Mr. Nesson wanted to introduce the justification defense through the testimony of Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr., Republican of California.

In a memorandum supporting the use of that defense, Mr. Nesson said that "the war in Vietnam was unquestionably an evil of the greatest magnitude" and that the 18 volumes of the Pentagon papers involved in this case "contained much information about the

war of which Congress had been deprived and which Congress needed to properly perform its constitutional functions."

"The executive branch wrongfully withheld the Vietnam study from Congress," Mr. Nesson's memorandum went on and "the defendants undertook to deliver to Congress the information contained in the Vietnam study" because they "believed, rightly, that Congress could get the information in no other way."

"The defendants acted with awareness of two great evils, the prosecution by the executive branch of the war in Vietnam and the executive branch's subversion, through information control, of the powers and responsibilities of Congress," Mr. Nesson wrote.

Mr. McCloskey, in another memorandum to the judge, supported the defense's position and gave details of how Congress had been deprived of the information. He was prepared to testify, Mr. Nesson said, that the acts of the defendants were

admiral whether, if the United States had used the weaponry in Vietnam that it would use to defend the United States, the admiral would then say that the national defense had been involved in that war.

"No, because to defend the United States you have to have a creditable foe against the United States," he answered.

"We were not threatened by North Vietnam. We went through a very tortuous period resolving whether we should be involved in that adventure or not, and the national defense of the United States was not involved in Vietnam when we had that option."

WASHINGTON POST
16 February, 1973

Device at Hill Hearing: 'Bug' or News Transmitter?

By Mary Russell
Washington Post Staff Writer

"precisely tailored to the evils they saw."

The defendants, Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr., are accused, in part, of "conspiring to defraud the United States" of the information contained in the Pentagon papers.

Leonard Weinglass, another defense attorney, argued that there was no law, only an Executive order, against leaking classified documents and that the "justification defense" was contemplated against the order.

Mr. McCloskey did get to testify on his second day of direct examination that "members of Congress, committees of Congress, the Congress itself is entitled to receive top secret material, and we do almost on a daily basis when Congress is in session."

Information Flow

Mr. McCloskey, the second defense witness, had been called to testify as a Congressional expert on the flow of Government information and, as a former marine colonel, as an expert on one volume of the papers. That volume tells about the marine landing in Vietnam in 1965.

Mr. McCloskey testified on Friday that disclosure of that volume in 1969 could in no way have affected the national defense, and so today, on cross-examination, David R. Nissen, the chief prosecutor, started out to impeach him as a witness.

Mr. Nissen asked him a series of questions about his military career and focused on maneuvers Mr. McCloskey took part in in the summer of 1965 just south of here at Camp Pendleton.

Mr. McCloskey was pressed into service during the operation, called Silverlance, more or less as an actor. He played the part of an ambassador to a mythical country, Camelot, for the purpose of training marines on how to act in a friendly nation such as South Vietnam. Mr. Nissen elicited this to present the implication that with such military training, Mr. McCloskey could hardly be taken seriously when he testified about the national defense.

A "sophisticated transmitter" has been found in the main hearing room of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

The device, not quite the size of a cigarette pack, may have been intended as a "bug." Or it may simply be a pocket transmitter that a broadcaster left behind.

The device was discovered Monday morning lying on a table used by the press when covering committee hearings. It was first thought to be a "bellboy" paging device brought into the room by someone accompanying Secretary of State William P. Rogers' who testified before the committee on Thursday, Feb. 8. Later it was discovered to be a "sophisticated transmitter with self-contained microphones and batteries" and was turned over to the FBI.

Committee sources say the device was attached to the underside of the table and was jostled loose by a member of the cleaning crew who then picked it up and placed it on top of the table where a staff member found it.

Rep. H. R. Gross (R-Iowa), a member of the committee, said he had been informed the device was taped underneath the table. Other committee sources say it was strapped beneath the table. FBI sources

would say only that no tape marks were found on the device.

An FBI spokesman refused to say whether the device was a bug, saying only that the bureau "had reached no final conclusion on that." The spokesman did acknowledge that the matter was under investigation as a possible violation of the Interception of Communications Act, the same law under which seven men were charged with planting bugging devices at the Democratic National Committee's Watergate headquarters last June.

Committee sources said that no closed hearings were scheduled in the next few weeks except for a Feb. 20 organizational meeting. The last closed hearing was on Oct. 12 when a Spokane, Wash., expedition was discussed.

Other than Secretary Rogers' testimony in open hearings last Thursday on the Vietnam peace agreement, the hearing room was used briefly last Wednesday night by some committee members and King Hussein of Jordan.

King Hussein was attending a reception across the hall and then went into the room with his security men and some members of the committee. The members and the king sat around a table and chatted informally for a few minutes, a committee source said.

He did not know whether the conversation was of a sensitive nature.

An authority in the technical aspects of broadcasting said yesterday the device, as described by chairman Morgan, sounds like one often used by television crews and reporters.

Committee Chairman Thomas E. Morgan (D-Pa.) described the device as a rectangular metal box about 4 by 1 1/4 by 3/4 inches.

Because it was first thought to be a State Department paging device, Morgan said, "its discovery was called to the attention of the Congressional Relations Office" of the department. Later in the day the security people who had accompanied Rogers to the hearing were also informed.

State Department security people picked up the device Tuesday morning and returned it at 5 p.m. "with the information that it was not a bellboy but an electronic transmitter," Morgan said.

Morgan then asked that the FBI be called in and requested the bureau to "sweep" all the other committee rooms for "the possible presence of any other devices." None was found.

Morgan said he has asked the FBI for a complete report upon completion of its investigation.

WASHINGTON STAR
21 February 1973

House 'Bug' Was Dead

The chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee says that the battery in a "sophisticated transmitter" discovered in the Committee Hearing Room on Feb. 12 was dead.

Rep. Thomas Morgan, D-Pa., made the disclosure after a closed meeting of the committee in which he briefed members about the investigation into the discovery of the device.

The FBI is investigating the discovery at Morgan's request and is reporting to him on its progress every two days, he said.

Morgan and other committee sources refused to speculate on whether the dead battery in the cigarette-pack-size device indicated that it had been in the committee hearing

room in operable condition for an extended period of time.

Morgan said he did not think that the device was placed in relation to the visit of Jordan's King Hussein on Feb. 7. He said Hussein's informal conference with committee members in the hearing room was a spontaneous affair after a reception across a hall.

The following day, Secretary of State William P. Rogers appeared in open session before the committee, and any bugging of that session would have been pointless.

Committee sources confirmed that the device was found by a cleaning woman Feb. 12 on the hearing room floor beneath a press table. The device apparently was placed on top of the table by

the woman and later turned over to the FBI.

If the FBI has given Morgan any clues as to the origin of the device, he apparently did not share them with committee members during yesterday's briefing.

LIFTING THE CURTAIN FROM GOVERNMENT SECRETS

It's easier now to get a look into those official papers that bureaucrats try to hide under "Secret" stamps. A federal law and a Nixon order have expanded the public's "right to know." But problems remain.

A VAST wealth of information—long kept hidden in files of the federal bureaucracy—is finally being pried out for public scrutiny.

Increasingly, despite often-vehement resistance from officials, records that once were secret are made available to Americans who ask for them.

This is important to individuals and business firms in many ways.

A taxpayer who is fighting an income-tax ruling, for instance, can now demand—and get—access to handbooks and other documents of the Internal Revenue Service that may help his case.

A businessman, appealing an unfavorable decision by the Federal Trade Commission or any other regulatory agency, can examine internal memoranda and other papers used by the agency in reaching its decision. This could help him challenge the agency's ruling.

A conservationist, opposing a construction project, can get copies of the environmental-impact report that is required on federally funded projects. Information in that report could be important to the conservationist's charges that the project would harm the environment.

A consumer, questioning the quality of a product sold to the public, can demand to see the results from Government tests of the product.

A historian, seeking military or diplomatic documents stamped "Secret," can force a review of their classification and perhaps obtain their release.

The public's right. Mainly responsible for this increased availability of Government information are two events of recent years which greatly expanded the public's "right to know."

First: Congress in 1966 passed a Freedom of Information Act. This law reversed a long-standing policy of releasing Government records only to those "properly and directly concerned." Federal courts have interpreted the new law as severely restricting the power of Government officials to withhold information from the public.

Second: President Nixon, in March of 1972, ordered the first overhaul in two decades of the U. S. system of protecting military and diplomatic secrets.

The "right to know" that these actions assert is not spelled out in the U. S. Constitution. It is based on an idea that President Nixon put in these words:

"Fundamental to our way of life is the belief that, when information which properly belongs to the public is systematically withheld by those in power,



THE KINDS OF INFORMATION THAT OFFICIALS CAN WITHHOLD

Under the 1966 Freedom of Information Act, federal officials may refuse to disclose nine types of records. Even these may be released at the discretion of those in charge.

Records that may be withheld include those concerning:

1. National security or foreign policy, specifically those that are required by executive order to be kept secret.

2. Internal personnel rules and practices of an agency, such as its reasons for hiring, firing and promoting employees.

3. Matters required by law to remain secret, such as an individual's tax return.

4. Trade secrets and other con-

fidential commercial information, such as formulas or sales data.

5. Internal memoranda and letters between consulting officials of one or more agencies. These are legally available only to someone suing the agency.

6. Personnel, medical and other files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.

7. Investigations, which may contain unproven rumors and the names of informers.

8. Reports relating to regulation of financial institutions.

9. Geophysical information, including maps, concerning the location and description of oil, gas and water wells.

the people become ignorant of their own affairs, distrustful of those who manage them, and—eventually—incapable of determining their own destinies."

It was to prevent the improper withholding of information that Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act. It grants "any person" clear access to "identifiable" public documents.

Under that law, a person need give no reason for wanting to see a document. And each federal agency is required to adopt "clear and workable" regulations explaining how the public can get copies of the agency's records.

Disclosure of information is to be the general rule—no longer the exception—according to guidelines laid down by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel. All individuals are to have equal rights of access to the records, and the burden of proof is put on the Government to justify the withholding of a document, not on the person who wants it.

The law allows the Government to withhold only nine types of records—and even they may be released at the discretion of officials in charge. The records exempt from mandatory disclosure include mainly papers per-

taining to national security, law-enforcement investigations and trade secrets, and internal memoranda. See the complete list below.

Easing the burden. To help citizens obtain information to which they are entitled, the Government is taking a number of actions.

Federal Information Centers, where persons can get answers to questions concerning Government, now serve the nation's 73 most populous cities. The centers are located in 36 key cities, and 37 other cities are linked to them by toll-free telephone service. For a list of these cities, see page 50.

The Government Printing Office publishes and sells more than 24,000 books and pamphlets of virtually every size and description. These publications can be purchased either by mail or at any of the Printing Office's 20 bookstores around the country.

Nearly every federal agency has set up reading rooms, where the public can inspect records. Large agencies, such as the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, have reading rooms in 10 regional headquarters.

If a person seeking a federal document is turned down at first, he may ap-

peal to the head of the agency. If the decision is again unfavorable, he may sue in court to demand the document.

Under this law, thousands of documents have been released voluntarily to interested parties. But many were released only after court action.

Victories in court. Since the law became effective in 1967, some 200 freedom-of-information suits have been filed. In roughly half these cases, the Government has been ordered to produce the requested document. Examples:

The Consumers Union, publisher of "Consumer Reports" magazine, won the right to see raw scores from hearing-aid tests conducted by the Veterans Administration. The union wanted the scores for a magazine article on hearing-aid quality.

Ralph Nader's Center for the Study of Responsive Law—investigating the safety of handling pesticides—extracted reports on the subject from the Agriculture Department.

American Mail Line, Ltd., a steamship firm, forced the Federal Maritime Subsidy Board to turn over a memorandum used by the Board in denying the company a 3.3-million-dollar subsidy.

In cases involving access to information, courts—with some major exceptions—have tended to lean toward the public's right to know and have narrowly defined the Government's power to withhold information.

Courts have generally rejected broad interpretations of the exemptions for trade secrets and other commercial or financial information.

Courts have also leaned toward the public in this controversy: Should an agency's internal memoranda be made public?

The Government contends that such disclosure would inhibit "full and frank" advice from a Government technician to his boss. But courts have ruled that if a memorandum is the basis for the agency's final action, it becomes a public record and should be revealed.

On the other hand, courts have consistently refused to order the Government to produce information relating to defense and foreign policy.

The Supreme Court, on January 22, upheld the President's power, under the Freedom of Information Act, to classify documents for security reasons without his classification's being subject to review by a court.

That decision rejected attempts by 33 members of Congress to force the disclosure of secret reports on an underground nuclear test in Alaska in 1971.

Courts also have leaned heavily toward the Government's side in the protection of investigatory files and most records concerning personal matters.

No penalty. Critics have charged that enforcement of the Freedom of Information Act is weak. There is no single agency to administer it throughout the Government, and there is no penalty for officials who improperly withhold information. In addition, the appeal system is time-consuming and expensive.

The House of Representatives' Government Operations Committee, which held extensive hearings on the subject early in 1972, concluded that the law is being impeded by widespread delay and evasion on the part of federal officials. In a report published last Septem-

ber, the Committee said:

"The efficient operation of the Freedom of Information Act has been hindered by five years of foot dragging by the federal bureaucracy."

The Committee found that major federal agencies took an average of 33 days to respond to an individual's first request for information. If the request was denied and the person appealed the decision, the appeal process took an additional 50 days.

Persons seeking records are often discouraged by the high fees many agencies charge for compiling and copying requested data.

As an example, Harrison Wellford, attorney for Ralph Nader's Center for the Study of Responsive Law, won a two-year court battle requiring the Agriculture Department to furnish research reports about the safety of handling pesticides. Then he was told that the reports were filed in folders containing confidential information about the manufacturers, and that he would have to pay \$91,840 to cover the cost of separating the releasable reports from the confidential information.

"At that point," says Mr. Wellford, "we decided to try to find other means to get the information."

Best-kept secrets. Perhaps the most voluminous—and certainly the most protected—files are those containing military and diplomatic secrets. To "lift the veil of secrecy" from these files, President Nixon last year issued Executive Order 11652, replacing President Eisenhower's 1953 order. Mr. Nixon's instruction has two objectives:

First, to reduce the amount of material classified Top Secret, Secret or Confidential. These terms are defined elsewhere on this page.

Second, to declassify the files earlier and more systematically than in the past.

To make sure the new order is carried out, the President set up the Inter-agency Classification Review Committee, headed by John Eisenhower, son of the late President.

The task this committee faces is monumental in size. Officials at the National Archives say there are more than 760 million pages of classified documents dealing with the period 1942 through 1962 alone. David R. Young, executive secretary to the review committee, estimates that this mass is growing at the rate of nearly 200,000 pages a day.

Behind these bulging files is a legion of secrecy-minded bureaucrats, who often classify information for reasons that are, at best, obscure.

Instances are reported of officials' classifying newspaper clippings. A memorandum suggesting that use of the Top Secret classification be reduced was once circulated in the Pentagon—and "believe it or not, that memorandum itself was marked Top Secret," a security officer reported. This officer estimated that only one half of 1 per cent of all classified material in the Defense Department actually contains genuine military secrets.

Why are Government officials so eager to classify their records? President Nixon recently suggested one reason when he said: "Classification has frequently served to conceal bureaucratic mistakes or to prevent embarrassment to officials and

Administrations."

Fewer classifiers. To curb abuses, the number of federal officials authorized to classify documents has been reduced sharply—from 43,586 to 16,238. In the Central Intelligence Agency, the number authorized to stamp Top Secret has been cut by 86 per cent.

Now, for the first time, agencies are required by the Nixon Administration to compile and maintain complete lists of employees who are authorized to wield classification stamps.

The White House also has tightened the rules concerning the kinds of information which can be classified. In the past, material could be classified if its originator had even the remote expectation that disclosure could cause damage to national security. Now, under Mr. Nixon's instruction, such information can be classified only if disclosure "could reasonably be expected" to endanger national security.

Also, in the past, classified information remained classified for 30 years—often long after it ceased to be dangerous to U.S. interests. Now, the new Nixon order requires automatic declassification after 10 years unless reasons are given in writing for keeping the information on the hidden lists. Even then a person can challenge the classification and demand its review.

Costly task. Declassifying the existing files will take decades—and be expensive. Just to complete the review of World War II records by 1975 will cost an estimated 4 million dollars—and Congress has appropriated only 1.2 million for that purpose.

Still, officials believe the Nixon order has improved access to classified documents. David Young reports that, of 177 requests for declassification in the first three months of the new system, 83 requests were granted in full and 4 in part. Another 52 have been denied and 38 are still pending.

Requests granted include those for release of papers relating to the exchange of Soviet spy Rudolph Abel for the CIA pilot Gary Powers, and the 1957 visit to Moscow by the late German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

Complaints continue, however. Lloyd C. Gardner, a Rutgers University historian, has been trying in vain for 10 years to get State Department papers on origins of the Korean War. He says: "For misdirection, subterfuge and circumlocution, there has been nothing like this bureaucratic performance since the old-fashioned shell game."

"The New York Times," after being turned down on 28 out of 31 requests for foreign-policy information, charged that the new system actually reduces access to classified documents because now an inquirer must specify the document he wants to see—and few outsiders can know precisely which document contains the information they want.


Despite all the recent changes, there is general agreement that it is still a complex, expensive and time-consuming job to get information from Government files—civil or military.

This has led to growth of an industry in Washington:

More than 15,000 lawyers and other representatives of 1,600 business and professional associations are employed at

digging out hard-to-get information sought by their employers.

Nevertheless, the balance is clearly shifting—away from the Government's desire to keep its files secret, and toward the public's right to know.



Under an executive order issued by President Dwight Eisenhower on Nov. 5, 1953, information requiring protection in the interest of national security can be classified in three categories—with access depending upon the security classification of a Government official or, in limited cases, a private citizen involved in Government work.

TOP SECRET: "Shall be applied only to that information or material the defense aspect of which is paramount, and the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in exceptionally grave damage to the nation, such as leading to a definite break in diplomatic relations affecting the defense of the United States, an armed attack . . . or the compromise of military or defense plans or intelligence operations, or scientific or technological developments vital to the national defense."

SECRET: "Shall be authorized . . . only for defense information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the nation, such as by jeopardizing the international relations of the U. S., endangering the effectiveness of a program or policy of vital importance to the national defense, or compromising . . . defense plans, scientific or technological developments important to national defense, or information revealing important intelligence operations."

CONFIDENTIAL: "Shall be authorized . . . only for defense information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which could be prejudicial to the defense interests of the nation."

WHERE TO GET FACTS FROM THE GOVERNMENT

Need information from or about a Government agency or department? If it is not convenient to get it directly from the agency's headquarters in Washington—

Federal Information Centers have been set up in 36 major cities. In addition, residents of 37 others may dial these centers toll free.

At the centers—listed in the telephone directory—federal employees either provide the answers sought or refer the inquirer to an agency which can do so. Cities with such centers and those with toll-free connections to centers (in parentheses) are:

NORTHEAST: Boston (Providence); Buffalo (Rochester, Syracuse); Newark (Trenton); New York City (Albany, Hartford, New Haven); Philadelphia (Scranton); Pittsburgh.

SOUTHEAST: Atlanta (Birmingham,

Charlotte); Baltimore; St. Petersburg (Jacksonville, Tampa); Miami (Ft. Lauderdale, West Palm Beach).

NORTH CENTRAL: Chicago (Milwaukee); Cincinnati (Columbus, Dayton); Cleveland (Akron, Toledo); Detroit; Indianapolis; Kansas City, Mo. (St. Joseph, Topeka, Wichita); Minneapolis; Omaha (Des Moines); St. Louis.

SOUTH CENTRAL: Ft. Worth (Dallas); Houston (Austin, San Antonio); Louisville; Memphis (Chattanooga, Little Rock); New Orleans (Mobile); Oklahoma City (Tulsa).

MOUNTAIN: Albuquerque (Santa Fe); Denver (Colorado Springs, Pueblo); Phoenix (Tucson); Salt Lake City (Ogden).

PACIFIC: Honolulu; Los Angeles; Portland; Sacramento; San Diego; San Francisco (San Jose), and Seattle (Tacoma).

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, March 6, 1973

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

CIA on the Trail of a Book

By Jack Anderson

The eloak-and-dagger boys at the Central Intelligence Agency are trying to get an advance copy of a book which is highly critical of the CIA's "dirty tricks department."

The author, ex-Air Force Col. J. Fletcher Prouty, was the Pentagon support officer for the CIA over a nine-year period. He did everything from supplying them with James Bond weapons to shipping three dozen lobsters to a CIA bigwig. And he has written a book about it, "The Secret Team."

To get the unedited galley, the CIA library approached the distinguished Sidney Kramer bookstore only a few blocks from the White House. A representative of the bookstore immediately called Prouty and suggested he could "help the sale" of the book by providing a copy of the galley.

But Prouty had been in intelligence too long to be an easy touch. He agreed to meet with the Kramer representative and then secretly recorded their conversation. Here is a partial transcript:

"Do you represent others?" asked Prouty.

"I can tell you who wants this," confided the emissary. "They're on our backs—the CIA."

"They are?"

"Evidently someone was going to present them with a copy the day before yesterday," said the representative,

but the deal fell through.

Prouty refused to turn over the galley to the CIA, which had a messenger waiting for them at the bookstore. We can provide the CIA, however, with some of the highlights:

CIA Secrets

• The CIA, Prouty charges, trained agents in the Maine woods because of the similarity to the Russian fir forests. Then it flew them to Norway where they were hopped into Russia on a light pontooned plane which landed on a hidden lake.

• The CIA skillfully managed to keep out of the Pentagon Papers almost all mention of its assassination and other "dirty tricks" operations in South Vietnam, alleges Prouty. Instead, the CIA larded the Papers with examples of how good its intelligence proved to be.

• In 1959, one of CIA Chief Allen Dulles' spy planes allegedly was shot down over Russia. The crew was captured, questioned by Soviet intelligence and later quietly returned to the United States. (They were debriefed after their return, by, among others, James McCord, a former CIA man convicted in the Watergate scandal.)

• Even though the late President Kennedy ordered the Joint Chiefs to keep a tight rein on covert CIA military operations after the Bay of Pigs debacle, the CIA circumvented the order in Vietnam and the Pentagon supinely let

them get away with it, says Prouty.

Footnote: In an earlier incident, the CIA went to court to block a book by one of its former employees, Victor Marchetti. But Prouty was never on the CIA payroll. When we asked the CIA whether an attempt would be made to suppress Prouty's book, a spokesman said: "There are no plans whatsoever to do anything about the book."

GENERAL

FEBRUARY 3, 1973

THE NEW REPUBLIC

Legal Drugs, Illegal Abuse

Amphetamines and Barbiturates

by Peter J. Ognibene

A story in *The New York Times* several weeks ago caused quite a stir on the cocktail party circuit. It implied that a prominent New York City physician had administered amphetamines intravenously to President Kennedy in Vienna when he met Khrushchev there in 1961, and at other times. The physician allegedly gave similar preparations to other patients, many of them prominent in politics and the arts.

Amphetamines, or "speed," are a significant source of drug abuse among young persons, but they have also been misused by their elders. Until the recent clampdown led by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, American pharmaceutical manufacturers had been producing some eight billion doses of amphetamines each year. First marketed in the 1930s under the trade name Benzedrine, amphetamines have been used to treat narcolepsy, a rare disease whose victims fall asleep involuntarily and frequently. They have also been used to treat hyperkinetic children, another rare affliction. Treating these two disorders would justify the production of *thousands* of amphetamine doses a year, not *billions*.

Most legally prescribed amphetamines have generally been used for a less serious medical problem. Because they are an appetite depressant, many physicians have prescribed them for obese patients. In most instances, they have had only modest results: the average weight loss has been on the order of a few pounds. A controlled diet and exercise are more effective ways to lose weight. "Diet pills" are central nervous system stimulants, and some people who had them prescribed for obesity have used them as pep pills. They were also used that way by the armed forces of the United States, Great Britain, Germany and Japan during World War II to combat fatigue and extend alertness, and the American military continued their use after the war. In 1970 the House Select Committee on Crime reported "that one of the largest purchasers [of amphetamines] is still the US military establishment."

Unlike heroin, which is illicitly produced and thus never medically prescribed, amphetamines have been introduced to many people by doctors who regard them as wonder drugs of a sort. "Heroin," one government official who is responsible for controlling illicit drug traffic commented, "has the mystique as 'the killer drug,' but amphetamines and barbiturates are worse because they are available, medically respect-

able and you don't know you're getting hooked." Estimates of the number of heroin addicts (500,000-600,000) can be made on the basis of heroin-connected deaths, hepatitis cases and related phenomena, but amphetamine abuse is harder to measure because, except for the declining number of "speed freaks" who inject the drug intravenously, most abusers are pill poppers. Some who become dependent on them while under a doctor's prescription may be maintained on the drug by further prescriptions by doctors who are unaware of the drug's danger. (Some doctors, for instance, still do not believe amphetamines are addictive.)

Dr. Sidney Cohen, former director of the division of narcotic addiction and drug abuse at the National Institute of Mental Health, has told Congress that "the use of hundreds of times the average dose of amphetamines is physically addicting, meaning that tolerance builds up, and definite withdrawal symptoms occur when the drug is discontinued." Over extended periods of time, Cohen warned, "the use of very high doses of amphetamines . . . may lead to brain-cell changes." High doses may also lead to serious psychological problems and violence. Dr. Joel Fort, a professor at the School of Social Welfare at the University of California at Berkeley, believes that "on a typical run [prolonged heavy use] of speed, there develops severe paranoia (paranoia characterized by delusions and hallucinations, violence, etc.), a marked tendency to violence sometimes tragically leading to murder, and serious physical deterioration." A common hallucination is that "bugs" are crawling under the user's skin.

After prolonged use of speed, users "crash" and can sleep for more than a day. To counteract the fatigue and depression which follow, many turn to "downers" such as barbiturates or heroin. The "needle culture" of the speed freak makes the transition to heroin an easy one, and it was a step many of them took a few years ago when speed became less fashionable and heroin was relatively cheap and in large supply.

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and, more recently, the Food and Drug Administration have tightened federal controls on amphetamines and amphetamine-like drugs. Production has been cut by 83 percent, and the drugs are now subject to the strict regulations regarding security and record-keeping under Schedule II of the Controlled Substances

Act. One government official told me, with more than a little satisfaction, that the cut in manufacturing quotas for amphetamines has resulted in "a dying industry." He also noted that "doctors are not prescribing amphetamines as freely as they once did." The FDA is currently sending a "drug bulletin" to some 600,000 physicians and other medical professionals to encourage limiting the use of these drugs. (We have still to follow the example of Canada which on January 1 prohibited physicians from prescribing amphetamines and pharmacists from dispensing them except for narcolepsy and other rare diseases.)

Three years ago, the House Select Committee on Crime found that Bates Laboratories of Chicago "had shipped 15 million amphetamine tablets . . . to a post office box for an alleged drug store in Tijuana, Mexico." If one had taken literally the street address for this nonexistent drug store, it would have been located at "the 11th hole of the Tijuana Country Club golf course." The committee estimated that "more than 50 percent of these drugs manufactured in this country find their way into the illicit traffic" and that "more than 60 percent of the amphetamines and methamphetamines presumably exported to Mexico find their way back into the bootleg market in the United States." When one pharmaceutical firm, Strassenburgh Prescription Products of the Pennwalt Corporation, sought to renew its license to export amphetamines, BNDD ordered it to "show cause" why its application should not be denied. In this order BNDD alleged the company was ineffective in controlling its Mexican subsidiary, citing, in this instance, that 1.2 million doses of amphetamines from this subsidiary had been seized from illicit traffickers over a nine-month period. Strassenburgh subsequently dropped its renewal application. Other companies have curtailed amphetamine exports: some because of government pressure, others because of a belated recognition that the drugs were being diverted into illicit channels.

Amphetamine abuse seems to be on the decline. Some users have switched to another central nervous system stimulant, cocaine, which was popular in the 19th century and is now enjoying a comeback. Others have turned to heroin, but most have probably found barbiturates. Unlike amphetamines, whose legitimate medical uses are few, barbiturates have dozens of important uses. Although they are being abused on a larger scale than amphetamines ever were, the legitimate needs for barbiturates require billions of doses per year compared to the thousands of doses of amphetamines needed to treat two rare diseases. Hence, these drugs cannot be controlled by drastically cutting production quotas.

The person who takes speed and then discontinues its use before the addiction-psychosis-brain damage cycle is run can generally make a complete recovery. Although young drug users passed the word that "speed kills," death from an overdose of amphetamines is rare. Death from an overdose of barbiturates is not.

Since the turn of the century, scientists have found more than 2500 derivatives of barbituric acid, some 50 of which have been put to medical use as "sedative-hypnotics." All of them are central nervous system depressants, and some of the long-acting ones, such as phenobarbital, are important in treating epilepsy

and in controlling high blood pressure and peptic ulcers. The short-acting ones are commonly used as sleeping pills, and because their effects can be felt within minutes, they are the drugs of choice for abusers of barbiturates. This abuse potential led BNDD to recommend that nine of the short-acting barbiturates be put under Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act to increase the security under which the drugs are manufactured and distributed. The recommendation, which was sent to the FDA last November 16, requires the concurrence of the secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (and the director of BNDD) to put these drugs under Schedule II. One inevitable consequence of such action would be lower production of barbiturates: a move which could be opposed by some of the powerful pharmaceutical companies even though it is the laxity of their present controls that has permitted millions of doses of barbiturates to be diverted from legitimate channels into the illicit market.

Heroin and amphetamines have been characterized as "hard" drugs, whereas barbiturates have come to be called "soft" drugs. This erroneous distinction—no doubt a part of the heroin mystique—is dangerously misleading: there is nothing "soft" about these drugs. Although their effects are similar to those of alcohol, barbiturates are potentially the most lethal of all abused drugs. A small dose reduces social inhibition and produces a mild "high." A somewhat larger dose intoxicates and results in a loss of judgment and physical coordination. The next stage is a loss of consciousness from which the individual can be aroused. A higher dose produces a coma, and a sufficiently high dose results in death. With alcohol, the user generally passes out before he can drink enough to go into a coma, but with barbiturates, a killing dose can be ingested before even the first effects are felt. Barbiturate overdose, not surprisingly, has long been a leading method of suicide, but accidental death from such is also common. It will probably become even more prevalent if abuse of these drugs continues to rise.

In December, Senator Birch Bayh (D, Ind.), chairman of the judiciary subcommittee to investigate juvenile delinquency, issued a report: "Barbiturate Abuse in the United States." The subcommittee found that an increasing form of drug abuse involves mixing alcohol and barbiturates. Because one potentiates, or intensifies, the other, a small dose of barbiturates can have a more serious effect when taken with alcohol than when taken alone. Dr. David Lewis of the Harvard Medical School told Bayh's subcommittee that "death has been reported with as little as 300 milligrams of the short-acting barbiturate plus a couple of ounces of hard liquor." (A typical pill might be 100 milligrams.) In other words, taking alcohol with barbiturates drastically compresses the boundaries between a dose that merely intoxicates and one that can kill. In spite of the well-publicized "horrors" of heroin withdrawal, it is rarely fatal. But going "cold turkey" from a high level of barbiturate addiction may lead to convulsions, psychosis or even death.

Because heroin is expensive and lacks potency when taken orally, it is used intravenously. Short-acting barbiturates, by contrast, are effective within minutes after they have been swallowed. Some young drug experimenters, apparently unaware of this potency, have tried to inject barbiturates, often with horrible

results. The danger of an overdose is, of course, increased, but mistakes in making the injection—a likely result when earlier doses have impaired the user's motor functions—can maim, if not kill. If the vein is missed and the drug is injected under the skin, a painful abscess will result. If an artery is accidentally hit instead of a vein, gangrene can result. Dr. Max Gaspar, clinical professor of surgery at the University of Southern California School of Medicine, told the Bayh subcommittee that "six of the patients, or 30 percent of the first 20 we saw [who had injected barbiturates into an artery] have had amputations of part of the hand or foot."

Barbiturate abuse is also associated with violence. One barbiturate user told Dr. Roger Smith, the director of the Marin Open House (a drug treatment center), about the effect of mixing "uppers" and "downers": "Once you've got enough goofers [barbiturates] so you're ready to kill some cat, you have to shoot up the crank [amphetamine] so you get the energy to do it." Those who saw a recent NBC documentary, "Thou Shalt Not Kill," about two convicted murderers on death row in a Utah state prison, may remember that they described their murder spree with no signs of remorse. Those murders took place over several days in which they were drinking heavily and popping pills. The pills were pentobarbitals.

Illicitly manufactured barbiturates are essentially nonexistent because these drugs are easy to obtain and inexpensive. Some children need only reach inside the family medicine cabinet; others buy them on the street for a quarter apiece. The drug manufacturers are now making more than 10 billion doses a year, or 50 for every man, woman and child in the United States.

Two years ago BNDD required that thefts of barbiturates be reported, and in the first report (for the 12-month period ending April 1, 1972) more than seven million doses were reported stolen. BNDD audits for a two-year period (ending April 1972) showed an additional six million doses which could not be accounted for. Indeed, the normal route of legitimate barbiturates (from manufacturer to wholesaler to pharmacy to doctor or patient) and the lax controls of Schedule III make diversion of these drugs a relatively simple matter for drug traffickers with plenty of bribe money. Like BNDD, the Bayh subcommittee would put the nine short-acting barbiturates under Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act. The move, while no panacea, would seem justified.

Much has been written about treating addiction to heroin and other opiates, but less work has been done on the problems of amphetamine or barbiturate dependence. Although most government experts now concede that heroin addiction is past its peak and barbiturate abuse is on the rise, the federal drug treatment and prevention effort still seems to be directed exclusively to the heroin problem and the creation of more methadone maintenance treatment facilities. That heroin is still a serious problem and that more methadone facilities are needed are non-debatable, but there seems little justification for ignoring other forms of drug abuse which are every bit as lethal. An official at the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention conceded that his agency was doing little to help the barbiturate addict but said that something would be done within the next six months. Without questioning his agency's good intentions, one sees little *preparation* for a federal effort to curb amphetamine and barbiturate abuse. There seems to be a dearth of ideas about *how* to do it and what facilities will be needed. One SAODAP official suggested that existing hospitals were sufficient, but another official in the same agency who has directed narcotics treatment programs said it was "hard to get hospitals to take barbiturate addicts" because many doctors consider such addiction to be an "illegitimate medical problem."

Burglary and theft by heroin addicts are serious problems in every metropolitan area, and so there is strong public pressure to get addicts off the street. Methadone maintenance is one way, incarceration another. On the other hand, amphetamines and barbiturates are inexpensive, and those addicted to them rarely have the criminal "talents" of members of the heroin subculture; little property crime is associated with their abuse. The violence and property crimes these drugs do cause are usually contained within the users' subculture. Put another way, a speed freak is not likely to steal your color TV but a heroin addict is. Nonetheless, amphetamines and barbiturates have been taking a heavy toll in human misery, and a humane government should act to alleviate it. It remains to be seen whether this administration will commit itself to helping these addicts with the same zeal it has applied to getting heroin addicts into methadone maintenance where they are no threat to private property.

The New York Times Book Review
February 4, 1973

Licit and Illicit Drugs

The Consumers Union Report on Narcotics, Stimulants, Depressants, Inhalants, Hallucinogens, and Marijuana—including Caffeine, Nicotine, and Alcohol.

By Edward M. Brecher and the editors of Consumer Reports.
623 pp. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. \$12.50.

Drugs and the Public

By Norman E. Zinberg and John A. Robertson.

288 pp. New York: Simon & Schuster. Cloth, \$8.95. Paper, \$2.95.

Heroin

By Richard Ashley.

268 pp. New York: St. Martin's Press. \$6.95.

The American Heroin Empire

Power, Profits, and Politics.

By Richard Kunes, M.D.

250 pp. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. \$5.95.

By PETER STEINFELS and
ROBERT M. VEATCH

America has not one but several drug problems. That should be the first lesson of a book like the Consumers Union Report, "Licit and Illicit Drugs." One can catalogue them, as it does, by drug:

Five hundred and fifty billion "doses" of nicotine smoked yearly. One estimate has it that 250,000 to 300,000 smokers die prematurely every year.

Five million alcohol addicts—a conservative calculation—and perhaps as many as 9 million drinking their way to irreversible brain and liver damage. No other drug is so commonly a factor in homicides and suicides. Over half the highway deaths and over half the arrests made generally in the United States are alcohol-related. And traditionalists may be reassured: among high school and college students, alcohol remains the "drug of choice," beating out marijuana by roughly the same overwhelming margin President Nixon gained over Senator McGovern.

Marijuana, nonetheless, goes up in smoke at the rate of about 5 million cigarettes a day. In 1969, the director of the National Institute of Mental Health estimated there were 2 to 3 million "social users" of marijuana and 800,000 to 1,200,000 "chronic users."

Figures on use of LSD, amphetamines, cocaine, and barbiturates fluctuate like the stock market; currently, rumor has it that amphetamines are bearish, barbiturates bullish, and LSD a long-run steady gainer.

Heroin addicts? Estimates have ranged from 70,000 to 700,000 to 3 million. Several respectable estimates are grouped around 250,000-315,000.

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If the higher estimates were accurate, most of New York would have to be stolen three times over to support those habits. But how many "users" are there who are not "addicts"? No one knows. One legacy of our narcotics policies is that we now have no idea of the dimensions of the problem.

The common contention of these four books is that our drug problems, at least those involving illegal drugs, are as much the creation of the public policies meant to solve them as they are the result of the drugs themselves.

"Licit and Illicit Drugs," a Consumers Union Report, purports to deal with all nonmedical drug use; but it is not to detract from the considerable accomplishment of Edward M. Brecher and the Consumers Union editors to suggest that their inclusion of drugs like alcohol, caffeine and nicotine is less out of concern for these "licit" drugs in themselves, than for purposes of framing the question in a manner taking full advantage of their readers' favored vices. That sort of editorial value judgment may escape some readers who, under the spell of the Consumers Union name, naively believe that evaluating drugs and social policies can be as "objective" an enterprise as evaluating vacuum cleaners.

But Mr. Brecher should not be blamed for such readers. Of the four books, his is much the best at defining terms (a lucid examination of the meaning of "success" in addict treatment programs, for example); at reviewing research and reporting it, even when inconclusive or contrary to his own views. His book is not without errors or questionable judgments. In a field so boobytrapped with mythology, controverted points and sheer unknowns, no book could be—unless it eschewed declarative sentences altogether. "Licit and Illicit Drugs" remains a remarkably clear, comprehensive and commonsensical book in a very difficult area.

Although "Drugs and the Public," 36

by Norman E. Zinberg and John A. Robertson, also purports to consider drug use generally, it is written largely in the context of the debate over legalization of marijuana, which the authors see as something of a test case for forming a new public consensus about drugs. The book may seem pale in the harsher light of today's concern with the heroin question; but it makes a number of special contributions: its emphasis on "set and setting"—expectation and surroundings—in determining the effect of a drug; its review of research problems; its discussion of the British hysteria over marijuana, an interesting addition to the usual presentation of the calmer British response to heroin.

Richard Ashley's "Heroin" attempts a comprehensive statement of the heroin issue that parallels the Consumers Union Report in many ways and occasionally enlarges upon it. Ashley emphasizes the vast reaches of our ignorance about heroin addiction, and yet his book is fired by an anger at the dogmatism, short-sightedness, and cruelty of our drug policies, an anger that sometimes colors his presentation with a dogmatism of its own.

Richard Kunes's book "The American Heroin Empire" might well have been titled "A Radical Reader on Heroin"—were that not unfair to radicals. Large chunks of his book are simply page after page of verbatim quotation from whatever newspaper and magazine articles the author has encountered on the subject. Dr. Kunes has apparently kept himself blessedly free of any contact with the technical literature on heroin. His idea of proof for an assertion is simply that it can be found somewhere, anywhere, between quotation marks. The result is a book full of half-truths, untruths, innuendoes, anecdotal evidence and unverifiable statements—a disservice to the thesis it announces, that the heroin problem cannot be analyzed apart from the political, social and economic context in which it has arisen.

Of the many issues which these books treat in common, three deserve special comment: the question of morality and life styles, the question of addiction and the medical model, and the question of future heroin policy.

In "Drugs and the Public," for instance, Zinberg and Robertson recognize the concern with life style and symbolic meaning which is at the heart of much public feeling about drugs. They aim, in fact "to unravel the more emotional responses to nonmedical drug use" and "see why they have heated up the drug issue"; they do not wish to wring legal change from an unresponsive majority, but to establish it on a new consensus.

And yet one feels certain that so long as their own individualist and utilitarian predilections force them to treat moral factors as "emo-

tional" or "irrational," their goal will elude them. Whenever the word "moral" or "morality" appears in their text, it almost always denotes a less than real reality, contrasted with "utility" and destined to give way before it, rather than giving "utility" some of its meaning.

According to the authors, marijuana use has become a critical symbol in the struggle between an emergent youth, "vociferously sacrilegious in their critique of social institutions," and "older and more traditionally American social groups." This, the authors conclude, "explains the often irrational opposition to marijuana reform." Yet if this *Kulturkampf* between generations is all that the authors' description makes it, why is the elders' opposition on a critical symbolic point "irrational"? It seems to make perfect sense. Unless, of course, symbols are unimportant.

Zinberg and Robertson admit that legalizing marijuana would lead to its widespread use, "ultimately changing the drug habits of the country." Yet they hold no brief for "permissiveness." In such a bind, can the good from using drugs or banning them be limited narrowly to medical and psychological benefits? Do not the more intangible benefits and damages represented by the styles of life have to be included? A participant at a recent conference on psychoactive drugs declared that what the group was really discussing was the future of the human character. Much of the public vaguely seems to agree, and its uneasiness will not be allayed unless the issue is more candidly confronted.

A second theme recurrent in the discussion of drugs is the substitution of medicine for law enforcement. Frustrated with the obvious deficiencies in treating addiction as a crime, authors grope for any feasible alternative. The "medical model" is ready at hand, and these books, like many before them, speak loosely, and inconsistently, of "the British medical model," treating addiction as an "illness," replacing the policeman with the physician. Ashley, for example, approvingly describes the work of the Rolleston Committee, architects of the British heroin policy, as creating a system in which "physicians, not policemen, were made the arbiters of drug addiction treatment." The Consumers Union Report, recoiling from the shadow of government control, insists that physicians should have ultimate authority over admissions to methadone maintenance programs.

Traditionally, the full-scale "medical model" suggests that the condition being treated is organic or possibly psychological; the person being treated is labeled "sick," which implies that he should be exempt from normal social responsibilities, that he is not responsible for his condition, and that he has a right to medical treatment.

Obviously, there are ambiguities in the medical model, different elements which different authors would be more or less willing to accept. (The

public health variant, moreover, sometimes invoked against an "epidemic" of "contagious" drug abuse, introduces a specific element of coercion.) Certainly the medical model offers a long tradition of legal drug use in which to integrate the employment of narcotics. But the effect, of course, is finally to place control of the addict in the hands of the physician, who legitimizes the sick role. It is not clear that physicians are qualified for this "gatekeeper" task, nor that it should be theirs. The much-hailed British medical model was never quite that: surely no other disease rated a card file on individual "patients" in the Home Office. The polarization of criminal and medical models begs for further refinement.

As for the prospects for reform in the area of heroin laws, Zinberg and Robertson writing only a little earlier than the others, concluded that it is unlikely: "Heroin maintenance . . . is not being seriously considered by policymakers." On the other hand Brecher and Ashley (and Kunnes, to a limited extent) all recommend some form of heroin maintenance; it seems that the question has indeed been inscribed on the public agenda.

The first reason why this has happened is that, as Brecher and Ashley document so thoroughly, all efforts to "cure" heroin addicts of their addiction have failed miserably. "The first and most important step in solving the heroin problem," declare the Consumers Union editors, "is to recognize at long last what addiction to heroin means. Society must stop expecting that any significant proportion of addicts will become ex-addicts by an act of will, or by spending five years in prison, or a year or two in a prison-like . . . 'drug treatment center,' or even in a 'therapeutic community' Almost all addicts, it is true, do stop taking heroin from time to time. But almost all subsequently relapse. Among those who do not relapse, roughly half become skid-row alcoholics." No realistic program can be built on the few conspicuous exceptions.

But the second reason why the heroin problem may now face a different future is that it has acquired a past. "Sense can be made of the drug scene only in a historical setting," writes Brecher in "Licit and Illicit Drugs," and he compares his eye-opening discovery of "The Opium Problem," a classic (1928) historical study by Terry and Pellens, to Keats's first encounter with Chapman's translation of Homer.

There is a danger in viewing all our national issues in the light of the One Great Issue of recent years; but the history of America's efforts to suppress narcotics reads like some shadow Pentagon Papers. Ashley suggests the metaphor of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution for that ambiguous bill, the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, which the drug bureaucracy expanded into a platform for its all-cut war against the devil drug. Every failure to gain

victory by police action only called forth another escalation—new crusades, more arrests, longer sentences. Officials deluded the public with propaganda, and themselves with phony statistics. Politicians and ex-addicts hawking new weapons or new strategies repeatedly hailed the light at the end of the tunnel. No one dared ask: Why are we fighting this war, and do we want to? Meanwhile, we worsened the situation in order to save it.

History's other lesson is the reminder that in 1914 the United States probably had more narcotics addicts per capita than it does today—but without the accompanying vice, corruption, crime and violence. Addiction was considered no blessing, to be sure; but it was the kind of curse under which both eminent and humble citizens managed to live out their lives (the typical addict was a white, affluent woman over 40); and not the catastrophe of today.

The question that arises, then, is whether methadone maintenance is a temporary "Vietnamization" of a solution, or whether it is a solid negotiated settlement. Brecher and the Consumers Union editors endorse swift expansion of methadone programs together with experimental efforts at heroin maintenance. Ashley rejects methadone and opts for having private physicians prescribe heroin. Kunnes still seems to hope in slow heroin or methadone withdrawal when combined with radical political education.

The debate turns on both technical and political issues, which could be more thoroughly aired than they are in these books. Does methadone maintenance threaten new forms of government control? (The authors who say yes, like Ashley, often don't recognize that the same arguments apply to heroin maintenance.) Can addicts be stabilized on heroin? Is the long action of methadone so important for avoiding the ups and downs of the heroin cycle? Is the real advantage of methadone simply the ethical and political acceptability of not supplying people with euphoria? But what if a sizable percentage of addicts want their euphoria? What about diversion to the black market, and the problems of users who may or may not be addicts? This is where the debate should be, not pursuing a will-o'-the-wisp like life imprisonment for pushers.

Neither the recommendations of "Licit and Illicit Drugs," nor those of the other books, will solve the drug problem; they may solve what has been called "the drug problem." They will not—as some liberals hope—remove crime from our streets; poverty, injustice and corruption from our cities; foolishness from our children; and weakness from our fellows and ourselves. We will have simply ceased to exacerbate these conditions. History may have taught us the benefits of modesty. □

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
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A land risen from the hashish

When the peasants of Ketama in Morocco started growing kif instead of crops a lucrative trade in illegal hashish became switched on. But while the smugglers stand to make a fortune from the boom, reports HENRY AUBIN, the Moroccans are losing out financially and culturally.

"LIFE IS better now," said the smiling, wizened Rifian tribesman, waving his arm toward the terraced hillside where his wife and daughters were harvesting the plots. "Now that we have changed our crops we are all richer." The hillside was cultivated with a head-high plant which, from a distance, looked like corn. But it was kif, the illegal, marijuana-like plant which yields hashish, several times more potent to smoke and more profitable to smuggle than regular pot.

From this peasant's fields, and from thousands like it in the rugged Rif mountains surrounding the town of Ketama, hashish flows to North America and Europe by the ton. Some individual traffickers have purchased up to 11,000lb. of the drug for shipment to North America.

The Moroccan Government, closest ally of the United States in North Africa, officially prohibits the cultivation, use, sale or transport of kif and hashish. But, in fact, it makes no effort to enforce its drug laws within a sanctuary zone of at least 1,000 square miles around Ketama. The US Embassy in Rabat is aware of this, yet expresses satisfaction with Moroccan drug control efforts; and the US Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), from its year-old, one-man outpost in Rabat which monitors drug traffic to America from North Africa, asserts that no significant amount of Ketama hashish reaches the United States.

But the international traffickers who stream here from the West disagree. Some call Ketama the biggest source of hashish west of Lebanon.

The hashish boom here is recent. In the mid-1960s several Algerians, accompanied by Frenchmen, visited the Ketama area and saw it as a potential gold mine. They saw that kif already grew abundantly here, though on a much smaller scale than today, without interference from the authorities. The Rifian peasants did not know how to make hashish from kif, but the visitors knew that once they began to make it, they would have little trouble getting it to the West, where the demand for intoxicants stronger than marijuana was high.

This was true because hashish is compact and easier to smuggle than regular pot. Hashish (or hash) comes in compressed bricks, whereas kif or marijuana is bulky, consisting of crushed leaves and twigs. The Ketama area, perched on the north-western shoulder of Africa near the Straits of Gibraltar, is ideally accessible to its Western markets. Within a day's drive of Ketama, a trafficker can reach three ports with ferries to Spain or France, two ports with freighters to North America and northern Europe, four international airports and—for particularly big hauls—several isolated fishing villages on the Mediterranean where boats are available for smuggling operations.

The Algerian-French entrepreneurs gathered large amounts of kif from the peasants and began transforming it into one of the world's strongest,

smoothest varieties of hash. After that, said the old Rifian tribesman, "We saw how much money the Algerians were making. They had a little factory in which they made the hashish from the kif flowers. We all went over to watch. It was easy to learn."

The process is simple: the kif flowers are sifted through a wire screen, producing a coarse brown powder. This powder is then rubbed through a cotton cloth. Some of this extract is pressed into bricks to be sold to traffickers; some is rubbed through the cloth a second time before pressing, and some is filtered a third time.

Each of these siftings corresponds to one of the three main grades of Ketama hash. The top grade sells here for about \$80 a kilo, second grade for \$65, and third grade for \$55. In the United States, the price for top grade is about \$4,000 a kilo.

"I used to grow maize," said the tribesman, speaking a mixture of Rifian Berber dialect, Arab, Spanish, and French. "In 1969 I switched to kif. Some people in these mountains switched a year before some a year after. But now we've all switched. When I grew maize, I did not make much money. To make enough money I had to work on the roads for the Government. Or I had to work at the lumber mill. Sometimes I took kif with me and went to Casablanca and Essaouira (cities about 300 and 500 miles away), where I sold it." In those days, most of his customers were Moroccans.

In all, he calculated, he used to earn about \$300 a year, typical for this area which is one of the poorest in Morocco. "But since I've been growing nothing but kif and making hashish, I've not had to get jobs." After expenses, he said, he's more than doubled his annual income, to about \$700. From his point of view it's a lot. "We used to have nothing," he said. "Now we have something."

His tea service was new. He and his family slept on new mattresses instead of on reed mats. He could afford cigarettes. His adobe house has a new tin roof. And though he himself wore the djellaba, or hooded robe, of the traditional peasantry, his sons wore Western-style tee-shirts and bell-bottomed slacks.

Hashish production is rapidly increasing; peasants say last September's harvest was a record. "Soon I will make more money," the old man said, leading his visitor to two new garage-sized adobe buildings a few yards from his home. "These will be my factories," he said.

As soon as the harvested kif had dried in the sun, he said, he would hire 10 to 15 persons, mostly old men and boys, at \$2 a day to process the kif into hash. "There is so much kif this year," he said, "that my family and I need help in making it into hash." Inside one of his garages were five polyethylene sacks stuffed with khaki-coloured kif flowers. Four of the bags were three feet high and about five feet around; the fifth was five feet high and nine feet around. The peasant said the contents, 2,000 kilos of unrefined hash, were only

about half of this year's crop. It takes about 100 kilos of kif to make a single kilo of refined hash.

"Hashish is very good," the old man said. But he could not afford to smoke it himself. Moroccans generally prefer the traditional, less concentrated kif, which gives a gentle high—and even that is smoked sparingly, and by a distinct minority, in most areas.

The peasants' profits from hashish are dwarfed by those of the European and American traffickers. Yet there seems to be little resentment or feeling of exploitation here. One

reason for the disparity in profits is that the hashish-producing peasants, fragmented into several tribes and hundreds of hamlets, have yet to organise an effective price system.

The desperate competition among the suppliers is evident along the three twisting roads that lead into Ketama. As far as 40 miles from the town, incoming cars encounter knots of ragged boys who stand in the road to halt traffic and thrust samples of hash through car windows, shouting prices alternately in German, French, and English.

Ketama itself consists of a filling station, a police station, enough ramshackle buildings to accommodate about 20 persons, and one de luxe, Government-affiliated hotel. Many of the town's residents are young middlemen—often the sons of the peasant producers—who accost traffickers and tourists in a variety of languages. "Hey, man," said one young Rifian berber who wore love beads and long hair, affecting hippie jargon, "can I lay some sweet hash on you?"

The town's trading centre is the four-star, 67-room Hotel Tidighine, privately operated by the Maroc Tourist chain but controlled by the Government through its investments. Middlemen cluster on its outside steps accosting guests, and have the run of the lobby. They also solicit customers at the bar, in the dining room and even in the "guests only" swimming pool, where they discreetly exhibit sample bricks of hashish.

Asked if anyone has ever been arrested at the hotel, an employee laughs. Enforcing the law is a police problem, he says, not a hotel problem, and the police here don't mind.

At the police station, officers insist that the fields of kif seen from the highways do not exist. "Monsieur, you are mistaken," a sergeant said sternly. "It is strictly illegal to grow, sell or transport kif in this country, and the law is strictly observed."

Minutes later, the sergeant and other officers looked on within earshot as four dealers greeted the visitor with the day's prices. "Ketama's far out, man," says one Detroit hippie. "I never thought I'd see it, you know, marijuana blowing in the breeze like that, rows and rows of it. They got a really friendly place, you know, even the cops. It's like an industry."

The sanctuary-like character of the region ends abruptly, however, some 20 to 50 miles outside Ketama, depending on which way the traveller is going. Police roadblocks and searches are among the problems a dealer may

encounter as he tries to leave the area.

"The rule of thumb," said a dealer from New York, "doesn't make much sense but it goes like this: you can grow kif in Ketama, you can process it into hash, and you can buy it there without worrying about it. But if you try to take it out of there you can get caught—though it's not likely. It's sort of like being allowed to counterfeit money but not to spend it, and that's a pretty hard system to enforce. It's a weird arrangement, but I'm not complaining." He was working solo on a shipment to Los Angeles that he said would net him about \$60,000.

Experienced traffickers reportedly have little difficulty getting their shipments past the police. Some use bribes, some take back roads and others hire Moroccans to take the hash outside the Ketama area. According to one close observer, "Most of the people who get arrested are casual, amateur types who haven't paid off the right people."

Large shipments of a ton or more are sometimes organized by teams of European or American dealers, four or five men each driving his own car. Secret compartments—usually on the underside of the cars—are loaded with hashish in special garages provided by middlemen in Ketama. (The cars are concealed there from informers who, under a widely rumored arrangement, get a cut of the bribes and the hash seized at roadblocks when they tip off police to a big shipment.) The hash-laden cars are then driven over unpaved, unguarded roads to isolated fishing villages on the Mediterranean coast, 40 miles north, where the bricks are transferred to yachts or fishing boats bound for Europe.

Arrests of persons with drugs are frequent—72 Americans last year, according to US consular officials—but the big groups are rarely caught, and penalties are generally light.

"When you get to Morocco," says one American hippie, "Forget everything you've ever heard about rotting for years and years in some Third World dungeon." An American caught with only enough hashish for personal use can expect a few nights in gaol and a \$75 fine at the most. A first offender arrested with a smuggler's portion can expect a maximum penalty of eight months inside and an \$300 fine.

Only one US professional has been caught in recent years, and he had only 33 kilos in his possession. The trafficker, Robert Ryan, a 32-year-old Californian, was betrayed by a Moroccan contact who had brought the hash to him from Ketama to Casablanca. Ryan is serving a two-year term, three times that given any other American, because of his alleged connections with a foreign heroin ring.

The big-time buyers are greatly outnumbered in Ketama by amateurs. Scores of them, often backpackers or hitchhikers, pass through the area daily—especially during the summer tourist season—and make relatively small purchases. They are the ones who invariably get stopped.

"To the best of my knowledge," says an American diplomat, "every American arrested so far this year has been a long-hair type between the ages of 18 and 25. Never fails."

The lesson is obvious: smugglers who look straight do not generally get hassled. Most of the big-timers know this. One Ketama source notes that all his major customers are clean-cut types, often over 30. They pass as middle class tourists.

Those amateurs who try taking their Ketama hash out of the country are often more earnest than shrewd. Some examples:

—A young New Yorker filled a used car engine with 16 kilos of hash and tried shipping it via air freight to California from the Casablanca airport. The postal officials accepted the pack-

age, then became suspicious and grabbed the bearded youth before he got out of the airport parking lot.

—A 23-year-old Brooklyn hippie tried mailing six kilos home in a camel saddle. He was caught, but he said it was his second effort: the first time it had worked.

—A Georgetown university law student was arrested last summer with 10 kilos in his car as he left the sanctuary area round Ketama. His main error: he also had a pistol with him, a serious offence in Morocco where civilians are forbidden to carry firearms. His bribe offer was spurned, and was in fact added to the list of charges against him.

—An American about to board a home-bound freighter in Casablanca was caught with a 30-kilo burlap bag of hashish on his shoulder. He was unaware that Moroccan Customs officials sporadically search people departing the country as well as entering it, unlike Customs in Europe or the US.

—A young man paid prison authorities in Casablanca \$6,500, he said, to lose his records and release him after serving eight months of a three-year smuggling sentence. Sure enough, he was freed at that time anyway, regardless of his bribe, since eight months is the maximum time served by a first offender.

For many Moroccans the hashish boom is most important for its indirect cultural effect on their country. The abundance and cheapness of drugs, as well as the lightness of the penalties, is helping to draw tens of thousands of young Westerners to Morocco every year.

There are other factors, too, for Morocco's sudden popularity: the warm climate, the low-key lifestyle, the friendly people and Arab culture. But at the camp sites springing up around the countryside and in the houses that hippies are renting by the dozen in the cities, drugs are integral.

The main cities for the consumption of hashish and kif, almost all of which originate from the Ketama area, are Marrakesh, Tangier, and Essaouira. Here, stacks of hash pipes, chillums, and other smoking paraphernalia are as common as postcard racks. There are also "free smoke" cafés where foreigners can light up without risk.

Because of the large numbers of drug-oriented young Westerners, and because of the fascination they exert on young Moroccans, their impact on this traditional Islamic culture is increasingly apparent. Many Moroccan teenagers ape the visitors, wearing long hair and bellbottoms. They seek their friendship, looking up to them as a kind of cultural and social varsity.

Increasingly, traditionalists are complaining that the young generation is neglecting Islam, turning its back on Morocco's true cultural identity and trying to turn into pseudo-Westerners. They complain that smoking drugs and drinking alcohol which used to be exceptional, are now becoming general.

The Government of King Hassan II, himself widely regarded as a mod, European-style swinger, has a mixed response to all this. At Ceuta, hippies are required to get haircuts before entering the country; but hair is ignored at other border crossings. Last summer the Government sponsored an international jazz festival at Tangier, which only increased the influx of Westerners and their influence.

The opposition newspaper, L'Opinion,

recently called on the Government to step up its "quasi-campaign" against the drug culture. But it did not employ the anti-drug arguments of Western conservatives; hippies pose a quite different kind of problem in the Third World.

What validity the counterculture might have as a recourse from the values of industrialised society, the newspaper suggested, did not hold true in this underdeveloped kingdom. What Morocco needs of its young generation is dynamism and hard work to bring the country up out of poverty. Drugs, it said, are only a way to escape reality.

"Hippies . . . are a dangerous phenomenon which the authorities tolerate . . . in distracting our youth from its true problems," the paper said, adding: "In cafés one can find them engaged in destroying all which is good in our youth. They are teaching them a language which has nothing in common with our reality. They are popularising destructive ideas (and are) propagating drugs—kif and hashish—in the midst of our youth which we are impatiently waiting to take in hand the destiny of this country."

There is an apparent discrepancy between the vigilance voiced by President Nixon against drugs of the marihuana, or cannabis, family and the attitude encountered at the embassy here in Morocco. There is also a discrepancy between what the pro-Government newspapers here hail as King Hassan's struggle against kif and what goes on in the field.

"There's little sense of moral outrage by Morocco towards pot," one junior US diplomat observes. "In Spain, where they imprison kids for five years for having a few grams of drugs, and in a lot of countries, people see pot almost as a threat to their way of life, but kif has been in Morocco a long time and there's not much outrage."

There is a tone of righteousness in the voices of some foreign traffickers as they discuss their dealings in Morocco. As one young, bearded New Yorker, a solo operator, put it, "The question is, who's getting hurt by all this? Nobody. My people in the States aren't getting hurt—they love the stuff and they aren't getting their health messed up like with alcohol or heroin."

"And my suppliers, the peasants, they aren't getting hurt. They're poor and they're making more money this way than they could any other. And me, I'm getting real rich. Morally this is a clean operation."

One young engineering student from Southern Morocco, who says he got radicalised during his studies in France, isn't so sure. "Ketama," he says, "is the same old story. It's very much like a metaphor for the industrialisation pattern you see everywhere in Morocco. The Western businessmen come in and build a tyre factory or a bank or a Holiday Inn, and they let Moroccans work there in the lower positions—and maybe in a few token executive positions."

"But the bulk of the profits leave Morocco. They flow to the West. Very little stays here, but our Government accepts the arrangement because it helps the unemployment problem and we make a little money off taxes. It's one way the gap between the rich countries and the poor countries gets bigger."

"Ketama's a lot like that in an unstructured way. Westerners make millions. The peasants who make the hashish live in poverty. It's the same kind of exploitation."—Washington Post.

BALTIMORE SUN
4 March 1973

Chinese gangsters run heroin trade efficiently

Hong Kong (Reuters)—Chinese gangsters are smuggling heroin throughout Southeast Asia and into the United States and Europe.

The so-called "Chinese connection" starts in the hills of southern Burma and stretches through Bangkok, Thailand, and Hong Kong to the Chinatowns of New York and London.

It branches through Saigon and Manila and operates with all the secrecy and skill of the Mafia.

Top Hong Kong government officials and veteran narcotics investigators see little prospect of any improvement in the situation.

In the rugged Shan states of southern Burma, opium poppy growing is controlled by a Chinese-Burmese identified by senior American diplomats as Lo Hsing-han.

Reports of Burmese government operations against poppy-growing Lahu tribesmen were welcomed here but investigators said that the Rangoon government had not made a concentrated attempt to ban opium cultivation.

"The terrain is so difficult up there," says one anti-narcotics agent, "that you can hardly land a helicopter. You either walk or ride a donkey."

From Burma, the opium is transported secretly through northern Thailand to Bangkok, despite Thai government campaigns to stem the flow and American technical and financial assistance.

Officials in Hong Kong say the supply of drugs from Thailand has not been reduced in recent months.

Chinese-Thai gangsters, mostly from the Chiu-Chow region of the south China coast and linked by Mafia-style loyalties, control the Bangkok operation, according to the investigator.

They convert the opium into "999" brand morphine and send a trusted lieutenant by

air to Hong Kong to negotiate a sale. At the same time, the morphine (or in some cases, raw opium or manufactured heroin) leaves Bangkok aboard a Thai trawler that chugs slowly up the south China coast.

After he makes a sale with one of about 10 Chiu-Chow gang bosses in Hong Kong, the man from Bangkok sails out of Hong Kong harbor in a junk to a secret rendezvous with the Thai trawler, often in unpatrolled Chinese territorial waters near Hong Kong.

He produces one half of a torn bank-note and matches it with the half held by the trawler captain, whom he has never seen before.

The drugs are transferred to the junk, and later to smaller sampans. The trawler sails back to Bangkok and the Thai-Chinese flies home, his work completed.

Within hours, the junk and sampans have slipped quietly into the harbors of Hong Kong or Macao, Portugal's 6-square mile territory 40 miles across the Pearl River estuary.

Eventually, after a series of secret exchanges between contacts who do not know each other, the morphine is delivered to a heroin factory in Hong Kong.

These factories, which can operate in one room of an apartment with little fear of detection, serve both the British colony's addict population of about 80,000 and a growing export market.

On the streets, the deadly white powder, often 90 per cent pure heroin, is retailed by experienced peddlers and often by street gangs known as "triads," who also specialize in extortion and brothel-keeping.

James Chien of the Society for the Aid and Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts says that most addicts he handles "are sold on the idea that the traffickers enjoy a certain protection."

Dr. L. K. Ding of the Dis-

charged Prisoners Aid Society, claims bluntly that "it is open knowledge that the police are protecting drug pushers."

But the police anti-corruption branch says it has not found any evidence to back up this charge.

Hong Kong addicts place their heroin powder on tinfoil, burn a match beneath it and inhale the fumes in their mouth either through a paper tube called "chasing the dragon," or a matchbox cover known as "playing the mouth organ."

Others put heroin grains on the end of a cigarette, point the cigarette skywards, light it and inhale. This method is described as "shooting the ack-ack gun."

Addiction has taken such deep root in the colony that the prison commissioner, Tom Garner, says 76 per cent of all admitted convicts are found to be addicts and 48 per cent are arrested on drug offenses.

About 10 per cent of Mr. Garner's convicts have sporadic access to heroin even when in prison.

Hong Kong's energetic Narcotics Bureau and Preventive Service have been making large seizures of morphine, heroin and opium but report that the street price rarely increases.

No one knows how much heroin leaves Hong Kong for the United States and Britain.

The colony is virtually a free port with little control over goods being exported, and it is virtually impossible to identify the source of heroin captured in other cities.

But, an experienced international investigator here says Hong Kong may be supplying up to 10 per cent of all America's heroin imports.

American agents have arrested a Hong Kong Chinese, allegedly carrying heroin away

from a freighter docked in Miami and they have also detained a man identified as the "unofficial mayor" of New York's Chinatown.

The United States-based Mafia has rarely, if ever, ventured as far as Hong Kong to buy heroin. "They don't have to," the international investigator said. "They can buy from the Chinese in the United States."

In Britain, authorities have arrested several Chinese with links to Hong Kong, including one man found with what was said to be "enough heroin to supply the known British market for two years," and handed down stiff jail terms.

One top Hong Kong narcotics expert says he believes substantial quantities of heroin are being smuggled regularly into Britain, possibly with stop-overs in West Germany or Belgium.

The "Chinese connection" has been linked to the extensive heroin trade in Saigon. In Manila a Chinese-Filipino was recently executed by a firing squad after being found guilty of operating a heroin factory.

The investigators here believe that one solution to the problem might be the establishment of an opium-buying monopoly in Thailand.

According to this theory, the monopoly would buy up all available opium at acceptable prices and help farmers to substitute other cash crops for the deadly poppy. It would also pick up a great deal of Burmese opium.

But, no one here is optimistic. "It is fairly safe to assume that we are going to have this problem for some time to come," says a drug rehabilitation expert, Dr. J. B. Holinrake. "If the present trends continue, the problem is going to get worse, especially for the younger segment of our population," he said.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Sunday, Feb. 18, 1973

Opium War Is Called Hopeless

By Anne Head
London Observer

PARIS — The American campaign to cure heroin addiction by stopping the growth of opium poppies is like trying to cure alcoholism in France by pulling out vineyards, says economist Michel Lambert, coauthor of a new book on the economic and political structures of the major opium-producing countries.

The book, "Les Grandes Manoeuvres de l'Opium," by Lambert and journalist Catherine Lamour, has been widely discussed in the French press. It says that the economic situation of all current opium-producing countries is such that they must take the position that their own survival must come before the lives of addicts in Europe or the United States.

Iran, which stopped production in 1955 but started again in 1969, is cited by other states who are being urged to stop production by the countries with drug problems. The Iranian representative to the U.N. Narcotics Commission said: "Our economic situation has become so alarming we have been forced to take a unilateral decision" to resume production.

Lambert, after two years of intensive study and visits to all the opium-producing countries, says: "Even if production is stopped or effectively controlled in one country, any underdeveloped country with a large unemployed labor force can start production. This could be the case, say, for various South American countries, or Mexico."

American financial contributions to Turkey, as part of the considerable political pressure to stop the cultivation of the opium poppy after 1972, offer no encouragement to other opium-producing countries. Turkish authorities had estimated that stopping production would cost the country \$432 million; U.S. assistance has amounted to \$35 million.

Drug Companies

The authors say that major European pharmaceutical firms are also beginning to be wary of the American

campaign, fearing that reduction in the sources of legal opium will do nothing to reduce illegal supplies, and that official prices will soar. They point out that the patents for existing near-substitutes to morphine and codeine are held by American firms, whose continued investment in research is superior to that in Europe.

The authors say that pressure from pharmaceutical firms on various European governments has been such that representatives of these governments have unofficially informed the Turks that if they continue opium production next year their production would be bought by the European market.

As long as a country has not signed the United Nations 1953 protocol for the control of opium production there is no real means of stopping production "aimed at a home market," although a considerable part of that production may find its way to the illegal export market.

The book describes the immense profits involved. The average price for 22 pounds of opium — whether paid to a Turkish, Afghanist or Laotian farmer — is about \$500. This produces 2.2 pounds of heroin. The average market price of five milligrams of heroin mixed with lactose is \$5 in New York, so between producer and consumer the initial value has been multiplied 2,000 times. Financial backers for such eventful profits are not hard to find.

Huge Profits

In the American market, the financiers have no actual dealing with the drug. An American source cited in the book says that "shares" of \$100,000 are normally advanced which within six months can pay back as much as \$2 million. It is estimated that between 10 to 15 tons of heroin, originally costing around \$5 million, makes a turnover for the American dealers of \$9.8 billion. The U.S. government's budget for 1972 to combat narcotics amounted to \$315 million.

The book argues that the major opium-producing countries — Laos, Thailand, Burma, Afghanistan and Turkey — have internal political and economic problems, which in the long run, will outweigh any pressure exercised by the United States.

Tribal disputes and political tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan make neither anxious to interfere with Pushtu problems. The tribes are not intimidated by local police controls.

NEW YORK TIMES
25 February 1973

The Selling By the Pentagon

WASHINGTON—Ever since Senator Gerald Nye's investigating committee turned the spotlight in the 1930's on "the merchants of death" — the world's munitions makers—the United States has vacillated on whether it should provide arms to foreign countries.

Up to World War II, it was regarded as morally repugnant if not un-American to foist weapons on other nations. But the Marshall Plan and the Cold War changed all that: Wasn't it in the national interest to supply arms against the Communist tide? Then, as the allies got on their feet economically, the United States in the 1960's launched an aggressive program to sell arms rather than give them away. Critics charged that this was making the United States, for no good reason, into "the world's number one arms salesman," and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee succeeded in imposing Congressional restrictions on arms sold abroad on Government credit.

Now, under the Nixon Administration, the pendulum is swinging back toward promotion of foreign military sales. And last week it was disclosed that the Shah of Iran had contracted to buy more than \$2-billion worth of American arms—including helicopter gunships and supersonic jet fighters—in the biggest single arms deal ever concluded by the Pentagon.

The Iranian deal illustrates the pros and cons of the arms-sales debate that resounded in Congress in past years and is beginning to be heard again.

A basic argument against massive arms sales is that the United States is pushing arms in developing nations that might better channel what money they have into economic programs. The Iranian Government, for example, has vast oil revenues—yet the per-capita income of Iran's peasants is \$350 a year.

Maybe so, counter the arms-sale proponents, but who is the United States to tell the Iranian or any other government not to buy arms? Besides, they argue, by selling arms the United States gains enough leverage to dissuade the purchasing country from going overboard in its military spending.

Another argument made against promoting arms sales abroad is that it tends to exacerbate regional tensions and set off arms races. There may be some statistical support for this contention in a recent report to Congress by the United States Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency. The report shows that world arms trade increased from \$2.4-billion in 1961 to \$6.2-billion in 1971, with most of the growth going to regions of conflict or confrontation. American arms exports climbed from \$1-billion in 1961 to \$3.4-billion in 1971. (During this same 10-year period, Soviet arms exports grew from \$833-million to \$1.5-billion.)

The State and Defense Departments reject this line of argument by saying that arms sales are controlled by the United States so as to prevent arms races and to meet only the valid security requirements of the receiving countries. In selling to Iran, officials say, the United States is reinforcing a "point of stability" in the volatile and strategic Persian Gulf region. What will the Shah do with all the arms? The official explanation here is that he wants to build up a "credible deterrent" against Soviet adventurism on his northern flank and Soviet-supported Iraq to the west.

Seasoned observers, however, place more credence on less sophisticated reasoning. Ever since World War II, the underlying purpose of arms transfers has been to bolster, befriend and sometimes pay off an ally. The Iranian sale maintains a pro-Western ally in the oil-rich Middle East. The United States is providing some \$2-billion in arms to modernize the South Korean forces — officially so South Korea can stand up to North Korea but also in direct repayment for a South Korean contribution of two divisions during the Vietnam war.

Then there's the business angle. When pressed on the justification for the arms sales, policy-making officials in the Pentagon and State Department come around to the argument that if the United States does not sell the arms, some other country will. Thus, they point out, Congress imposed restrictions on military sales to Latin America starting in 1966. In the past five years, Western Europe and Canada have sold more than \$1-billion in arms to Latin-American countries; the United States about one-third that total. Before the Congressional restrictions, the ratio was almost exactly the reverse.

Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee had a tart comment on that last week. The United States, he said, had become an "arms salesman" in order to stop Communism, but is now continuing in that role in order to enhance its balance of payments. No so, retorted a top State Department official, Curtis W. Tarr, the purpose of arms sales is to "deal with the valid security requirements" of individual countries; the "business opportunities" are just a "byproduct."

What was never clearly explained in the former rounds of the arms sales debate and is yet to be explained in the new round is how "valid security requirements" are determined.

—JOHN W. FINNEY

WALL STREET JOURNAL

1 MAR 1973

Liquid AssetsMiddle East Oil Funds
Play an Increasing Role
In Monetary TurmoilDespite Earlier Assurances,
Arabs Helped Sink Dollar;
Iraqi Aide: 'We Profited'

'How Can You Blame Them?'

By CHARLES N. STABLER and RAY VICKER
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL


The prospects for any lasting stability in the world's monetary system seem dubious indeed. And a major reason is the role played by Middle Eastern nations in the turmoil in gold and foreign-exchange markets.

This is the gloomy conclusion of some international economists and other analysts, who have watched with alarm as oil money flooded first into Swiss francs, then into German marks and now into gold. How volatile money is involved in the current crisis can't be determined, but, whatever it is, the volume is bound to rise in future years. This means that a major and growing source of instability is being added to an international monetary system already tottering under massive money flows from international corporations and speculators. And, most analysts agree, there isn't much, if anything, that can be done about it.

"The problem poses nearly impossible dilemmas," says Walter J. Levy, a New York petroleum-industry consultant. "Any way you try to sterilize the money (from oil sales) or put rules on (the oil nations') use of these funds will just mean that they won't increase production" to meet the world's growing energy needs.

Oil on Troubled Waters

The Middle Eastern threat to the world's monetary system had been anticipated by many analysts. But prior to the recent flare-up of money troubles and the devaluation of the dollar Arab leaders had been making soothing statements. They would not, they said, use their funds to disturb the monetary

WASHINGTON POST
7 March 1973

Joseph Alsop

Global Wealth
Shifting From
West to East

The mystery of crises on the world money-market is so deep, for most Americans, that the drama chiefly excites the experts. But it is time to note that something akin to "The Decline of the West," that Oswald Spengler wrote about, lies behind the latest round of trouble for the U.S. dollar.

To get the current facts out of the way first, the present money crisis looks like ending with the dollar losing a lot more of its value against the world's stronger currencies. Add the probable new drop to the dollar-devaluation that took place a bit earlier. You then get the following approximate but quite likely total losses of value:

About 40 per cent of the dollar's former worth as against the Swiss franc.

Nearly 40 per cent of the dollar's former worth as against the Japanese yen.

And about 32 per cent of the dollar's former worth as against the West Ger-

market, like an excess of bilge in the hold of an unstable ship. By the same estimates, this figure will reach \$36 billion in three more years!

If you think about the matter historically, you can see that this is an intensely precarious, even untenable situation for the long run. The oil-rich Arab states, please remember, are uniformly weak militarily. With the possible exceptions of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, these states are also unstable politically. Their accumulation of such enormous wealth is like the accumulation of neat packages of billions upon billions of dollars on the open streets of the toughest neighborhood in a crime-ridden city, with no policemen within miles.

For the short run, meanwhile, these immense sums the oil-rich Arabs are accumulating must realistically be subtracted from the former wealth of the Western powers. Only 20 years ago, the U.S., Britain, France and other Western countries would have been raking in four fifths of the profits now going to the Arabs who happen to sit on the world's main oil-sources.

This drastic shift of a vital locus of wealth is only one part of a much larger story, moreover. Another part of the same story is the immense success of the Japanese economy in the last two decades, and Japan's consequent absorption of huge markets formerly Western-dominated. It should be noted, too, that Hong Kong and Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, have all been following in Japan's footsteps.

Nor is that the story's end, by any means. Like the famous cloud no bigger than a man's hand, which then

long, until the next money crisis."

Like international money managers everywhere, most Arab officials are closemouthed about their operations. But some are willing to talk.

"We profited from the devaluation of the dollar," an Iraqi government official says in Baghdad. In Kuwait, which reportedly threw hundreds of millions of dollars on the market in the days leading up to devaluation, a government agency now says: "Precautions had been taken in anticipation of possible devaluation." Similar reports come from Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. In Tripoli, a Libyan source says, "We have been protecting ourselves."

The Art of Self-Protection

In foreign-exchange trading, protection means cutting the risk of loss caused by a reduction in the value of foreign funds held, mostly dollars. When the dollar appears weak, these assets are exchanged for stronger currencies, such as the Swiss franc or mark. Then, if devaluation occurs, the upward revaluation of the strong currencies results in a profit. This profit affects the loss on dollars still on hand or on those sold earlier at low prices.

Kuwait, for example, has the equivalent of \$2.5 billion in officially held foreign-exchange assets. But, according to the finance ministry, only about \$300 million was "fully exposed" to devaluation of the dollar.

Reserves of Middle East nations are held as deposits with commercial banks, in Eurodollar investments, in gold and in financial instruments of various governments and agencies. Because the U.S. has frowned upon central-bank investments in Eurodollars—that is, dollars on deposit abroad—big European central banks have all but withdrawn from this market. But, central banks of smaller nations have taken their places.

One major American bank recently made a confidential survey of the Eurodollar market. It concluded that as much as \$15 billion of the \$80 billion total outstanding had come from central banks. A little under half that total may be from Middle Eastern and North African countries, one official of this bank says.

Money in the Eurodollar market may be transferred fast into a strong currency in any money crisis. Because any such money goes through commercial banks, it is almost impossible for any outsider to evaluate totals. A Middle Eastern nation, for instance, may have funds with a dozen different banks from First National City Bank to Union Bank of Switzerland in Zurich and from Bank of America to Deutsche Bank in Frankfurt.

If there is any dollar dumping, a foreign-exchange dealer may not know the source of it; he is usually dealing with commercial banks. Incoming dollars may be received by the dealer as if they were holdings of the banks rather than of their clients. Moreover, banks, mindful of the huge amounts of business that may be coming their way in the future from the Mideast, fear being connected in any way with discussions of customer habits and inclinations.

When one London branch of an American bank is asked for information, a spokesman pleads, "Don't even call us a New York bank. Say we are in Philadelphia." Then he relents to add: "All right, make it New York, but please don't call us a big New York bank."

Central-bank holdings, of course, represent only a part of the money in the Mideast. There are substantial private holdings in the Persian Gulf, in major Saudi Arabian cities and in Lebanon. One estimate, made by the Financial Times of London, places Kuwait's total foreign holdings at about \$6.6 billion, for instance.

Middle Eastern money is of special significance because that area can claim to be the world's fastest-growing store of capital. And the outlook for further gains in revenues from oil is staggering.

Economists at New York's Chase Manhattan Bank estimate that crude-oil production from the Middle East will double by 1985, rising to 40 million barrels a day, says John D. Emerson, a bank vice president. Saudi Arabia, probably destined to be the world's largest producer of oil, received about \$13 billion in oil revenue between 1960 and 1972. During the next 13 years, from 1973 through 1985, "a conservative estimate of Saudi Arabian receipts from oil is \$150 billion," Mr. Emerson says.

Problem: How to Spend Money

Add in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf states including Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and expected oil revenues would rise from \$27 billion during the last 12 years to \$227 billion this year through 1985, Mr. Emerson calculates.

Some of the revenue being collected by these Middle Eastern oil nations can be spent, of course, on domestic economic development. But Mr. Emerson says, "There are limits to the rate at which a country with a small, poorly educated population can spend money."

If one assumes that these countries can spend, say, 50% of their annual oil income on economic development and investment, their reserves of gold and foreign exchange will rise to well over \$100 billion in 1985.

"Entire world reserves currently amount to \$150 billion," Mr. Emerson says. He adds that he isn't trying to make an accurate prediction of how much Middle Eastern gold and foreign-exchange reserves will actually amount to but is "only trying to show you the extent to which their power and influence in the world of finance will grow."

And political influence will grow, too, some analysts fear. Already, Japan, which is even more dependent on Middle Eastern oil than the U.S. or Europe, "apparently feels it has to be very cognizant of Arab feelings when its delegates vote in the United Nations," one economist says in New York.

Some efforts are already underway to reduce the world's dependence on the Middle East for oil or somehow corral the financial and political problems this reliance brings. One idea: The U.S. could improve its bargaining position with the Middle East by building enough mammoth tanks or other facilities to store a two-year supply of fuel. The cost of this move would add an estimated 40 cents a barrel to the present \$3.50-a-barrel price of oil. Thus,

although expensive, the move would allow more effective bargaining on future supplies from Arab countries and would provide time for the development of other energy sources.

More immediately, private and official institutions in the West are trying to tap the Middle Eastern money pool for investments. This move is in line with Arab desires and would remove some capital from the "hot-money" flows that periodically disrupt foreign-exchange markets. However, for various political and economic reasons on both sides, prospects are slim for sopping up a substantial amount of oil money in this way.

World Bank and the Arabs

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) sees the Arab nations as a source of funds for relending to other nations. Robert McNamara, who heads the bank, recently visited several Arab nations to make such a pitch.

Venezuela is urging its partners in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to join in creating an OPEC bank. "The time has arrived for OPEC members to have a bank of their own for financing economic and oil development in their respective countries," says Hugo Perez la Salva, Venezuela's minister of hydrocarbons.

Bank of America and private-Middle East investors have set up the Bank of Credit and Commerce-International in Luxembourg. International Maritime Banking of London has opened a Beirut office to cover the Middle East. Britain's National Westminster Bank recently opened an outlet in Bahrain, in the Persian Gulf, to cover the area. Morgan Guaranty has purchased an interest in a Beirut bank. The second-largest bank in Beirut is Moscow Narodny Bank, the Soviet Union's bid for garnering some of the financial traffic in the Middle East.

In Beirut, a key Mideast banking center, 37 of the country's 73 banks are foreign-owned or affiliated, with several big American banks represented.

Union de Banques Arabes et Françaises—a consortium established with Credit Lyonnais, Paris, and 22 leading Arab banks—has established branches in London and Rome. Shortly it plans to open another in Frankfurt. Recently, this consortium extended a \$10 million medium-term loan to the Brazilian state of Rio de Janeiro for highway construction. This was a typical type of deal for putting some of the Mideast money to work. Banque Franco-Arabe—a consortium of Societe Generale of Paris and several private banks in the Persian Gulf—is promoting trade between Europe and the Mideast.

This month another consortium, Compagnie Arabe de Internationale d'Investissement, was formed at Luxembourg, with European and Arab banks as members. Its prospectus says it intends to "contribute to the solving of financial and investment problems which, on account of their new size, will require broad, diversified and powerful international associations."

Monday, March 5, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

Arab Oil Money Hurt Dollar

By Ronald Koven and
David B. Ottaway

Washington Post Staff Writers

Arab oil money played a large part in the monetary crisis which forced a second devaluation of the dollar last month, according to both Arab and U.S. officials.

Some well-placed Arab sources claim that as much as half of the \$6 billion in speculative money that flowed to Frankfurt in mid-February consisted of Arab-owned Eurodollars. U.S. sources view that as somewhat exaggerated, but they readily concede that Arab money accounted for at least \$1 billion.

The last official estimate of the Bank for International Settlements is that the Middle Eastern countries hold \$7.5 billion of the \$80 billion in the Eurodollar market, made up of dollars circulating in Europe and not repatriated to the United States.

There has been growing concern in the U.S. government that the Arab oil-producing states, whose steadily mounting official bank holdings are now calculated at about \$12 billion, might be tempted to use their monetary clout for political ends. Their reserves are expected to double in the next three years.

Private holdings of the Arab ruling families are thought to be roughly equal to the official government reserves in many of the oil states.

Despite urgings by radical Arabs that the oil money be used deliberately to pressure the United States into changing its Middle East policy, it is generally believed that, with the possible exception of Libya, the Arab money was moved in February in response to the normal instinct of monetary self-preservation.

It is widely conceded that the major U.S. oil companies also played a large part in the Frankfurt speculation and that the Arab governments simply followed their lead in their instance.

There is some dispute whether Saudi Arabia, the superpower of the oil exporters and perhaps Washington's closest Arab ally, took part in the attack against the dollar.

Saudi sources insist that

they simply took a heavy loss on the devaluation, keeping their \$3 billion in reserves where it was bound to suffer in any devaluation. But other knowledgeable Arab sources contend that the Saudis also tried to protect their dollar holdings, along with most of the other Arab governments.

U.S. sources tend to believe that Libya, the most politically motivated of the large Arab fund holders, was one of the most active speculators. The Libyans are known to have attacked the British pound in the past for purely political reasons.

Pinning down the source of such "hot money" flows, however, is very difficult.

If an order to switch from dollars to West German marks comes from an Arab account in Beirut through a corresponding Swiss bank, there is no way for money changers in Frankfurt to know exactly who placed the order. There is hard evidence, however, that Arab officials in Beirut are trying to keep track of who does what, and the Arab League is known to have conducted a detailed study of the subject.

It is far too early even to make an educated guess of who is behind the latest attack on the dollar in which the West German central bank was forced on Thursday to buy up almost \$3 billion, the record for a single day.

The problem of determining who the speculators are will be a key consideration in a forthcoming Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigation to be conducted by the subcommittee on multinational corporations headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho).

Sources close to the preparations for that inquiry are expressing shock that the U.S. government has so little hard information on who has been speculating against the dollar.

But banking sources say that, of the major U.S. and foreign corporations operating across national boundaries, the oil companies are the most prone to play the money markets. This is because they must pay huge sums to the Arab oil states, and the companies try to settle their debts

in the most advantageous way.

Thus, if there is \$100 million to be paid to Kuwait in three months, for example, an oil company might be tempted to buy marks now in anticipation of a dollar devaluation or an upward revaluation of the mark.

If the bet is correct, the company could make a tidy profit, buying back the \$100 million it needs to pay Kuwait and pocketing \$10 million in marks in addition in a 10 per cent devaluation.

This practice, known as "leads and lags," is a contagious example for the Arab treasuries, whose officials have often been tutored by the Western oil companies.

An Arab League study by Prof. Youssef Sayegh, head of the economics department at the American University of Beirut and a prominent Palestinian, concluded, however, that there are some limitations to the use of oil money as a political weapon.

He cited the case of a huge, politically motivated transfer (more than \$1 billion according to one estimate) of Libyan funds from Britain to France in late 1971.

Sayegh said that most of the Libyan money found its way back to British banks within a week because there was essentially nowhere else for it to be absorbed. "The Arabs are prisoners of their own funds," he concluded.

The militant Libyan government, with official reserves now estimated at more than \$3 billion, is considered so far to be the only Arab state with both the resources and the inclination to use its money holdings for political purposes.

Equally militant Iraq, a country now in heavy financial difficulties, is potentially more troublesome for the monetary system than Libya, however.

While Libya's oil reserves are limited and its production has been cut back, Iraq is now considered to have the second largest reserves in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia. It plans to expand its production after just settling a nationalization dispute with Western companies. Until recently, non-Arab Iran was traditionally ranked as the Middle East's second largest oil source. But recent official estimates are that Iraq's oil potential far outstrips Iran's.

For the moment, however, Western worries about Arab oil money's place in the international monetary system are largely confined to the manipulations of the coffers of such traditionalist kingdoms and sheikhdoms as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain and Qatar.

Their current monetary tactics are still thought to be purely motivated by profit-taking and self-protection. That, as recent events in Frankfurt have proven, is threat enough to force the burning of the proverbial midnight oil in the chanceries of the West.

It is clear, however, that those traditionalist Arab states are becoming conscious of the leverage they can have on the monetary system at crucial moments.

When the United States had its first devaluation, in December 1971, the Arab states were just beginning to build up their reserves. Since then, official Saudi dollar holdings have nearly tripled. With more to lose than before, the Saudis and others are demanding to know whether their friendship with the United States will continue to cost them money every time there is a devaluation, not to speak of the cost to their position in the Arab world if Washington continues to back Israel against the Arab cause.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 February 1973

A Plea for Meddling

By Heinrich Böll

COLOGNE—The hopeful process one calls "worldwide easing of tension" helps least those who, under constant risk of denunciation or imprisonment, most enthusiastically support it: writers, academics and intellectuals.

We hear that the Soviet Union is seeking better relations with Spain; Greece will soon recognize the German Democratic Republic. Will the consequences of this rapprochement be that Colonel Papadopoulos puts in a good word for East German author Wolf Biermann or that Erich Honecker of East Germany has a few kind words for the imprisoned or censored Greek authors? Will Generalissimo Franco intercede for Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and for Vladimir Bukovsky or Mr. Kosygin for Spanish publishers and writers Castellet, Cirici, Cucurull, Fauli, Manent and Triadu (each was recently fined some \$3,000 and had his passport revoked)?

Will President Nixon stand up for Indonesian author Toer and for the 100,000 political prisoners in Indonesia? During the discussions with the Czech Government regarding a treaty will the Government of the German Federal Republic put in a word or two for the Czech authors who appear to be condemned to terror and starvation?

I fear all these questions must be answered in the negative for, within each of these systems which are persecuting them, whether in Spain as "Reds" or in Czechoslovakia as "Friends of the Imperialists," all these authors, academics and intellectuals can be considered the progressive intelligentsia who were once good enough to be used as advance men and advocates of a less rigid dogma. Now, politically, they are totally "irrelevant."

Although we know that without them and their uncounted predecessors nothing, absolutely nothing on this earth would ever have been achieved, they can still be left to languish. Trade is established, profitable investments become possible, and if something should go sour, the intellectuals will always be there as convenient scapegoats.

Amnesty International, International PEN, organizations of writers and scholars all receive ever more frequent reports of imprisoned, censored, accused intellectuals; each individual case deserves public attention. It is questionable, though, whether these lonely appeals and resolutions mean anything if the politicians refuse to heed appeals from these organizations.

The danger exists that conscience will become no more than a faded flower in the lapel of various ideologies if the politicians choose not to understand that they alone can convert the moral thrust into political reality and if they do not finally abandon the hypocritical concept of "nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states." At international conferences where military and economic help are discussed, who ever thinks about Paraguayan writer Rubén Barreiro Seguir or Uruguayan Jorge Musto and Carlos Nuñez or the hundreds of young men and women in Turkey who have been crippled from tortures?

It's part of the perversity of the intellectual situation that precisely those forces which profit from trade with the Socialist bloc or the underdeveloped NATO and SEATO countries still publicly denounce those who support easing of tension and greater openness between differing political systems.

Meanwhile, rather than shrinking, the number of imprisoned authors grows weekly, almost daily—and in-

vestments continue to flow to Brazil, to Turkey, to Greece. Everything is "normalized," except in the prisons and camps. It would be, of course, "emotional" to test those Western liberties which are supposedly still defended in Greece.

It was a great encouragement when finally at least one politician (who was later joined by others) found the courage to energetically and clearly break through the principle of "non-intervention." Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme did so when the American Air Force with intensified brutality wanted to bomb North Vietnam into peace. Olof Palme's courage is catching on; it would be a consolation for us authors and intellectuals if his courage would spread over the world, if we could find support from the politicians of the world in regard to our appeal for the indivisibility of liberty.

We authors are born meddlers; we meddle in the administration of justice and cultural policy in the Soviet Union, in Czechoslovakia, in Spain, in Indonesia, in Brazil, in Portugal, and we meddle in the frightening developments in Yugoslavia, where once again scapegoats are being sought and where another hope is to be laid to rest. And we will also meddle in the People's Republic of China, in Cuba and in Mexico. It sounds idealistic, but it is not. Meddling is the only way to stay relevant.

I plead for meddling, even in the affairs of my own country, the German Federal Republic. And I would like to take this opportunity to mention the PEN Emergency Fund for Writers in Prison and Their Families. The fund is administered by the Dutch PEN and has an account at the AMRO Bank in The Hague.

Heinrich Böll, novelist and essayist, is the 1972 Nobel laureate in literature.

NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1973

'You Have Become Someone Else'

By David H. Hackworth

COOLANGATTA, Australia—America, what has happened to thee? Once you were morally impeccable and staunchly proud; a model republic with your citizens having unbounded power; a symbol of freedom, the hope of the downtrodden and a shelter for the world's poor and oppressed; one nation under God where free men lived in equality, peace and justice; a country not divided by hate and weakened by your citizens' apathy. Your streets were safe and rivers clean and the sky over you was pure and blue; and your mighty Constitution was a document that protected your citizens and served as a torch that illuminated bigotry and slavery in the world's dark lands.

What happened? Why have thousands of talented Americans left your shores to settle in distant lands? Why have millions of your good conscientious citizens slipped away from you and copped out in that apathetic twi-

light land of the Silent Majority? Why have so many of your precious youth lost faith in you and become disenfranchised nomads?

Is it because you have become someone else? Is it because you have strayed from the path that your founders hacked with bare hands out of granite? Is it because you no longer have a purpose? Is it because you are now so powerful you have little respect for those lands less strong? Is it because you have become a bully who flexes his military muscles or jingles his purse at the nations that will not fall in line with your selfish programs? Is it because bumbling bureaucracies manage you rather than your citizens govern you? Is it because you have placed your foreign policy in hands of intellectuals who talk in riddles about balance of power, high risk U.S. involvement, and Cold War strategy?

America, I love you. I have repeatedly risked my life fighting your battles. I carry the heavy burden of being responsible for the death of many of

your youth lost during the last two decades of sorrowful adventures. I once believed that you were all the good things inscribed in marble in your capital. But I no longer have that unrequited faith. I am one of your disillusioned sons. I believe you have misplaced the virtues that made you a symbol of freedom.

I am ashamed of your military adventures. I am disgusted by your support of foreign dictators who oppress their people. I am disillusioned by your willingness to compromise your principles for the sake of expediency. I am filled with despair that you conducted the most massive bombing in world history on a small Asian nation at Christmas time as part of an insane war that ripped you asunder.

Liberty and freedom no longer seem part of you. Electronic snooping devices invade your homes. Your journalists are imprisoned for refusing to divulge their sources. A major political headquarters is ransacked and bugged by its opposition with hardly a murmur from your citizens. Sham

WASHINGTON STAR
23 February 1973

CARL T. ROWAN

U.S. Altering Its Role in the World Arena

The very headlines seem to shout that a new era has dawned for this country in its relations with the rest of the world:

KISSINGER TOPS FRONT PAGE IN PEKING ... U.S. AND CUBA SIGN ANTI-HIJACKING AGREEMENT ... EGYPT SENDING TOP AIDE TO CONFER WITH NIXON.

Here, within the span of a couple of days, are major diplomatic initiatives with three countries with which we have not exactly been on speaking terms — two of them Communist and one viewed as a "client" of the Communist bloc.

It adds up to a remarkable Nixon achievement that he has moved this country so far away from the old notion that, primarily through military force and military alliances cemented by obdurate anti-Communism, the U.S. could "contain" Chinese influence in Asia and circumscribe the Soviets in Europe.

One simply must assume that full diplomatic relations with Peking are going to be restored during Nixon's presidency, and probably a lot sooner than most Americans think. This step is inevitable; it makes good sense considering the thrust of Nixon's "low profile" policy in Asia, and there does not seem to be much to recommend undue delay in taking that step.

If the People's Republic of China gave a big assist in producing the truce in Vietnam, and there is strong evidence that it did, then Nixon

surely hopes that China will also help ensure that Southeast Asia is kept calm enough for the U.S. to rest easily with a low-profile, we-won't-intervene policy in the years ahead.

It may gall even Nixon to have it said that his policies seem to rest on a late acceptance of old arguments by Charles de Gaulle, Jawaharlal Nehru and others, that the isolation of and hostility toward China lay at the heart of most of the upheaval in the Far East.

If rapprochement with Peking does make for more tranquility in Asia, the new Nixon policies will be vital to countries like Thailand, Malaysia and even Indonesia. Thailand still faces a grim threat of a China-backed "war of liberation," and both Malaysia and Indonesia still face mild, lingering threats of Communist subversion.

Because Cuba is smaller and weaker (and there is a tendency to treat the small and weak with greater contempt), we have continued a harsh hostility toward Communist Cuba even while developing cozier relationships with Russia and China. But you can wager, if that anti-hijacking agreement is to have practical meaning, the U.S. will have to adopt a friendlier posture toward the Castro regime.

This may not mean a restoration of diplomatic relations with Cuba during Nixon's tenure, but it could. Surely it must mean that the U.S. will

no longer twist arms so relentlessly to dissuade other nations from bringing Cuba back into the hemispheric fold.

The restoration of truly friendly, cooperative relations with Egypt and other Arab countries may turn out to be even more difficult than working things out with China or Cuba. The Israeli-Arab dispute is fraught with so much emotion that it seems beyond solution. Clearly, as long as that conflict lasts, Israel will be the client of the United States and angry Egyptians, Syrians, Iraqis will seek the backing of the Communist bloc.

Yet, Egypt's sending an emissary to Washington offers evidence that Nixon has made a fairly convincing demonstration that the United States wants a fair settlement

and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Surely, considering the energy crisis that lies ahead for this country, Nixon and millions of other Americans would like a return to full and friendly relations with oil-producing countries in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Yet, a lot more than oil and energy are involved. Americans have sensed new levels of interdependence with other nations, whether the issue is pollution, monetary policies or our need for vast supplies of a variety of raw materials.

This is simply not the time for this country to maintain age-old spats with China, Egypt or any other country. We all should take comfort from the evidence that our government is now willing to bury a few ideological hatchets and concentrate on areas of mutual interest and hope.

trials have occurred to silence your dissenters and make a mockery out of your judicial system. Your citizens who loudly disagree with your ventures are maligned by your cunning character assassins, incarcerated on trumped-up charges, and cruelly set upon by your governmental agencies. Your citizens seem to have lost much of their personal liberty and privacy.

Ycs, America, you have had great leaders to guide you out of the wilderness. Men whose wisdom, vision, courage and humility made you once the richest, most powerful and respected nation in the world. But the difference between today and yesterday is that those leaders who made you great also carefully listened to your citizens and then you had a government of the people, by the people and for the people. Leaders were se-

lected because of their ability and because they could be trusted to follow the will of the people.

God bless you, America. I hope that you can get it all together so you will again be known as the land of the free and the home of the brave. So goodbye, America. I have followed the westward quest of my ancestors who many years ago left the British Isles in search of liberty, justice and freedom. I have found these qualities alive in Australia, a young vigorous country that holds these principles high and is very much like you were, America, before you shrugged.

David H. Hackworth is a retired U.S. Army colonel who was one of the most decorated officers in Vietnam. He is now working as a waiter in an Australian resort.

Far East

HUMAN EVENTS
3 March 1973

A Critique of the Vietnam War

By COL. ROBERT D. HEINL JR.

The Vietnam war probably represents the most grievous self-inflicted wound the United States has ever sustained, but its international liquidation on essentially just and successful terms well justifies Georges Clemenceau's famous aphorism that war is a series of disasters that ends in victory.

Our zigzag track into, through and finally out of the Indochina morass will fuel a century's worth of analyses, dissertations, dissections, theses, term-papers and controversies rich in might-have-beens, but certain main lessons and conclusions as to the war already stand out.

Joseph Alsop has referred to Vietnam as "the worst-managed serious war in U.S. history" and there are few who would dispute that judgment-in-chief.

The conduct of the war was both botched and blotched with strategic error and misperception, with failures and deficiencies of command, with major mistakes of method and tactics, and with self-defeating factors and constraints which alone nearly lost the war outright. Besides being a graveyard of people, Vietnam was also a graveyard of reputations.

Despite all blunders, despite domestic dissension and defeatism, despite world efforts of Hanoi's powerful friends—despite everything, really, that could go wrong, and mostly did—a number of interlocking, ultimately powerful factors nevertheless combined to bring us through the major Vietnam crises of 1965, 1968, 1970 and 1972, and now around the corner.

Considering its abysmal track record throughout much of the war, American strategy, particularly under the Nixon Administration, ultimately managed to recoup failures that ought to have guaranteed defeat and shambles.

The biggest strategic mistake of the war, among several, was one which Douglas MacArthur and many another professional soldier had warned against, time out of mind. Rule No. 1 for the United States, echoed and re-echoed the strategists, was to avoid a land war in Asia against Asia's limitless manpower. Yet that is exactly what we walked into.

Despite more than 925,000 battle deaths—close to 4 per cent of total popu-

lation—North Vietnam still proved able to meet its manpower needs at all stages of the war while absorbing all the killing modern firepower could deliver.

Ho Chi Minh spoke correctly when he prophesied: "You will tire of killing us before we tire of being killed."

An equally fundamental U.S. misperception, at least until 1970, was to regard the war as a conflict to be waged exclusively in and for South Vietnam—in other words, a Vietnamese war. On the other hand, as early as 1946, speaking in the Hanoi opera house, Ho Chi Minh openly enunciated what was to be

the undeviating Communist strategy and objective, that the war was for all Indochina.

American refusal to recognize the evident facts of Hanoi's strategy—the enemy's invasions, occupation and blatant military exploitation of Laos and Cambodia—our Cambodian trans-border operations, committed U.S. forces to a hobbled war in which, until frontier doors swung one way only, into South Vietnam, and never the other way into Communist sanctuaries.

Obscurity of aim, feeding logically into failure of strategy, enveloped U.S. operations from the start.

To know or formulate U.S. aims in Vietnam, even now, is hard enough; in 1965, when clear knowledge of the objective should have been the initial benchmark for strategy, the aim (aside from rescue of the South Vietnamese ARVN from total disaster) often seemed to be to find the enemy and fight him, with no political objective stated, let alone comprehended, for this most political of wars.

Because there were no clear aims, the soldiers rarely had a sufficiently precise idea of what they were trying to do, and they were kept in that ignorance by Lyndon Johnson's White House and Robert McNamara's Pentagon, both of which minutely over-supervised operations, monopolized decisions and, sometimes, it seemed, positively begrudged the right of the military to have ideas about the war.

Coupled with and exacerbating the effects of the foregoing fundamental deficiencies in strategy was another which probably bears the blame, more than any single factor, for the intolerable

prolongation of this longest of American wars.

The false strategic theory known in its stylish days of the 1960s as "graduated response" not only added years to the war but undoubtedly underlay its no-win mind-set, unique (and uniquely discouraging) to the American temperament.

was the notion that precisely measured armed force or military violence, incrementally administered to a theoretically rational enemy, one notch at a time, would bring him to a point where he recognized the price as too high. Between hard covers or in official position-papers, the idea looked good. In actuality, it proved disastrous.

The results of graduated response, to cite examples, were that we bombed the North but avoided the Hanoi-Haiphong targets that would hurt the enemy very much. We never executed Inchon-like amphibious thrusts against North Vietnam's vital communications centers (e.g., Vinh, practically the Grand Central Station for the Ho Chi Minh trail) and other such points north of the DMZ.

Not until seven years after the Joint Chiefs of staff unanimously recommended it (and the foregoing tough military actions as well), did we finally mine Haiphong and blockade North Vietnam.

The exaggerated fear of vague consequences that made graduated response seem an essentially ineffective strategy seem alluring was epitomized in 1966 when Averell Harriman scolded a senior U.S. general for suggesting that Haiphong should be mined. "What!" Harriman burst out, "and either trigger World War III or have a million Chinese in North Vietnam within six weeks!"

Vietnam—as the above rebuke would suggest—was the first minutely civilian-run war in American history. Civilians in the White House and the Pentagon, mischievously aided by instantaneous worldwide communications, took over every significant and not a few insignificant details of military operations from the unfortunate soldiers who understood

Col. Heint has been studying the Vietnam war from the outset. He pieced together this critique of the U.S. role in the conflict over a period of years from interviews, research and tours of the Far East. A graduate of Yale and a Marine Corps combat veteran of World War II and Korea, Col. Heint is a recognized expert in military affairs and a renowned military historian and lecturer.

only too well that if anything went wrong, they alone would be held responsible, rather than the bright and self-assured young pipe-smoking civilian statisticians and social scientists in Washington.

If there was one grossly wrong-way to run war, it was typified by the late President Johnson telephoning battalion commanders in the field, making individual target selections for fighter-bombers and bragging to reporters, "They don't dare bomb an outhouse without my say-so."

Closely allied to intolerable civilian oversupervision of the professionals was false and insistent reliance—typified by Robert S. McNamara and those around him—on statistical indicators to arrive at misleading conclusions as to the progress of the war.

The notorious body-count (as if wars were won by human butchery rather than achievement of strategic objectives) exemplifies the self-deceiving passion for quantification which enveloped the civilian managers of the war and provoked one Army chief of staff (Gen. Harold K. Johnson) to protest what he called "this scoreboard war."

If high command in Washington (at least until Richard Nixon arrived) was muddled and mismanaged, what can one say about the ineffectual command arrangements in Vietnam where, despite the Himalayan disparity of roles, contributions and national power, the United States never imposed a single combined command to direct and coordinate American and South Vietnamese forces and operations?

That Gen. Creighton Abrams had to rely on advice and persuasion and some backstage arm-twisting to secure the most elementary cooperation of South Vietnamese forces—for their own good and for their own national survival—is an anomaly that will astonish military students for generations to come.

In human terms, the greatest mistake of the war will probably be considered the Johnson Administration's decision to fight a distant, overseas war (what in the old days would have been called "a colonial war") using a conscript army. This single error imposed constraints, handicaps and ultimately cancerous national divisions onto the country and our entire conduct of the war.

If one single lesson, among so many, might be ineradicably drawn from the Vietnam experience, it is that no war can long be pursued by a democracy unless it is acceptable to those called upon to fight it in the ranks.

Arising directly from this looming mistake was another defeating constraint which permanently limited the efficiency of all military operations—the 12-month overseas tour. Unlike World War II, where troops stayed overseas for the duration, the Vietnam war was perpetually being waged by beginners or by

nervous short-timers. At any given moment—due singly to the 12-month tour—the average time on station of any given GI in Vietnam was four months.

In the oft-repeated observation of one of the war's true authentic heroes, the late John Paul Vann, who gave his life defending the Central Highlands against the final Communist invasion, though we fought for 10 years, we never had 10 years' accumulated experience, but the regularly repeated mistakes of 10 separate one-year tours.

Put in still other words, because of the rotation system, every U.S. unit in Vietnam had a 100 per cent built-in casualty rate per year.

This lack of institutional memory and continuity in policy, leadership, tactics—in short, every aspect of war-making and pacification—practically guaranteed the too-often disjointed, formless, inconsistent and spasmodic way in which the United States sometimes seemed to pursue the war.

* * *

Together with civilian interference, strategic aimlessness and misperceptions, defective personnel, the military effort in Vietnam was bogged down by enormously overstuffed headquarters and bloated logistic installations which devoured resources, manpower and military momentum.

At a time when we were fielding 500,000 American soldiers in Vietnam, no more than 90,000 of these at most were combat troops. The U.S. war effort, in other words, was all tail and no teeth.

The swollen, sprawling American headquarters, MACV (Military Assistant Command, Vietnam) outside Saigon, was called "Pentagon East," its air-conditioned corridors swarming with staff officers wearing starched fatigues to create the illusion that they were discharging combatant functions.

The Leavenworth-trained general staff officers who (subject to the whim and aberration of Washington civilians) tried to run the war from "Pentagon East" seemed to suffer from a running deficiency of professional imagination. Their Clausewitz-indoctrinated, often rigid and narrow view of war fathered the elephantine "search-and-destroy" big-war conventional tactics of the Westmoreland years, together with disdain

for "the other war" of pacification and their neglect of the humble Vietnamese ARVN.

In such minds (but of course it would be unfair to say that all our planners or commanders thought that way, or the war would never have turned out as it has), Vietnam was perceived as a war against the enemy rather than what it truly was—a war for the people.

(Maj. Gen. J.F.C. Fuller, Britain's

magisterial military historian, once mordantly observed that whereas most Western nations fight to destroy their enemy, the Communists wage war to convert him.)

Closely related to our built-in big-war conventional approach to this least conventional of wars was typical American over-reliance on air power to achieve and solve everything.

To be sure, the carefully thought-out, well-executed final bomber offensive against Hanoi and Haiphong certainly deserves central credit for ending the war. In a literal sense, the final air onslaught was truly Clausewitzian—"a continuation of politics by other means" which achieved the clearly political objective of bringing about conclusive and serious negotiations to settle the war.

Not so much can be said for our often aimless, usually extravagant, almost invariably cost-ineffective single reliance on aviation as the favorite firepower-purveyor of the United States.

In a war that amounted to a zero-sum contest for one population, the military aircraft proved a singularly ineffective weapon. In the words of one observer, "bombing never won a convert."

For reasons that are difficult to justify intellectually or professionally, the vulnerable, costly manned aircraft (pricing out above \$2 million apiece with a million-dollar pilot) was used time and again to attack targets that other cheaper and frequently more effective weapons could have handled.

One example was the comparatively marginal and secondary role assigned to naval bombardment in favor of air attacks. Despite the fact that many hundreds of important targets in North Vietnam lay within easy range of the monster 16-inch Naval gun, we waited over three years to reluctantly recommission one battleship (total cost equal to that of six crashed F-4s), and then foolishly mothballed it prior to the massive Communist 1972 offensive when the need was greatest.

Yet it would be wrong-headed not to underscore, in defense of air power, that control of the air (whether economically or correctly exploited at all times or not) was, with control of the sea, perhaps our greatest winning asset and one of only very few such.

Over-absorption with the necessary military contest against Hanoi's regular formations—the deadly serious big war along the DMZ in 1966, 1967 and 1968, for example—led American soldiers to slight the other war, that of pacifying the countryside, winning the support of the rural population and overmastering the Vietcong.

One salient aspect of this neglect of pacification from the outset (in sharp contrast to the skilled and experienced British counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya and later in Borneo), was neglect to recognize the central role in a

guerrilla war of an effective, highly trained national police.

It was well-nigh systematic U.S. neglect of the police function in South Vietnam until after the rude shock of Tet in 1968 which gave the Vietcong a free run that nearly toppled Saigon.

Closely allied to American neglect of police training and development was a parallel failure to concentrate, first and foremost in this kind of political war, on intelligence. Here again, to be sure, we encounter the reflection of inbred weakness of the U.S. military system in which the G-2 intelligence specialty is too often a professional dead-end.

Besides initial failures to develop an effective national police function, backed by a massive counterinsurgency intelligence effort such as was belatedly mobilized by Robert Komer (another of the war's forgotten heroes, who first grasped and energetically attacked the fundamental problems of pacification), American advisers committed two long-term mistakes with regard to the regular South Vietnamese military forces.

The first serious mistake in American advice and military assistance to South Vietnam dates back to the earliest days of the Diem regime. This error was to organize and prepare the South Vietnamese ARVN for another Korean War and in the process turn out a mirror-image copy of the U.S. Army conceptually unsuitable to Vietnamese needs.

In the mid-1950s, it was all too easy to view the two Vietnams as another pair of Koreas and to visualize the coming struggle as another Korean-type Communist smash-and-grab involving overt invasion and a subsequent war of position.

Nothing remotely like this happened and for this, as well as many other reasons, the performance of the ARVN was anything but brilliant against the fine-honed Viet Minh veterans with the new name of "Vietcong," who had just humiliated France's best army.

After U.S. ground forces intervened, the ARVN found itself shoved aside, not to be seriously rebuilt and trained until after Tet in 1968, when Gen. Abrams took this effort in hand.

The ultimate proof of Abrams' (and of course the ARVN's) success came in 1972 when—with American air and naval support to be sure—ARVN soldiers and Marines resolutely fought the flower of Hanoi's iron regulars.

Despite Communist Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap's contemptuous head-on strategy that called for the capture of Hue by May 1, that obliterated an An Loc but never took it, that never won Kontum or Pleiku, and never came near cutting South Vietnam in two—despite the massive Ardennes-like invasion of the South by 14 veteran Communist divisions, the

ARVN stopped them in their tracks and saved the South.

One reason why the ARVN in 1972 found itself so dependent on American airpower was the other major planning mistake for which U.S. advisers must be held blameworthy. This was the failure to foresee the need for a South Vietnamese air force sufficiently powerful and versatile to meet requirements of the other services and the present national situation.

The relative retardation of the Vietnamese air force—however well it performed within given limits during the 1972 crisis—accounts in the main for our continuing requirement to retain strong American aviation units in Thailand to prevent the MIG-equipped North Vietnamese from one day storming into the South, attaining air supremacy and starting a new war.

No past war in American history—possibly in all history—has been waged by a great power under such a burden of constraints, self-imposed handicaps and self-defeating limitations.

Some of these—for example, the enemy's savage resort to hostage warfare, using U.S. POWs—were unavoidable. Others—national defeatism, failure to proceed straightforwardly with declared war, the bankrupt strategy of graduated response—were our own doing.

No matter how the war finally ended, it was a defeat for the United States in terms of its psychological aspects. Because the Communists thoroughly understood and proficiently manipulated world and American domestic opinion, they scored point after point and at certain times (such as the student uproar in mid-1970) brought the country close to unsurrection.

Besides exploiting American defeatism and propagating the notion (which only our ultimate stern actions in mining and bombing the North dispelled) that Hanoi had no breaking-point, Communist propaganda successfully perpetrated the worldwide dike-bombing hoax and a host of lesser atrocity counts with which (as in the case of the equally false Korean germ-warfare charges) the United States will remain smeared for a generation.

* * *

The most difficult single constraint on the war effort was the unrelenting hostility of American news media, and particularly that of U.S. major television networks.

Underlying this bitter conflict lies the whole unsolved question of fighting undeclared wars in an open society operating under the 1st Amendment.

The United States came near to defeating itself by television, which, we should somberly realize based on Vietnam experience, comes close to

for the mass destruction of national will.

Future historians will be struck if not amazed at the consistently high (and quite undeserved) credibility and sympathy accorded Communist Hanoi, as opposed to the vilification and disbelief meted out by American media towards their own government and soldiers.

Unquestionably, many of the grave difficulties encountered in a totally visible war arose from the lack of censorship which in turn derived from the absence of declared war. In this connection, older readers will remember, for example, that the World War II public never saw a picture of a dead American GI until after the Normandy landings in 1944.

Another consequence of undeclared war was the decision not to mobilize reserves and thus to rely on draftees to fight a war which most came to detest and resist. The poisonous effect upon the morale and discipline of the Army of hostile, over-educated, resentful draftees surfaced most clearly in the succession of post-1969 unit mutinies in the face of the enemy and in the repeated murder (known as "fragging") of strict or unpopular officers or NCO's.

Perhaps the hardest lesson for the United States to learn in Vietnam was the realization of how difficult it may be for a great power to bring its full weight and strength to bear in a distant, politically tangled and obscure overseas war of limited objectives. It was this very perception which once prompted the Duke of Wellington to say, "For a great power, there can be no such thing as a little war."

After this long litany of misperceptions, national illusions, poor decisions and near disasters, the question may well be asked: How did the United States manage to come through as well as it has?

The positive factors, few indeed, yet sufficiently weighty to have tipped the scales, seem to be as follows:

- Absolute control of the air and the sea. While the Communists enjoyed and exploited their trans-border sanctuaries deep in the jungles of Laos and Cambodia, the United States had its own sanctuaries offshore on blue water: Aircraft carriers that Vietcong sappers could never harass, floating naval artillery (though never enough of it) with invulnerable battery-positions and unlimited on-position ammunition.

Moreover, because 90 per cent of what Hanoi required to sustain war reached it by sea, our control of the sea and our power to deny it to Hanoi's suppliers, as we did by mining Haiphong and the other ports, may well be viewed as the ultimately decisive factor in the war.

- American technical innovation and superiority. This characteristically American advantage comprehends firepower (laser bombs, automatic weapons, beehive ammunition, all types of "smart" ordnance) massive use of helicopters in Korea, one war

earlier, by the U.S. Marines—sensors, weather modification, modern mines, pilotless aircraft (RPV's), electronic warfare in a hundred guises and shapes, superb communications, generally superior mobility and crushing logistic superiority.

- Ultimate success of two twin but distinct U.S. programs—Vietnamization and pacification. Vietnamization meant the transfer of the war to a sufficiently trained, equipped, motivated and battleworthy ARVN which could then assume the burden of defending South Vietnam. This has been accomplished.

- Pacification meant the process of defeating Vietcong terrorism and shadow government throughout South Vietnam and winning the support and confidence, in particular, of the rural population. The very success of this complex, many-faceted and highly sophisticated program was what prompted, in fact inexorably compelled, Hanoi to throw in its last reserve, its regular army, into overt invasion of the South.

Only when the Communists recognized that time was running against them in the pacification struggle did they determine to stake everything on a final throw of the iron dice.

- Hanoi's reckless penchant for big war. From the moment Vo Nguyen Giap crushed the French—the first defeat in history of a modern army by Asian guerrillas—North Vietnam allowed itself to be seduced into illusions of military omnipotence. These illusions led to the Communists' most fundamentally bad decision—that to challenge the United States frontally in 1964-1965.

Following this gravest mistake came two other almost equally serious Communist errors: Headlong commitment of the hoarded flower of the Vietcong to the Tet offensive in 1968 (coupled with the disastrous failure to replay Dien Bien Phu when encircled U.S. Marines at Khe Sanh refused to emulate French mistakes); and, in 1972, the final reckless and irretrievable North Vietnamese invasion of the South in a campaign which, 300 days later in the end, came close to costing Hanoi its effective regular army.

In summary, and no doubt in oversimplification, it might be said that the winning equation for the United States could be formulated in these terms:

Vietnamization plus pacification plus destruction of the Vietcong (1968), plus frontal defeat of the North Vietnamese regular army (1972), plus blockade, plus final bomber offensive (December 1972) equals attainment of U.S. objectives.

What the foregoing equation omits—because limited to military factors—is the overwhelming success of Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy in forging a consensus among the great powers that Viet-

nam could no longer be allowed to continue as a poisoned apple of discord in world affairs.

Without that essential precondition—the American agony in Indochina would still be dragging on.

A few conclusions as to the war—miscellaneous and fragmentary because we are still so near the event—warrant statement even at this point-blank range:

- Vietnam cannot be regarded as a typical guerrilla war or a theoretical model of future wars of national liberation. It was America's peculiar misfortune to involve itself gratuitously in a uniquely difficult situation which it would be nearly impossible to duplicate in other times or places. For those who launch wars of national liberation, the wreckage of Vietnam should underscore a rueful but typically blunt remark by Nikita Khrushchev after Korea: "It was easy enough to start the Korean War. It was not so easy to stop it."

- Despite massive Communist propaganda to the contrary, Vietnam was not a true civil war. At most—while the authentic indigenous Vietcong of the South still played a role, before their virtual liquidation at Tet 1968—it represented an externally fomented revolt within the South. Vietnam, in fact, was no more civil war than was Korea, and openly ended the way Korea began, with overt invasion by Hanoi's regular army across the DMZ in March 1972. Profound differences divide the two Vietnams and it is a historical fact, too often disregarded, that, during the past 800 years, less than a hundred altogether have seen all of today's Vietnam unified under one government.

- Vietnam may well prove to be the last large rural insurgency based in the countryside rather than the cities. Until the mid-1960s, guerrilla war was regarded, classically speaking, as a rural

phenomenon. Since that time, urban terrorism has taken deep root in the cities (as in Northern Ireland) and looks like the wave of the future is revolutionary war.

- In its closing days, Vietnam seems to have answered (or at least indicated an answer to) the long-argued question as to how well American big bombers might do in delivering nuclear weapons against a sophisticated air defense.

The survival with low attrition of U.S. B52s against the world's most advanced Russian-model air-defense system (that of Hanoi and Haiphong), including not merely SA-2 missiles, as widely reported, but also the new and feared low-altitude SA-3, certainly seems to indicate that more modern B52s, let alone the oncoming B-1 super-bomber complete with such electronic decoys as the SCAD (available in 1974), are by no means obsolete as nuclear-delivery vehicles.

- Finally, the turning-points of the war can now be clearly identified as: 1965 (U.S. commitment of ground forces to save South Vietnam); 1968 (destruction of the Vietcong at Tet); 1970 (the closing of Sihanoukville in Cambodia and neutralization of Cambodian sanctuaries; and finally, 1972 (destruction of Hanoi's offensive capability to wage big war).

Who won the war?

Nobody.

Who lost?

Everybody.

Perhaps Benjamin Franklin had it right when he wrote: "I never knew a good war or a bad peace."

Or, in the end, looking to the future, might we not turn to William Tecumseh Sherman? "The only legitimate object of war," he somberly said, "is a more perfect peace."

NEW YORK TIMES

3 March 1973

Saigon Newspaper Fined Over Veteran's Interview

SAIGON, South Vietnam, March 2 (Reuters)—A Saigon newspaper reported today that it had been fined one million piasters, or about \$2,300, for contravening the Government's press laws.

The daily Doc Lap said in a front-page story that it had been convicted for publishing an interview with a disabled South Vietnamese veteran in which the man complained about the length of the war and his own fate.

Saigon military court ruled that the article should have not the blame on the communists for the war. The story, said the court, could lead people to believe that the South Vietnamese Government was responsible for the disabled soldier's suffering.

The court found the article detrimental to national security and the publisher of Doc Lap, Hoang Chau, was given a year's suspended prison sen-

NEW YORK TIMES

3 March 1973

4 South Vietnamese Describe Torture in Prison's Tiger Cage

By SYLVAN FOX

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, March 2—A group of recently released political prisoners, reportedly spirited into Saigon secretly, described today how they were beaten, tortured and ultimately crippled during years of confinement at the Government's island prison on Con Son.

One of them, a young man, in describing his year-long detention in the tiny cells that have come to be known as tiger cages, said:

"During that time not a single day passed that we were not beaten at least once. They would open the cages and they would use wooden sticks to beat us from above. They would drag us out and beat us until we lost consciousness."

The prisoners' stories, told in a hospital room to which they had been brought by friends and relatives, reflected the plight of thousands of political prisoners held by the Saigon Government who have become the forgotten people of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement.

Large Group Unaffected

While the accord provides for the exchange of a small number of political prisoners identifiable as belonging to one side or the other, no provision is made for the thousands of non-Communist, anti-Government prisoners held by Saigon because it considers them politically dangerous.

No one is certain how many the Government holds. Some estimates put the figure at 20,000 to 30,000; others go as high as 200,000.

Saigon says it holds only about 5,000 "political prisoners," who, as captured Communist civil servants, come under the provisions of the Paris agreement on the return of civilian detainees. The Communists say they hold only 200 such prisoners. Each side disputes the other's contention.

No provision of the accord appears to cover those held by Saigon who are non-Communist and anti-Government and who do not want to be handed to the other side but merely want their freedom.

The four former prisoners interviewed today said they were members of a group of 124 released on Feb. 16 from Con Son, which is about 60 miles off the Southern coast.

Center of Controversy

The island became a center of controversy in 1970 when two American congressmen revealed the existence of the tiger cages, small concrete trenches with bars on top in which five to seven prisoners were cramped in a space about five feet wide, six feet long and six feet deep.

The former prisoners said they were flown to Bien Hoa, about 15 miles northwest of Saigon, and held in a police station there until Feb. 21, when they were released with orders not to go to

However, at least 11 were brought here by friends and family and deposited in the relative—if temporary—safety of a Saigon hospital.

Those interviewed assumed they had been released because they were disabled and sick; all said they were convinced they would soon be rearrested.

A Government spokesman, told of the interviews, said he could not comment without knowing the identities of those involved. He said he did not know of any recently released political prisoners.

According to the former prisoners, they had each spent about five years in custody without being tried or granted a hearing.

They denied they were Communists, although two said they were supporters of the Communist-led National Liberation Front.

One who said he was neither a Communist nor a supporter of the front was a slightly built, round-faced man aged 23 who described himself as a Buddhist activist. He said he was a student at the Hung Dao high school in Saigon at the time I vomited blood or until the blood came out of my eyes or ears," having soapy water of his arrest in December, 1967.

He said he was picked up by the police along with friends who, like him, had been active in what he called the anti-Government "Buddhist struggle movement."

Asserting that he was unable to walk as a result of his treatment while in custody, he related that after his arrest he was taken to the national police headquarters in Saigon and "beaten and tortured on and off for a whole year."

He described the torture as being beaten with sticks "unt

His torturers accused him of participating in anti-Government activities, he added, and "said they tortured us to punish us."

Manacled and Suspended

Another form of torture employed by the police, the young man said, was to manacle prisoners' hands behind their backs, then hang them from the ceiling by the manacles until they lost consciousness.

After a year in custody in Saigon, he said, he was taken to the Chi Hoa Prison in Saigon and installed in what was known as "the movie house" because it was "like a big box and it was dark like a movie theater."

"There they chained our feet and attached the chains to a pole," he continued. "There were between 50 and 100 prisoners. We had nothing to lie on, and it was filthy and dirty and cold. Every day they would open the door and send in a bunch of common criminals who would beat us with sticks and kick us."

Describing life in the tiger cages, the young man said that several prisoners died but he could identify only one by name.

A week after the Congressmen went to Con Son, he said, the inmates were put in what he called the stables—a row of structures that had housed water buffalo.

"During the time we were kept in the stables they continued to beat us viciously," he said. "One of my friends, Tran Van Tu, suffered a broken arm. Another man, Nguyen Ngo Thuong, was ferociously beaten on the head."

In December, 1970, the former prisoner related, he and about 80 other sick and disabled prisoners were flown back to Chi Hoa. "I guess I was going crazy at that time," he added, saying that he was also paralyzed.

He remained in Chi Hoa until June, 1971. The treatment there was better at that time, he said, though "once in a while they would beat us just a little."

In June, 1971, he and others

at Chi Hoa were informed that they were being returned to Con Son.

"We tried to resist," he said, "saying we were still sick and needed more time to recover. We told them many of us still could not walk and many were still very sick."

But, according to his account, the jailers responded by bringing in the policemen and common criminals who threw tear-gas grenades into the cells. "We all choked and lost consciousness," he said.

They were put on a ship to Con Son. By then the old tiger cages had been replaced by new ones built by an American contractor and paid for by the United States.

The former prisoner said that while the cages were about the same size as the old ones, each cage housed only one person. As a result, he added, "the jailers would not beat us from above but would open the steel bars, jump in and beat us."

Diet: Rice and Water

Throughout 1972 and in the first two months of this year, he said, his daily food ration consisted of "a few spoonfuls of rice and a little water."

The most recent beating took place last Jan. 6 in Row A and B of the tiger cages," he said. "About 70 prisoners were seriously injured then." He explained that the beatings occurred "because we asked for more food and more water."


According to the former prisoner, a man named Le Van An was beaten to death in one of the mass beatings last May. He also asserted that in the beating Jan. 6 a Buddhist monk named Thich Hanh Tue was beaten almost to death.

"The prisoners asked that the monk be given treatment," he said, "but they ignored the request and a few days later he died."

When he and the others were released, the young man related, most were transported to various parts of the country, but 25, including him, were kept at Bien Hoa.

Other prisoners at the Saigon hospital corroborated the account with only minor personal differences. All told of torture, beatings and malnutrition.

"Each of us went through a similar ordeal," a 38-year-old former prisoner commented.



The New York Times/March 3, 1973
Con Son, where political prisoners are held.

forced into his nose and mouth, and being subjected to electric

WASHINGTON STAR
5 March 1973

RICHARD WILSON

It's Hard to Tidy Up After an Untidy War

Wars end untidily and Vietnam is no exception. Recent testimony before a congressional committee indicates that prisoners of World War II may still be lost in the vast Soviet penal system.

Juridically we enjoy no more than an armistice in Korea. The Armistice Commission is still meeting 20 years after hostilities stopped.

The "German question" has never been settled. A curtain, made of bricks, stones and mortar in some places, still separates the East from the West in Europe.

So it is little wonder that barely a month after the cease-fire in Indochina, fighting is still going on. It will be surprising a year from now, due to the "leopard spot" nature of the cease-fire, if there are not continuing clashes on a fairly general scale. The wind-down of a 20-year war cannot be expected overnight when none of the antagonists consider themselves defeated.

As has been demonstrated time after time there are two practical ways of relating to Communist-controlled countries. One is to have no relations at all. The other is to find special areas of mutual benefit and exploit them.

Exploitation can rarely be sustained if means of bringing pressure are absent. Thus, when the Communists made trouble about returning prisoners of war, the United States ceased clearing mines from Haiphong, boycotted the Paris conference, and suspended troop withdrawals.

The means must be at hand to bring pressure, as was so dramatically illustrated when the U.S. heavily bombed the North. It follows that the means of bringing pressure must be present during the cease-fire period if the military clashes are to taper off and become insignificant in a final settlement in Vietnam.

Call it reparations, buying off Hanoi, or whatever else, a U.S. commitment of the reconstruction of North Viet-

nam is pressure in the form of inducement. Once granted, the taking away of direct aid becomes a factor which must be taken into consideration in Hanoi's formulations of policy.

This is why the Nixon administration is so strongly committed to the obviously unpopular project of helping to rebuild North Vietnam. Without some such means of bringing pressure, now that all military forces are pulled out, the United States can talk a good case for reconciliation, without being able to do much about it.

The means of bringing pressure already exist with respect to South Vietnam. President Thieu's government probably could not survive the withdrawal or substantial reduction of American aid and support. This evident fact will lie behind President Nixon's forthcoming conferences with Thieu at San Clemente.

The President cannot expect to have the same degree

of leverage with Hanoi, which also has the support of Russia and China, but substantial U.S. help is not something Hanoi would lightly forego.

The President has sought to diminish public and congressional objections to such aid by stating that it would come from the national defense and foreign assistance budgets. It would be his argument that domestic programs would not therefore be any less as a result of aid to Hanoi.

This argument is not likely to be too persuasive with opponents of aid to Hanoi such as Sen. George McGovern or those who wish to internationalize it to the extent that it could not easily be used as an instrument of American policy, such as Sen. J.W. Fulbright.

Their aim is the opposite of the President's. They wish to terminate once and for all American involvement in Indochina. The President wishes to continue to influence the course of events there as the leading Pacific power.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
2 March 1973

TWILIGHT IN INDO-CHINA

LITTLE COMFORT for the cause of democracy, either in Vietnam, the rest of Indo-China, or indeed anywhere else in the world has emerged from the Paris conference. From the start its allotted role of guaranteeing the cease-fire and peace settlement of just over a month ago was unreal to the point of fraud. None of the outside countries dragged in to present some sort of diplomatic façade had the least ability to influence future events, and all most sensibly shied away from any tangible commitments.

The conference's other intended role was that of watch-dog for the implementation of the agreements. This too seems to have gone by the board, as the number of votes needed to bring it together again was fixed by the Communist participants at a figure that is unlikely ever to be achieved. Yet in present circumstances the final disappearance of any form of Indo-China conference will be a sensible acceptance of harsh realities.

The fate of Indo-China now depends mainly on the ability of the legitimate democratic Governments to hold their own against the North Vietnamese army. This in turn depends on the extent to which China and Russia provide or deny the necessary arms. So far as America is concerned, once her prisoners have been restored and her remaining few troops once and for all withdrawn, she will be loath to get involved again. President Nixon's main hope—and that of the South Vietnamese, apart from their military and political capabilities—lies in the Russo-Sino-American triangle. China wants to keep Russia out, and to develop her rapprochement with America to prevent Russian global expansion. Russia may think it counter-productive elsewhere to make a monkey of Mr Nixon in Indo-China. In this situation it might conceivably pay Hanoi to settle for American aid for the time being.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 March 1973

Largest Cambodian Paper Is Closed by Government

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia, March 4 (AP)—The Lon Nol Government closed the nation's largest and most popular daily newspaper, Koh Santepheap, today.

The Information Ministry charged the daily, which has a circulation of 230,000, with a breach of national security in an editorial today that compared a pro-Government demonstration Friday to similar rallies in the days of the ousted head of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

The paper said that the Government staged the rally to

camouflage growing popular discontent with the Government's inability to tackle corruption and inflation.

But many here believe that the real reason that the paper was closed was its popular serial, "Bloody Revolution Inside the Palace." A historical allegory, the serial traces the successful coup d'état of the royal Nil family, a tale that most Cambodians recognize as a thinly disguised version of Prince Sihanouk's overthrow and Marshal Lon Nol's ascension to power.

The newspaper was the 16th closed since the Government imposed a strict press code in May. The code has practically outlawed direct criticism.

WASHINGTON POST
1 March 1973

Hanoi: It's Still U.S. War Too

POWs Used as Last Lever on American Policy

By Peter Osnos

Washington Post Staff Writer

SAIGON, Feb. 28—The agreement to end the Vietnam war, celebrated as peace with honor by President Nixon, has turned out in its early stages to be little more than an excuse for American disengagement from a continuing bloody conflict.

As long as American prisoners were

News Analysis

released on schedule and the withdrawal of U.S. forces proceeded quietly, the countless violations of the Paris accord by all of the Vietnamese contestants attracted no great international attention and concern, at least as viewed from here.

In an effort to keep the American departure going smoothly and give conditions in the Vietnamese countryside a chance to settle down, the extent of the problems has been minimized by many U.S. officials. Gloomy reports were easily submerged beneath the hoopla of POW homecomings and Henry Kissinger's travels to Peking and Hanoi.

But by holding up this week's prisoner release, the North Vietnamese brought events to a head. They have, in effect, reminded the United States that "this is still your war, too."

"We have the impression that the U.S. delegation is solely concerned with the release of American prisoners of war," a North Vietnamese spokesman said Tuesday, expressing a feeling shared by Vietnamese of all allegiances.

Putting it another way, Hanoi was telling the United States that in its haste to end a long and much regretted involvement in Vietnam, it has overlooked the

fact that the agreement to bring peace has failed so far in its objective, even in the imperfect way that had been predicted.

The North Vietnamese have used the POWs as their only leverage in bringing U.S. influence to bear on the present situation in which hundreds of North Vietnamese and Vietcong cease-fire delegates are being held virtual captives in South Vietnamese compounds while the fighting goes on.

The Communist ploy was an artful one and it may bring short-term improvements as the South Vietnamese respond to American pressures to end blatant harassment of the other side. But the inevitable moment will still arrive when the United States is gone and the Vietnamese themselves will have to come to terms.

What will happen then?

Doubts about the future loom as large as ever.

There has been nothing visible here in the month since the agreement was signed that shows a genuine willingness to do as Article 11 of the accord instructed, "achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or another."

President Thieu's government and the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary Government have managed to agree on political discussions near Paris, thousands of miles removed from what takes place here.

Perhaps those talks will make headway towards a meaningful political accommodation. The mere fact of ranking officials from the two sides meeting raises a shred of hope.

Meanwhile, Thieu, backed by his army and police, maintains the position that the Vietcong are enemies of the state.

One of the first things that returning South Vietnamese POWs are required to do, for example, is chant in unison: "Overthrow the Communists. Republic of Vietnam Forever."

The raising of a Vietcong flag is regarded as a provocation to be met with maximum available force.

Thieu is keeping such a tight and threatening grip on political expression that even his non-Communist opponents are afraid to make any moves that might be wrongfully construed. Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh's attempt the other day to speak out on behalf of what he called South Vietnam's "third entity" had to be billed as a reception for friends because a press conference would risk reprisals.

Minh, in a somewhat forlorn appeal to the international conference on Vietnam now meeting in Paris, correctly observed that none of the guarantees of personal freedom theoretically insured by the agreement is actually being observed.

The agreement solemnly pledged there would be "freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of or-

political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership and right to free enterprise."

It was extremely unrealistic, Vietnamese and American observers now agree, to promise reforms which did not have the slightest chance. If anything, the South Vietnamese government has become more restrictive since the agreement took effect, rather than less.

Even so, a semblance of a true cease-fire, the core of the accord, was expected. That has not happened either.

The scale of combat has diminished in the past few days, according to informed diplomatic assessments, but it is still reckoned to be greater than it was during many periods of the war. One reliable intelligence estimate places the current level of activity at about what it was in October 1972.

Aviation Fuel

Commercial suppliers of fuel to the South Vietnamese air force say that consumption by government war planes is as great as before the cease-fire, even though all bombing missions are supposed to have ended. U.S. officials in one important province northwest of Saigon said last weekend that South Vietnamese air strikes there were still routine.

Artillery fire is another index of warfare. Diplomatic sources, with access to highly classified South Vietnamese reports, say that in the northern military region alone, government troops have been firing an average of 35,000 rounds a day.

Official casualty figures continue to show both government and Communist killed in the same numbers as before.

With the successful end of the South Vietnamese drive to retake the coastal town of Sahuynh in Quangnai Province, there are no longer any major ongoing battles. But scores of skirmishes are taking place every day. According to U.S. officials in at least one province, government commanders are still ordering their troops to shoot Communists on sight.

The Vietcong are also violating the cease fire by taking potshots at helicopters, closing roads ostensibly in government hands and by shelling government units in many areas, military sources say.

The prevailing view among the American offi-

NEW YORK TIMES
1 March 1973

Not Much Of A Peace

By Tom Wicker

The first month of "cease-fire" in South Vietnam has not been gratifying for anyone, except for the release of the first group of American prisoners. Fighting continues at unacceptable levels, international control is nowhere really in evidence, and not even a beginning has been made on the longer-range question of the political development of Vietnam.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that difficulties also developed over the release of more P.O.W.'s and the further withdrawal of American troops. That was the central exchange between Hanoi and Washington, and it could hardly have been unaffected by the other failures and disagreements.

President Nixon is clearly right that, so long as he keeps the agreed schedule for troop withdrawal, Hanoi is legally obligated to keep to its schedule for releasing American prisoners. On the other hand, if the North Vietnamese Government believes that the over-all agreement is not being adhered to by the Saigon Government and its American supporters, a delay in releasing its prisoners is the most effective bargaining device it has, and legal obligations are not likely to deter its use.

Short of a resumption of military action, Mr. Nixon's best defense against that tactic—since the small remaining American force in South Vietnam

IN THE NATION

nam probably is of little interest to Hanoi—is to see to it as best he can that the total agreement is reasonably kept. But that is not going to be easy, for several reasons.

One is the sheer difficulty of policing everything that happens in South Vietnam, a difficulty that would be considerable even if there were smoothly functioning control machinery. There is no such machinery and no one—as the Canadian participants are complaining—to hear or to act upon the reports of such organizations as there are.

Both Saigon and the Vietcong, with their North Vietnamese backers, seem to have sought as much last-minute military advantage as they could get, particularly in villages and territory

they can claim to have "under control"; naturally enough, therefore, both also have resisted the other's efforts. In the absence of effective policing, that kind of see-saw struggle could go on quite a while.

The basic reason is that neither Saigon nor its Vietnamese adversaries have really acquiesced in a peace agreement, putting an end to their long struggle and signaling collaboration in future political development; rather, Saigon is an unwilling participant in what was basically a deal between Hanoi and Washington to get the Americans out of the war, and to leave Vietnam to a Vietnamese solution. The struggle for that solution continues.

That is why it has seemed somewhat premature on Mr. Nixon's part to insist that he has achieved a "peace with honor" that can lead the world to a "generation of peace." It was understandable that he should want to put the best face possible on what he believes was the best agreement he could make; nevertheless, it seems clearer every day that a real peace has not been achieved, and that even the cease-fire may not be possible to reach, let alone sustain.

To say that is to raise more questions about Mr. Nixon's rhetoric than about the arrangement finally concluded at Paris. Critics of the war and students of Southeast Asia have long insisted—some since before American combat troops entered the war—that the future of Vietnam was a matter for the Vietnamese to decide, both historically and under the international procedures agreed upon at Geneva in 1954.

American policy, which never accepted the Geneva agreement, came to insist, instead, that South Vietnam was a legally constituted nation being subverted and invaded by another power, and that view is implied even in the documents that finally produced the cease-fire.

The events surrounding the Paris negotiations suggest, however, that this implication was designed more nearly to serve Saigon's political needs than to reflect actual American policy in the 1970's. No matter to what extent the South Vietnamese have been armed, aided and exhorted, the fact remains that the Paris agreements leave it to the Vietnamese to work out the political future of Vietnam.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the fighting continues and that neither Vietnamese side shows much willingness, as yet, to cooperate with the other, even in peace-keeping measures. The Americans—at least those in Army uniforms—are going home, and Mr. Nixon is claiming credit as a peacemaker, but for the Vietnamese, the real struggle lies ahead. The chances are not bright that it will be political rather than military.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER

3 March 1973

Small fry caught by a big war

The fate of Saigon's 'political' prisoners is one of the central issues between the South Vietnamese Government and the Communists. Under the Paris Agreement, signed yesterday, these 'civilian detainees' should be released, along with those civilians held by the

Communists. South Vietnamese prisons are not normally open to journalists, but MARTIN WOOLLACOTT talked to prisoners in the prison ward of Quang Ngai hospital, in Central Vietnam.

THE PRISON WARD was packed with people—girls and women, two nursing mothers with their babies, men and boys of all ages from 13 to 60. Some lay motionless on the beds, staring at the ceiling. One woman twitched and shivered under a blanket. Others were talking quietly.

But the ward was no hell-hole. It was crowded, with many shared beds, but hardly more crowded than the hospital's other wards. A not unamiable policeman presided at a desk near the entrance, seated next to a one-legged Buddhist priest, one of the prisoners. The food which came while we were there looked good: rice, meat, and vegetables in individual canteens. The prisoners, apart from the fact that some were clearly quite sick, seemed a very ordinary collection of Vietnamese. If these were political prisoners, they must be the small fry. And so it proved, with one exception.

As we edged down the narrow aisle between the beds, we heard scraps of their stories. The burly little 13-year-old boy, wearing a bright purple shirt, picked up carrying penicillin—he says for his mother; the police say to the front.

The young woman under the blanket: picked up four years ago after her husband went off to North Vietnam, on suspicion of Communist connections. Detention extended after the first 18 months because, she says, the police said her "attitude" was not right. One of the nursing mothers: picked up for travelling between villages without the necessary papers three months ago. The other mother, whose baby is only two weeks old, born in prison, says she cannot remember why she was picked up.

The monk's story, as related by David Barton, one of the American social workers who regularly visits the ward: he lost his leg in 1968, during the Tet offensive, when the Saigon pagoda he was in was shelled. Returning to his Hoe village in Quang Ngai, he was picked up for selling medicine to the front and for "speaking against the Government." His skull-like head is yellow and drawn. The social workers

say he has advanced tuberculosis.

A big, bearded old man, in for treatment of broken ribs, does not answer the questions about why he was picked up. He stares at the social worker and tears roll slowly down his cheeks. "I have so much pain . . . it just goes on and on." They give him some pain-killing pills.

While we were on the ward, one girl went into convulsions—a kind of screaming hysterical fit, lashing out with her arms and legs. Within two minutes, three other young women were kicking and screaming too. One girl cried: "I know nothing. . . . I'm telling the truth. . . . Why are you hitting me so many times." Another shouted: "I don't know the road. . . ." A third kept crying out, again and again: "Two months, only two months. . . . it's not my fault."

The policemen, helped by some of the men prisoners, tied the girls to the beds. The shouting and screaming gradually subsided. An American doctor told me later that such tantrums are not uncommon among Vietnamese women in particular. "It's a defence mechanism against stress. It releases tension," he said.

Later we were able to talk to three prisoners at some length, a young man and two girls. The first girl, 19 years old, quite pretty, and given to evasive giggling, during which she put one small hand over her mouth, claimed she was arrested when "buying food in the market." That was 18 months ago.

She said she was beaten by the police when first arrested. She claimed: "I was in a solitary cell for two months. I got the electricity one day and three times I got the water . . . it tastes awful. They make you drink it until you're fat. Then they hit you with their fists." But it has been over a year since she was interrogated. Since then, there has been no brutality, she said. Her real problem appeared to be that her father is "in the north." Such connections inevitably lead to police suspicion.

"Everybody in the prison knows there is an agreement," she said. "Nobody knows what it will mean."

said, but "of course I'll remember, I'll never forget." She is on the ward because in one of these hysterical fits, she broke an arm already damaged by a shrapnel fragment when she was caught fighting in 1970.

The young man was dressed in black, cheerful and smiling. He described the conditions at the prison as not bad. He too told a story of beating at the time of his arrest. Police found him on a bridge with a lighted oil lamp at night. He says he was fishing but "they think perhaps I was with the front."

The second girl was the only prisoner we met who openly, indeed proudly, confessed to being a member of the NLF. She lay on a stretcher while an abscess on her hip was being treated, and talked. She was captured by South Vietnamese soldiers 10 months ago, she said, after she and four other Front

guerrillas, all carrying weapons, stumbled into a minefield. Three were blown to pieces and she and another survived. She was sent to hospital in Da Nang, then questioned at the Da Nang interrogation and detention centre. "I was beaten a lot," she said. "I was unconscious many times. . . . I accepted I was going to die." She told her captors what she knew, she said. "You have to do it," she told us. After Da Nang, the third degree stuff stopped. She was sent to Saigon for 10 days' questioning, interspersed with political re-education talks, and again questioned, but without brutality, after being sent on last September to Quang Ngai.

The political re-education did not seem to have worked.

"The NLF will win," she said firmly; and then she embarked on a political lecture of her own. Asked about other prisoners, she said: "More than half are innocent. All they were doing was carrying rice or nucman (Vietnamese fish sauce) back to front areas. There are very few like me."

At one point, she said she was willing to talk to us because we were "progressive" Americans. There were good and bad in all societies, she said, even in the South Vietnamese Government.

Quang Ngai is a province that for many years has been heavily penetrated by the Communists and is also under the influence of the neutralist An Quang Buddhists. In many areas, ordinary people have simply no choice about maintaining contacts with the Front, whatever their own views.

So most of the people we met, with the single exception of the NLF girl, were probably "guilty" but in a very small way—and no more guilty than many others not yet picked up by the police. No doubt the majority of the so-called "political" prisoners fall into this small-fry category. Captured senior cadres and prestigious neutralist politicians form only a small proportion of the prisoners. There are thought to be hardly any among the 2,000 or so prisoners in Quang Ngai—a figure given to me by American social workers. The rest are like those we met—men and women who, while very possibly guilty of doing small things for the Front, are really just ordinary people caught in the trap of civil war.

WASHINGTON POST
22 February, 1973

Pathet Lao Gains Major Goals in Pact

U.S. Pressure Seen a Factor

By Lewis M. Simons
Washington Post Foreign Service

VIENTIANE, Feb. 21 — The Laotian cease-fire agreement signed here today represents a victory for the Communist Pathet Lao in realizing its key political objectives.

Under the combined force of North Vietnamese military attacks and U.S. diplomatic pressure during the past three weeks, the government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has given in to virtually every Pathet Lao demand.

As a result, the rightist elements in Souvanna's government have all but been demolished. And although Souvanna is generally conceded by all parties as the most logical choice to head a new coalition government, his future role could be in doubt.

The accord, divided into military and political sections, is most entirely the work of the Pathet Lao, with minor concessions to the government side.

Under the military provisions, all foreign troops in Laos must be withdrawn within 90 days from the time the cease-fire goes into effect — at midnight EST tonight.

[U.S. bombing in Laos ended several hours before the cease-fire went into effect, according to an Associated Press report from Vientiane quoting reliable sources.]

This has been a basic Communist demand since negotiations between the two sides began on Oct. 17. Souvanna had been striving for a 30-day schedule.

The 90-day grace period could prove most useful to North Vietnam, which has some 65,000 troops in Laos. Informed observers believe Hanoi will use the three months, if necessary, to move personnel and supplies along the Laotian portion of the Ho Chi Minh trail into South Vietnam and Cambodia.

Furthermore, nowhere in the agreement—according to an unofficial Pathet Lao translation from the original Lao into French—is mention made of North Vietnam.

Conversely, the United States and Thailand are specifically called upon to respect the "peace, independence and neutrality" of Laos. The United States, in addition to bombing Laotian territory with Thailand-based aircraft, has supported an estimated 30,000 man force of "volunteers" from the Thai

army fighting in Laos.

By studiously not mentioning North Vietnam, the agreement perpetuates Hanoi's insistence that its forces are not and never have intruded into Laotian territory.

Souvanna's concessions to the Pathet Lao on the North Vietnamese question is a blow to the government rightists. Led by Finance Minister Champassak Sisouk, the rightists struggled without success to hold off an agreement which did not include a clause demanding North Vietnamese withdrawal.

Sisouk insists that the North Vietnamese will not pull all of their forces out of Laos and that, in time, they will again attempt to seize control of the country.

The cease-fire in place will, in principle, revert to the 1962 Geneva agreement on Laos, establishing separate zones of control under the Pathet Lao and government sides.

At present, the Pathet Lao are believed to be in control of two-thirds of Laotian territory but less than one-third of the population of some 3 million.

The 1962 agreement, in fact, is the basis for most of the new settlement. The two Laotian sides have committed themselves to executing the basic cease-fire terms while turning over supervision of the peace to the International Control Commission (ICC).

The ICC is to be composed of the same three members nations which were chosen in the earlier accord: Canada, Poland and India. The size and scope of the commission are not specified in either the old or the new agreement. These matters are to be discussed by the two sides later this week.

ICC Reactivated

The government side has striven for an ICC of at least 500 observers, while the Pathet Lao want a much smaller force. According to informed observers, the reactivated ICC will be no larger than it was in 1962, about 300 strong.

On the political side, the new provisional government, which is to be set up within 30 days of the cease-fire will be a 50-50 affair.

While the exact number of seats from each side has not yet been determined, the provisional body will be augmented by "two personalities who are for peace, independence and neutrality." This unusual wording means that each side will choose one so-called neutralist of predetermined inclination.

At the same time the provisional government is established, a political consultative

council will come into force. This body will be of the same ideological composition and proportions as the provisional government.

The council, another Pathet Lao pet project, is expected to oversee the administration of the political and military provisions of the accord. It is also supposed to organize national elections.

No date for the elections has been set under the agreement. However, the national constitution stipulates that the present National Assembly may not be dissolved until May.

Another clause of the accord says that the cities of Vientiane and Luang Prabang will be "neutralized." Asked to explain what this meant, Pathet Lao chief negotiator Phoumi Vongvichit said only that "neutralize means exactly what it says."

This presumably means that the Pathet Lao will be guaranteed complete safety and protection in the two cities. Vientiane is presently the government's administrative center and Luang Prabang is the royal capital. Both are in government-controlled areas. The Pathet Lao have their administrative center in the northwestern town of Sam Neua.

The agreement states that once the cease-fire goes into effect, persons living in Pathet Lao and government-controlled areas will be free to move into each other's areas. This is intended to help the hundreds of thousands of dis-

placed Laotians return to their home villages.

The matter of supplying government and Pathet Lao military forces by way of routes through each other's territory, however, has yet to be decided.

POW Returns

Prisoners of war held by the two sides are to be returned "no later than" 90 days from the start of the cease-fire. The United States lists about 300 Americans as missing in Laos, although large numbers of these are assumed to have been killed when their planes were shot down. The Pathet Lao recently released a list of just seven U.S. military personnel, two American civilians and one Canadian as being held in Laos.

The accord was signed today in a five-minute ceremony at Souvanna's home. Phoumi signed for the Pathet Lao and Interior Minister Pheng Pongsavan signed for the government side. The signing was witnessed by about a dozen invited foreign diplomats including the ambassadors of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Britain.

Later in the day, the Pathet Lao held a press conference at a shed attached to the Pathet Lao headquarters here.

Reading from a prepared text, Phoumi said that the cease-fire would be "total and simultaneous" and would include "the cessation of bombing and shooting on the part of the U.S. Air Force."

NEW YORK TIMES
22 February 1973

Only One Side Rejoices

The Lion's Share of the Bargain in Laos Seems to Have Gone to the Communists

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE
Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Thursday, Feb. 22—While the peace accord signed in Laos yesterday bears a strong family resemblance to the accord signed on Vietnam last month, the Communist side here seems to have won the lion's share of the bargain.

The agreement reflects the enormous military and political pressure the Communists were able

News Analysis to exert here at the last moment.

In effect, the accord leaves the Communist-led Pathet Lao controlling most of the territory of Laos for the time being, with the remaining

part to be administered on a 50-50 basis by the Pathet Lao and the Government. Until yesterday power was theoretically shared three ways by the Pathet Lao, the rightists and the neutralists.

Furthermore, while the accord specifically names the United States and Thailand as foreign forces in Laos, the North Vietnamese, whose forces are much more numerous here, are not named. The Vietnam cease-fire agreement calls for "foreign countries," which it does not name, to withdraw military forces from Cambodia and Laos.

Given the disarray in which the neutralists and rightists

making up the Vientiane Government now find themselves, the discipline and unity of the Communist side is certain to provide an enormous advantage.

Even on a number of relatively minor points, the Government demonstrated yesterday that it had finally yielded to Pathet Lao pressure.

Among these is a provision on the withdrawal of foreign forces.

The Government had argued that 30 days or at the most 45 days after the cease-fire will be ample time to withdraw all foreign forces. The Pathet Lao insisted on 90 days. According to the joint document signed yesterday, foreign troops will be obliged to leave Laos 60 days after the date that a new provisional government made up of both sides comes into being.

This government is to be formed within 30 days from yesterday. So, in effect, the Pathet Lao demand for a 90-day period prevailed.

Given the volatility of Laotian politics, three months is a long time, in which North Vietnamese troops can continue to bring heavy pressure to bear, particularly when American air raids are halted.

Even presuming that the cease-fire is relatively effective, the Laotian Army has never been known for its discipline or unity, and now, with the war over in theory, many Vientiane units are likely to disband themselves for lack of unifying direction.

The most effective elements fighting for Vientiane in any case are irregular troops, many of them tribesmen, who are often paid and commanded directly by American Central Intelligence Agency men. Irregular units tend to disperse rapidly unless held together by firm

command, high pay and a feeling that they will continue to be supported by Americans if necessary.

Right-wing politicians and conservative neutralists here are almost unanimous, at least in private, in their harsh denunciation of yesterday's accord. Many openly charge "an American sellout."

The United States will maintain its powerful air bases in neighboring Thailand, but American air support, the politicians believe would be resumed only in case of some obvious catastrophe.

To avoid this, the Communist side, the politicians contend, will chip away subtly but nonetheless effectively at the skimpy military and political fence remaining between them and ultimate complete control of Laos.

As a matter of fact, the United States still has a national stake in Laos, apart from the general pledge Washington has made to help rebuild the war-torn nations of Indochina.

The Pathet Lao hold a number of American prisoners who, they say, will not be returned by Hanoi but will be returned by the Pathet Lao in Laos itself.

The number of these prisoners is not known, but several hundred Americans have been placed on the missing list in Laos over the years.

Yesterday's accord specifies that prisoner exchanges in Laos—presumably including the Americans and those of other non-Laotian nationalities—will be completed within 60 days of the creation of a new provisional government, hence, within 90 days from yesterday.

These prisoners could become another lever in Pathet Lao hands, for pressure on the Americans, although there have been no direct formal contacts

between the Pathet Lao and the Americans.

One particularly weak aspect of yesterday's accord, differing from the agreement on Vietnam, is that no protocols were attached covering specific problems, such as prisoner exchange or the future role of the three-nation International Control Commission.

The accord merely says that the commission—made up of India, Canada and Poland, with the Indian delegate as chairman—will function according to the rules laid down by the 1962 Geneva agreement on Laos.

That agreement proved unenforceable and broke down almost immediately.

Indians, Canadians and Poles stationed here with the Control Commission are extremely pessimistic that the current agreement will work any better, unless all sides show a great deal more good faith than seems likely at present.

There remains a great deal of uncertainty whether Canada will be willing to continue her participation in the commission.

Despite the implied denunciation of the United States in the accord document, there is agreement in the accord that United States aid to all of Laos, including the Pathet Lao, will be welcome.

This aid, the accord says, will be worked out in discussions between the provisional Vientiane government and the United States.

The American aid mission here seems likely to expand provided Congress sustains the White House pledge to continue aid to Indochina.

But the Pathet Lao can be expected to watch American activities closely, particularly those that might have military or paramilitary applications.

This notably includes Air America, the paramilitary airline operated mainly for the

C.I.A., which supplies irregular Vientiane forces and provides a more or less military airlift for the Vientiane Government.

The control commission is expected to contract for the use of Air America aircraft for its own duties in the near future.

Vientiane clearly gained one important point in negotiations with the Pathet Lao. This concerns creation of a "political consultative council."

This joint council is to be made up of equal numbers of representatives from the Pathet Lao and Vientiane Government plus "a certain number of personalities favoring peace, independence, neutrality and democracy."

The Pathet Lao may well end up with a majority vote on the committee, which will be responsible for working out political details of the formation of a new provisional government and later of calling general elections for a new National Assembly.

But the decisions of the council must be unanimous, a fact leaving the Vientiane Government considerable room for maneuver.

The accord stipulates that after the council reaches a unanimous decision on any issue it must then submit that decision to the provisional government, which in turn will submit it to the king for promulgation.

The agreement does not say that the provisional government has veto power over an agreement by the council, but at least the provisional government is placed higher in the chain of command.

Hopes were expressed by all parties that for once goodwill and peace would prevail in Laos.

But in more personal terms, the Pathet Lao was rejoicing and nearly all Government officials were bitterly lamenting the agreement.

JOURNAL, Providence
6 February 1973

Resumption of War By U.S. Seen Possible

By JOHN KIFFNEY

A former State Department aide who wrote one volume of the Pentagon Papers said here last night that close study of the documents indicates that American military action in Vietnam could resume sometime in the future.

Richard C. A. Holbrooke, a 1962 Brown University graduate, said that the Defense Department-ordered history of the Vietnam war shows that Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon all had deep commitments to "save" Indochina from the Communists.

He said this negates the

extent the feeling he had in government service that each escalation was decided by the narrowest of margins, the "dovish" point of view just losing out.

"As for the present, 'the one thing Nixon has not changed is his objective, and I do not think that will change. He does not want the fall of Saigon to the Communists,' Mr. Holbrooke said.

"That may well lead us to further deep involvements," he added.

A colleague, Anthony Lake, a former staff member of the National Security Council under Henry Kissinger, agreed.

Mr. Holbrooke, who wrote a book on the Vietnam war, said he does not support

nam mess during the next few weeks—in other words, bug out with honor," he said. "But we are allowing Agency for International Development, defense contractors, and CIA people to stay."

With full-scale war, "these men will be hostages," and "could bring back the bombers," he predicted.

Mr. Lake advocated supplying assistance, including military aid, without committing American advisers to the Saigon regime.

Mr. Lake and Mr. Holbrooke lectured informally to about 200 Brown students under sponsorship of the political science department.

Asked about the current Los Angeles trial of Daniel Ellsberg for allegedly releasing the classified Pentagon Papers, Mr. Holbrooke prefaced his remarks by noting he was in the position to do the same thing, but didn't.

Mr. Holbrooke, who wrote a book on the Vietnam war, said he does not support

the government's trial contention that release of the documents was harmful to the national security. The papers contained a "lot of stuff the public should have known," he said.

But he described his feelings on the release of the papers as a lot more complicated. "He is not a great hero," he said of Mr. Ellsberg.

Mr. Holbrooke said the Pentagon Papers are great source material on the war, but are not a definitive history, because the researchers and writers did jobs of varying quality, and because they were precluded from access to presidential papers and CIA documents, and were under orders not to conduct interviews.

Mr. Holbrooke, who edited the Brown Daily Herald while at Brown, is now managing editor of the magazine Foreign Policy. Mr. Lake is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment Fund.

LONDON OBSERVER
25 February 1973

The friends Nixon ditched in Laos

from MARK FRANKLAND: Vientiane, 24 February

THE PARTIAL resumption of American bombing in Laos shortly after the cease-fire began at noon on Thursday only slightly covers up the ruthlessness with which America is now prepared to extract herself from Indo-China.

The significance of the Laotian agreement is that it shows that America has abandoned its 20-year-old policy of supporting right-wing regimes in Indo-China just because they are anti-Communist.

The Laotian settlement thus has an immediate and very worrying importance for the Government of Marshal Lon Nol in Cambodia, where a cease-fire has still to be arranged. And it even puts a question mark over the extent of future American support for the regime of President Thieu in South Vietnam.

The new direction of American policy was somewhat masked in the Vietnam settlement because the South Vietnamese anti-Communists under President Thieu remain powerful even without American support. But the American decision to bomb temporarily and selectively in support of the Laos Army during the inevitable period of violations of the cease-fire is the best possible proof that the non-Communist Laotians are defenceless.

Here, where a right-wing Government had come to rely on America to fight its war, pay its bills and even do much of its day-to-day governing, the effect of the new policy has been cruelly obvious.

It has forced America's old Laotian friends to conclude a settlement with the Communist-led Pathet Lao that gives the latter at least a 50 per cent share in the country and probably a good deal more. The prudent and the rich among the pro-Americans are already making plans for an exile in Thailand or France.

The saddest cases are the little people who got caught up in the war that America used to want without a chance of understanding what they were letting themselves in for—people like the hill tribesmen whom the Central Intelligence Agency turned into guerrillas.

But to appreciate the full shock of what America has done, one must look at the fate of much grander victims, such as the handsomely named Sissouk Na Champassak, Finance and acting Defence Minister and Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's right-hand man. Sissouk is typical of the sort of men that were most prized by the Americans as assistants in fighting their Indo-China war.

Coming from the princely family of Champassak, which still rules southern Laos almost as a medieval fiefdom, he is irreproachably anti-Communist. Like many Laotians he hates and fears the North Vietnamese.

Educated and intelligent, he speaks English as well as French (always an important point with the Americans) and is as honest an administrator as Laos is likely to get. When I first met him several years ago in his Finance Ministry, he explained that the only way to cut down the cheating was for him to go over the country's books himself.

He ran the country's finances to fit in with American policies. When, last year, he so infuriated the rest of the right-wing by upping taxes that they tried to drive him out of office, it was the Americans who helped to save him.

He put the country's pitiful military resources at the service of United States strategic requirements and right up to the signing of the cease-fire he was sending Lao soldiers, many of them only teenagers, into battles in which they had every chance of being slaughtered.

Of course he had seen the writing on the wall. He talked to friends of plans to go abroad, hopefully as Ambassador in Washington or London. Just before Christmas, he told a visitor: 'We shall always be the little pawns in the game, always the eternal victims.'

All the same, when the moment of truth came for him last Tuesday, it was difficult to bear. Perhaps the way the Americans played their hand made it worse, for until the end they were backing 'their' Laotians with the heaviest air strikes of the war.

But one of the consequences of the Kissinger visit to Hanoi earlier this month had been a message to Souvanna Phouma that the bombing would have to end this weekend, so that the US could go to the international conference on Indo-China with its hands clean.

Souvanna, who has always kept a certain distance from the Americans, apparently decided there was no point in delaying any more and ordered the distasteful agreement to be initialled on Tuesday afternoon. He then summoned his Cabinet and showed it to them. Predictably, the right-wing protested, with Sissouk leading the pack.

In a last effort to stop what he must have known was inevitable, Sissouk telephoned the American Ambassador. The Ambassador, who plainly enjoyed the chance Laos gave him to be more of a general than a diplomat, could give Sissouk

no comfort this time and had to listen to charges of treachery and selling-out his allies.

Who then was the most guilty, the Great Power which made its little ally think it would fight in Indo-China for ever or the men like Sissouk who trusted it in the face of all historical experience? In Sissouk's defence, one must say that, able man though he is, he comes from a tiny country and had to deal with the far more able representatives of the world's most powerful State.

In his defence, too, is the way in which Washington seems to have built its new Indo-China policy on an assumption that is not shared by many of its own officials, let alone its old allies—namely, that the North Vietnamese will indeed withdraw their troops.

'Don't ask me what I think, that's what I have to believe,' was the answer of one senior

American in Indo-China when this problem was put to him. But Sissouk does not have to believe it and it is understandable that he should feel the Americans are making him a promise they cannot honour.

The Laotian Communists were not slow to twist the knife in the wound. They have always accused Sissouk and his colleagues of selling Laotian independence for foreign money and they are delighted that Sissouk's foreign friends have now proved faithless.

At a press conference after the agreement was signed, the chief Pathet Lao negotiator was asked if he had met the American Ambassador. Yes, he replied, he had talked to him at the signing ceremony. The negotiator broke into an innocent grin. He had 'thanked the Ambassador for all he had done to help us to achieve the agreement.'

Los Angeles Times

Tues. Feb. 13, 1973.

Both Sihanouk, Lon Nol Obsolete, Experts Say

Slow Change Expected to Shape Future of
Cambodia as Power of Ruling Class Fades

BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT

Times Staff Writer

PHNOM PENH — The future of Cambodia lies in the hands of neither ailing, self-created Field Marshal Lon Nol, who is reluctantly supported by Washington, nor exiled Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who is supported with almost equal reluctance by Hanoi and Peking.

The nominal leaders of the two forces apparently fighting for control of the land of the Khmers have already destroyed each other—and themselves. Neither is particularly relevant to the fate of the broad mass of the Cambodian people. Both have already become anachronisms, since both represent a minuscule, corrupt, and semifeudal ruling class whose day is past.

That is the judgment of the best informed and most astute observers of the Cambodian scene, including both neutral and committed diplomats and the infinitesimally small, politically conscious Cambodian intelligentsia. The situation they describe, which follows, is a bleak one for their nation.

Deposed in 1970

Sihanouk, the god-king, abdicated as monarch in

order to make himself the constitutional ruler of the country he still called the Kingdom of Cambodia. But he was deposed in March, 1970, because he had not only lost the confidence of the urban populace of Phnom Penh, but had also alienated a large segment of the farming masses.

Sihanouk's antics since that time have not substantially strengthened his position, despite the miserable performance of the men who succeeded him. The urban class is strongly opposed to his restoration, though the peasants are still moved by feudal loyalties and the hope that he would reverse the inflation and deprivation produced by war.

"But Sihanouk's unlikely return could last only briefly," observed a knowledgeable European diplomat. "When people discovered that he could do little about inflation, shortages, and suffering, he would be swept away—and he could do little or nothing about those ills."

Aware of Liabilities

Sihanouk is, in any event, unlikely to return. He has demonstrated his own awareness of his precarious hopes in his own

NEW YORK TIMES
16 February 1973

Cambodia, Mired in War, Looks to U.S. as Only Help

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia, Feb. 13— Cambodia, the last country of Indochina to be engulfed by the war, watches dejectedly as peace continues to elude her.

While negotiations on how to make and apply peace are the principal preoccupations of neighboring Vietnam and Laos, the sound of gunfire is heard here once again and is coming nearer to the capital.

The Government of President Lon Nol and the guerrilla forces fighting under the banner of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, far from talking to each other, deny each other's legality.

Worst of all, in this capital that has gone from prim to sleazy, from gay to sullen, in less than three years of war, belief has become general that the Government is so incompetent, its army so impotent, that it can make neither peace nor war and cannot protect the vital interests of Cambodia and her seven million people.

And the Cambodians — who had known only French colonialism and Prince Sihanouk's authoritarianism and who have not had practice in being masters of their national fate — look hopefully, often pleadingly, to the chief present source

of power in their country to solve their problems.

That power is the United States. America provides Cambodia with about \$170-million a year in military assistance and about \$100-million in economic aid.

In 10 days of conversations with Cambodians — leaders of government and political life, laborers, generals, teachers and other civil servants, businessmen and ordinary soldiers — one common theme stood out: American power in Cambodia is so great and Cambodia is so feeble that the country's future is in the hands of the United States.

Significantly, this feeling is as widespread among leaders of the Government and the military as it is among the general public and the opposition.

In the American view the Cambodian attitude is an anachronism: The United States Embassy does not want to be the viceroy or proconsul of Cambodia. The United States no longer creates and overthrows governments in Indochina; it merely supports countries to defend themselves against aggression.

Without Advance Notice

Vietnamese Communist troops invaded Cambodia after Prince Sihanouk's overthrow in March, 1970, and before the United States and South Vietnam invaded Cambodia in their turn. The invaders did not ask Cambodia's permission or even give her Government advance notice.

The relationship seems different now. American diplomats encourage Cambodian opposition figures — this includes almost all politically active Cambodians except Marshal Lon Nol and most of his entourage — to confront the marshal with their views and make a republican and democratic form of government work.

But the Cambodians, whose faith in the words of the great powers exceeds that of many other peoples, do not see the United States' role in Cambodia in such terms. They do not distinguish between American support for Cambodia and support for Marshal Lon Nol.

They interpret the congratulatory messages from the United States that followed Marshal Lon Nol's election to the presidency last June — after he had unilaterally disbanded the Constituent Assembly in March and had proclaimed his own Constitution and obtained its adoption in a referendum in May that is generally considered to have been exceeded in voting ir-

utterances.

He has repeatedly promised to return to Cambodian soil, which he has not touched in almost three years, despite his claim to rule the greater part. In this last such promise, a week ago, he added that he would settle in France if he returned and found he was not wanted.

The government of Lon Nol, on the other hand, is a thin, worm-eaten facade. A series of powerless prime ministers has made no progress whatsoever toward consolidating the authority of the government of the Khmer Republic or attacking even the most pressing — if most superficial — social and political problems.

Lon Nol is himself almost wholly ineffective after a massive stroke last year. Sisowath Sirik Mat, a member of the royal family who is relatively efficient, refuses to join the government.

Lon Nol's younger brother, Lon Non, is a disruptive element who has even used restive students against his brother's prime ministers. He obviously did not realize that he was not merely releasing the genie of social discontent, but encouraging that genie.

A few thousand students are, at the present time, hardly a major force. They are too naive politically and too disorganized, as well as being out of touch with the masses.

But the Lon Nol regime is rapidly crystallizing discontent by such actions as shooting student demonstrators. Afterward, Lon Nol blandly announced that the Viet Cong had fired the shots, though many foreigners had watched his military police discharge their carbines at student demonstrators.

The Lon Nol regime is also courting its own destruction in the classic way of petrified ruling classes, which cannot change their ways. It is both wholly corrupt and strikingly inefficient.

A few examples indicate the extent of corruption:

A former minister of commerce, an intimate of Lon Nol, sold most of last year's rice crop to Phnom Penh's enemies, the Viet Cong, creating a massive rice shortage. He is now counselor of state.

Wounded soldiers must pay large bribes to be ad-

mitted to military hospitals. Once admitted, they must pay for their own medicines at inflated prices — and fight to prevent nurses from selling their bedclothes out from under them.

Inefficient Army

Although some good young officers have appeared, inefficiency is exemplified by the army. Most of the young students who enthusiastically rallied to the anti-Sihanouk, anti-Viet Cong cause three years ago have now been alienated by the army's inability to engage the enemy effectively and by such practices as carrying thousands of "phantom soldiers" on the rolls so that commanders can collect their pay and rations.

Both Sihanouk and Lon Nol are tragicomic — tragic for Cambodians and comic to foreigners.

But present Cambodian society itself is the chief problem. It is dominated by a tiny antiquated ruling class.

Phnom Penh is almost the last city of the old Asia which existed until the late 1950s. It is populated by intellectuals, businessmen, professionals and aristocrats who are remote from the countryside.

Sihanouk himself is the greatest obstacle to both peace and progress. He is playing out of the role of the god-king, the fall of the god-king, against the backdrop of a country which must, whether it wishes or not, enter the modern age. Like Lon Nol, he is both product and symbol of a ruling class which cannot change — even if it wished to do so, which it does not.

However, social and political change will occur, though slowly. Lon Nol and his successors are likely to retain nominal power for some time — largely because they are in Phnom Penh, the capital, though Phnom Penh's authority over the countryside is minimal.

Cambodia is likely to undergo a protracted process of change. The future will lie with the insurgents, regardless of any peace agreements, unless the United States supports the forces of change.

For its own reasons, the United States is not likely to do so.

It is almost impossible to overthrow the sta-

tus quo, however tenuous and unviable, is now particularly reluctant to involve itself more deeply in Cambodia's internal affairs.

That weakness is also a strength. The United States is not committed to Lon Nol as it is to Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam.

The American interest in sustaining Lon Nol for a time is modified by the disinterest Peking displays in radical change in Cambodia. Neither great power wants to make the area a major new battlefield.

In the short run, the fate of Cambodia will be determined by the disinterest of both Washington and Peking.

In the long run, slow change accompanied by political and military strike will shape the new Cambodia. That future will be shaped by Cambodians who support neither Lon Nol nor Sihanouk.

regularities only by the presidential election that followed—as genuine expressions of support and admiration rather than routine courtesies.

Similarly, people from the marshal to his most outspoken political opponents consider the visits of American officials, generals and admirals as votes of confidence in his leadership. Often the American intent is misinterpreted.

Message From Agnew

When Vice President Agnew stopped here on Feb. 1, a principal message he intended to deliver was this: The United States believes that Marshal Lon Nol's exclusion of such major political figures as Lieut. Gen. Sisowath Sirik Matak, his one-time Premier, and Brig. Gen. In Tam, an opposition leader, from the Government made it too narrowly based and unrepresentative and therefore not in the best condition to negotiate with its enemies.

At American urging, to underscore the message, the two leaders, as well as a former chief of state, Cheng Heng, were invited to Marshal Lon Nol's luncheon for Mr. Agnew. One of them said the principal result of the Vice President's visit was to make the Cambodian chief "200 per cent" optimistic about American support and his ability to win the war.

Similarly, when Gen. John W. Vogt Jr., deputy commander of American forces in Vietnam and commander of the Seventh Air Force, visited on Feb. 6, he intended to lend emphasis to American urgings of tighter military discipline and the elimination of corruption to achieve the best use of the military aid.

The principal impression of the visit that circulates among the presidential entourage is that General Vogt so praised Cambodia's military performance as to cause Marshal Lon Nol to believe that the United States was encouraging him to pursue the war to final victory.

One of Marshal Lon Nol's close associates after Prince Sihanouk's overthrow who held high office until ousted by the marshal asserted: "This country has no political maturity. All Cambodians regret the effects of what the United States has done. It is true that you do not want to—must not—dominate us. But you come as friends. You must say the whole truth, not all that flattery."

"You do not want to stage a coup d'état—I understand that," said a political leader of unusual sophistication acquired during a long stay in France, "but you pay the soldiers. If you held up their pay for one month it would finish the Government."

Actually the United States foots slightly less than half of the military payroll by allowing the Government to use for that purpose the counterpart funds in Cambodian riels that it receives by selling goods im-

ported with American financing.

About half the budget of 32 billion riels (about \$150-million) covers the military payroll. Counterpart riels in 1972 amounted to 7.2 billion to 7.5 billion riels. This contribution to the military is in addition to the direct military aid.

Reflecting an oppressive political atmosphere, people interviewed, with few exceptions, voiced the fear that if their names were disclosed in stating their views they would be in trouble. Such timidity, in the absence of repression of major political figures—if not of strong-arm methods by the Government—is traced by informed sources partly to political habits dating from colonial days and to Prince Sihanouk's rule.

Another and increasingly important element of the fear of what expressed opposition might entail appears to be based on the growing arbitrariness of Marshal Lon Nol's Government and the open power of the only man remaining close to him—his younger brother, Brig. Gen. Lon Non.

Out in the Limelight

After two and a half years as a gray eminence General Lon Non emerged from behind the throne last October to become an open power in his own right as Minister Attached to the Interior Ministry, in Charge of Liberation and Edification (Community Development) General Mobilization and Rallying—that is, winning guerrillas over to the Government.

Those attributions, in addition to the special power conferred on the President's brother and close confidant, have made the general, who at the time of Prince Sihanouk's overthrow was a major in the military police, the undisputed head of internal security as well as the man officially responsible for such contacts as there are with the guerrillas and their leaders.

In an interview General Lon Non reiterated the official line that Prince Sihanouk exercises no control over the guerrillas, whose number is estimated at 30,000 to 40,000, and that they are profoundly divided into mutually hostile factions. As a result, he said, there exists no central leadership with which he can establish contact.

His policy, he said, is to make contact with local leaders to encourage them to defect with those under their command. He added that such defections were increasing.

The general's view finds limited credit among Cambodian officials and foreign experts. The surrender ceremonies that have been held under his sponsorship are believed to have been staged, using villagers or even soldiers to whom old weapons and clothing have been issued and a few riels paid to act as "defectors."

Obstacles Traced to Lon Non

On the political scene General Lon Non is held responsible even by local officials for intrigues that have prevented the broadening of the governmental base to include such

loyal figures as General Sirik Matak and General In Tam, who is head of the Liberal party.

General Lon Non is known to exercise decisive influence over the one-party National Assembly, elected last year without opposition candidates because the preceding presidential voting had instilled in the opposition no confidence in a fair vote or count.

Last month, mainly in response to the American urgings, Marshal Lon Nol asked General Sirik Matak to return to the Government as Vice-President and General In Tam as special counselor to the President. When General Sirik Matak posed as a condition the consent of the leadership of Marshal Lon Nol's Social-Republican party, the Assembly, to the Marshal's chagrin, produced a negative petition; unsolicited by him and signed by 126 of the 140 deputies.

New efforts to bring General Sirik Matak into the Government are believed to be making progress, but sources close to him fear that unless his acceptance of the vice presidency is accompanied by the departure of Marshal Lon Nol and his brother for an extended visit to the United States for medical reasons, the results will not be positive.

General In Tam, one of the principal architects of Prince Sihanouk's removal, accepted the counselor's post last week, but in an interview at his hospital bed, where he is recovering from a kidney ailment, he said that he would stay only if he was assured of the tasks of pacification and of making contact with the guerrillas and with the necessary means of carrying them out.

In the last two weeks Premier Hang Thun Hak has been the target of staged demonstrations of opposition as well as of apparently inspired rumors of his resignation. They reached a high point last Saturday, when the Khmer Press Agency, controlled by General Lon Non, gave them official currency by issuing an unsolicited official denial.

The agency is just one of the interests of General Lon Nol, who appears to control considerable funds for the sponsorship of a number of shadowy committees. The Committee for Special Coordination, a large group of unspecified functions, was his principal instrument until he became a minister.

"He is the champion of committees, meetings and intrigues," a former close associate said.

The main source of funds, in the common belief—which is supported by the highest military sources—is the body of troops that General Lon Non commands, the Third Brigade Group. It is the successor to irregular troops that he began to recruit, many among the Cambodian minority in South Vietnam, shortly after his brother achieved power.

Actual Strength Uncertain

When it was only a brigade the general said in an interview that it had more troops

than a division. A real count remains unavailable, and in the difference between actual manpower and the numbers for which pay is drawn is thought to lie a source of financing.

Nonetheless, in the current American-backed restructuring of the armed forces to eliminate "phantom" or nonfunctioning soldiers, the Third Brigade Group is to become one of the army's four divisions; on Marshal Lon Nol's order his brother will be its commander.

Ranking sources close to Maj.

Gen. Sosthene Fernandez, Chief of the General Staff, said the command was aware of the problem and planned to establish the other divisions first, with an honest head count, in the hope that this would persuade the President to insist on similar procedures in his brother's division.

General Lon Nol, whose taste runs to large or flashy cars and boldly printed silk blouses, which he says are inspired by Pierre Cardin, has achieved extraordinary eminence among his military and political colleagues.

At a Cambodian New Year party at his house last April, he stepped out among his guests under an arch of sabers held by fellow officers, including generals. He was a colonel. At a recent dinner party attended by two other senior ministers, he entered amid signs of deference from all present, and even the ministers fell silent in mid-sentence when he began to speak.

Lon Nol's Image Tarnished

Marshal Lon Nol's popularity and reputation have declined as steeply as his brother's power has risen. In the past, associates told puzzled foreigners that one had to be Khmer to understand his penchant for mystical Buddhist fantasies, his oracular pronouncements on the grandeur of Khmer civilization and his air of remoteness from the pressing problems of the day. Now they concede that they are equally puzzled.

High officials describe the method of government as Byzantine, with orders, sometimes contradictory, issued by the President in response to friends, mainly military, who have caught his ear or to requests by his brother. Recently two officials had notes on scraps of paper bearing his consent to their appointment to the same foreign post.

As a result, high civil servants in technical capacities said that administration was falling apart and resources were being pillaged. Military commanders hold supreme power in most provinces and despoil them by selling natural riches—timber, fishing rights, land—to the highest bidder.

Take What They Want

Businessmen in Phnom Penh complain that the Government or its high civil and military officials take what they want when they want it and that payment often has to wait.

Meanwhile, the avenue in front of the Lycée Descartes,

an elite school, is clogged every morning and noon with the cars of the war-rich delivering and picking up their children. The city is swollen to perhaps double its prewar size of 600,000, with refugees crowding into relatives' homes or in shacks they put up where they can.

Most of the men work as coolies, earning about 50 cents

a day, and the women sell fruit and vegetables to earn perhaps a dime.

"If the Americans continue to help a regime that is in its agony," a physician of high reputation commented, "it will either lead to total civil war or it will chase all of us into the arms of the Communists."

THE NEW REPUBLIC

FEBRUARY 24, 1973

Hanging Fire

Cambodia

Pnompenh

The Paris agreement created the framework for a conclusion to the hostilities in Vietnam, and the chances for a cease-fire in Laos currently appear to be good. But here in Cambodia, the third state of Indochina, the war grinds on without any visible prospect of settlement. Essentially triggered by Richard Nixon's tactical "incursion" in the spring of 1970, it has degenerated into a prolonged, savage and, above all, futile war that cannot quite be understood, much less ended, by its participants. So it continues to devastate a small, inconsequential country whose only crimes have been weakness and geographical location.

The opposition forces, usually described in neat press accounts as Communist, seem to be less a homogeneous movement than a loose coalition of disparate groups vaguely united in their resistance to the government. They include followers of the deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk, leftist insurgents who trace their origin back to the struggle against the French, and assorted other dissident factions as well as regular North Vietnamese and Vietcong units for whom Cambodia has primarily served as a base for actions in South Vietnam. In the face of this confusingly diverse enemy, the government has been unable to discern an interlocutor with whom to negotiate.

The government itself, moreover, is scarcely a cohesive entity. The chief of state, President Lon Nol, is a crippled, petulant old man whose legitimacy is dubious, partly as a result of his blatantly rigged election victory last year and partly because of his constitutional shenanigans the year before. Distrustful of his subordinates and wary of his rivals, he governs haphazardly through his swaggering younger brother, General Lon Non, a former gendarme whose reputation for corruption has lost the regime whatever respect it may have had following Sihanouk's ouster nearly three years ago. Aware of their government's fragility, Lon Nol and his sibling fear negotiations even though they lack the strength and the will to continue fighting. The only public figure here who has given serious thought to the question of a truce is a popular and unusually honest politician by the name of In Tam, whom Lon Nol defeated in last year's phony presidential election. In Tam recently drafted a plan to form a committee composed of representatives from all the Cambodian parties engaged in the conflict in the hope that they might resolve their differences. He submits that the various Cambodian rebel groups are basically nationalists.

Chinese domination as much as other Cambodians. Therefore they should be receptive to a compromise. But so far his plan has gone nowhere.

The inability of the Cambodians to accommodate to each other has prompted the suggestion that a cease-fire here may perhaps be achieved through foreign intervention. One theory holds that Henry Kissinger will pull a plausible peace proposal out of his sleeve. Another prediction is that the international conference scheduled to open in Paris later this month might take up the Cambodian situation. Judging from their public positions, however, the powers seem to be no closer to a compromise than the Cambodians. The North Vietnamese, whose influence here is decisive, contend that Sihanouk and his government in exile represent the "legality, authenticity and continuity" of the Cambodian state. The same theme is echoed by the Chinese, who have housed and fed Sihanouk in Peking since his downfall. But the Russians, who still maintain a mission in Pnompenh despite their rhetorical commitment to the revolutionary cause, have repeatedly made it clear that they consider the prince a puppet of China and thus unacceptable in any new equation. The Nixon administration is similarly suspicious of Sihanouk, especially since he adamantly refuses to participate in any arrangement with Lon Nol.

There has been some speculation that Hanoi and Peking might scuttle Sihanouk in exchange for a coalition that would include members of the Cambodian insurgent organizations now fighting inside the country. This notion is not illogical, at least on paper. The leftists have no love for Sihanouk, since he repressed them brutally when he was chief of state. But if their clandestine radio broadcasts reflect their real attitude, the dissidents are cool to the idea of negotiations, particularly with the Lon Nol regime. Besides, the status of the nominal rebel leaders is extremely ambiguous. Statements of the "liberation" movement are regularly signed by Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon and Hu Nim, three former Pnompenh politicians who disappeared six years ago after incurring Sihanouk's wrath. Whether they are dead or alive is a mystery. One story has it that they escaped to Hanoi. Another version is that they were executed by Sihanouk, and are now being impersonated by doubles.

When Vice President Agnew swept through Pnompenh a couple of weeks ago, he expressed American support for the local regime but without specifying Lon Nol by name. This signaled to the more sensitive diplomatic analysts here that the United States is not totally locked into Lon Nol and might agree to dump him for the sake of a solution. According to this thesis both Lon Nol and Sihanouk could be retired to southern France, thereby opening the field for compromise to more flexible Cambodian personalities. Such a maneuver would certainly require the cooperation of Hanoi and Peking, and Kissinger may have proposed it on his trips to those capitals last week. But even with North Vietnamese and Chinese cooperation, the maneuver may not be easy. Sihanouk is stubborn and Lon Nol, whose brother is enjoying the perquisites of power, is equally capable of digging in his heels.

The Pnompenh regime ought to welcome a reasonable end to the war since its forces are being badly

controls only 20 percent of the country's territory and some 60 percent of the population, most of them refugees who have poured into the cities. The eastern third of the country is occupied almost entirely by North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops. They once numbered as many as 60,000, but most have recently moved into South Vietnam primarily to secure areas in the Mekong Delta. About 20,000 or less still maintain an elaborate logistical network in Cambodia in order to supply both their own units and their Cambodian allies. The Cambodian insurgents have grown in spectacular fashion, from some 3000 in 1970 to nearly 45,000 at present. They are now organized into battalions, many with North Vietnamese cadres, and their equipment includes such weapons as 82-millimeter mortars and 75-millimeter recoilless rifles. Their domain extends across the country to the outskirts of Phnompenh. But they have widely refrained from attempting to take the capital, which, with its huge refugee population, is more of a liability than an asset. Their strategy, lifted directly from Mao Tse-tung, has instead been to bar access to the city. The strategy is working. Except for a couple of roads open to convoys, travel is impossible. The insurgents have been less successful at blocking the Mekong River, along which vital oil shipments come up from South Vietnam, principally because the Saigon army and American aircraft have defended the artery. It may be, however, that the insurgents are not trying too hard since they also need the oil. But they may seek to cut the river as a gesture now that the South Vietnamese are prohibited by the Paris agreement from entering Cambodia.

What sustains the Cambodian army is American military aid, which currently amounts to some five million dollars a week. The latest equipment due to be delivered here includes a half-dozen C-130 transport aircraft and a squadron of A-37 dragonfly jet fighters. The aid program is administered by a 75-man US team under the command of a brigadier general responsible to the US Pacific Headquarters in Hawaii and its presence here has already aroused controversy. Last week, demanding the termination of the program, North Vietnam pointed out that article 20 of the Paris agreement stipulates that foreign countries must "totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing . . . military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material" into Cambodia and Laos. The official US response states that the Paris agreement also enjoins its signatories to respect the 1954 Geneva accords on Cambodia, article seven of which permits the Cambodian government to solicit foreign military aid "for the purpose of the effective defense of the territory." The same passage in the Geneva accords is being cited by the United States to

justify its continued air attacks here. A fallback position for the United States in the event that its military mission here is compelled to leave may be to rely on Thai surrogates, as has been done in Laos for years. Cambodian infantry and special forces units have been secretly training in Thailand since 1971 at American expense. Thai military teams are now stationed here and more are expected to arrive during the months ahead. Despite the Paris agreement, Thai troops have also been authorized to cross the border into northwestern Cambodia.

If the Cambodian army depends on the United States for survival, its officers have been enriching themselves to such an extent on American aid that they are said to surpass local Chinese merchants as the wealthiest class in town. Their wealth is apparent in their new suburban villas, in the sleek Mercedes that clog Phnompenh's streets and in their presence at the city's fancier French restaurants. The irony is that many of the same officers, Lon Nol and his brother among them, formerly earned handsome profits peddling weapons and rice to the Vietcong. Some senior soldiers reportedly still sell guns and other hardware to their enemies—the going price for an M-16 rifle, for instance, is \$20—but the most lucrative form of army corruption is padding military payrolls with nonexistent troops. Although the army's total strength on paper has sometimes been put as high as 300,000 men, its real size is probably half that number. And since a private's monthly wage is \$20, commanders can pocket in the neighborhood of three million dollars every payday. Officers have been found listing their wives, concubines, children and even servants on their payrolls. One unit supposed to number 2000 men was discovered to have only 84 soldiers. In another case an officer fearing exposure suddenly reported that 733 of his thousand troops had deserted within a month. Under pressure from the US mission here, the army recently appointed financial examiners. But General Lon Non's unit, a brigade group, has been somehow exempted from investigation. The few officers found guilty are likely to receive gentle treatment since, as a government spokesman explained, severe punishment is alien to Cambodian mores. It is also obvious that the arrest of every guilty commander would wreck the country's already feeble military establishment.

Supporters of Nixon's invasion of Cambodia still argue that his action successfully prevented a major offensive by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong against South Vietnam. But if the Saigon regime gained a bit of time, Cambodia was sacrificed. It is now a ravaged land and even a cease-fire, should it come, will be too late.

Stanley Karnow

MR. KARNOW, former diplomatic correspondent of The Washington Post, reports for NBC.

WASHINGTON POST
21 February, 1973

Robert C. Maynard

Return of the Prisoners: Script by the Military

When important news events involving deep human emotions occur, those of us who are witnesses gain an opportunity to identify with the principals and wonder how we might react under similar circumstances. In this age so dominated by the electronic eye and high speed word transmitters, we who are at a distance seem sometimes almost obscenely close at hand.

For example, when Mrs. Robert Purcell of Louisville, Ky., spoke to her returning prisoner husband for the first time in seven and a half years, I felt like a stranger intruding at a family reunion; it seemed the wrong place for strangers to be as intimacies were exchanged. That is an issue of taste and ethics which undoubtedly will be debated in many places, including I'd guess, the Purcell household.

What concerns an observer of the way we receive our news is not so much this instance in which the mass media may have overstepped the bounds of good taste, but rather the fact that the press was such a passive participant. True enough, the networks went to Clark Field live and cameras dashed here and there to catch a glimpse of an emotional moment. But those were rare. The fact of the matter is that the return of the prisoners of war was a militarily-managed event down to the last "God bless America."

Even after it was clear that these were men perfectly capable of speaking for themselves, the entire event

The writer is the Ombudsman of The Washington Post. In this capacity he monitors news and editorial operations and offers in this space his own views on the performance of the news media in general and of this newspaper in particular.

continued to be handled as if the 163 returnees had no minds of their own. If the military had stopped at that, it would have been questionable enough. But it is now beginning to emerge that the Air Force did its best to shut off the press from any independent reporting at Clark Air Force Base.

According to reporters on the scene, one written directive, posted on barracks bulletin boards, told personnel at Clark: "Don't talk to the press because they will distort everything you say." Besides, James Sterba of The New York Times has reported that even in cases where the returning prisoners requested an opportunity to speak with representatives of the hometown press, permission was denied.

We are thus

framework in which to focus our empathy with persons isolated from any contact with their society for seven or eight years. They return to a society more surely programmed in "them-against-us" terms than the one they left. Even as the machinery for information makes it possible for us to see an event such as the return of prisoners live half way around the globe, the bases of concern are made more limited. We still don't know what these men actually experienced—only what the military wants us to know of their experience.

The consumers of information get to know what the returning prisoners can tell us after an armada of 80 military public relations agents briefed them first on how to communicate with their countrymen through the mass media. Not surprisingly, then, we received a number of paeans to "honorable peace" and could only wonder how that very phrase happened to be among the first to pop out of the mouths of men in captivity for such long periods of time.

When it became clear that we were heading toward some settlement of enough of our disputes with North Vietnam as to allow for the return of prisoners, the Department of Defense prepared a booklet for the men. It was part of the large glut of material designed to help them catch up on the rapid changes in the time since they have been in foreign prisons.

The booklet tells them about the new hip language of "dude" and "right on" and brings them up to date on some of the major events of the past

several years. But as I watched the militarily managed show unfold, I couldn't help wonder how they would be brought up to date on one of the fundamental issues of these times—the way we communicate with each other.

Perhaps, in the end, nobody really needed a primer on the subject of the relationship of the government and the press. The Department of Defense provided us all, prisoners and ordinary citizens alike, with an object lesson in what the issues are all about. If you start off believing that the press "will distort everything," then you have seriously narrowed the options available for understanding what's going on. With that set of mind, it is not a "distortion" to provide returning prisoners with rough drafts of airport statements that praise an "honorable peace," but it would be a distortion to have candid give and take between the returnees and the press.

In the only interviews permitted at Clark Field, reporters were told beforehand that they could not ask the men any "controversial" questions. Those who need to catch up on how freedom and democracy are doing can look to the handling of the return of the prisoners by the military for some lessons in the act of news management, circa 1973.

Limited though we were in our access to any genuine information about how these men fared and what they really think about that, there was one spontaneous photograph instant that should win a prize. At Andrews Air Force base, when Maj. Arthur Burer returned, that spontaneous human response was when his wife and children broke military protocol and rushed across the tarmac to their man. The whole military honor guard arrangement disintegrated and human beings, in their frailty and their joy, took over. It is the lone photograph—with Mrs. Burer literally off the ground in exhilaration—that we can take away from this story as belonging to ordinary people, not to the managers.

WASHINGTON OBSERVER
15 FEB 1973

Observations

Republican congressmen are complaining among themselves at the way candidate Nixon hogged campaign contributions last election, leaving little for Congress. One told WO, "Nixon and the Democrats won and the Republicans and McGovern lost." . . . Many observers credit President Thieu of South Vietnam as being one of the most statesmanlike leaders on the world scene. He kept Kissinger and Nixon from imposing a coalition government on South Vietnam. And thanks mainly to him, South Vietnam has recovered its fighting spirit, which was destroyed with the murder of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother by the CIA. Diem, by the way, is fast becoming a legendary hero and a patron saint in Vietnam.

NEW YORK TIMES
20 February 1973

P.O.W.'s and the Press

Military, Keeping Newsmen at Bay, Has Carefully Managed the Return

By JAMES P. STERBA
Special to The New York Times

CLARK AIR BASE, the Philippines, Feb. 19 — The first 163 American prisoners freed by the Communists in Vietnam have come home to the theme of "God bless America," and many officers at this base clearly believe that the returnees' conduct has set the stage for a restoration of unchallenged patriotism and of the status of the military man to his honored place. If so it will have been no accident

News

Analysis

but a result of careful military planning.

First, the return represents the epilogue to an American war story that never seemed to end, and getting all the prisoners back will be one of its few undisputed achievements. For many Americans the return symbolizes victory. For others it merely confirms the war's conclusion for the United States.

Second, the captured men were predominantly career officers and fighter-bomber pilots—probably the most enthusiastic of American warriors.

Third, the military's repatriation effort was carefully programmed and controlled to insure that all would be retrieved without a hitch, that nothing was said or done to tarnish the prisoners' image and that everything was said and done to enhance it. This meant keeping a safe distance between them and inquiring newsmen; the widespread distrust of the press among the military made it relatively easy.

Joyous and Emotional

The arrival of the first prisoners a week ago was not only good news but also a joyous and emotional event that reduced to tears many of the nearly 200 reporters and photographers on hand.

At least partly for insurance, a team of nearly 80 military public-relations men were assembled from throughout the Pacific to hide possible warts and stand as a filtering screen between the press and the story.

No newsmen were allowed to fly to Hanoi or Saigon aboard the medical pickup planes—to photograph, to interview or even to observe silently—though there were extra places.

Here at Clark Air Base, the first stop on the way home, newsmen were barred from direct contact with the returning prisoners in the first days.

On Friday there was a 20-minute news conference with two senior prison-camp leaders who were carefully counseled beforehand by information officers. Last night a five-man pool of newsmen, under careful supervision, was allowed to

observe for 20 minutes as the 20 men who had just returned were eating dinner in the hospital cafeteria. Today six newsmen were allowed to interview one returnee each for 20 minutes under ground rules that prohibited "controversial" questions and allowed information officers to monitor the interviews and to censor any remarks thought to be sensitive.

Except for that, newsmen were not permitted to talk with the men in the hospital, and doctors and nurses were not allowed to give interviews.

Officers in a Key Role

Those few prisoners who expressed a desire to speak with reporters from hometown newspapers were refused permission. They were allowed to receive written questions and counseled on which ones to answer, and their answers were censored.

Military information officers not only reported the news but played a key role in making it as well. Except for what newsmen could glean from sympathetic sources, all information was clearly by the public-relations officers. It was a delicate assignment, and planning what the world would know about the prisoners was a major factor in Operation Homecoming.

Civilian and military officials had said that the restrictions on contact with the press were based on a desire to protect the health of the former prisoners and to shield them from stress. The policy was maintained though the men were found to be in generally excellent health—enough so to be allowed to drink beer and wine, eat steaks and ice cream, see movies, go shopping and be questioned at length by the hospital staff and friends.

Then the officials stressed that the major reason was to insure that nothing endanger the return of the 400 military men and 13 civilians still held in Vietnam, as well as the undetermined number in Laos. That standard precluded nearly all discussion about health problems, camp conditions and North Vietnamese treatment.

At the outset of the actual return the military information officers aboard each evacuation plane advised the senior officer-prisoner aboard that live television cameras would broadcast the arrival at Clark Air Base to the American people and that a statement was warranted.

When the prisoners asked what they should say, suggestions were offered and a rough draft was prepared, with the information officers saying something like "that sounds great to me." As a result all four of the spokesmen from Hanoi

so far have used similar language in thanking the Commander in Chief and the American people, but information officers insisted that they had not suggested such phrasing.

The statements appeared sincere, but newsmen could not determine whether they were unanimously approved.

The prisoners, who were tightly organized under senior officers, had planned how they would handle themselves. They had talked about what they would say, and they wanted to walk off the evacuation planes proudly. According to a senior officer here, "this was their way of showing that Hanoi had not broken them."

The prisoners also want to tell the stories of their imprisonment and treatment, but reportedly only after one agreed-upon condition is met—that all are free. That made the job of information officers easier.

The 19 military men released in South Vietnam by the Vietcong were quite different. Not in the fighter-pilot fraternity, they were not organized and were in much worse physical condition. Their stories of survival in the jungle would probably be more bizarre than those of men in organized camps in the North.

Specific Data Refused

Col. John W. Ord, a physician and the hospital commander here, termed the general health of the prisoners reasonably good but declined to discuss specific ailments uncovered even though many were obvious—for fear, he said, of upsetting Hanoi's sensitivities.

In declining to allow doctors and nurses to be interviewed, he said they were too busy. Several met newsmen privately, however.

Despite the effort to avoid "possible stress situations," two busloads of the freed men were kept waiting for more than an hour in the tropical sun until Lieut. Gen. William Moore, 13th Air Force commander, arrived to shake hands before they departed for home.

The military's concern over the image of the returning prisoners was reflected not only by the numbers of information officers on hand but also by the information specialists in key jobs.

Col. Homer A. Davis, chief of information for the 13th Air Force, wrote the Operation Homecoming plan for Clark Air Base and became its chief operations officer. Col. Alfred J. Lynn, chief spokesman for United States Forces in the Pacific, not only went to Hanoi with the initial support team but also took part in the negotiations for the first group's release al-

though he had not been previously scheduled to.

Some officers and men directly involved in retrieving the prisoners were allowed to talk with reporters, but were carefully briefed beforehand.

Officer Was Reprimanded

Lieut. Col. Robert L. L'Ecuyer, one of the flight surgeons who went to Hanoi, was interviewed with other crew members before taking off. He avoided answering any questions.

Col. Leonard W. Johnson Jr., over-all evacuation flight coordinator, did answer newsmen's general questions and was reprimanded for it. A flight surgeon, he was expected to be aboard one of the evacuation planes but was grounded at the last minute.

As added insurance that the returned prisoners would not speak with newsmen, the officers assigned to serve as escorts were told, they said privately, that they would be held responsible.

Before the first prisoner release a week ago, information officers arranged for three of the escorts to talk with newsmen, but they were told to avoid discussing several subjects, including whether they knew the names of the men they would escort.

While Marine and Army escorts knew months in advance, Navy and Air Force escorts did not. Asked by a reporter, an Army major denied that he knew the name of his man. Information officers reportedly apologized for putting him in a position in which he was forced to lie. An information officer told reporters it had been a misunderstanding.

Clark Personnel Warned

Directives had gone to 26,000 airmen and their families against expressing opinions to reporters on the war, the ceasefire or the prisoners. An airman quoted a directive on his barracks bulletin board as saying, "Don't talk to the press because they will distort everything you say." When newsmen heard about it and prepared to photograph it, the directive was removed. But such directives reportedly continued orally.

"This is one of the biggest stories of our time and it is being covered by military information officers," said Gordon Gammack, a long-time war correspondent for The Des Moines Register who covered the repatriation of Americans after the Korean war. He recalled that their return was also in stages over several weeks and that they were given the option of whether they wanted to speak to the American people through the press or not.

WASHINGTON STAR
3 March 1973

S.I. HAYAKAWA

The Majority: Not Silent, Merely Ignored

For days the newspapers were full of it: "Glorious Day for American People," "The Long Awaited Day Is Here — Freedom," "Yule Tree Awaits City's First POW," "Hero's Welcome for Freed POWs," "California Relatives Joyful," "Gift Offers Flood Returning POWs."

Then they began to arrive: "Warm Welcome — Sun Shines on POWs," "Cheers at Travis (Air Force Base): 2,000 Welcome POWs," "Flags Up Today for POWs," "San Diego — First POW Home Buys Ill Mother," "(Lt. Cmdr. Everett) Alvarez Tells Family. He's Proud to Be an American," "Job Program for Returning POWs," "POWs Weep at Children's Serenade," "400 School children Sing God Bless America," "God Bless America and Nixon — Capt. Kramer, Captive Since '67."

Time and Newsweek were dizzy with excitement, with cover pictures and full-page color spreads of the reunion of returned prisoners of war with their wives. As the POWs deplaned at Travis the photographers and TV men recorded the smart salute with which each returnee greeted the welcoming generals and color guard. There was a touching scene of a major, shot down over North Vietnam in 1965, meeting for the first time his son, now 7 years old.

And there were innumerable feature stories on the POWs. How was their health? What did they say? What did they

want to eat? What did they miss most while they were in prison camp? What changes do they see in the country, now that they are back? (Some had been captive since before the introduction of the miniskirt!)

Who remembers now the three prisoners of war handed over to American anti-war activists, apparently for propaganda purposes, a few months ago? One wonders vaguely in the back of one's mind how they were selected to be released.

For a long time the anti-war movement, having captured the hearts of a large number of intellectuals, professors and college students, monopolized the networks and the press. The media were entranced with the sit-ins, the burning of draft cards, the demonstrations and riots. They glorified and made instant heroes of those who would have smashed the greatest universities of America in the name of peace — by which they meant instant withdrawal from Vietnam. Hence for a long time the media have made patriotism entirely unfashionable.

With the return of the POWs, however, there is not only jubilation in the media over their reunion with their loved ones. Suddenly patriotism is in fashion again. How brave the men have been!

If the morale of the returned POWs is high, it is because they were sustained by their patriotism; it is because they

were good soldiers; it is because they had that American, never-say-die spirit!

This sudden change in the climate raises for me an impossibly difficult question. What is public opinion anyway?

All these people who are now saying that they are proud of our soldiers, that they are proud of America's role in saving South Vietnam from Communist tyranny, that they have believed all along in "peace with honor" rather than peace at any price — why haven't they been heard from during the past few years? Why were the "silent majority" silent — if they were indeed a majority?

A Hudson Institute study, "The Forgotten Americans: The Values, Beliefs and Concerns of the Majority," by Frank Armbruster (Arlington), shows that the majority were indeed "forgotten" in the major channels of public opinion — on the subject of Vietnam as well as on a number of other subjects such as drugs, pornography and draft evasion. Relying on the findings of the Gallup, Louis Harris and other scientific opinion polls, Armbruster gives evidence that American opinion is not subject to rapid ups and downs on major issues, but is surprisingly stable — and moderate.

For example the figures show that from August 1968 to August 1971 those who believed that the Vietnam war

was a mistake rose from 53 percent to 60 percent. However, the common man rejected the doves, whose program could lead to nothing but national humiliation, and "leaned toward the hawkish (but far from bellicose) candidates."

Why? Armbruster credits the realism of the American people, who "know a bad situation when they see it, but they also know that the world is full of bad deals, many of which cannot be avoided, and they will endure difficult situations for a surprising length of time."

The media — especially television — are governed by show business standards of evaluation. What they want is dramatic action that will grab your attention. So when anti-war protests and rallies provided dramatic action, the news media gave them extended coverage, creating the impression that "everyone" was ashamed of America and the war.

However, when the POWs returned and provided a different kind of dramatic situation rich with emotion, the networks rallied around, creating the impression that "everyone" is proud of America and her soldiers — as I am sure most Americans are.

What is to be remembered is that the silent majority are not necessarily silent. They are merely the unreviewed, the untelevised, the ignored.

NEW YORK TIMES

9 March 1973

P.O.W. SCORES ROLE OF U.S. IN VIETNAM

SACRAMENTO, Calif., March 8 (UPI)—A career Air Force officer who was a North Vietnamese prisoner says the United States butted its "nose into somebody else's business" and that President Nixon could have settled the war for the same terms four years ago.

Maj. Hubert K. Flesher, 40 years old, a fighter pilot who spent more than six years in Communist prison camps, expressed a different view from that of many former P.O.W.'s who have agreed with Mr. Nixon that the United States won a "peace with honor."

"I don't think we really won the war at all," Major Flesher said. "If we expected a South Vietnam that essentially belonged to us, that was in our camp, then we certainly lost the war."

Major Flesher, 20 years old,

Force veteran who intends to remain in the military, said the prisoners were generally "split" into two factions about the war.

'Superpatriots' vs. Others

"There were the superpatriots who felt we should be in there killing them by the thousands, as opposed to another faction which felt the bombing and that sort of thing was not doing any good," he said in an interview yesterday.

Major Flesher said that he "personally didn't think there was any attempt at brainwashing" by the Communists but "a lot of people came to the realization that we were not truly there to defend the rights of the South Vietnamese people."

Major Flesher, who was shot down in December, 1966, compared the war to America's Revolutionary War of 1776, declaring, "It was a conflict between the Vietnamese people, and whether you like it or not, it should have been theirs to decide."

"I think more and more people came to realize this," he

lieve that possibly we had asserted our noses into somebody else's business."

"It's my personal opinion that the 14 points that they offered in 1969 were what were agreed to in 1972," he said.

"They asked for complete total withdrawal of United States forces, a complete halt of air activity over all of Vietnam, the stopping of support of the Government of South Vietnam and for elections. Christ almighty, in looking at the peace terms and everything, that's exactly what they got."

Asked about amnesty, Major Flesher said: "I'm not opposed to it."

"There were a lot of young men who were honestly opposed to this war and were not able or willing to have themselves involved in a situation where possibly they would be killing other people for a cause they didn't believe in."

"It certainly would not make me angry to see these people back home and fitted back into American society," he added.

WASHINGTON POST
24 February, 1973

Kenneth Crawford

Eating Crow on Vietnam

You can lead people to crow but you can't make them eat. It is futile to try. Nevertheless, repeated tries made by President Nixon and public officials who stood by him through his Vietnam ordeal are understandable and, in elementary justice, pardonable. They have been subjected to merciless abuse for a very long time by critics who said their policies would never produce an agreed ceasefire, much less peace, and by some who denied that they were really trying.

These abusers are of several kinds — spokesmen for foreign governments, U.S. members of Congress, American newspapers, columnists, television commentators and periodicals with national and international circulation. Some of them have indulged a penchant for alarmist prediction as well as savage criticism.

During the climactic bombing raids on Hanoi and Haiphong, for example, the President's sanity was called into question and he was threatened with impeachment. All this just before the truce agreement that started U.S. prisoners of war on their way home and Indochina on its way to an admittedly fragile peace.

The fragility of the peace is what makes a backward look at the excesses of fault-finding with administration performance desirable. Perhaps a dose of retrospect will make the critics a bit more tolerant in the future. It is probably too much to expect that Sen. George Aiken's call for restoration of bipartisanship in foreign affairs will be heeded.

But perhaps some of the venom can be extracted from the partisanship. This would help in the remaining difficult task of converting the ceasefire agreement, so far honored almost as much in the breach as in the observance, into a real peace.

Moreover, those of us who have sympathized with the President's determination to achieve what he describes as an "honorable peace" and who, in the past, have been ridiculously over-optimistic about the prospects in Vietnam have endured a lot of taunting. We are entitled, if not to a last laugh, at least to a last growl.

Mr. Nixon himself growled at a post-ceasefire press conference about journalists who can't see any distinction between an honorable and a dishonorable peace. Secretary of State William Rogers growled in an appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee about the prime minister of Sweden, who compared the bombing of North Vietnam with Hitlerian genocide, which, incidentally, neutral Sweden did nothing to stop.

Given an opening, Rogers would doubtless have let go, too, at Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who said in a speech that the U.S. would never have treated Europeans as it treated the Asians of North Vietnam. She seemed to forget that Asian casualties in North Vietnam were a fraction of European casualties inflicted by U.S. forces in the second world war in bombing raids on German and Ger-

man-occupied cities. Also that since the war the U.S. has shown almost \$10 billion worth of concern for the Asians of Mrs. Gandhi's India.

Years of simmering discontent with the President's course in Indochina boiled over when, after Henry Kissinger's announcement that peace was "at hand," the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong was resumed and intensified. Even then the so-called "carpet bombing" was nothing like as devastating as second-world-war air attacks. Yet it brought the Communists back to the bargaining table, probably not because it had a crippling military effect but because it served as a warning that more and worse could follow.

Comment in Congress ranged from Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield's prediction that the bombing would prolong the war to Sen. Vance Hartke's conclusion that it amounted to a nuclear challenge to Moscow and Peking. "Armageddon may be only hours away," Hartke declaimed. To Sen Edward Kennedy it was a "senseless act of military desperation by a President incapable of finding the road to peace." Rep. Bella Abzug talked of impeachment.

Anti-Nixon columnists and newspapers were equally vehement in their denunciations. One columnist spoke of "nukes," reluctantly he said, as the only thing Mr. Nixon had in his arsenal still untried. Another called the renewed bombing "war by tantrum." Still another declared it "morally outrageous and politically useless." To a particularly fervent administration

critic it spelled "failure on a grand scale."

A normally quite restrained opposition newspaper found the ultimate bombing "so ruthless, so difficult to fathom politically as to cause millions of Americans to cringe in shame and to wonder at their President's very sanity."

News magazines emblazoned their covers with such captions as "The Specter of Defeat."

Network television commentators agreed almost unanimously that the President when he first blockaded North Vietnamese harbors had thrown away his chance for a summit meeting in Moscow. One of them questioned whether the Soviet Union, "to save face," wouldn't respond by stirring up new trouble in Europe or the Middle East and North Vietnam by overrunning strategic Kontum in South Vietnam.

As we now know, none of these dire forebodings was borne out by events. Yet none of the foreboders has seen fit to acknowledge excessive pessimism. One newspaper complained that it was being ridiculed for doom saying "as if anyone who warns of danger is proved the fool if danger is averted." This draws a fine line between warning of danger and predicting disaster.

Anyway, Mr. Nixon and Kissinger have come through with an agreement. Those who said it couldn't be done their way have been proved wrong. Critics can console themselves with arguments that the bombing didn't do it or that it should have been done sooner or that, in any case, it won't prevent an ultimate Communist victory. They will never admit that they were dead wrong this once, as who ever does? The Nixonites wouldn't if the shoe were on the other foot, as it has been at times along the way.

Crow just isn't edible in public places.

NEW YORK TIMES
25 February 1973
Aid to Hanoi

'How Can I Vote For It?'

WASHINGTON—With Secretary of State William P. Rogers sitting at the witness table of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal began wondering aloud.

How, the Queens Democrat mused, could he explain to his constituents a vote for economic aid to North Vietnam when President Nixon "had cut off 100 domestic programs?"

Mr. Rogers ducked the question. "I'm not requesting your vote this morning," he replied.

Mr. Rosenthal's question is one that has been asked with increasing frequency, both in public and in private, by members of Congress of late. Virtually every Congressman had a pet program or project omitted from the President's budget, and, if there is not

enough money for loans to farmers or grants to libraries, for instance, where, they are asking, is the money for North Vietnam?

Mr. Rogers's response was also typical. The Nixon Administration quite clearly is planning to ask Congress to provide economic assistance to help rebuild North Vietnam. But the Administration's spokesmen are reluctant to make any specific proposal until the climate in Congress has changed—until the prisoners have all been returned, until the fighting has completely stopped and until, perhaps, emotions over the domestic budget have calmed.

Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, seemed to be speaking to Congressional naysayers last week when he said: "You should look at the economic aid program not in terms of a handout, and not in terms of a program even of reconstruction alone, but as an attempt to enable the leaders of North Vietnam to work together with other countries and particularly with Western countries."

In the Paris accords that the United States signed last month, this country promised "to contribute to healing the wounds of war." In fact, economic assistance is one of the levers the Ad-

WASHINGTON STAR
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WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

Aiding the Unrepentant Enemy

By FRANK GETLEIN

ministration hopes will pry the North Vietnamese into maintaining the peace long after the last American prisoners and troops have gone home.

Nonetheless, the sentiment in Congress right now is so strongly against such aid that an Administration request for it would almost certainly be denied.

"One or two billion dollars for Hanoi has as much chance as a billion or two for the U.S. poverty program—and that is zero," declared Senator William Proxmire, the Wisconsin Democrat.

The reaction of the fiercest Congressional hawks to the idea of giving aid to a former enemy was predictable. Senator Barry Goldwater summed it up. "The North Vietnamese were the culprits in this," the Arizona Republican argued. "They could have ended the war before it caused any damage to their country. Their failure to do so caused many American deaths, and I don't think we should pay them for it."

But recently, Congressional doves—the very same politicians who protested a few months ago about the damage American bombs were doing to North Vietnam—have joined the opposition to proposals for aid to that country.

Senator George McGovern, who had urged a postwar program of aid for the North Vietnamese during his bid for the Presidency, declared last week that he "cannot be at all sympathetic now" to the idea of direct reconstruction aid to North Vietnam.

Opposition to helping to rebuild North Vietnam was by no means unanimous. Senator Mike Mansfield, the Democratic leader, and Senator Hugh Scott, the Republican leader, said they were "leaning toward" supporting the Administration. Economic assistance, Senator Mansfield remarked last week, was "essential to stability in Indochina and is not too big a price to pay." But Senators Mansfield and Scott were distinctly in the minority.

According to Congressional staff members, mail has been running heavily against aid to North Vietnam. Last week, thousands of persons—most of them black, young and poor—rallied at the Capitol to try to persuade Congress to preserve the anti-poverty programs that the Nixon Administration wants to abolish.

More than one legislator, like Representative Rosenthal and Senator McGovern, said that he could not justify cancelling programs that were so important to these Americans and, at the same time, defend aid to a former enemy.

"How can I vote for a program of rebuilding Haiphong and Hanoi," asked Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, "when we haven't even cleaned up the streets here in Washington from the 1967 fire and riots?" —DAVID E. ROSENBAUM

The idea of the United States giving postwar economic aid to our enemy of last month, North Vietnam, is an interesting one, so interesting that it has aroused immediate opposition in both houses of Congress, on both sides of the partisan aisle and in both liberal and conservative quarters.

The comparison has been made to our postwar aid to Japan and Germany, a comparison which seems to promise that a generation from now we will be flooded with cheap, well-made cars and tellies from North Vietnam and be forced to devalue the dollar yet again.

In reply to that comparison, it has been pointed out that our aid to Germany and Japan was given only after those powers had surrendered unconditionally and their old, wartime, evil governments had been replaced by good, peacetime, democratic governments like our own.

North Vietnam has not surrendered at all. The same evil government that once posed such a threat to San Diego and to the cause of freedom everywhere is still in power, unrepentant and still poses precisely the same threat to San Diego and to the cause of freedom everywhere.

The most scrupulous reading of the assorted chapters and protocols of the Peace of Paris fails to reveal a word about renouncing the capture of San Diego as an interim goal on the way to San Clemente. The prudent American can only assume that the evil North Vietnamese still have their eyes on the Coronado Hotel as headquarters.

That being so, the opposition argument goes, we would be doubly, triply foolish to send aid to the Southeast

Asiatic Commies and have it come back in the form of bombs over the Bay Bridge.

The trouble here is that the American people have been educated over the years to regard most of their wars as moral enterprises of a high order. We threw off the British tyranny in 1776, did it again in 1812, smote the Wicked Mexican and so on and so forth, right up to and including the war in Vietnam. Our wars have been holy wars, and none has been more holy than Vietnam, as is clear from the slightest glance at the public rhetoric of Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and a cast of hundreds of government spokesmen of lesser rank.

If you are in a holy war, you may not win it — although we always have until now according to our beliefs but you certainly do not just call off the shooting and become chums with the hated enemy.

★

Other nations can do that. In the old diplomatic wars or the more modern trade wars, winners and losers could stop for a bit and once more be relatives and trading partners! They were, after all, dealing with Uncle Henry or with John Bull the Honest Broker. We, on the other hand, have tended to be dealing with the Prince of Darkness and all his works and all his pomps.

The wives and mothers of the still unaccounted-for American soldiers missing in action have demanded — probably in vain — that no aid be given North Vietnam until a full accounting of their men has been made. It is a reasonable request, and if the government cared half as much

as it has said it does for the troops, and especially for prisoners and missing, it would honor the request without even discussing it.

But another condition ought to be attached to congressional approval of aid to the undefeated unrepentant enemy. This is simply some form of public admission that we were wrong in the first place, that North Vietnam had no designs on San Diego and was no threat to the free world except insofar as the free world can be identified with the fortunes of a corrupt military dictatorship.

That admitted, aid makes sense. That not admitted, aid is a kind of super-cynicism that neither the American people nor their Congress is quite prepared to accept in their government's dealings with the world — although perhaps such acceptance would be an improvement from many points of view.

The super-cynicism — or realpolitik, or simple immorality by the standards of our rhetoric — consists in this: The aid is to be used not as an act of reparation or even as an act of humanitarian concern. It is to be used as a lever for keeping North Vietnam to the terms — whatever they really mean — of the chapters and protocols of Paris.

★

Since that same cleverness lay behind the Christmas bombings and, indeed, all the diplomatic bombing, as distinct from the tactical bombing, it takes no great gift of prophecy to see a day, not too distant when we shall alternate blowing up hospitals and rebuilding them, blowing them up once more and putting them back together, in a pattern that reasonably could last forever.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 February 1973

U.S. Killer Reported Hired In a Plot Against Marcos

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17—President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines believes that last fall, shortly before he imposed martial law, he was the target of a right-wing assassination plot involving a hired killer from the United States, according to information supplied to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

As described in a document given to the committee by a Philippine Government official, key figures in the plot were Vice President Fernando López and Sergio Osmena Jr., President Marcos's opponent in the 1969 presidential election. The reported objective of the plotters was to overthrow the Marcos Government, and to carry out the killing they were said to have brought in a "hit man" associated with various criminal groups in the United States.

One plan reportedly worked out by the professional killer, who was arrested by the Philippine police, was to shoot Mr. Marcos from the back of a sound-proofed Volkswagen truck while the President was playing golf. Alternatively, he reportedly planned to blow up a boat landing used by the President.

The bizarre story was recounted in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report made public today. The report was prepared by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, two committee staff members who last November made an inspection trip to the Philippines and South Korea.

On Inspection Trip

While there have been cryptic references by the Philippine Government to the assassination plan, particularly after the arrest of the American gunman, the report marks the first time that the alleged plot has been spelled out in detail.

While they were in Manila, the two committee staff members said, a high Philippine Government official told them that the reason President Marcos had declared martial law was that he had uncovered a plot from the right to assassinate him and that the key figures "were Vice President Lopez and Mr. Osmena." The official also said that "three Americans were involved in the plot."

The report did not identify

the Philippine official, but one possibility was that it was President Marcos himself who arranged for the story of the assassination plot to be given to the two staff members with the expectation that it would be made public eventually by the Senate committee. In a foreword to the report, the two staff members noted that they had met with President Marcos "at his request."

'Web' of Plots Described

To support the charges, the official, according to the report, arranged for a document to be given to the two staff members describing "a web" of plots against the Marcos Government, including a "rightist revolution and coup d'état." As summarized in the report, the document gave the following details of the rightist plot:

Shortly after the 1969 election, a group composed mostly of retired colonels and generals organized a revolutionary junta with the aim of first discrediting President Marcos and then killing him. The group was headed by Eleuterio Adevosio, an official of the opposition Liberal party.

Mr. Adevosio informed the junta at one meeting that he, Mr. Osmena and "someone in the United States Embassy staff" had conferred about the take-over plans and then at a subsequent meeting said "Washington authorities had been briefed and they showed great interest in the junta movement."

Part of the take-over plan was to designate Vice President López as a caretaker President during the transition period and this was approved by Mr. Osmena and "apparently by the Liberal Party and their alleged American supporters, particularly by Larry Tractman and Company."

According to records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which maintains an office in Manila, Tractman had been convicted of smuggling and conspiracy in the United States in 1950 and had been a controversial figure in Philippine politics, closely associated with Mr. Osmena.

On June 20, 1972, Tractman and a second American, Robert Pincus, brought a third American, August McCormick Lehman, to Manila, the report continued. Tractman introduced Lehman to Mr. Osmena as a professional killer.

Lehman made several silencers and was flown to the Osmena farm on the island of Cebu where he test-fired a rifle with a silencer in the company of Mr. Osmena's son. Lehman also adapted a Volkswagen van, making it soundproof and arranging it so that a sniper could fire a rifle

through a hole in the back covered with a World Health Organization insignia. The truck was to be parked near the Pasig River so that President Marcos could be shot while on a golf course.

According to the report, Lehman also ordered an oxygen tank to be used by scuba divers for plant bombs to blow up the presidential post landing as President Marcos passed. He set up a booby trap with a mine to protect the room where his firearms were stored.

On Sept. 30, a week after martial law was proclaimed, the "legal attaché" of the American Embassy informed Philippine security officers that Lehman had been arrested in Kansas City, Mo., on Oct. 16, 1971 for carrying a concealed weapon, that he was known to have been associated with criminals in New York, New Jersey and Tennessee, and that on or about June 17 he had left New York to "make a hit" on an unknown person, possibly abroad.

Also according to F.B.I. records, the report continued, Pincus said that he knew Lehman was a "hit man" for a union in Tennessee and had "hit" several persons. Pincus, who was not further identified, told the F.B.I. on his return to the United States that Lehman had agreed to pay him \$5,000 a month plus expenses, but that he had left the Philippines after receiving a threatening call in his Manila hotel room.

Philippine authorities announced on Nov. 15 that they were holding Lehman and that he had confessed. The document said he had "revealed" that the final details of the assassination plot were to be coordinated with Vice President López, with the expenses borne by Mr. Osmena, Tractman and Eduardo Figueras, a former candidate for Mayor in Manila.

Vice President López, a member of a wealthy family owning a major electrical utility seized by the Marcos Government, is still in Manila. Mr. Osmena is reported to be in hiding in the United States.

The staff report said the "high" Philippine official explained that there had been no public mention of the plot in Manila because the conspiracy extended into the highest circles of the Government and the military and disclosure would undermine public confidence in the military at a time when such confidence was essential.

The staff report does not vouch for the accuracy of the account of the reported plot, which it said was recounted in such detail "because a high Philippine official considered it sufficiently important to spend an hour talking to us about it and secondly, because it conveys some of the atmosphere of violence, paranoia and surrealistic intrigue which one senses in the Philippines."

The report noted that United States Embassy officials said they had no knowledge of such a plot but did have some corroborating information about the Americans allegedly involved.

At the same time, the report pointed out that "both official and private observers believe that those Filipinos with large financial interests, particularly the enormously wealthy—the 'oligarcha' as they are called—view the prospects of President Marcos' continued rule as a serious threat and that it would not be out of character for some among them to seek his assassination."

The report also noted that the Marcos Government might also have an interest in promoting the story of the rightist plot since the original reason it gave for martial law—that it was to combat a leftist plot—"had been greeted with such skepticism" and that it "might now be seeking to justify its actions on grounds less likely to be rejected by liberal critics abroad."

WASHINGTON POST

1 March 1973

Victor Zorza

A Chinese Guide to Washington

The CIA has intercepted a message sent to Peking by the Chinese Communist mission at the United Nations. The text was obtained by the CIA's top agent Maxwell Smart who was disguised, on this occasion, as James Bond. The message explains America to the Chinese diplomats who are to open soon the new Chinese Liaison Mission in Washington. Here are some excerpts:

Your first impression of Americans will be that they all look the same. You will therefore have great difficulty in telling one individual from another. White Americans do indeed look very much alike, what with eyes that do not slant, large noses, and other facial characteristics which seem common to all. But there are certain ways, discussed in the section on Social Intercourse, to help you to distinguish between different categories of Americans, if not between different individuals.

Americans who come to China say that our men and women look alike, because both sexes wear the same clothes. In fact, however, it is young Americans of both sexes who wear the same clothes and hair styles to an extent which sometimes makes it difficult to tell male from female. This uniformity is evidence of the regimentation forced on society by the totalitarian American capitalist system.

Styles of dress are imposed by a ruthless dictatorship exercised through the fashion magazines. Deviation from the approved norm is punished by social ostracism or by dismissal from work, so that freedom-loving elements have either to conform or to starve. In Washington you will soon learn to recognize a government official by his dress, and tell his rank by the furniture in his office. Businessmen, industrial workers, farm workers, etc., all wear different types of dress, which helps to maintain the barriers between them, and to control the popu-

lace.

Some Americans claim that in China the population is brainwashed by the constant stream of propaganda blaring from loudspeakers on every street corner. You will find that the Americans have a much more subtle and insidious form of mass brainwashing. Certain kinds of music are piped into restaurants, airliners, elevators, workplaces—in fact, wherever people congregate—in order to shape the mood of the masses, to make them more docile or more alert, more relaxed or more productive, depending on circumstances.

In China we use quotations from Chairman Mao's little red book to appeal to man's better nature, because ours is an ideological society. In the United States mass propaganda takes the form of advertising designed to trigger the buyer impulse, because theirs is a consumer society. No Americans can escape being manipulated by the news and advertising media unless he shuts himself off completely from the flow of public information. But since he needs the information to survive in a highly competitive society, he remains open to the advertising message and therefore to manipulation.

The consumer ethic is the foundation of the American system. The United States can only keep going by producing more and more, otherwise the corporate empires dedicated to production would crash and bring down with them the whole social and political structure. So Americans work more and more to consume more and more to create more and more work. This is known as the work ethic. The advertising which creates the consumer demand is far more pervasive in America than the propaganda of Chairman Mao's thought in China. Its task is to preserve the American system, and it therefore has to be far more persuasive whatever the cost.

The importance of TV in forcing the

message on the citizen-consumer is still growing. Television is assuming the role which the church once held in American society. For instance, the TV set occupies in each home the place which a family shrine takes in a Chinese home. The high priests of television are better known to the American people than any other public personages, and they can easily sway the mood of the country.

Complaints from the White House that the TV networks and the press oppose the government are part of an elaborate charade which the media and the administration play in order to mislead the public. In fact, the media and the administration work hand in hand to mold public opinion. Before Nixon's visit to China, no one had a good word to say about our country. But since he abandoned his rigid anti-China stance, the media began flooding the public with information favorable to our country. Some of the most fanatical anti-Communists have suddenly become China-lovers.

We must remember, however, that the totalitarian controls available to the American system could again enable it to switch overnight from friendship to hostility. Our comrades who will be arriving in Washington shortly must always bear in mind that this city, like the American system itself, is built on duplicity and deception.

The available text ends abruptly at this point. A footnote adds that Chinese experts are preparing a series of explanatory leaflets on various aspects of the American scene, such as sports, food, comics, politics, sex, art, education, foreign policy and many others. Readers who would like to provide further insights for our Chinese guests, or to correct some of the gross misconceptions quoted above, are invited to send suggestions to this column.

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BALTIMORE SUN

6 March 1973

Taipei diplomat's defection adds fuel to Reds' reunification drive

Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun

Hong Kong—A Nationalist Chinese diplomat defected to Peking only three days after the People's Republic appealed to Nationalist military and civil officials for open or secret negotiations for a peaceful "liberation" of Taiwan.

Sung Wei-pin, former commercial attache of the Nationalist Embassy in Australia, arrived in Peking Saturday with his wife and their two children, and they were given a "warm welcome and cordial reception," the official news agency Hsinhua reported Sunday.

Ordinarily, a defection of a

relatively junior official such as Mr. Sung would not have worried the Nationalist government of President Chang Kai-shek on Taiwan seriously. Mr. Sung's was the seventh defection since the end of 1965.

But coming so soon after Peking publicly offered an olive branch to Nationalist officials on Taiwan irrespective of their past "wrongdoings," this latest defection cannot but have psychological impact on Taiwan.

Senior Chinese officials, speaking last Wednesday at a Peking meeting ostensibly marking the 26th anniversary

on Taiwan against the Nationalists, told the Taiwan officials that a Chinese domestic solution of the Taiwan question is now possible as the result of President Nixon's China visit last year and Henry A. Kissinger's recent trip to Peking.

They proposed, obviously with the leadership's approval, that negotiations on the unification of Taiwan with the mainland should start as soon as possible and that officials from Taiwan may travel publicly or secretly to the mainland with their safety and the secrecy of their trips guaranteed.

mass defection of Nationalist officials at the Wednesday meeting.

Mr. Sung's action, therefore, went a step further than Peking had anticipated.

Although he said on arrival in Peking that he had decided long ago to return to the Chinese mainland, his defection, on the heels of the Peking appeal, is bound to produce an added propagandist effect for China's current drive to settle the Taiwan question peaceably among the Chinese themselves, an approach that the United States endorses.

A State Department spokesman in Washington reiterated after the Peking appeal that the U.S. interest was simply in seeing that the Taiwan question was resolved peaceably by the Chinese themselves. An official spokesman in Taipei dis-

NEW YORK TIMES
25 February 1973

'Massive Changes Are in Course in Asia'

In his speech to the South Carolina Legislature last week, President Nixon said that with the end of the American involvement in Vietnam, "The critical question is: How do we end a war and then go on from there to build a peace?"

His query suggests a related question of broader scope: What is the American strategy for the post-Vietnam era in the Far East, where the Big Four—the United States, Japan, China and the Soviet Union—face each other in a shifting balance of power?

Massive changes are in course in Asia. Each big power maneuvers vis-à-vis the others. And of the four, the United States commands the least freedom of movement.

The American break with the past is not as neat as suggested by the President's comment. The United States is in the process of completing its military disengagement from Indochina, but it remains very much involved in the political and economic support of its protégé regimes in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The United States is also militarily tied to Thailand and the Philippines, in both of which it maintains big military bases, and to Taiwan and South Korea. Furthermore, the Nixon Doctrine of 1969 continues in being as a sanction for intervention at our discretion in Asian countries where insurrection might threaten to disturb the political status quo.

Those commitments tie us to various petty autocrats who, if history is any guide, will upon occasion try to pit the United States against their foreign or domestic enemies in easy disregard of the American national interest. Thus in confronting the great, the United States will be encumbered by its bonds to the petty.

And circumstances have changed greatly since most of those obligations were undertaken. Mr. Nixon's visits of 1972 to Peking and Moscow, our subscription to the principle of peaceful coexistence with both Communist powers, and last week's announcement that the United States and China will be opening official liaison offices in each other's capitals combine to emphasize the outstanding feature of the changing scene: The United States is now without official political "enemies," with perhaps the exception of Castro's Cuba.

The situation is thus no longer one in which the military factor dominates. Mr. Nixon foreshadowed a change in strategic emphasis when, in July 1971, he enunciated what might be called the second Nixon Doctrine, setting forth the concept that in the future there would be increasing competition among five major economic powers — the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, China and the West European community. One immediately apparent feature of that proposition is that presumed "allies" are henceforth potential antagonists, quite as much as the Chinese and Russians. And, in fact, the "Nixon shock" in the commercial field the fol-

lowing month, and the second devaluation of the American dollar this February, did not affect China and the Soviet Union but hit Western European countries and Japan—the latter with especial force.

What of the positions of the other major figures in the Far East?

Of the three, Japan and the Soviet Union occupy the more favorable tactical positions. Although both have expanding economies, they are in general following complementary, noncompetitive paths. And each has goods the other wants. —Japan industrial products and modern technology, and the Soviet Union industrial raw materials.

Japan, now being asked in effect by Washington not to trade so much with the United States but to turn elsewhere, finds a natural trading partner in the Soviet Union. Moscow has invited Japanese participation in the exploitation of Siberia's natural resources, opening the door wide enough to permit American participation in such undertakings. Tokyo has gone ahead, if cautiously, and there has been a substantial increase in Japanese-Soviet trade in recent years. Washington hesitates, seemingly uncertain how far to proceed along unfamiliar ways.

Except in political terms, China has the weakest competitive position. Encircled by powers that do not share its Maoist ideology, China clearly experiences a profound sense of long-term military insecurity. Given its military and economic debility, it must perforce try to borrow strength from one or more of its opponents for use in pursuit of its national goals. The results of Henry Kissinger's latest visit to Peking indicate that the Chinese leadership seeks to use the United States for leverage against the Soviet Union and Japan in the immediate present, and to obtain additional trade opportunities, while leisurely working toward its long-term political goal of recovering Taiwan for mainland China. But when and where it can, China will also exploit, for profit, its relationships with the other two powers.

The United States thus approaches the post-Vietnam period in the Far East with important handicaps. And there is a fundamental flaw in the over-all American strategy: the United States proposes not so much to collaborate with others in the economic sphere as to compete in a complex viewed as being one of "adversary" relationships. In the Far East as a whole, even as in tortured Indochina, however, the consolidation of peace will clearly be a laborious process, and accomplishment of the task will require consideration of the needs of others and a generous measure of collaboration in the economic as in the political and military fields. Neomercantilism does not fit the long-term purpose of creating a peaceful, ordered Asia.

—O. EDMUND CLUBB

Mr. Clubb served 20 years in Asia as a United States Foreign Service Officer.

missed the Peking overtures as "not worthy of comment."

Hsinhua, in its initial comments, had already capitalized on the defection by saying that it was inspired by the excellent situation at home and abroad.

Foreign Ministry officials, greeting Mr. Sung at Peking Airport, praised him and his family for their "patriotic act."

Eastern Europe

WASHINGTON POST
8 March 1973

U.S.-Soviet Detente Threatened

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, March 7—The new Soviet-American relationship, so carefully nurtured by both countries during the first Nixon administration, appears from here to be in serious jeopardy because of the dispute over Soviet emigration policy.

A damaging confrontation is still avoidable, but at the moment, the U.S. Congress and the Kremlin are on a collision course. Unless one or both of them back down, the recent achievements of Nixon-Kissinger-Brezhnev diplomacy could be forfeited.

These are the opinions of calm and experienced diplomats in Moscow, and one can dismiss them only by contending that either Congress or the Kremlin doesn't mean what it says about the emigration restrictions, which principally affect Soviet Jews seeking to go to Israel.

More than 70 senators and 260 members of the House have co-sponsored legislation that would withhold most-favored-nation status and all U.S. government credits from any socialist country that "denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate" or "imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration."

The Soviet Union selectively denies its citizens the right to emigrate, and it charges taxes of up to \$30,000 to emigrants with university degrees, allegedly as a means of recouping the cost of higher education. This tax is a law of the Soviet Union, officially published at the end of last year.

If these congressmen—a majority of both houses—pass the amendment they have sponsored, the Soviet Union will be denied expanded trading concessions. These benefits were a precondition for final implementation of the Soviet-American trade agreement signed last October, so that document would not come into force.

The Soviet Union obviously regards increased trade as one of the principal potential benefits of improved relations with the United States. If Congress effectively eliminates

this possibility, diplomats here speculate, the Soviet Union may find it impossible to expand cooperation with the United States in other fields.

More immediately, it is difficult to imagine Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Party leader, coming to America as planned this summer or fall if Congress has just denied his country most-favored-nation status, thus killing the trade agreement.

Predictions of a strong Soviet reaction to an adverse vote in Congress are based on an assumption of great pride inside the Kremlin. Historically somewhat xenophobic, and sensitive in the extreme about any challenge to its own sovereignty, the Soviet government cannot easily agree to change a law at home to satisfy foreigners.

Soviet politics may work in the same direction. It is presumed here that Brezhnev's improvement of relations with the West, and especially his opening toward the United States, is controversial inside the ruling Politburo. If Brezhnev's policy was to stumble in the U.S. Congress, his opponents, the Politburo's hawks, would have a strong new argument.

How the Soviet Union got into this dilemma is a mystery. The emigration tax which caused the furor in Congress was imposed quietly last August. Well-placed Soviet sources said at the time that it was a hasty decision, in response to Egypt's expulsion of all Soviet military advisors, meant as a demonstration of continued solidarity with the Arab's anti-Israeli campaign.

In the fall, Soviet diplomats in foreign capitals, journalists in Moscow and other sources began hinting that the tax might just disappear, or be reduced to a token amount. In October, apparently as a ploy to help President Nixon's reelection campaign, the Soviets allowed several hundred Jews with university degrees to emigrate to Israel without paying the tax.

Also in October, Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) introduced the amendment that would deny the Soviets any trade concessions unless they abolished the tax and allowed free emigration. Whether this hardened the Soviet position is unknown. At the end of December, the law authorizing the tax was officially published for the first time, meaning that the Soviet government could no longer quietly drop it.

However, an official of the Soviet Interior Ministry announced at the turn of the year that the Soviet government would especially the elderly, would

not have to pay the tax, and that the amount of tax would be lower for those who had contributed to the state by working for some years. As finally published, the tax regulation also includes a provision that the tax can be waived in special circumstances.

The tax—which applies only to the college-educated—would probably affect less than 10 per cent of prospective emigrants, according to both official and unofficial Jewish estimates. This 10 per cent includes many of the most articulate Jews, and also those who are best-known abroad.

Soviet spokesmen content that 95 percent of those who applied to emigrate have been allowed to go to Israel. Without endorsing this figure, Jewish sources acknowledge that most applicants seem to be able to leave. Those denied permission included many tragic and well-publicized cases, however, and the fact remains that under present circumstances, future applicants with university degrees are subject to taxes of up to 10,000 rubles or more. (An average Soviet intellectual doesn't earn that much in three years.)

The tax is by no means the only obstacle to Jewish emigration, and the Jackson amendment refers to more than the tax. It covers any country that "denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate." Long before the educa-

tion tax was applied, the Soviet Union prevented all but a special few to emigrate.

There are thousands of non-Jewish Soviet citizens who might like to emigrate, but cannot. Some 40,000 ethnic Germans, for instance, are trying to get to West Germany. Thus, as it is written, the Jackson amendment demands a change in fundamental Soviet policy of long standing, not just an end to discrimination against emigrating Jews.

Many diplomats in Moscow—including Westerners sympathetic to both the United States and the Soviet Jews—question whether the long-term interests of either would be served by congressional action that could jeopardize Soviet-American detente.

On the other hand, a number of these diplomats note that pressure on the Soviet Union had effectively changed the Kremlin's policy on Jewish emigration in the past. It seems inconceivable that more than 50,000 Jews could have emigrated in recent years without an outcry from Western public opinion.

But it is also arguable that Western pressure had the opposite effect in the case of the emigration tax.

The Soviet Union might be so eager for better relations with America that it would succumb to this pressure and abandon the emigration tax, but such a switch would certainly fool the experts.

WASHINGTON POST
1 March 1973

Soviets Delaying Bolshoi U.S. Visit

Reuter
MOSCOW, Feb. 28 — Soviet Culture Minister Ekaterina Furtseva said today the Soviet Union was "in no hurry" to answer proposals from U.S. impresarios that the Bolshoi Ballet should tour the United States.

Speaking at a press conference here she warned that Soviet dancers would have to be sure of freedom from harassment if the company were to travel to America. The Bolshoi Company has not visited the United States since a spate of incidents involving the militant Jewish Defense League and Soviet officials two years ago.

THE NEW YORK TIMES; SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1973

Leaders of American Legion, in a Major Shift, Seeking 'Friendly Dialogue' With Soviet War Veterans

By EVERETT R. HOLLES

Special to The New York Times

SAN DIEGO, Feb. 17—Since its organization 54 years ago the American Legion has yielded to no one in the militancy of its opposition to the Soviet Union and Communism, but now its leaders have decided on a new tack. They intend to join a growing national trend, paced by President Nixon, and seek a "friendly dialogue" with war veterans on the other side of the Iron Curtain to work with them toward common objectives.

A delegation from the Soviet War Veterans Association has been invited to this country to be special guests at the legion's midwinter conference in Washington Feb. 25 to March 1. A group of veterans from Poland has received a similar invitation to the legion's national executive committee meeting in May.

Joseph L. Matthews of Fort Worth, 59-year-old national commander of the American Legion, returned home in December from exploratory talks with officials in Moscow, Leningrad and Warsaw and is now touring the United States, explaining the proposed rapprochement to legion posts.

He acknowledged during a visit to Southern California that

the idea had been "slightly traumatic" for some of the older legionnaires because of their long-held attitudes toward the Soviet Union. He added, "It was not an easy decision for me to make to go to Russia and initiate this thing."

"But generally," Mr. Matthews said, "the 2.7-million members of the American Legion approve and a great many of them are enthusiastic about the idea which can, in no sense, be construed as going soft on Communism."

"We are simply proceeding," took President Nixon to Moscow and Peking, that different ideologies can exist in the world without war if people can get to know each other better."

Formal approval for setting up a "friendly dialogue" with the Soviet war veterans is expected to be asked of the legion's national executive committee when it meets in Indianapolis for four days in May, before the project is presented to the legion's membership at its 1973 convention in Hawaii Aug. 17 to 23.

Mr. Matthews said that he was awaiting acceptances from the Russian and Polish veterans to his invitations but he added that it had been anticipated that Moscow and Warsaw would delay any decisions un-

til after a negotiated truce in Vietnam.

"Now that the war there has been stopped," he said, "I think there is a good chance that they may come."

While he was in the Soviet Union and Poland, Mr. Matthews said, he was asked repeatedly about the United States involvement in Southeast Asia and we had some rather sticky sessions on the subject.

"I refused to discuss the war in Vietnam because it would have been inappropriate for me to do so," Mr. Matthews said, "and I kept stressing to them that it was more important to talk about things we would agree on than those matters of national policy on which we could not agree."

He said he found that the American Legion and the veterans groups on the other side of the Iron Curtain had many similar objectives, including veterans' rehabilitation and benefits and the promotion of youth projects.

In some respects, he said, the Soviet Union appears to have more advanced programs of veterans' care than does the United States, for example, in prosthetic research to provide artificial limbs for the handicapped.

Mr. Matthews said that he was also impressed by the help given to disabled Soviet veterans, known as invalids of war.

Special privileges extended to Soviet invalids of war include small automobiles that they can buy for about \$3,000. Such cars normally cost about \$9,000 for an able-bodied Soviet worker earning \$50 a week.

Behind the Iron Curtain, a man or woman is considered to be a veteran if he or she was involved in any phase of the fighting effort. Those who served in partisan or guerrilla units are entitled to the same benefits as former members of the Red army.

Mr. Matthews said that he was unable to obtain information on the size of the veterans' organizations in the Soviet Union and Poland but that, having been formed in 1966, long after the end of World War II, their rolls apparently are far smaller than the American Legion's 2.7 million members, whose military service goes back to World War I.

The Soviet War Veterans Association appears, he said, to be financed entirely by the Soviet Government but Communist party affiliation is not required for membership.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, March 7, 1973

Soviet Journal Hits Role of U.S. Jews

MOSCOW (AP) — A prestigious Soviet journal on U.S. affairs claims in its latest issue that American "Zionists" are jeopardizing "a most important factor" contributing to mutual trust — increased U.S.-Soviet trade.

The monthly U.S.A., the only Soviet journal devoted solely to American affairs, had sharp criticism in its March issue for U.S. Jewish organizations trying to influence the outcome of a congressional vote on granting most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union in trade relations.

A group of 250 House members led by Arkansas Democrat Wilbur D. Mills, who chairs the powerful Ways and Means Committee, has threatened to block the tariff benefits sought by the Nixon administration for Moscow unless the Soviets stop charging "ransom taxes" on Jews who emigrate.

The Soviet explanation of the tax is that it is designed to recover the cost of free educa-

tion the emigres received.

A Senate resolution sponsored by Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., also demands the tax be lifted. It has the support of an estimated 80 of the 100 senators.

"Zionists aim to direct their blow first of all at economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States," commentator Alexander Kislov wrote in the Soviets' latest blast at opposition to the trade provisions.

"And this is not by chance, since economic ties are a most important factor facilitating a growth of trust and, consequently, an improvement of the international situation in general," Kislov added.

The government news agency, Tass, distributed a summary of Kislov's article last night. The journal is due out later this week.

The shortened version of the article made no mention of the education tax, the prime factor complicating the approval of most-favored-nation status.

The article said the main reasons for the American "Zionists' campaign of anti-Sovietism" is to "divert attention" from Israeli's "brutal repressions in the Middle East, to instigate a new flareup of nationalistic sentiment among Americans of Jewish origin" and "to evoke anti-Soviet feelings among broad segments of the American population."

Western Europe

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
3 March 1973

West Germany scrambles to put stopper on security leaks

By David R. Francis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn
Espionage, if it is that, has apparently developed a new politeness in this capital on the Rhine.

Recently someone — not yet publicly known — popped some "most secret" NATO papers into the mail to the Soviet Embassy in nearby Rolandseck.

Soon after, the Soviet ambassador had a messenger take these original documents to the West German Foreign Ministry. Politely, he added a note saying, "With friendly greetings from Ambassador Falin."

The leak is not believed to be militarily important. The papers reportedly discussed the civil-preparedness side of NATO's biennial command-post exercise, called Wintex 73.

For the government, though, the leak is embarrassing. Bonn already has a reputation for holding secrets like a sieve. In 1968 and 1969 the capital was rocked by a series of espionage scandals. In one case, agents stole a NATO rocket and sent it by airfreight to Moscow, marked "machinery."

Chancellor Willy Brandt's government quickly clamped strict security wraps on the story. Armed with a list of the more than 100 supplied with the secret documents, the office of the federal attorney general in Karlsruhe launched an investigation. Even though a government spokesman had announced this action, the Karlsruhe office would not admit officially even their investigation.

At NATO's SHAPE headquarters in Belgium, an information officer could not even say when the Wintex exercise is to begin.

"That's still classified," he held. When it was noted that some newspaper stories set the date as March 7, he replied: "I know, but I have rules to play by."

To the German press, the story has become a fount of fun. "More amusing than painful," said the headline to an article in the Rheinische Post.

Documents 'sent back'

The author, Heinz Schweden, imagines humorously that the Soviets regularly send back documents in plain envelopes marked "wrong address" to a lost-and-found office for secret papers in the Foreign Ministry.

Perhaps, he adds, the Soviets were merely acting in the spirit of the German-Soviet friendship treaty ratified last year.

Christian Potyka, writing in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, suggests that the sender of the document might be someone seeking the Rhine carnival medal, the Award Against Deadly Seriousness.

Exchange proposed

There was some speculation that the Soviets did not even open the envelope they received. So Mr. Potyka wonders if the

Western strategists are offended that their laboriously thought-out military positions find so little attention.

He proposes that the preparatory talks in Vienna for a mutual and balanced-force reduction should add to their agenda a proposal calling for the regular exchange of maneuver papers.

"This could make it unnecessary to actually hold the maneuvers and save a lot of money," he writes. Seen from that standpoint, the Wintex blow could become a milestone in the history of disarmament.

Welt am Sonntag, a weekly newspaper, has a cartoon showing an official in an office overlooking the Kremlin with a "top secret" NATO document in his hands. He says into the phone: "You can send that back. We already have enough of them."

Perhaps the full story of the Wintex affair will emerge this week. A member of the opposition Christian Democratic Party has asked a question in Parliament about it, and the government is expected to reply.

Perhaps the full story of the Wintex affair will emerge soon. A member of the opposition Christian Democratic Party has asked a question in Parliament about it, and the government is expected to reply.

Of course, espionage is always a problem for the security of NATO nations. But the staff command exercise itself points to what likely is an even more serious security concern for European nations. These are the Communist Party members and the huge number of foreign workers living in Western Europe.

There has been speculation in the press that the Wintex documents themselves may have been sent to the Soviet Embassy by a leftist civil servant.

The exercise imagines that at a time of dangerous troop concentrations and naval maneuvers by the enemy "Orange Country," the police in Marburg must deal with a rebellion by Spartakus students. MSB Spartakus is the student wing of the West German Communist Party.

In other German states, the exercise reportedly gives the police the task of stopping newly arrived provocateurs from stirring foreign workers into rebellion.

In most European countries, foreign workers face discrimination and sometimes maltreatment.

Whether as a result they could be provoked into riots or other troublesome activities at a time of crisis is questionable. However, with some 2.3 million foreign workers in Germany, 1.2 million in France, 1.5 million in Britain, and smaller numbers in the low countries and Scandinavia, the possibility must be of some concern to NATO officials. The RDP 77-00432R000100110001-4

BALTIMORE SUN
22 FEBRUARY 1973

Bonn says Russians returned secret data

By GENE OISHI
Bonn Bureau of The Sun

Bonn—Red-faced officials acknowledged yesterday that secret NATO documents were returned earlier this month to the West German Foreign Office "with friendly greetings" from the Soviet Embassy here.

West German authorities also acknowledged that an investigation was underway to find out how the documents, classified "top secret," got into Russian hands in the first place.

Exercise underway

The Soviet Embassy declined to confirm or deny the press reports of the affair. A spokesman would say only, "We have read the newspaper reports with interest."

The documents reportedly deal with Wintex 73, a biennial NATO maneuver to test military and civil emergency planning and communications in the event of a nuclear attack.

The exercise, which already is underway, involves the establishment of an emergency government as well as a military headquarters in a complex of underground installations in the Ahr Valley, a few kilometers south of Bonn.

According to press reports, most of which have been confirmed by authorities, the documents were mailed to a Soviet diplomat attached to the embassy at Rolandszck on the outskirts of Bonn about two weeks ago.

Personnel dumbfounded

A few days later, on February 9, the diplomat reportedly delivered the documents personally to the West German Foreign Ministry "with friendly greetings from Ambassador [Valentin] Falin," the Russian ambassador.

The diplomat reportedly assured the dumbfounded For-

eign Ministry personnel that he was returning the documents just as he received them and that no photocopies of them were made.

West German military experts, meanwhile, indicated that the documents, since they dealt with only a small part of the exercises, had only a minimal effect on military security.

Of little interest

The *Generalanzeiger*, one of the papers that broke the story, speculated that one of the reasons the Russians returned the papers was because they contained so little of interest, another reason being to promote the spirit of East-West détente.

According to authorities, there were only 100 copies of these documents available and the suspicion of the source of the lead was narrowed to two

governmental departments.

From one of the departments one set of files reportedly have disappeared, while several sets of files are missing from another.

In this West German capital, notorious for leaks, major ministries were quick to clear themselves.

The Defense Department spokesman said, "Our papers are complete." The Interior Ministry spokesman assured the press, "Employees or offices of the Interior Ministry are not affected [by the investigation]."

Ruediger von Wechmar, government spokesman and head of the Federal Press Bureau, asserted, "documents are never missing from our offices."

THE ECONOMIST FEBRUARY 24, 1973

Germany

The short-haired lads for Honecker

FROM OUR BONN CORRESPONDENT

Berlin

Next week the five-month trial of Horst Mahler, sometime fashionable Berlin lawyer, more recently renowned urban guerrilla, will end in west Berlin's central criminal court. Herr Mahler has been charged with founding and taking part in a criminal organisation hostile to the constitution and with "collective and grievous robbery," notably including the carrying out of three bank robberies in the space of seven minutes.

During the trial the accused called as witnesses Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, both now in custody, whose anarchist group named itself the Red Army Faction (RAF). They took their chance to give the trial the semblance of a teach-in on future urban guerrilla tactics. And when the prosecution demanded a 12-year prison sentence for Herr Mahler the former lawyer remained blankly impassive, but the student element at the back of the court emitted unbelieving gasps and laughter as the "hiring state pigs" concluded their case.

Already the elaborate ritual of organising demonstrations in support of Herr Mahler has begun. There are teach-ins on Mahler at the technical university, by permission of the president, and cyclostyled minutes of inter-

TIME

5 March 1973

INTERNATIONAL NOTES

Gone With the Wintex

Bonn's embarrassing reputation of being the leakiest capital in Europe inevitably provokes a certain sympathy from security-minded government officials everywhere. West Germany's state secrets are stolen with benumbing regularity by one or another of the country's estimated 16,000 foreign agents, while other bits of classified information have a way of turning up in the headlines of the nation's newspapers and flashy illustrateds. Until last week, however, nobody could recall a case in Bonn—or anywhere else, for that matter—in which a foreign power was thoughtful enough to return a set of secret files to the country from which it had been stolen.

WASHINGTON POST

21 February, 1973

NATO Documents

BONN—Secret documents disclosing details of a NATO staff exercise were mailed to the Soviet embassy here, which later sent them to the West German Foreign Ministry, the West German news agency DPA reported.

DPA said the documents were originals, taken from one of fewer than 100 sets prepared for the "Wintex 73"

command-level paper war game played by NATO to test its crisis machinery.

The documents described the political scenario for the war game and the role of German civil defense organizations in it, DPA said. West German officials said, the dossier in question represented only a fragment of the total documentation on the exercise.

minable meetings on who shall march with whom and who shall carry which banner saying what. Of a student body of some 52,000 in west Berlin as many as 15,000 could be classed as militants. The difficulty is to distinguish between the maoists, stalinists, trotskyites and orthodox east German communists.

It is the maoists who are making the running on the Mahler case, probably because they are anxious to regain face after Chairman Mao's decision to co-operate with the Americans of all people. But the most remarkable development in west Berlin's student politics is the rise in the power and influence of the students who look to east Berlin. Perhaps no more than 1,000 in all, they are a highly-disciplined bunch, tightly organised in cadres and with hair as short as any bank clerk. Many of them visit east Berlin and east Germany for political courses during the vacations. Clearly, they have no more love for Herr Mahler's anarchism than has Herr Honecker across the wall. But, as one

student put it, "For us Mahler is a knife with which to rip open the rottenness of bourgeois society."

The Free University campus in Dahlem looks a battlefield. Faculty buildings are daubed with slogans ("Nixon mass murderer, Brandt his accomplice"). The entrance halls are hung with handwritten manifestoes and exhortations. Here the "long march through the institutions," in Rudi Dutschke's phrase, has largely taken place. Thanks to the democratic system of "co-determination," radicals have a two-thirds majority on the boards of the departments of philosophy, social sciences, political science, German studies and the fine arts, and can muster a simple majority in six other departments. For this reason many teachers and students who want to get on with some work are leaving for west Germany. Some radical students are also leaving Berlin to find new political targets in west Germany: the new university of Bremen is fashionable.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 February 1973

British omit top items in new defense program

By John Allan May
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

London
Great Britain's new defense plans hide more than they reveal.

What they hide is the great dilemma: What comes after the Polaris submarines? The latest missiles from America, or cooperation with France in a new and wholly European nuclear deterrent force?

It frequently has been denied that Prime Minister Edward Heath made any nuclear deal with President Pompidou as part of the price of Britain's entry into the European Community.

But most experts feel certain that he did agree to study the range of possibilities open to Britain and France together in developing a joint deterrent.

Mr. Heath has spoken often of the value of British-French nuclear collaboration.

Early action indicated

The time is fast approaching when this concept has to be translated into terms of military hardware.

The view here is that it soon will be.

But one thing the latest British defense white paper reveals is the extent to which inflation already has increased the cost of defense.

The bill for the year ahead will be \$1.2 billion larger than last year's.

Spending on defense is up slightly even in "real" terms, discounting inflation. Next year it will be 5 1/2 percent of gross national product instead of 5 1/4 percent.

Britain is strengthening its commitments to NATO, the white paper states.

There is no sign, it adds, that the Soviet Union is slackening its defense efforts. It has 90 new silos for strategic missiles under construction, 6 new ballistic-missile-firing submarines, 1,500 missiles on site, 60 operational ballistic-missile subs and 300 attack and cruise-missile subs.

Soviet coverage expanding

Soviet naval forces range the world in increasing numbers. Its long-range aircraft cruise the Atlantic and Pacific, and on occasions the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean.

There are 94 Soviet and Warsaw Pact army divisions stationed in Eastern Europe, the white paper adds.

Britain is cooperating with France on the Jaguar strike planes, with West Germany and Italy on a new multi-role combat aircraft, with Belgium on a new combat army reconnaissance vehicle, and new howitzers with Germany and Italy.

This year one more nuclear powered submarine will enter service. Four nuclear attack submarines are under construction. The aircraft carrier Hermes will come back as a commando ship. Two new cruisers become operational. New cruisers to carry vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) strike planes are planned.

Modernization of the Air Force with Phantoms and with Harrier VTOL fighters has been completed. Navy Buccaneer and Nimrod forces now will be strengthened.

NEW YORK TIMES
19 February 1973

Paris Police Ban Conference Of U.S. 'Exiles for Amnesty'

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Feb. 18 — The Paris police have banned a conference of a group called Exiles for Amnesty scheduled here Tuesday and Wednesday by American war resisters.

The police said that the meeting, which would have brought together United States-based antiwar groups and deserters and draft-evaders living in Europe, was potentially "disruptive to public order" coming so soon before the 12-nation conference on Vietnam, which starts here Feb. 26.

Michael Uhl, a 28-year-old Vietnam veteran who works for Safe Return, a New York group advocating total amnesty, said the conference organizers would bow to the police order and go home. About 20 of the expected 80 participants had arrived in Paris.

Mr. Uhl said that "we would have been out of town well before" the Vietnam conference began.

He attributed the police move to "an extraordinary degree of pressure" he believed American officials had put on the French Government.

WASHINGTON POST
19 February, 1973

Vietnam Veterans Reported Training IRA Guerrillas

From News Dispatches

LONDON, Feb. 18—The British army said today it was becoming increasingly worried about aid from the United States for the outlawed Irish Republican Army and the possibility that U.S. Vietnam veterans might come to Ireland to fight.

The conservative London Sunday Telegraph published an article saying that U.S. veterans are already training members of the extremist Provisional Wing of the IRA, which is conducting a guerrilla war to force the reunification of the largely Catholic Irish Republic and Protestant-dominated Ulster.

British intelligence officers said the newspaper report was "by and large well-informed."

UPI reported.

The intelligence officers' assessment, according to UPI, is that almost 90 per cent of the Provisionals' weapons come from America.

According to this version, Britain's internment of IRA explosives experts has forced the guerrillas to recruit Americans as military instructors.

The intelligence officers also reportedly said that U.S. government agents are working both in the Irish Republic and Ulster to determine the extent of involvement by Americans.

Provisional IRA spokesmen denied the reports.

The report in the Sunday Telegraph said British forces have captured 70 semi-automatic rifles, 18 submachine

guns, 200 M-1 carbines, 60 Gai-rand rifles and more than 100,000 rounds of ammunition in the last 18 months—all of U.S. origin, the newspaper said.

The report added that British intelligence had identified 12 former American servicemen working with the IRA, mostly operating in the Republic and seldom venturing into Ulster. It said the Americans specialized in making booby traps.

It quoted a senior British army officer in Belfast as saying, "There is no doubt about it. American involvement here is becoming one hell of a headache. If we could stop American help we could also stop the IRA's campaign dead in its tracks."

The newspaper report also said 40 per cent of Provisional IRA funds, \$500,000 last year, came from IRA front groups in New York and Boston.

It added that William Whitelaw, Britain's secretary of state for Northern Ireland, might ask for urgent negotiations with the U.S. embassy

here and with U.S. immigration authorities about the alleged presence of Americans.

There are no obvious signs of Americans in the trouble areas of Northern Ireland, although a British army spokesman said that two Americans in the Irish Republic had been "warned away."

Another American, Gerald Brady of Chicago, is serving five years in the Maze Prison outside Belfast after being convicted on arms charges.

A former American Marine said in Dublin last week that he had been approached by the IRA in a New York bar when it was learned that he was coming to the republic on a leave of absence from his job. He was asked to train IRA volunteers in terrorist tactics, he said, especially in the use of explosives and booby traps.

The American, a Korean war veteran, said he refused in New York and again when he was approached at his Dublin hotel.

NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1973

London Police Kill 2 Attacking Embassy

By MICHAEL STERN
Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Feb. 20 — The police shot and killed two masked Asian youths brandishing imitation guns who invaded and terrorized the Indian High Commissioner's office in central London near the Strand today.

A third youth, a 15-year-old Pakistani schoolboy, was captured and was being questioned to find a motive for the attack on the High Commissioner's office, which has the status of an embassy. The police discount robbery as a motive and believe the attack was political.

Pakistanis have been staging demonstrations in London and Manchester in recent weeks to protest the refusal of India to release prisoners captured in the India-Pakistan war of December, 1971.

Two police officers rated as marksmen fired 11 shots at close range before bringing down the two youths. Each was hit once and died instantly. They have not been identified yet but they are believed to be Pakistanis no more than 20 years old.

Special Squad Used

British policemen are usually not armed. They are issued guns only when they are sent

out to find armed suspects or when they are on such special assignments as guarding embassies.

The two officers who shot the Asian youth are members of the Special Patrol Group, a squad of 200 men trained to use arms and to respond quickly in emergencies. They were standing by in a patrol car to back up men on embassy duty when they heard a radio call asking for help to stop an armed attack at the Indian High Commissioner's office.

The youths had entered the office, an imposing six-story stone building in Aldwych, opposite the Royal Shakespeare Theater, and had immediately taken seven hostages, tying up some and making other kneel in a ground floor reception room. Besides the imitation revolvers they were carrying two daggers, a short sword and a bottle of acid.

One hostage broke away and hurled himself through a plate-glass window to escape to the street. He directed the police to a side door, through which they were able to come up behind the youths and surprise them.

Youths Refused Surrender

John Gerrard, a deputy assistant commissioner of police, said the armed officers chal-

lenged the first youth they met and asked him to drop his gun. When he refused, they fired. They then turned to the second youth, who was half hidden behind a pillar. He, too, was asked to drop his weapon. Commissioner Gerrard said, and he, too, refused. The officers then fired on him.

The 15-year-old was carrying an "edged weapon" when he was overcome and captured, the commissioner said.

Asked at a news conference when an armed policeman was justified in firing his weapon, Commissioner Gerrard said:

"Every officer issued with a firearm is told without any doubt at all that he can use his weapon if he, or a person he is protecting, is attacked by someone with a firearm or another deadly weapon and has no other means of defending himself."

He said that a coroner's inquest and a departmental inquiry would have to determine if the police officers were justified in firing but he left little doubt that he thought they were. He asserted that the imitation guns, short-barreled six-shot revolvers made of plastic and metal, were quite realistic.

Attack Is Embarrassment

"If you were threatened with one from behind a pillar, you would think it real," he said.

The attack is an acute embarrassment to both the police and the Foreign Office. Lord Balmori, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, called on the acting Indian High Commissioner, Mahara Krishna Rasgotra, to express regret over the incident. Mr. Rasgotra is India's Ambassador to Britain, although, like other Commonwealth country representatives here, he does not have that title.

The police are proud of their reputation for avoiding unnecessary violence and were stung by criticism in Parliament and the press seven weeks ago when another police officer, armed for embassy duty, shot and killed a bank robber in a busy shopping street. It was the first such death in London in 60 years.

In the House of Commons this afternoon, members pressed Robert Carr, the Home Secretary, who is responsible for the police, for assurances that such incidents would not become part of London life.

Mr. Carr replied: "Prompt action by the police, demonstrating that anybody who attempts this sort of thing in London is caught and dealt with, is perhaps the best deterrent and the best way to allay people's fears."

BALTIMORE SUN
7 March 1973

Europe suspicious of U.S. moves

BY PHILIP POTTER

London Bureau of The Sun

London — President Nixon may have meant it when he said five years ago he wanted his administration to be one of negotiation and not confrontation with the rest of the world, but the emerging European union is not sure it is included in this genial concept.

This is what one senses in a visit through at least parts of the European Economic Community.

The February currency crisis that forced Germany to spend heavily to support the dollar certainly had elements of confrontation in European eyes.

"Benign neglect"

Conscious that their own balance of trade with the United States has only recently become favorable to the tune of a half billion dollars, they contend they are having to bear the brunt of a payments crisis caused by heavy American deficits.

There is a freely voiced feeling among EEC eurocrats, bankers and government financial officials in Belgium and Holland that the American Federal Reserve Board and the administration could have intervened had it desired to halt the flow of American dollars into European exchange markets. Some believe it was all plotted to enable a second devaluation of the dollar—a devaluation totaling about 27 per-

cent since Washington closed its gold window in August, 1971.

U.S. surplus expected

While British government spokesmen do not share that dire view they admit to a prevalent feeling in Europe that "benign neglect" by Washington officialdom contributed to instability in the money markets, and mostly at Europe's expense.

In fact, there is growing feeling in Belgium and Holland at least, that the dollar now is undervalued and this will permit a rapid rise of U.S. exports to Europe that in a few years will put the American trade account back in surplus, largely at Europe's expense. They also see Japan's trade being diverted to Europe and they are as afraid of that as Americans are.

In Belgium there was talk of a "coincidence" in U.S. and Soviet interest in holding Europe down because of its potential economic strength vis-à-vis the existing super powers.

The European commission's top-level civil servants claim the U.S. now goes over everything the commission does with a "fine tooth comb" and Washington keeps the American representative to the commission busy trotting around with complaints and suggestions.

As one put it: "I see the ambassador far too much; not that I don't like him."

The counter-claim by American officials from Washington

is that commission position papers are seldom changed by the Council of Ministers and then it is too late to influence EEC decisions.

"Who do we talk to in Europe, the ministers or the commission? There is no easy way for us to find a point of contact. So there's a problem of getting into discussions before positions are set in concrete," said one American official.

Mood of total frustration

This, he said, had created a mood of total frustration in Washington and the conclusion there was that the EEC commission was the "most difficult of all" with which to deal.

Hence in the February monetary crisis, Paul Volcker, the U.S. under secretary for monetary affairs, confined his European problem-solving consultations to the finance ministers of Germany, Britain, France and Italy. The smaller nations in the EEC, quite naturally, resented being left out, and so did the commission.

There are plenty of bones of contention to keep things on the boil. Even before the formal trade negotiations get under way late this year, there will be negotiations at Geneva involving American claims for compensation under Article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Disposition to help

While confrontation on many fronts is in the air it may be said that no European govern-

ment wants to weaken the Atlantic alliance.

It also is said that Europe's leaders are fully aware that defense, trade and monetary matters all bear on the U.S. balance of payments problem, and there is European disposition to help, however compartmented the various negotiations necessarily will be, and the different timetables negotiators will have to meet.

A thorny problem

Continued access for American agricultural products in EEC markets, given its common agricultural policy based on high prices to European farmers and high duties to keep exports out, is admittedly a thorny trade problem.

As for the liberalizing of trade, no one in Europe now expects the sort of 50 per cent tariff cuts across the board achieved in the Kennedy round, nor will the forthcoming GATT negotiations do a lot to clear away non-tariff barriers to trade of which the U.S., like many other nations, has its share.

What is hoped for, as the British put it, are steps forward and not backward in the realm of furthering world trade. In Britain, at least, there is no disposition to be punitive toward Japan, but the EEC countries obviously are going to team with the U.S. to get that over-competitive country to open up its own markets.

WASHINGTON POST 20 February, 1973 Arms Sales Drop

PARIS — France reported a drop in arms sales in 1972, and an official implied that U.S. dumping was largely to blame.

Paul Masson, chief of the staff to Defense Minister Michel Debre said he believed that the drop had been caused by international competition which is currently led by powerful and well-equipped nations whose methods and objectives "leave us perplexed."

WASHINGTON POST 18 February, 1973 British Marines

LONDON—The Defense Ministry said British Marines have been training at Camp Lejeune, N.C., under a NATO exchange program, but stressed that the program was in no way connected with the fighting in Northern Ireland.

A spokesman said it was "pure coincidence" that the unit had recently been on duty in Ulster.

Near East

NEW YORK TIMES

28 February 1973

Greek Students, Long Passive, Now Challenge Regime

By ALVIN SHUSTER
Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, Feb. 27 — Greek university students, for years the most passive in the West, are now posing major problems for the army-backed regime with demonstrations and strikes in support of demands for academic freedom.

The student activism, the first such open movement of protest since the army seized power here nearly six years ago and imposed martial law, has emboldened opponents of the regime, surprised and dismayed Government officials stirred the imagination of Greeks and left many wondering: "Why now?"

Three years ago, a group of students told a visitor that, while campuses elsewhere in the world were alive with agitation, Greek students were in no position to act. They talked of the desire to get their diplomas, of the fear of the police and army, of their inability to find more than a few dozen colleagues interested in open defiance.

Today, at a time when campuses abroad are relatively quiet, the time has come for many students here. And, as they see it, it is a nonviolent movement that will gather momentum because, as one said, "the incompetence of this Government will constantly give us causes to broaden our support."

For members of the Government, the agitation represents a betrayal. Premier George Papadopoulos and other ministers have constantly preached the need to win the support of the nation's youth and to improve the quality of education.

Accordingly, the regime has built new schools, provided free tuition up through the university level, announced free meals for college students not living at home and given students books and interest-free loans.

Many students, however, have made it clear that material largess is not enough. And so, the officials find themselves somewhat bewildered by the troubles. For this was supposed to be the new generation that grew up under the regime; young people who were 12, 13 and 14 years old when it came to power in 1967, those on whom the rulers depended for the "transformation of Greek society."

A group of students, all of whom attend the Polytechnic University in Athens, the coun-

try's most prestigious technical institute, gathered in a downtown apartment to explain the reasons behind the agitation. They were clearly worried about Government retaliation and did not want to be identified by name.

"The reasons are varied and with deep roots," said Nikolaos, a 20-year-old student of civil engineering. "With time, I guess you can say we are becoming more mature. The movement is genuine. There is a time for everything and it took us a while."

"We are tired of decrees against us. We are weary of fraudulent elections for our representatives, who always turn out to be pro-regime. We object to Government commissioners, all ex-generals, sitting in the schools. We want an important voice in drafting the new charter for higher education."

"Underneath, too," said John, a 21-year-old who is studying electrical engineering, "we have the feeling that this Government can't last too long now, that it can't keep it up. We are not saying its days are numbered, but maybe its months are."

'United Like Never Before'

"I'm also saying that we may get tired," he went on. "The campus may appear to quiet down for a while. But we're doing the best we can. We have no plan. The surprising thing is that we are united like never before under this Government."

It is this sense of unity that appears to have given many students their new-found courage. Though obviously inhibited by the powerful apparatus of police informers and the strictures of martial law, they are finding at least limited security in numbers and are talking of encountering less and less difficulty in moving the once-apathetic within their ranks.

Several students said that the effort was ideologically mixed, with support from the left, right and center. And they indicated that it had been coordinated by small groups meeting quietly for more than a year despite the prohibitions against such clandestine strategy sessions.

The Government has also helped their cause in what is generally regarded — even by some supporters of the regime — as a bad case of nerves. "We certainly lost our cool," said one Greek close to the Government.

The Government expressed its regrets to the United States Embassy today for an incident Friday night when five policemen, in search of demonstrating students, invaded the Hellenic-American Union, which seeks to promote cultural relations. As guests were leaving after a showing of an American

movie, John Ford's "Stagecoach," the policemen searched the premises and beat up the receptionist. The embassy protested.

Police Sent to Campus

This incident followed what appeared to have been two major mistakes made by the regime earlier in the month. First, policemen were sent to the campus of the Polytechnic University to break up a demonstration and beat many students to the ground.

"Five hundred police attacked," said one young man who was there. "They were sadists. They were pulling the hair of girls. They hit us on the head, shouting 'You want democracy?' Take this!" One beaten student wrote "Shame" with his blood. I was there and saw it. Other students were not but they have all heard the story and are terribly upset."

The second apparent miscalculation came on Feb. 13 when the regime, worried about the rising unrest, issued a new decree signed by Premier Papadopoulos to end military deferment for students who were striking or inciting others to protest. This enabled immediate call-up for military service.

Thus what started out as a campaign involving other issues such as less Government intervention in university life and the desire for a greater say in academic affairs is now centered on the draft decree. Some 100 students, most of them leading activists, have been forced to stop their studies and go into the armed forces. There is no appeal.

"Bring back our brothers" is one of the current slogans used by groups of demonstrators, who, again on Saturday night, surged into Constitution Square here only to be chased away by the police. Their other shouts within the last two weeks, particularly during the 30-hour sit-in at the law school of Athens University, included "We want our freedom!" and "Greece for Greek Prisoners!" — a play on the regime's slogan of "Greece for Greek Christians."

The Government is trying to play down the difficulties, ordering the ostensibly free press to avoid the issue and saying that the troublemakers represent "a small group of Fascists and Communists," not the bulk of Greece's 70,000 university students. Although the activists' support is difficult to gauge, several thousand have taken part in protests here and in Salonika in the north.

Action Called 'A Miracle'

"I've seen the student struggles over the years in the United States," said an American professor on a visit here last week. "I'm not sure our kids would have done what

those students did at the law school occupation."

"It came after that massive beating at the Polytechnic," he said, "and still they had the courage to occupy the building under martial law and in the presence of all those police."

"That wasn't a patty raid," the American went on. "In the States the students were usually on top, with the school administration on the defensive. The students were on the defensive here and the fact that they did what they did seems to me to be nothing less than a miracle."

Beyond the draft decree, the agitation has been fed by other older laws, notably a 1969 decree that bans student strikes and student demonstrations and any unauthorized gatherings whether public or private. Students must get their rector's permission, for example, for any meeting.

What many students most detested, however, was the handling of student elections last November.

The Government, in a gesture to win over this generation, decided to allow voting for student representatives. This followed a round of speeches by Byron Stamatopoulos, the Government's chief spokesman, who urged the students to take more interest in academic life and to speak out more freely. He gave a series of receptions around the country last year and wined and dined a variety of students.

The November elections were designed to ease unhappiness over the lack of "student power" because the army, when it seized power in April, 1967, abolished the existing student councils and appointed leaders.

"The students were soon disillusioned with their elections last year," said a professor at the Polytechnic University. "They soon found out that the colonels talked like democrats but behaved like dictators." The elections were organized by the student leaders who had been appointed by the Government and were clearly rigged; pro-regime candidates won almost every contest.

Leaders Drafted Into Army

"At the Polytechnic," said one bitter young man, "we managed to have three elections in two of the schools — topography and chemical engineering. We insisted on elected people watching over the voting. The result was that all the pro-Government people lost."

"Now what's happened to our leaders? Of 15 of the elected representatives in civil

engineering, more than half had their deferments lifted last week and are now in the army.

"I remember the voting very well," said another student. "They put up the lists to register for one or two days for just a few hours, and it seemed that only pro-Government students knew when to come. It was a clear fraud."

The anger over the elections was coupled with continuing grievances over the appointment by the Government of former military officers to sit in on high-level meetings of the university administration. The regime thought so highly of the idea that it wrote the jobs into its Constitution. Some of the commissioners are more active than others, but professors and students said that their mere presence interfered with university autonomy.

Informers Are Resented

Moreover, students complain

bitterly of informers in their classes, saying that some are paid and others are would-be police officers, for example, who are studying law or other fields to advance their careers.

"In the best cases, the informers are not paid," said a young man whose father was a district attorney dismissed by the regime. "In the worst cases, they are paid."

University education here, of course, had serious shortcomings before the coup. Some professors required purchase of their own books; for instance, giving better grades to students whose names were listed as buyers in the bookstores.

The system in most universities was and is archaic, with little contact between students and their professors, with only a few exceptions. There is overcrowding, the young are merely lectured at and never listened to. In most schools grades are based solely on the students' ability to memorize.

"Most of our professors don't want to discuss politics with us and we understand why," said one Polytechnic student. "Their appointments have to be approved by the Government. They don't want to talk about anything. We hardly ever see them, except at a distance."

One of the consequences of the current troubles is that at least some of the professors have come into the open on behalf of the students, a rare alliance under this regime. Five testified on behalf of 11 students who were given suspended sentences for disturbing the peace at one demonstration, and other professors have issued statements opposing the draft decree. The rector and administration of the Polytechnic University have resigned in protest.

After six years, the Government has not been able to solve the basic problems of the universities, much less soften the existing decrees aimed at

stifling dissent. The 53-year-old Minister of Education, who took over his job last August, is Nikolaos Gadonas who, even Government supporters acknowledge, knows little about education.

Sixth Man in Post Since '67

In 1967 he was an army colonel, one of the original planners of the military coup, and was serving as the head of intelligence services in northern Greece. He is a graduate of the army cadet school and the High War College and has no background or experience in teaching.

He is also the sixth Minister of Education since the 1967 coup, reflecting the regime's difficulties with the job. During the height of the student troubles last week, Mr. Gadonas was in the countryside opening a new high school.

NEW YORK TIMES

6 March 1973

The Changing Mood of Greece

By ALVIN SHUSTER

Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, March 3—Athenians are in the midst of carnival time, and the confetti horns and masks have transformed the plaka into a sort of mardi gras.

Housewives are complaining of rising prices, students are planning their next move, and opposition politicians are walking around with new smiles. Rarely in the six years since the army seized power have those opposed to the Government displayed such high spirits. They feel, rightly or wrongly, that events are finally inching their way, that the Government is somehow slipping, that resentment is spreading in society, that the United States is reconsidering its policy of support and that the ruling colonels may soon begin internal quarrels.

Their confidence is fed partly by the present open agitation of university students and partly by wishful thinking.

Control Is Firm

Premier George Papadopoulos, though faced with mounting problems, has never relied on public opinion to hold power. This is a crucial factor. And his control over the vital ingredients—the army, the police, the intelligence forces—seems firm.

None of the elements troubling the Government now ap-

pear to be decisive in themselves. It seems unlikely that the students—their fight for academic freedom sublimating their distaste for what they feel is a repressive Government—could bring the Government down all by themselves.

And, while there are mounting protests over black market prices, inflation and inadequate wages—despite the vigor of the economy—the masses do not seem about to mount the barricades.

"We should remember, though, that the situation no longer appears static," one diplomat here said. "The people are changing and so is the economy."

Opponents of Junta

Now Feel Protest Is Having Effect

omy. I find more and more Greeks questioning where they are going. There will be more ferment as time goes on."

Premier Papadopoulos, who also is regent, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and Minister for Planning and Government Policy, talks to crowds in the provinces about the "gales that do not frighten us." He announces a 15-year plan for development, rejects attacks that "we are tyrants" and exudes confidence.

Even so, it does appear that at least some Athenians are more willing to test the limits set by what some call "the vacillating dictatorship." The students, for example, mixing

anxiety with courage, would not have openly demonstrated, boycotted their classes and occupied the law school three years ago.

This apparently increased willingness to challenge, but with caution, shows up in small ways. Within the last month, a new decree came down forbidding taxi drivers to smoke while carrying passengers—who, in theory, were saved from loud taxi radios by an earlier decree. While these would undoubtedly have been obeyed to the letter in the early days, taxi drivers seem to be smoking more and the bouzouki music seems louder.

Scattered Protests

There are no powerful trade union organizations as such, but the building workers are demanding higher wages. The movie theaters were shut down last week in protest against both taxes and the films on television. Bank employees have thwarted Government efforts to blend their lucrative pension funds into a national pool.

For the Government, quick to boast of American support and equally quick to ignore Washington's nudges to move or to democracy, the problem has been to avoid major confrontation wherever possible. It reserves its great power for use only when necessary to stifle dissent or to intimidate. And it attempts to give the impression at the same time of movement toward parliamentary rule, and, yet, to prevent it from actually being reached.

"I don't know whether they

want to give up power," said one Greek who supports the Government. "I do know that if they do, they don't know how."

Prosperity Has Increased

Accordingly, what the Premier calls a "parenthesis" in Greek political history will mark its sixth anniversary on April 21. And some here, who three years ago were still vocal in their support for the Government for bringing stability to Greek life, for ending the chaos of constant strikes, for abolishing parliamentary intrigue and turmoil, are now telling the same visitor that "perhaps six years is long enough."

Under the Government, however, Greece has found increased prosperity, with an annual growth rate of about 8 per cent and an economy that appears healthy for the moment, whatever the potential danger from short-term foreign debts and rising living costs. But prosperity, independent experts argue, does not always translate into political stability.

A somewhat puzzled supporter of the Government illustrated the point by telling of a visit to an island recently where he found new roads, new schools, new hotels, higher income and, yet, general apathy toward the Government. When he asked the villagers why they were not warmly embracing their rulers, they replied:

"We want something new."

Wednesday, March 7, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

Protests Show Cracks in Greek Regime

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Foreign Service

ATHENS—"I don't understand where the foreign correspondents who visit this country find all this opposition to the regime," an American diplomat here said a year ago. "I live here year-round but I'm darned if I can find it."

That assessment of a population's acquiescence in the military-backed dictatorship established by the April 1967 army coup expressed one of the puzzles of Greek life at that time. Despite the suspension of most civil and political liberties and repression of dissidents, Greece under martial law has projected an image of prosperity, stability and contentment.

After a month of widespread student unrest, however, some small cracks have appeared in the picture. At the universities themselves, the campus protests revealed a sizable opposition to policies that have eroded educational independence and imposed controls over many aspects of academic life.

Government assertions that the unrest was engineered by a tiny minority of "anarchists," "former politicians," and "Communists" seem unconvincing after sit-ins, protest meetings, and boycotts that involved a majority of the 80,000 Greek university students.

[The government closed the Athens University Law School for a week yesterday and banned a general student meeting, according to wire service reports from Athens. Police and uniformed military police patrolled the area, and witnesses said several demonstrating students were arrested.]

There is also at least some evidence that the drafting of 97 students into the army, and the beating of some of them inside university buildings, may have cost the government the confidence of segments of society that had been neutral or even in favor of its authoritarian rule.

Some 1,200 citizens signed a protest against the induction of students into the armed services. The presumably thoroughly pro-government Senate (Executive Council) of the embattled Athens Polytechnic University resigned in protest against police brutality.

The position of Prime Minister George Papadopoulos still seems unassailable. He commands the police, army and security services and has the support of Greece's business and financial groups. Even the government's most bitter critics have trouble presenting a credible scenario that would lead to its downfall.

Yet Papadopoulos conceded the essential difficulty he faces in governing a country that lacks any political mechanism for defusing tensions.

Although Papadopoulos promised the student-faculty group that he would heed legitimate student requests, few observers believe that the government is in many positions to make essential compromises without jeopardizing its own status. Hints from officials suggest that the government may be preparing to use the unrest to justify further delays in moving toward more representative government.

Public opinion is difficult to measure in Greece. The vast majority of Greek citizens seem to a non-Greek eye to be preoccupied with enjoying their booming consumer society. But opponents of the government maintain that the outward indifference is artificial and that the real significance of the student protests was that they roused many Greeks from their political passivity.

"The image of inviolability has been broken," said a journalist. "The sense that the regime is in total control of everything is less strong than it was."

"Education is the essence of society and without free education you cannot develop a society," said a professor. "We are returning to the 19th century, when our fight was over academic freedom and the inviolability of the university."

"The events have made all Greeks sensitive to the deprivation of their basic liberties," said a young student interviewed in Athens last week. "The way the government handled the demonstrations made the whole country conscious that they were living under a violent regime."

Such views clearly are a shock to a government that

has energetically courted the younger generation in hopes of winning it over to the ideals of its so-called April revolution. Students have been pampered with free medical care, cheap meals, loans and free movie tickets.

While offering these blandishments, however, the government tightened its controls over Greece's universities. Through a series of decrees and new constitutional acts, it assumed powers to dismiss and appoint professors and named government commissars (usually generals) with broad powers to supervise universities. An estimated one-third of Greek professors are believed to have left their posts because of dismissal, resignation or early retirement since 1967.

In responding to a steadily growing student movement which was demanding a larger voice in educational matters, the government has followed a zigzag course. Under pressure from several thousand students, the government permitted students to elect their own boards last November.

But dissident sources claimed that pro-government forces tried to control the outcome with intimidation, procedural tricks and fraud.

Student demands include the release of the 97 drafted students, repeal of the special decree that withdrew their deferments, undergraduate participation in drafting a new law on higher education, new elections for student boards, and removal of police informers and suspected members of the former strong-arm Fascist youth organization "EKOS" from the campus.

What happens next may depend on the depth of underlying tensions in Greek society and the strength of mass support for change. Student sources say their movement is independent of any political party. But for any opposition to be effective ultimately, it would have to offer some convincing alternatives to the present government. Such an alternative does not exist, and some Greeks fear that the opposition could become di-

vided between leftists and social reformers on one side and conservatives who would like to restore the monarchy of exiled King Constantine.

At this stage, Greek prosperity may be working against social agitation. Greek per capita income exceeded \$1,000 in 1971 and national income grew by 8½ per cent. Strikes are illegal in Greece but there has not even been a wildcat walkout of serious proportions in six years.

Opponents of the government insist that the euphoria is misleading and that worker unrest will soon appear over rapidly rising prices. More than 250,000 Greeks have gone abroad to seek better jobs. Economic critics say that corruption has increased under the dictatorship and that economic inequalities have widened as a result of special tax treatment for powerful economic groups.

They also maintain that such important economic indicators as private capital investments in manufacturing have dropped off since 1967.

Workers in Greece have seldom been an effective political force. For this reason, some government opponents put their hopes in the army, whose position toward the government's handling of the student issue is uncertain. However, student leaders say they are doubtful that the army could play a role in restoring democracy and more progressive policies.

"Since the Greek civil war, our army has become more and more reactionary and riddled with secret organizations," said one source. Nevertheless, the Papadopoulos government apparently worries more about opposition to it from the right than from the left. Many retired army officers are still angry over the expulsion of King Constantine after an abortive royal counter-coup on Dec. 15, 1967.

"What unites us," said a former conservative politician this week, "is our contempt for the regime. We Greeks shall pursue the road that leads to our freedom."

NEW YORK TIMES
1 March 1973

Greece's Press, After Relative Freedom, Is Coming Under Growing Pressure

By ALVIN SHUSTER
Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, Feb. 28—After a period of relative freedom, the Greek press is coming under increasing pressure from the army-backed Government to maintain silence on sensitive issues in a campaign that has left publishers and journalists confused and angry.

As part of the effort, the Government's Press and Information Department also called in six foreign journalists to protest what it thinks are false reports on Greece. Such reprimands have been infrequent for Athens-based foreign correspondents in recent years.

The main targets, however, have been the Greek newspapers, which had become surprisingly lively in the last 18 months as they tested the limits of the 1970 press law. Criticism of Government policies, satirical cartoons and comments, and descriptive and varied reporting—all within limits—had provided Greeks with a marked change from the newspaper diet they received in the early days of the Government, which seized power in 1967.

Student Stories Disappear

Obviously concerned that the recent student agitation could inspire more, the Government has now made it clear that it

WASHINGTON STAR
18 February 1973

wants that issue virtually to disappear. Last Thursday, the papers were full of stories and pictures of demonstrating students. Since then, the word "student" is hard to find.

Asked why the newspapers are no longer writing about students, Byron Stamatopoulos, the chief Government spokesman, said: "The Greek newspapers are free to write, in accordance with their opinion, what they like. What is forbidden is to write false reports."

The key reason for the shift stems from a session Thursday night when Deputy Premier Stylianos Patakos called in editors and publishers for an "exchange of views" on the handling of reports on the student unrest. The message was clear and the stories disappeared.

About 100 reporters are now circulating a petition asking the Athens Union of Journalists to explain to readers why all news of student unrest has suddenly vanished. They feel that their professional prestige and reputations are at stake.

"The present system is worse in many ways than when we had censors in our office," one publisher said. "At least then we knew what we could say and what we couldn't. This system is chaos. And the pressure is never in the form of a frontal attack. They try to get at

you in subtle ways, down narrow back lanes."

The case of George Athanassiadis, the publisher of Vradyni, a right-wing Athens afternoon newspaper, illustrates the point. He is now reluctantly the symbol of press freedom.

Sitting in his first floor office on Piraeus Street, the 61-year-old publisher told what happened after he decided to print more details of the student troubles than the Government desired.

Change in Heart

On Saturday, he said, a team of 20 tax officers entered his offices and made a detailed search of desks and files of all members of the staff, including copy boys. A group also went to his home where, among other items, they confiscated some love letters he wrote to his wife during World War II, he said.

"When the revolution started six years ago," he said, "I thought it would do some good, that the colonels were honest and well-meaning. Then it grew on me that they were not in power provisionally but for personal advantages."

"I thought I would try to guide them toward an evolution toward democracy," he continued. "I am writing, I am shouting, but nothing happens. This, after all, is a right-wing paper and it was being read by peo-

ple in the army. I began to criticize the Government and they began to attack me."

'Financial Sacrifice'

The 1970 press code, which brought press offenses under the jurisdiction of civil courts, allowed some leeway in the news. But newspapers that criticized the Government found they were not receiving the lucrative advertising placed by Government agencies.

"My paper is regarded now as the most critical," Mr. Athanassiadis said. "But I am not a hero and don't want to be one. I feel I am doing my duty as a journalist."

"The fact is that this is a financial sacrifice. It is not only the Government advertising we are losing. But many big companies refuse to give us their business for fear of making the regime unhappy. These are all subtle pressures, but effective. If I have done something wrong, then bring me to court, man to man."

The fullest coverage in town on the student agitation now appears in The Athens News, which is published in English and is not usually viewed with concern by the Government. English-speaking Greeks say they are translating its articles for their fellow workers. But its owner, John Horn, is being prosecuted for publishing a "misleading" headline.

CARL T. ROWAN

Truth from Mrs. Gandhi Raises Hackles

In this extraordinary era of pandas from Peking and Cadillacs for the Kremlin, the countries the administration is giving the old cold war cold shoulder to are the few democracies still around.

The rhetoric out of China, Russia and North Vietnam is still full of the old insults like "imperialist," "murderer," "aggressor," but Henry Kissinger and Co. keep popping into Communist capitals to break bread and drink wine as though the hosts were the best friends freedom ever knew.

But let the prime minister of India speak some truths about the Western presence in Asia—truths that add up to trifling criticisms compared with what the Communists have been saying—and the U.S. government puts on a childish tantrum.

It has Daniel P. Moynihan, the newly-sworn ambassador to India, start his tour of duty with a European vacation which is a silly and transpar-

ent way of saying to India: "We're irritated, so we'll stall the arrival of our ambassador."

What did Prime Minister Indira Gandhi say to inspire such a crisis in the State Department?

She noted that Asian nationalism drove the colonial powers out, but some Western powers with a "colonial outlook" kept rushing military forces into Asia to fill some "power vacuum" they perceived to exist.

She said there never was any real vacuum, and that failure to understand this "explains the paradox of the West's involvement and failure in Asia."

But surely that isn't what irked the Nixon administration—not when recent history gives her observations such tragic support.

No, the Gandhi comment which stung administration leaders like a misdirected

"I abhor chauvinistic nationalism or racialism of any color and type, but I would like to ask a question. Would this sort of war or the savage bombing which has taken place in Vietnam have been tolerated for so long had the people been European?"

Never mind that millions of white Americans already had answered that question, with people from all levels of life contending that the fierceness and vindictiveness of the bombing was all the greater because the victims were Asian. Americans might be cursed for saying it, but for India's leader to utter even this implied charge of racism could only revive White House curses about "those supercilious Indians."

Mrs. Gandhi is one of the savviest people on earth, so there is no chance she did not foresee that her question about the racist implications would raise hackles in Wash-

ington. She probably went ahead with the comment to draw greater attention to India's displeasure at the way the United States seems to be trying to divvy up influence in Asia among Russia, China and Japan while ignoring India, the second most populous country in the world.

Note her comment that "the interests of trade and commerce and of the manufacturers of armaments do not distinguish between ideologies and have no compunction about making an about-turn should it suit them to do so. A declaration of love for democracy does not seem to be incompatible with open admiration for dictatorship. While this attitude remains, can there be clear thinking or positive action for real peace?"

However gratuitously in temperate those comments may seem to official Washington, the lady pours forth ideas Americans deserve to ponder

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Friday, February 16, 1973

Mideast insights for Washington

Hussein's profitable U.S. visit

By Dana Adams Schmidt
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington
The prolonged visit of King Hussein of Jordan to the United States this month has set in motion a thorough reconsideration of American Middle Eastern policies.

The King's perceptive discussion of Middle Eastern regional diplomacy, in which he plays a growing part, has been mixed with some practical bargaining over economic and military aid and a very private Florida honeymoon with Queen Alia, his third wife.

Personal negotiations

The King himself has handled much of the aid negotiations, particularly as they affected his beloved Air Force. The results, after three days of high-level talks during his official visit in Washington and much coming and going between Washington and Florida are these:

King Hussein will get two squadrons of new F-5 "Freedom" fighters, which were designed to be up to dealing with Soviet-built MIG-21's and which probably stand a fighting chance against Israel's American-built Phantoms. They will supplement the 18 F-104's already in the Royal Jordanian Air Force which the Jordanians have found extremely difficult to maintain with the relatively simple equipment at their disposal.

The backbone of the Jordanian Air Force still consists of World War II British-built Hawker Hunters which have proven amazingly versatile and long-lived.

\$60 million in aid

On the economic side, Jordan will get \$50 million budgetary assistance which is almost entirely free for the King to do with as he sees fit and \$10 million in the form of a development loan. This is the high-water mark in the long history of American aid to Jordan dating back to 1957 when the King had narrowly avoided being overthrown by Nasserites and the Eisenhower administration labeled him as a true foe of international communism.

Since the King suppressed the Palestinian guerrillas in his country in September, 1970, however, relations between the United States and Jordan have grown much closer and the King has made an annual visit to Washington.

This year he has come to Washington especially to test the water at the beginning of the new Nixon administration.

Hints of rapprochement

King Hussein is not alone, furthermore, in having observed the element of East-West rapprochement behind the Vietnam settlement and in speculating that similar developments might be in store for the Middle East.

Premier Alexei N. Kosygin of the Soviet Union reinforced this impression by stating

recently that now that there is a Vietnam settlement the remaining grave threat to world peace is in the Middle East.

Elsewhere it is said that President Nixon is eager to reinforce his historical image as peacemaker in Indo-China by bringing about a settlement in the Middle East.

Presumably with calculations of this order in their minds, King Hussein is to be followed here soon by Muhammad Hassanein Heykal, the editor of Al-Ahram and Egyptian government spokesman, and by Premier Golda Meir of Israel.

Viet preoccupation still

In fact King Hussein discovered the White House is still very much preoccupied with Vietnam but fully intends at the earliest opportunity to focus on the Middle East.

For the time being the administration's policy is the very pragmatic one enunciated by Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

The U.S. wants Egypt and Israel to have direct or indirect discussions on a limited settlement on the Suez Canal to get Israeli troops to withdraw part way across the Sinai Peninsula, in return for Egypt's reopening the canal.

The State Department feels strongly that if ever there is to be movement toward settlement in the Middle East it must start between Israel and Egypt. It told the King that such a development need not derogate any eventual settlement on the Jordanian side.

Loss of interest feared

The King was, however, not convinced. He is afraid that once the big powers have got Suez reopened they will lose interest in doing anything about what he considers the more important problem, namely, Jordan's territory now occupied by Israel on the West Bank of the Jordan River.

In this connection the department listened carefully to King Hussein's exposition of his proposal for an autonomous West Bank, which he insists could not be put into effect until after a general settlement. It noted that he has developed his public position on two lines:

First, he now is on record as saying that he would be willing to negotiate directly with Israel if an acceptable agenda could be worked out. This somewhat mysterious statement leaves questions which remain unanswered about what an acceptable agenda would be and how it could be arrived at.

Second, he now is talking about dual sovereignty for Jerusalem. This is an ingenious formula for obfuscating the most sensitive prestige issue in the whole problem. If it could be said that Israel and an autonomous West Bank state both had their capitals in Jerusalem and the city could in fact be run by a neutral city manager, faces might be saved on both sides.

Mutual disengagement

On a broader level King Hussein heard that the White House will soon be giving serious

consideration to the idea that the United States and the Soviet Union could agree on a mutual disengagement from the Middle East in the form of undertakings to restrict the flow of arms into the area.

To the Israelis, whose margin of military superiority over the Arabs is probably greater now than ever before, this would be preferable to any kind of big-power advocacy of specific terms of settlement. Still holding out for direct talks with the Arabs, the Israelis are fearful of big-power pressure for military withdrawal from occupied territory.

As for the King's honeymoon, he and his

wife disappeared last Saturday, heading south and hoping, according to word from the royal household, for the kind of privacy all honeymooners appreciate.

The King will be able to show his bride around with assurance, having thoroughly explored the Florida east coast on previous visits. He has come to love an annual vacation in the U.S. because he feels safe under FBI protection and likes being treated, as he says, "like an ordinary person." He loves the casual "Hi, King" treatment he gets at Florida resorts.

NEW YORK TIMES
1 March 1973

After Sinai

No useful purpose is served by an acrimonious debate over the assignment of blame for the downing of a Libyan airliner in the Sinai peninsula last week. It should not have happened—no one disputes that. Israelis justify the actions of their trigger-happy pilots, but they express no joy over those acts; this attitude contrasts with the obscene satisfaction voiced by many Arabs, including Arab governments, after some of the bloody "Black September" attacks.

The basic fact illustrated by this tragic incident is that clashes, deliberate or accidental, are going inevitably to occur over and over again, in one form or another, as long as the two sides remain locked into the rigid stand-off which has produced such a sterile stalemate all these years.

For too long, many of Israel's leaders have been lulling their people into the mistaken belief that the present status quo is in Israel's long-term interest. For his part, President Sadat of Egypt has been far too quick to back away from his occasional flashes of flexibility, choosing instead to retreat to the time-worn position of holding on to maximum demands that stand no chance of being realized with or without another war.

The present moment of sobriety could well be seized upon to make the point that the stability of the present stalemate is illusory. Below the surface of Israel's election campaign this year is the hint of a widely held popular belief that the rigidity of the last five years may have served its purpose, and could now gradually be relaxed for the sake of the troubled Israeli economy and the well-being of the country's future generation. This is hardly the message Premier Meir is bringing to President Nixon today, but it is the view of others in her own Labor party. In this context, the Israeli Cabinet decision to offer compensation to the victims of the Libyan airliner was a wise reversal of previous ministerial disclaimers.

Constant self-justifications, arguments in a framework of some abstract system of logic—this style of monologue has failed both Arabs and Israelis for two and a half decades. A new round of peacemaking diplomacy, which Mrs. Meir welcomed on her arrival in the United States just as King Hussein had a month earlier, can bear fruit only if both sides back away from encrusted dogmas aimed not at reconciliation but at scoring empty debating points.

NEW YORK TIMES
8 March 1973

Indian Official Says Poison Was Found In Grain From U. S.

Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI, March 7 — India's Food Minister said today that recently arrived shipments of American grain had included some poisonous seeds but that they had been detected before the grain could be distributed in drought-stricken areas of the country.

Speaking in Parliament, where agitated members asked about the matter for an hour, the minister, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, said there was no question that anyone had deliberately mixed the seeds into the grain before shipment to India. He said the seeds came from the weeds that grow with the grain.

Tiny, black seeds — known botanically as stramonium and locally as dhatura — were reportedly found mixed liberally with shipments of milo, a type of sorghum, from the United States that arrived at Bombay last month. The seeds were said to be sufficiently toxic to make people sick and, if the people were weak, to kill them.

Shipment of 200,000 Tons

The poisonous seeds were said to be found in a consignment of 200,000 tons of the sorghum part of the 800,000 tons of grains bought by India in the United States. The grain was intended for the people in the states of Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan.

The Food Minister said the Indian supply mission in New York that had bought the grains had been asked to take up the matter with the American suppliers. Meanwhile, he said, the Government has arranged for a thorough sifting of the sorghum already received.

Vasanth Sathe, a member of the ruling Congress party, said that in the United States sorghum was mainly used for cattle and that the small amounts of poison mixed in with it did not kill any animal. Even if the Americans consumed the adulterated milo, he said, they were constitutionally strong enough to withstand any adverse effect. "But in India our people are weak, sir," he said. "We should not go by American standards."

Mr. Ahmed said according to the explanation received from the India supply mission, it was normal practice in the United States that a mixture of 5 to 6 per cent of "foreign materials" was allowed in milo and that because of mechanical harvesting it was not possible to prevent the poisonous seeds from getting mixed with the grains.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
3 March 1973

Moynihan takes up task of soothing New Delhi

By Saville R. Davis
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

New Delhi

The delicate task of working out a new relationship between the United States and India has begun.

It is already clear that India has its own ideas about where it fits in Mr. Nixon's proclaimed "new era of negotiation" — and that the Russian presence will be strongly felt.

Only minutes before new U.S. Ambassador Patrick Moynihan arrived at Delhi airport, a clever and imaginative delegation from the Soviet Union emplaned through the departure lounge. The Russians got here first.

They had made history by devising a new form of "socialist" barter trade and flew home with Indian accolades.

Henceforth, Indo-Soviet trade will no longer be the hit-or-miss barter style, based on whatever goods happen to be available. The new plan is for each country to compile a "need" list of sophisticated, valuable products it genuinely wants to import — then arrangements will be made to create new industries in the other country to produce them. Investment capital deficiencies would be made up by the Soviet Union.

A major impetus

This agreement is regarded here as a revolutionary new impetus to socialist economics — sensitive to the needs of a developing country.

India will continue to trade in the dollar market, for America is still its best customer.

But India's heart is in the new Socialist forms of trade, and in a discreet friendship with the Soviet bloc.

Announcement of the new Soviet agreement — just as Ambassador Moynihan was en route to New Delhi — was the latest illustration of the delicacy of his mission.

Indian foreign policy today is still dominated by one fact. The Soviet Union stood by it during the liberation of Bangladesh — while the United States tried to block it. Years will be needed to dim the memory of that event, said one well-informed American here, perhaps exaggerating to make the point.

'Low key' urged

A top-level Indian official who is well acquainted with the United States concurs.

"Anything urged on India by Americans right now is reason enough for Indians not doing it," he said. His advice to Mr. Moynihan is to say very little, in a very low key.

If Mr. Moynihan suggests a renewal of American aid, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi may well refuse it.

If the United States permits American "lethal arms" to flow into Pakistan again, India will react with any degree of fury that

will not hurt its export trade.

If the United States sends naval forces into the seas around India, as it did at the height of the Bangladesh affair, India might respond by giving naval bases to the Soviet Union. This issue is not remote, in view of the current Soviet effort to reopen Suez and establish a route for its Mediterranean fleet into the Indian Ocean.

With regard to the new U.S. ambassador, a diplomatic jest reported in Indian newspapers is that Mr. Moynihan should apply his famous phrase "benign neglect" to American relations with Delhi. It is privately suggested here that another Moynihan quip, the title of his book "Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding," would have been even more appropriate.

The strain on American relations with this country is as heavy as peaceful behavior can bear.

Conversations with Indians on all levels suggest that it was not only President Nixon's "Christmas bombing" or his strong support of Pakistan's former President Yahya Khan that were the cause of India's disaffection. Nor was it just the cancellation of further American aid to India during the Bangladesh crisis, or the threat to India by sending the U.S. Carrier Enterprise into Indian waters. Or Mr. Nixon's deliberate exclusion (as it is characterized here) of the world's largest democracy from its former role in the peace machinery of Indo-China.

Something deeper is involved.

Socialist resurgence felt

India is going through a strong resurgence of its own particular brand of socialism. Although by no means Communist, it is well to the left of what America considers center. This leads to a certain resentment of the capitalist United States and all its official works — political, economic, military, and diplomatic.

Most informed Americans here, who are friendly toward India, think that the potentially good elements of the Nixon-Kissinger detente policies simply cannot penetrate the ideological wall with which India presently surrounds itself.

Some Indians are more sharply critical of their own government. They are the moderates and conservatives, who complain that Mrs. Gandhi invokes the same kind of abstract principles and "holier-than-thou attitude" that her father often displayed at a time when international realism is needed.

But most Indians support her, share her style of idealism, and present Ambassador Moynihan with a stubborn, guerrilla kind of resistance that is likely to match his Irish eloquence — at least at the start.

India is in a mood right now to apply the Gandhi-Thoreau brand of civil disobedience to Mr. Nixon's "new era of negotiation."

Whether this is to serve merely as constructive criticism — or becomes part of a strategy to displace U.S. efforts with an entirely different structure of detente — remains to be seen.

WASHINGTON POST
8 March 1973

Eight Terrorists and the Sudan

The Sudan now confronts that recurrent dilemma of Arab governments: whether to enforce the law against the Palestinian terrorists. The answer will indicate the kind of relationship that the Sudan wants to maintain with the United States and Europe. It will also indicate, for that matter, the kind of relationship that the Sudan wants to maintain with the other Arab and African nations.

The Sudanese now hold the eight men who seized three diplomats—two Americans and a Belgian—and proceeded to murder them. Gen. Nimeri, the Sudan's ruler, says that the law must take its course. The world will have to wait to see what that means. Other Arab governments, in recent months, have behaved disgracefully on this issue. When four Palestinian gunmen killed the Jordanian prime minister on the steps of a Cairo hotel 16 months ago, Egypt jailed them and then, after the noise had died down, released them on bail. The bail appears to be permanent. After the murder of the Israeli athletes in Munich, the gunmen were freed by the hijacking of a German aircraft and they landed in Libya to a heroes' welcome.

The Palestinian terrorists depend upon Arab governments for a degree of support—in terms of money and safe bases—without which they could not exist. But the terrorists are also a threat, to one degree or another, to these same governments. They are tolerated because they serve more purposes than they acknowledge. The murders in Khartoum are an illuminating example of this obscure and predatory side of Arab politics, in which the terrorists are sometimes used as weapons by one Arab against another.

The Sudan's relations with the rest of the Arab world grow steadily more complex and ambiguous. The last major attempt to overthrow Gen. Nimeri was in the summer of 1971, as he was proceeding to unhook himself from his earlier dependence on the Soviet Union. A group of Communist officers seized Khartoum briefly. The leftist government of Iraq immediately dispatched a large delegation by air to bear congratulations to the rebels. Their aircraft mysteriously exploded in midair at just about the time that Gen. Nimeri, counterattacking with unexpected force, was sending the rebel leadership to the firing squad. The general then broke off relations with Iraq, charging "clear interference" with the Sudan's internal affairs.

The Nimeri government emerged from that episode with debts to its northern neighbors, Libya and Egypt. There was repeated talk, in the succeeding months, of joining those countries together in an Arab federation.

But last winter, in an event that attracted little attention abroad, Gen. Nimeri succeeded in settling the civil war that had dragged on for 17 years, with incalculable bloodshed and devastation between the Sudan's Arab north and its Negro south. The idea of an Arab federation was not popular in the south, and the general postponed entry.

Libya's next move was a blatant attempt to establish a presence on the Sudan's southern border. Last September its neighbor to the south, Uganda, fell into a dispute with Tanzania. The Libyans attempted to send five transport planes, loaded with troops and weapons, to Uganda. The Sudanese government denied permission to fly over its territory, and forced the planes to land at Khartoum. Relations between the Sudan and Libya have deteriorated steadily since then. At the end of the year, Libya was affronted again when the Sudan reopened diplomatic relations with the United States. Gen. Nimeri has now hinted that Libya played a role in organizing the assassination of the diplomats.

The murder of Ambassador Noel and their Belgian colleague, his deputy, Mr. Moore, certainly symbolized the outrage of eight Palestinian terrorists, and perhaps others, to be the Sudan's new opening to the West. But that was not the only symbolism in the incident. It occurred on the anniversary of the settlement of the Sudanese civil war, the event that caused the government in Khartoum to think a little less like Middle Eastern Arabs and a little more like Africans. Behind the Palestinians' simple and open hostility to Israel and its friends in the West, there operate other strategies that are anything but simple or open.

The Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, said in an unguarded moment this week that he supported the death penalty for the gunmen in this case. It is not really Mr. Rogers' position to advise the Sudanese government on penalties. The American authorities, for example, decided not to put Sirhan Sirhan to death for the murder of Sen. Robert Kennedy. The real test of the Sudan's intentions is whether it now proceeds to enforce its own laws and international obligations in good faith. If it follows the recent Libyan and Egyptian precedents, turning the murderers loose with a wink and a smile, the world can assume that Gen. Nimeri is consigning his fortunes to the equivocal benevolence of those two countries. If he desires wider friendships for his country, his government will have to carry out its full responsibilities to enforce the law. It is not an immediate American or Belgian interest that is at stake here, nearly so much as the long-term national interest of the Sudanese government and the 16 million people it rules.

Saturday, Feb. 17, 1973

THE WASHINGTON POST

U.S. Plans Policy Review on Greece

By Barbara Bright
Washington Post Staff Writer

The National Security Council is planning to re-examine U.S. policy toward Greece, according to well-informed sources.

The policy review, expected in March, comes on the heels of two events that

have changed American relations with the military junta that has governed Greece since 1967.

Greece has told the United States that it no longer wants the \$10 million in annual direct military grant aid it has been receiving.

More than 1,900 American Navy men and their families have moved to

Greece following Washington's decision to make Piraeus, the port of Athens, a home port for the Navy in the Mediterranean.

The stated U.S. policy on Greece, a NATO ally, has been to encourage moves toward re-establishing the democratic process there and, at the same time, to

support the government with military aid. Last year Congress, angered by the junta's slow pace at reviving constitutional rule, voted to cut off Greek military aid, but President Nixon used a waiver clause to continue the aid because of what he

described as "overriding requirements of national security."

Change Not Certain

It is not known if the upcoming NSC review will modify or redirect U.S. policy toward Greece.

One White House source said he thought any change unlikely, because of the current talks between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations—in which Greece is involved as an observer—about troop cuts in Central Europe.

Another source denied that a review is planned.

But with the Vietnam war over, the United States has promised to pay more attention to its allies in Europe and to seek a solution to the Middle East crisis—and both of these efforts could affect Washington's position toward Greece.

In the Middle East, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's expulsion of Soviet military advisers has reduced the Soviet presence. President Nixon had used that presence as a justification for bolstering the U.S. military posture in Greece, and particularly for the

homeporting arrangement under which a carrier task force of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, complete with dependents, is to be stationed in Athens.

Greece and NATO

In Europe, the Greek colonels' unilateral rejection of grant aid has undermined the Nixon administration's attempt to get its NATO allies to take on support for Greece's military program.

Some European observers say that Greece continues to be a political problem within NATO. Support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is waning among young European voters who have no recollection of World War II, and who are especially unenthusiastic about backing the Greek military dictatorship.

West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, for example, is coming under fierce attack from the youth wings of Chancellor Willy Brandt's Social Democratic Party and of his own Free Democratic Party for his plans to visit Athens.

U.S. Politics

Within U.S. domestic politics, Greece is an example

of the continuing struggle between the legislative and executive branches of government.

Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal (D-N.Y.), who is chairman of the European subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and who has been a consistent critic of U.S. policy toward Greece, has asked the General Accounting Office to do a continuing audit of U.S. expenditures on the Athens homeporting arrangement.

The arrangement, which is expected to bring Greece some \$13 million yearly, was made by an executive agreement under the NATO treaty, without consulting Congress.

The first phase of homeporting, involving a command group, a destroyer squadron, about 1,250 dependents and 1,960 military personnel, has already been completed.

"The only way Congress could rescind the homeporting arrangement now," a State Department spokesman said last week, "would be for them to cut off the U.S. Navy budget."

Greeks' Criticism

But the Athens agreement has its critics within the Greek government as well. After Premier George Papadopoulos publicized last month's rejection of U.S. grant aid as a triumph of nationalism, Greek opponents of the U.S. homeporting suggested publicly that Athens—since it had cut some of its apron strings to the Americans—should now be able to get rid of the homeport facilities.

One curiosity about the grant-aid rejection—Greece still gets some \$65 million yearly in U.S. military credits—is that the Nixon administration did not share in the announcement. In the current power struggle, it could have been thrown as a sop to Congressional critics.

The Pentagon and the State Department have long contended that U.S. military aid to Greece is vital to U.S. interests in the Mediterranean. If the colonels no longer need the direct aid, it is conceivable that Congress may take a second look at authorization of the more significant military credits.

LONDON OBSERVER
25 February 1973

ISRAEL: PROBLEM FOR THE WORLD

ISRAEL'S armed forces carried out two military actions last week—one planned, the other almost accidental. The raid deep into Lebanon against guerrilla centres in the Palestinian refugee camps was a spectacular feat. The communiqué announced "dozens" of dead; Israeli public opinion—understandably in view of the ferocity of Black September actions—was cheered.

But then came the shooting down of the straying Libyan Boeing, killing some hundred non-combatants. Whatever blame may lie on the pilot for not landing when ordered, this excessively hawkish act illustrates the nervous tension in which Israel lives. The week's two actions are uncomfortable reminders of the real perils that will always threaten to spoil the promise of Israel's achievements, as long as there is no negotiated peace.

And these perils are likely to grow. For the Arab States will become stronger and richer as their control of the world's largest oil fields brings Europe and the United States into increasingly deep dependence on them. And the Soviet Union, with its own oil resources, is always likely to offer them military protection. This new situation may allow the Arabs in turn to extract sophisticated modern armaments, rather than money, from their Western oil clients. There are signs that this is what they will do.

A mass Arab invasion to recover Sinai and the other lost lands may be impossible. But, in perhaps 10 years, these States hope to be able to make overwhelming attacks on Israel's few cities with weapons which cannot all be intercepted. (If the West will not supply the hardware, then Russia or China will.) Whatever losses the Egyptians and others suffered when the Israelis hit back would be considered worth the destruction of Israel's cities and of her power to dominate the Middle East in future. And this the Arabs maintain in spite of their belief that Israel may already have home-made nuclear bombs.

This is disquieting talk. But the emotional bitterness

underlying it—the feeling that your enemy deserves no pity whatever—is all too similar to Israeli emotions behind, for instance, last week's avenging raid on the Palestinian camps in Lebanon. It must be taken seriously.

It therefore looks probable that this part of the world is moving towards disaster within the next 10 years. If the outside world does nothing about it, there is no reason whatever to suppose that Israel and her neighbours will reach a negotiated peace on their own.

But what can the outside world do? It is Israel that must make the big concessions, as the victor, if a settlement is to be negotiated rather than dictated. But the Israelis—and Jewish history does not suggest that those who weaken can rely on the protection of others—will be reluctant to make concessions which put her at the mercy either of the Arabs or of her Western friends and backers. Persuading Israel to accept a settlement which Israelis judge to be against their interests is hopeless and would be morally wrong.

There is, however, one factor that has always been missing from official plans for a Middle East settlement. We know the terms the Arab States might probably accept; we have an idea what sort of deal most Palestinians might consider. What is quite unknown is the physical guarantees that Israel would require if she is to meet those terms.

The Israelis sometimes give the impression that no guarantees could ever be enough. If that is true, there may be no way of averting the destruction of Arab and Israeli cities. But to accept this monstrous prospect would be treason to mankind, and to the thousands of potential victims.

Effective military guarantees are not, after all, impossible to provide for these relatively weak nations. A Soviet spokesman suggested not long ago that Russian and American troops might jointly police a frontier strip between Israel and Egypt, once the border was agreed. Extended to include other national contingents, and with proper air support, this scheme could indefinitely grant Israel and the Arab States a more than adequate buffer along all their frontiers. If it had to stay for a hundred years, its cost would be a fraction of the cost of rebuilding a war-shattered Middle East. It might, indeed, become the nucleus of a United Nations police force, to neutralise disputed frontiers which threatened to provoke war. This would indeed be a development as historic as any that these lands, synonymous with civilisation, have produced in their long past.

WASHINGTON POST
26 February, 1973

Turkey's Parliament Acts With a Bayonet at Its Back

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Foreign Service

ANKARA—"This Parliament will enact reform legislation," said a Turkish deputy recently. "It will do it because there is a bayonet at its back."

The bayonet was a reference to the Turkish armed forces, which exercise ultimate power in this country under the state of emergency that has now lasted almost two years. As a means of restoring law and order, the bayonet has been an effective tool. A ruthless campaign against leftist groups which terrorized cities, universities and military bases up to a year ago appears to have been effective.

But the maneuverings of a conservative-dominated Parliament have thwarted enactment of economic and social reforms that the military commanders believe are necessary for longer-term stability.

Preparation of bills on land reform, the closing of tax loopholes that benefit rich businessmen and big landowners, and expanded educational facilities are moving at a snail's pace.

News Analysis

Since reforms are a precondition for the lifting of martial law that still prevails in major Turkish cities and nine provinces, some reforms are inevitable. But the conservative majority in Parliament has managed to hold them to a minimum.

Most observers agree that there will be crucial tests for Turkish democracy in the months ahead.

It is still an open question when and how full civilian rule and normal parliamentary democracy will resume. National elections for a new Parliament are scheduled for September. The leaders of all the major political parties want martial law to end well before then, so the campaign can take place in the freest possible atmosphere.

Future Course

The future of constitutional rule in Turkey could depend on how the country makes the transition from military to civilian control.

To restless Marxists, as well as to older adherents of the progressive rule of the founder of the Turkish republic, Gen. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, it sometimes seems that Western-style parliamentary democracy may not be right for Turkey at its present stage of development.

Turkish liberals, who are a minority, claim that the laissez-faire economic policies and conservatism of the country's largest political organization, the Justice Party, are ill-suited to a relatively poor country that needs social reform and economic modernization.

Others still yearn for the former Kemalist one-party dictatorship in which an elite group imposed its decisions from the top. According to an indictment recently issued in Istanbul, these yearnings reached the point of treasonous disloyalty. Thirty-two persons, including high level army officers, are accused of trying to topple the parliamentary system and establish a revolutionary dictatorship. Just before the 1971 army intervention.

The precedent for that intervention was established in 1960 when the army took over the government and overthrew Adnan Menderes, who was later hanged. The armed forces again intervened in 1971 in the interest of "national security," after a long period of leftist agitation and parliamentary deadlock. Parliament was left to function and the military leaders chose to exercise their power behind the scenes, through a coalition government now headed by Premier Ferit Melen.

That solution has proved frustrating both for politicians and for the military commanders.

To progressives, the results of martial law have been particularly disappointing.

Law and Order

In the last year martial law took a harsher turn as the military-backed government embarked on a tough law and order campaign. Hundreds of leftists, including professors, journalists, students and lawyers, were jailed and more than 1,000 are awaiting trial by military tribunals.

Last week, the National Assembly voted 309 to 63 for a constitutional change that will set up special state security courts to try political extremists after martial law ends.

Earlier, Parliament had approved a sweeping university law that drastically reduced the traditional autonomy of Turkish academic centers.

These tough measures have not been accompanied by any significant reform laws.

In an interview this week, the chairman of the left of center Republican People's Party, Bulent Ecevit, charged that the conservative majority in Parliament had been using the cover of martial law to enact its own hardline program, while dragging its feet on reforms.

"Martial law gave the conservatives the chance they always wanted to establish a dissected democracy," he said. "It's not fair to blame it all on the military. The laws passed represent the free will of Parliament—but not the will of the people or the pressure of the military."

The conservative Justice Party can afford to go slowly on reform, he added, because in a martial law situation it does not feel under direct public pressure.

Ecevit's Republican People's Party is the party of Ataturk, and it supports radical reforms, including such innovations as a form of peoples capitalism in which workers could establish their own enterprises through trade unions. But the party has only 97 deputies out of 450 in Parliament compared with 228 for the

Justice Party.

Parliament Tests

Land reforms considered an important test of Parliament's ability to approve a program of social justice. But there are already signs that the Justice Party will try to water down government-proposed measures which also have the backing of Ecevit's party.

In an interview, Justice Party chairman Suleyman Demirel described land reform as "some sort of chewing gum." He said it was of little interest to 98 per cent of the population.

Nevertheless it is clearly of interest to the powerful land-holding lobbies from which the Justice Party gets strong support. Many Justice Party senators and deputies are themselves big owners.

The military-backed government proposed a land redistribution that would enable all peasant families to earn a minimum of about \$1,200 a year. Last week a parliamentary commission sought to weaken the bill.

One change would triple the limits of holdings on modern farms while leaving the definition of modern vague enough to be interpreted by district bureaucrats in favor of landlords. Another change would also benefit landowners facing expropriation.

Land reform has become a test of Parliament's acceptance of the military's prodding. While the armed forces have had almost free reign to try leftists and bring about law and order, the politicians have managed to retain surprising bargaining power through skillful maneuvering. Further tests are ahead.

One of these will come when Parliament elects a new president for a five-year term in March. So far neither the army nor the political parties have nominated candidates to succeed President Cevdet Sunay, 67, a former general.

NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1973

Iran Will Buy \$2-Billion in U.S. Arms Over the Next Several Years

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 21 — Iran has contracted in recent months to buy more than \$2-billion in military equipment from the United States in what Defense Department officials describe as the biggest single arms deal ever arranged by the Pentagon.

Officials said that the purchase would include such equipment as helicopter gunships, F-5E supersonic interceptors, F-4 fighter-bombers and C-130 cargo planes. But the officials were reluctant to talk about the specifics because of the reported sensitivity of the Shah of Iran to publicity about the transaction.

Senate sources who had been briefed on the arms deal said they understood that Iran would also purchase such advanced weapons as laser bombs, the guided bombs used against North Vietnamese targets in the final stages of the Vietnam war.

It was also understood by Senate sources that at the Shah's request the United States would station an unusually large detachment of 300 military personnel in Iran to train Iranians in the use of the new weapons.

Shah Said To Do Choosing

The arms to be purchased were said to have been determined largely by the Shah, who over the years has favored the most advanced weapons produced by the United States and who with his oil revenues has the money to buy them.

For example, in addition to the F-4's that he has been purchasing for the last decade, the Shah reportedly expressed an interest in the F-15, a new Air Force interceptor not yet in production.

State and Defense Department officials said that the large-scale transfer of arms,

which is to go on over the next several years, would help reinforce what they described as "a point of stability" in the Persian Gulf area.

A stable and progressive regime that is playing a constructive role in the area," one State Department official who is involved in the negotiations explained.

At the same time, both Defense and State Department officials emphasize that aside from such considerations, the deal was entered into on the ground that it would be highly profitable in helping American arms manufacturers caught in a post-Vietnam slump in orders and in helping to redress this country's deficit in balance of payments.

'Cash on the Barrelhead'

The Shah, according to defense industry sources, will pay "cash on the barrelhead" for the weapons.

"It sure is going to help fill in some of the gaps on our production line," said a representative of one aircraft manufacturer that is to get a major part of the order to fill.

As described by State Department officials, the arms purchases are part of a five-year modernization program that the Shah adopted for his armed forces two years ago. The officials said that with the withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf in late 1971, Iran decided to accelerate and compress the modernization program.

For more than two decades, the United States and Britain have been the traditional arms suppliers to Iran, with the Shah on occasion threatening to turn to the Soviet Union for arms if he could not obtain them from Western sources.

Beginning in 1950, the United States gave more than \$800-

million in military aid to Iran, but in recent years, as Iran grew wealthy from oil, the military assistance shifted from such aid to sales of the arms on basically commercial terms.

As it became apparent that Britain would withdraw from the Persian Gulf, the Shah began stepping up his purchases of arms, turning to the United States primarily for aircraft and to Britain for ships and tanks.

Both State and Defense Department officials acknowledged that the ordered arms were beyond the Shah's needs for maintaining internal security in his country. But, it was said, the Shah's basic concept is that he needs a military force that could discourage any Soviet adventurism in the area and block any move by neighboring Iraq, which has received substantial military equipment from Moscow.

Exact Size of Order Secret

The exact size of the arms deal is still kept secret. Senate sources said that they understood the total was nearly \$3-billion, but defense officials said it was "closer to \$2-billion."

More than half of the orders are said to be for several hundred helicopters and interceptors.

The Bell Helicopter Company, for example, has received an order for 202 AH-1J helicopters, a gunship used by the United States Marine Corps, and for 234 model 214-A helicopters, a 16-passenger cargo helicopter, a 16-passenger cargo helicopter. The helicopters are to be built at Fort Worth, Tex. The Bell company officials describe the order as worth at least \$700-million over the next five years.

In addition, Iran has reportedly placed an order with the Northrop Corporation in Hawthorne, Calif., for about 140 F-5E's, a new interceptor

particularly designed for foreign air forces as a defense against the Soviet-built MIG-21. The F-5G, a fighter that is easy to maintain is expected to cost about \$1.5-million a plane.

The Iranian deal reportedly reflects a new emphasis by the Nixon Administration on promoting foreign military sales. In some ways, officials say the Nixon Administration is returning to a policy of a decade ago when the Defense Department pushed foreign military sales so aggressively that Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Britain publicly deplored the "high-pressure salesmanship of the Americans."

The promotion campaign led in the late nineteen-sixties to Congressional restrictions, initiated largely by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Senate committee was concerned that the sales were promoting arms races and imposing undue financial burdens on developing countries.

After a slowdown in arms sales, "the pendulum is beginning to swing the other way," according to one State Department official involved in setting policy on military sales.

This time, however, officials insist that it is the State Department, not the Defense Department, that will have the dominant voice in controlling military sales.

Vice Adm. Raymond E. Peet, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Assistance, also insists that his military team have orders not to promote arms sales to other countries.

Arms sales, meanwhile, have surged upward from a low of \$925-million in 1970. They reached \$2.1-billion in 1971, \$3.45-billion in 1972 and are expected to total \$3.8-billion in 1973.

WASHINGTON OBSERVER

15 FEB 1973

**WAR
SHIFT** Presidential Assistant Henry Kissinger is now scheduled to work out another "peace plan"—this time between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Negotiations are under way for a Kissinger visit to Cairo.

Backing Kissinger up is the threat of American military intervention, now that American troops are out of Vietnam. That this is not an idle threat is seen by many indicators. In spite of the great reluctance of the American people to get into any more wars, there is no doubt but that most politicians and pressure group bosses who were "doves" in Vietnam are "hawks" when it comes to placating the Zionists by pledging the support of the taxpayers and parents of America for Israel.

In readiness for the mission, the U.S. Army stopped training infantry officers many months ago for the tropical jungle combat of Vietnam and is now preparing them to fight wars in the Mideast and Europe.

The pronounced shift in officer training was described by Col. Byron Green, the director of instruction at Ft. Benning, the base where most army infantry officers are trained.

"We used to have five Vietnam villages which we used for training the young officers in guerilla warfare," he said. "But they have fallen into disorder and disuse.

"We still have one which we will keep intact because we think it is important that we do not lose the experience and learning acquired at so much cost in Vietnam."

Another reason for keeping the remaining village, he said, is that there is a large possibility that any future war will be in a village-type area. "Seventy-four per cent of the inhabited areas of the globe are village-type areas," he said.

It will be necessary at some point, however, to rebuild this village because of the hard wear it gets — and when it is rebuilt it probably will be composed of adobe structure "such as would be found in the Middle East," said Green, instead of the thatched structures there now.

To attract and hold combat troops, the Army—for the first time since the Civil War—has begun giving a \$1500 bonus to all who volunteer for infantry, artillery or armor. This is not the usual re-enlistment bonus but an outright enlistment bonus to make sure that the three basic combat branches are filled with competent, battle-tested veterans ready, willing and able to fight for Israel.

Currently the Soviets and the Israelis, while undoubtedly at loggerheads over some problems, not the least of which are the conflicting aspirations for the partition of the Middle East oil resources, covertly cooperate in most matters, one of which is the Soviet ploy to continue bamboozling the Arab masses.

An instance of this is the clandestine nature of the Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations. Officially, those diplomatic relations were severed with great fanfare by Moscow at the time of the Six Day War of June 1967. At that time the Soviet Union closed its embassy in Tel Aviv. But they merely transferred their diplomatic offices to the Russian Orthodox Monastery in Jerusalem—which had already served for 19 years as a KGB compound.

The monastery, which is located on the outskirts of Jerusalem, was established, with its extra-territorial status, 130 years ago by Nicholas I of Russia, who obtained the concession from the Ottoman Empire, together with the prerogative to act as the protector of the Orthodox Church in the lands under the Turkish sway. During the British regime the Monastery was operated by the Russian churches in exile, but was turned over to the Soviets by Israel in 1948—and has remained a Soviet enclave since then, in spite of the Soviet-Israeli "breach."

Its story since then is only vaguely known through scattered reports. The latter indicate a massive influx into the extra-territorial grounds of sinister-looking "monks," more than one athletic-type father abbot and a constant shuttling of top echelon religious dignitaries between the walled institution and the Soviet Union. Of the original recluses, two nuns committed suicide and most of the other Czarist-affiliation nuns and monks have dispersed.

Recently a tourist reported seeing a tall and stately archimandrite in flowing robes sprightly getting out of a taxi and inadvertently slamming in his beard, which came off. He had learned the Orthodox liturgy, canon law and dogma, but had neglected to learn how to protect "his" beard from accidents.

Another secret Soviet emissary to Israel is the notorious Victor Louis, who is also a close confidant of Henry A. Kissinger. Louis, who serves as Moscow correspondent of the *Evening News* of London, is a Russian Jew who uses his press credentials for world travelling on secret errands for the Kremlin, including to Washington, D.C., to confer with Kissinger. He only uses his Soviet diplomatic passport on his missions to Israel.

Africa

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
21 February 1973

Moroccan plan to push out sea boundaries irks Spain

By Richard Mowrer
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Madrid

Morocco's announced intention to extend its jurisdiction 70 miles out to sea looms as a dark cloud on the Spanish horizon.

The move threatens to damage severely Spain's flourishing fishing industry, third ranking in the world after Japan's and Russia's. For generations Spanish fishermen have reaped a rich harvest from the teaming underwater life off the Northwest coast of Africa. Now 23,000 of them manning some 2,000 boats, together with canning and freezing industries ashore, stand to be affected.

In 1962 Morocco extended its territorial waters to 12 miles. The idea now is to extend the country's territorial fishing limits 58 miles farther.

Fishing inside the 12-mile limit is to be restricted to Moroccan boats. Fishing by boats of other countries in off-shore waters extending 58 miles beyond the 12-mile limit is also to be prohibited, unless special bilateral accords between Morocco and individual countries are reached.

An exception voiced

The Moroccan initiative, taking into account the narrowness of the Strait of Gibraltar that separates Europe from Africa, makes an exception there. Moroccan jurisdiction would not extend beyond a median line equidistant from Spain and Morocco. At its narrowest point the Strait of Gibraltar is seven miles across.

But, it is pointed out here, stretching territoriality 70 miles out to sea on the Atlantic side would bring "Moroccan waters" to within two miles of Lanzarote, one of the Canary Islands — a totally unacceptable situation.

Madrid is set to take a strong line against the Moroccan plan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is holding its fire and resorting to quiet diplomacy in the hope that Morocco's King Hassan II, who has not yet signed the decree, will have second thoughts.

But Commerce Minister Enrique Fontana Codina said: "Spain cannot accept unilateral extension by other countries of their fishing limits. If Morocco's decision to extend its territorial waters to 70 miles is officially confirmed, the Spanish Government will protest."

Negotiations likely

There is no doubt here that Spain will seek bilateral negotiations leading to a fishing agreement with Morocco. But it is noted that agreements with Morocco have a way of getting unstuck.

In 1969 a 10-year fishing agreement was signed. It specified that its terms would not be affected by possible extensions of territorial waters, unless both parties agreed. But this accord now appears to have been jettisoned by Morocco.

In September last year both countries set up a joint fishing and boat-building enterprise financed by Spain to the amount of 50 million pesetas (\$835,000) and based in Agadir. This arrangement is still functioning.

Madrid is allowing Moroccan citrus exports to transit through Spain to compete against Spanish oranges in European markets, much to the distress of Spanish growers.

During the past three years repeated incidents, which Madrid has tried to minimize, have involved Spanish fishing boats and Moroccan patrol vessels. Some 160 trawlers have either been chased, fired at, boarded, or seized by the Moroccan Coast Guard.

In August last year Moroccan launches stopped the 10,000-ton Spanish ferry Ciudad de Ceuta in the Strait of Gibraltar and searched it.

Last summer the Spanish authorities imposed a news blackout on the Spanish press regarding information or comment about Spanish Sahara, the phosphate-rich territory that Morocco wishes to annex, along with the Spanish enclave cities Ceuta and Melilla.

It is thought in some quarters that the Moroccan plan to extend jurisdiction 70 miles out to sea and offer bilateral negotiations at the same time, may be related, in Spain's case, to the Spanish Sahara issue.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
22 February 1973

Black Envoy Finds S. Africa Job Confusing

PRETORIA, South Africa (AP)—A black diplomat is working at the U.S. Embassy in segregated South Africa, and naturally one or two jokes have cropped up.

A comic strip depicts Prime Minister John Vorster in the midst of an interview.

Q. How do you feel about this American Negro diplomat, James Baker?

A. Why, he's no problem. Some of my best friends are Americans.

No Comment

Vorster has not commented on this caricature. Nor has Baker, who arrived two weeks ago. He is 37, a bachelor, and an economics officer in the U.S. Foreign Service. One of his jobs is to help advise potential U.S. investors on the advisability of investment in the only nation that formally classifies its people by race.

Baker has taken the house of his predecessor on Club St., in the plush Pretoria suburb of Brooklyn. There black nannies wheel around white toddlers on sultry afternoons, black garden boys keep the lawns neat and blacks do other such chores.

The Virginia-born Baker isn't the first black to come here on diplomatic business. U.S. officials who are black have made several visits and Malawi Ambassador Joe Kachingwe has been around several years. But then Malawi relies on South Africa for monetary aid. The United States doesn't necessarily rely on South Africa for anything.

Asked how he felt here at first, Baker replied:

WASHINGTON POST
22 February, 1973

Congo Warning

BRAZZAVILLE—The Congo government of President Marien Ngouabi has warned that there are new threats of a coup against the government.

The state radio accused a Malian cousin of rebel leader Ange Diawara of negotiating with an underground

movement and of being an agent for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

It was also announced that Sivain Bemba, minister for information, sport, culture and the arts, has been arrested.

The reports followed Ngouabi's disbanding of the national police force and his call for a radical cleanup of the Congolese army.

"Confused."

"The apartheid problem is not one which makes me jump with glee," he commented.

"We can turn our assignments down but I thought about it and decided to come.

"In my view it was not a symbolic appointment. My job is a job that has to be done. I don't think I would have wanted to

come here as a symbol."

Embassy officials say Baker is unlikely to run into any incidents. One observed: "Diplomats don't often walk the streets, you know."

Even if he did step out onto Paul Kruger St., South African protocol officials probably would be out to see that nothing untoward happened.

Travel Permitted

Baker may travel about South Africa. But normal diplomatic procedure requires any embassy to inform the host government of out-of-town trips to avoid suspicion of snooping. It seems unlikely that Baker's sudden arrival in a country town would catch any restaurateur by surprise.

The far right Herstigte Nasionale Party has ex-

pressed public bitterness about Baker's assignment. It fired off a telegram to Prime Minister Vorster and a "declaration of protest" to the U.S. Embassy which said in part: "We reject this appointment as a gesture which purports to be in the interest of good relationships between the U.S. and South Africa and declare that in principle this person is not welcome in South Africa."

HINDUSTAN TIMES

14 February 1973

WASHINGTON POST
22 February, 1973

S. African Apartheid -Hit at Airline Hearing

By Jay Ross

Washington Post Staff Writer

Racial discrimination, rather than the usual questions of fares and schedules, was the issue at a Civil Aeronautics Board hearing yesterday on an airline route application.

South African Airways has applied for a regular route from Johannesburg to New York via the Cape Verde Islands. The application is being challenged by several groups opposed to South African race segregation policies.

The hearing—which was to determine what issues should be included in considering the application—marked the first time that racial discrimination has been raised in a board hearing on landing rights, according to CAB bureau counsel Jerome B. Blum.

After the 2½-hour hearing, Ross I. Newmann, an administrative judge for the CAB, said he would rule on the scope of the final hearing.

The administrative judge determines the issues at stake in the final hearing on the basis of arguments in the preliminary hearing. So yesterday's session was the key stage for the opponents of the airline. Blum said the hearing was the longest preliminary session held by the CAB.

Normally, landing rights for foreign airlines are handled routinely, and the preliminary and final hearings are held on the same day. This was the case in 1968, when South African Airways was first granted U.S. landing rights on a Johannesburg-Rio de Janeiro-New York route.

This time, Blum filed a statement that the application should be considered in light of whether the airline complies with the 1964 Civil Rights

Act, which outlaws discrimination in employment and public accommodations. In his role as bureau counsel, Blum is supposed to represent the public interest at CAB hearings.

Blum was joined in many of his arguments by a group including the Black Congressional Caucus and several organizations interested in Africa. Rep. Charles Diggs, (D-Mich.), chairman of the Black Caucus, attended the hearing.

South African Airways counsel Brice Clagett argued that the policies of South Africa were irrelevant and that the CAB does not have the authority to consider such foreign-policy matters in an application.

"This way lies madness," Clagett said, adding that if agreement on political matters is required for international transportation, there could be no such transportation.

He said he thought the CAB bureau counsel had "taken a pretty militant position."

Later, he said that the airline does not segregate passengers on international flights.

Peter J. Connell, speaking for the airline's opponents, said that South African Airways could not conform to the non-discrimination provisions of U.S. law and that black American employees of the airline would not have an equal opportunity to advance in the home office.

He also said American blacks would not be able to receive equal treatment on charter flights, which the airline is also applying for on the same route.

The CAB must submit its final determination on granting the route to the White House for approval.

S. Africa's uranium sales a threat to world peace

NEW DELHI, Feb. 13 (UPI) — The phenomenal development of the uranium industry in South Africa, which is not a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, could become a real menace to world peace.

Sounding this warning Mr Charles C. Diggs, chairman of the United States House of Representatives' sub-committee on Africa, has said that the industry had been developing in South Africa since World War II, uranium being a byproduct of gold in nearly half the mines in that country.

In a statement before the Joint Committee of Congress recently, Mr Diggs said that South Africa had already begun selling uranium without any guarantee for its peaceful uses and with its new enriched process it could pose a danger to world peace.

The statement, published in the latest issue of Sechaba, the official organ of the African National Congress in South Africa, said this was the result of the indirect support the international monetary authorities had extended to the goldmining industry in South Africa by providing a guaranteed market at a guaranteed price.

U.S. demand

This international support — in the first place with an unlimited demand at the official price from the United States Reserve Bank and now with a guarantee against falling prices and balance of payments from the International Monetary Fund — and also contributed to the perpetuation of a neo-slavery system in the mines, Mr Diggs added.

Mr Diggs said this support also helped the South African Government, which had also subsidised

marginally-economic mines very heavily in times of difficulties because the industry was very crucial to the entire White-owned economy and, therefore, to the entire structure of South African society.

The Government played a vital role in the continuance of the neo-slavery system in the mines by entering into bilateral agreement with the Portuguese colonial government of Mozambique for the supply of a given volume of "labour units" for which payment was made to the labour-exporting government in the form of compulsorily "deferred wages."

He said: "Even more important is the system of influx control whereby Africans in the labour reserves are prohibited from leaving without a contract and where a job in the gold mines is often the only alternative to starvation."

Mr Diggs said any attempts to go to the towns to seek work freely was prevented by a complex network of pass laws, which were fundamental to the whole system of regulating Africans to serve the White economy as "labour units."

If there were a free labour market the mining industry in South Africa would have to double its wages to compete with the manufacturing industry.

This competition, he said, was eliminated by the full machinery of a police state forcing people to take the lowest-paid jobs. "It is clear then that the South African legislation, which forces Africans to stay in the reserves until they are needed on the mines, is largely responsible for the fact that the international monetary system has the gold supplies that it does," he added.

NEWSWEEK

5 March 1973

WHEN A GUEST CAN DO NO WRONG

Peking is still smarting—but in silence—over the conduct of one recent VIP visitor, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (the former Belgian Congo). The African ruler jarred the Chinese by arriving with an entourage of his Belgian advisers, complete with ladies and lapdogs. He angered them still more on leaving by stopping in India, China's main adversary in Asia, after his hosts had specifically asked him not to. The Chinese have stifled their indignation because Mobutu's visit ended Zaire's relations with the Chiang Kai-shek government, eliminating one of Taiwan's last African footholds.

Western Hemisphere

WASHINGTON STAR
25 February 1973

U.S.-Cuban Ties:

The time has now come for President Nixon to abandon some of the fixations and fictions about Cuba that obsess the administration and begin serious consideration of a new policy leading toward restoration of political and economic relations with the Communist island nation.

Let us review the bidding: Nixon already has made his peace with the Marxist giants, Russia and China. The State Department now has negotiated an agreement with Fidel Castro that hopefully will terminate Cuba's role as a haven for U.S. skyjackers. It has always been apparent that Cuba has never been isolated by the American policy and the sealing-off resolutions of the Organization of American States.

This leaves only the question of the extent to which Castro's Cuba supports revolution and represents a threat to the other nations of the Americas. And it has long been evident that the Havana regime was never very effective at the business of exporting subversion and is now giving little more than lip service to the aspirations of native revolutionaries who once were trained and financed by the Cubans.

As to the presence of Russian military forces in Cuba, the best information is that there are less than 5,000 technicians there. The submarine base at Cienfuegos has never been used by Soviet nuclear submarines, and it really makes no difference: A nuclear-powered submarine does not need a base. The three Russian subs stationed off the East Coast of the U.S. (compared to 14 or so U.S. subs in the North Atlantic approaches to Russia) are serviced by tenders.

Nixon's last public utterance on Cuba was made in a Star-News interview on November 9 when he said, "There will be no change, no change whatever, in our policy toward Cuba unless and until—and I do not anticipate this will happen—Castro changes his policy toward Latin America and the United States."

Well, perhaps the accord on hijackers is a major change such as the President sought in Cuban policy. In point of fact, Castro's denunciations and fiery words mean very little to the United States and Latin America so long as he is unable and unwilling to ship out guerrilla forces and agents to try to overthrow OAS governments.

The United States gets at least as severe verbal treatment from other Latin governments with which we do maintain relations—Chile and Panama come to mind—as from Fidel Castro.

Time for a Change

The existing policy, it now seems to us, has outlived the realities. Communist Cuba is not friendly, but it does cooperate with the United States on a number of fronts already: Postal and phone service exist; the airlift of exiles has been resumed; weather and commercial aviation information is exchanged; United States airlines fly across Cuba using an approved air lane; Cuban athletes have appeared on American soil for the Caribbean olympics in Puerto Rico.

Furthermore, the other Latin nations are beginning to waver and move toward rapprochement with Havana. Mexico never broke relations. Chile and Peru have resumed them. Some of the new OAS members in the Caribbean were not subject to the OAS resolution consigning Cuba to pariah status. And others, such as Venezuela, Ecuador and perhaps Panama, seem ready unilaterally to resume relations with Cuba.

There cannot be any advantage for the United States in remaining aloof when all our European allies have never ceased trading with Cuba. A nation as powerful as the United States can lose little by having normal relations with a country of whose leaders it does not approve. Of course, it takes two to tango; Cuba's Castro would have to be willing to accept a return to normal relations. But the ease with which the Swiss diplomats did the legwork between Washington and Havana to produce the hijack agreement is an indicator that the two neighbors could go a few steps beyond toward restoration of the relations that were severed in 1961.

For President Nixon, the Cuban question no doubt has personal as well as policy facets. Mr. Nixon, indeed, is one of the few U.S. government officials who has ever met Castro face-to-face and he did not find the flamboyant prime minister particularly attractive. But that was back in 1959 when Castro was in the first flush of his seizure of control in Cuba, with his star in the ascendancy, and Mr. Nixon's eminence as vice president under Dwight D. Eisenhower was on the wane.

Today it is Mr. Nixon who is sitting on top of the world while Castro has become a backwater politician, no longer the mover and shaker of world events as he once was. It is not necessary that Mr. Nixon or Castro admire one another in order for the U.S. to accept the fact that

it is anachronistic to pretend the 8 million people of Cuba exist in a vacuum.

The Cuban question also may raise personal problems for Mr. Nixon in other ways. For one thing, the President unquestionably feels an empathy with the Cuban exiles and even a sense of debt to them because of the Bay of Pigs fiasco. But while that abortive invasion was conceived by the Eisenhower-Nixon team, it was launched by the Kennedy administration. And Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the sole surviving Kennedy brother, has long since urged that U.S. policy toward Cuba be re-explored and reassessed. If a Kennedy can risk the wrath of the Castro-hating exiles, it should be at least as possible for the President.

Inevitably, with the Asian war at an end, Mr. Nixon will be turning his attention more and more to the Third World of Latin America and Africa. It is unfortunate that he has not had the time before this to become more interested and involved with the Latins. There is an area about which the President is not overly

informed, and his one sharp recollection is that he was nearly killed by a riotous mob in Venezuela in 1956.

But all Latins are not alike, and monumental changes have taken place. So it is with Cuba. Fidel Castro and Cuba today are not the same as they were 12 years ago. The world is now made up of different equations, and Cuba is one of them.

There no doubt would be a host of problems to solve, such as the expropriated U.S. properties, the Russian military presence, the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay, the sale of Cuban sugar to the U.S. and the problem of the 300,000 anti-Castro exiles living in the United States. But the missile crisis and the Bay of Pigs are ancient history now. We believe President Nixon and his advisors should now turn their full attention to Cuba. The nation that can accommodate itself to a peace agreement with North Vietnam surely can do the same with the shabby dictatorship of Castro. He is, after all, far from the only dictator in Latin America. He may not even be the most dangerous dictator there.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
15 February 1973

Hijack pact hints warmer trend for U.S., Cuba

By James Nelson Goodsell
*Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor*

More and more it looks as if some sort of warming trend in Cuban-United States relations is in the offing.

The imminent signing, probably before the weekend, of a broad antihijacking agreement is seen in hemisphere circles as one more evidence of this trend.

Meanwhile, it was disclosed in Ottawa that Cuba and Canada have also agreed on terms of an antihijack agreement dealing with piracy of both airplanes and boats. A formal signing of the agreement is expected soon in Ottawa.

Although both Washington and Havana reject the idea that the agreement amounts to a turn for the better in relations, there are numerous signs that suggest that such a turn is coming.

There is clearly a rising tide of sentiment in the United States for such a turn and a number of observers who have recently been in Cuba suggest that the Cuban Government is leaning in this direction also.

Long way to go

Still there is a long way to go before the two nations

difficulty encountered in working out the antihijacking agreement, even though both sides clearly wanted the pact, suggests the problems that lie ahead.

It has taken three months of negotiations to work out a viable agreement — and both Havana and Washington have made sizable concessions in their original stands to reach the accord.

Although the agreement has yet to be made public, it is understood that the pact covers both aerial and sea piracy. Under terms of the agreement, Cuba would be required to bring skyjackers who are United States citizens to trial or to extradite them to the U.S. mainland.

For its part, the United States would be prevented from giving safe haven to Cubans who commit crimes and flee to the United States, although apparently it excludes others who simply sought exile.

Washington yielded on its original stand that the accord cover aerial piracy alone. Moreover, the United States pledged, although somewhat indirectly, to keep anti-Castro elements in the United States from harassing Cuba.

Retroactivity refused

In the hard bargaining, Havana is understood to have accepted the United States position that the accord include extradition as well as prosecution as alternatives in dealing with skyjackers.

Cuba also yielded to the U.S. position that the agreement cover only future incidents and not be regarded as retroactive, which could have meant the return of some Cuban-refugees now in the United States.

The talks were carried out through the Swiss Ambassador to Cuba, Silvio Mashata.

who made several trips to Washington during the three months of negotiations.

State Department officials, as well as Secretary of State William P. Rogers and President Nixon himself, stressed Tuesday that the impending agreement should not be seen as evidence that United States policy toward Cuba is changing.

Yet their carefully worded remarks in this connection appear to some observers to indicate that they have left the door to such a change slightly ajar.

1969 bid recalled

It is not lost on observers that the present accord is along the lines of a 1969 Cuban proposal — one that Washington apparently was not interested in then. Times have changed, however, and it is suggested that although the Nixon administration felt an

urgency in working out the antihijacking accord to halt the rash of skyjackings, it also felt the time was right for talks with Cuba even through an intermediary.

A group of Republican legislators, taking note of this situation, late last month called on the Nixon administration to work out a broad detente with Cuba.

The group, headed by Rep. Charles W. Whalen Jr., of Ohio, argued that with settlement in Vietnam and detente with China and Russia, the time has come for Washington to mend its differences with Cuba.

The Republican lawmakers join a number of their Democratic colleagues who last April sponsored a congressional commission looking into the whole question of relations with Cuba and concluded that the time for a change had come.

WASHINGTON POST
16 February, 1973

After 87 Hijackings, An Agreement With Cuba

For years Cuba complained that the United States was committing, sanctioning or—by remediable laxness—permitting two kinds of acts harmful to the security and sovereignty of Cuba. One was armed raids by exiles; the other was escapes by disaffected Cubans. The complaints were essentially true, although the scope of American complicity has altered over time. Successive presidents were trying, if not to topple Fidel Castro or subvert his rule, then to prevent him from stabilizing his rule. Attempts to stigmatize Castro as an outlaw and to expel him from the inter-American system constituted the formal diplomatic aspect of this policy. Hospitality to fleeing Cubans, amounting to an invitation, constituted an informal political aspect.

Havana responded in three ways. It went to Moscow, giving the Kremlin its first Latin presence and client—a matter which took on apocalyptic dimensions in the 1962 missile crisis but which has since, one hopes, been tamed by detente. Second, Havana took up the cause of Latin revolution; having failed, perhaps being wiser, Castro now limits most of his support for the cause to rhetoric. Finally, Havana demanded that the United States stop permitting disaffected Cubans—"illegals" or "criminals" to Havana, "political refugees" to Washington—to enter the United States. Taking the view that it was Fidel's problem, the U.S. turned a deaf ear.

The situation might have gone on unchanged but for the airplane hijackings, especially the two especially terrifying cases last fall. There can be no serious argument that it was the American policy of "isolating" Cuba which forced the Cubans into the unwanted role of being viewed by American criminals and psychopaths as a good place, the only convenient place, to hijack a plane. Such people, Havana has correctly observed, "saw our country as a site where the U.S. itself had destroyed all legal international instruments to act against them." Through 85 "successful" hijackings the United States tolerated these consequences of its isolation policy; without, of course, conceding that they were the consequences. But

the especially flagrant and bloody nature of the 86th and 87th passed the limits of Mr. Nixon's toleration.

Political considerations no doubt played a part but it was plainly the last two hijackings which provided the President the impetus (and also the cushion of public support) for opening hijack talks with the Cubans. In turn this gave the Cubans the necessary leverage and opportunity to open talks with the United States on "illegal exits." The result of these negotiations, conducted through the helpful Swiss, was yesterday's agreement on hijacking "and other offenses," the first Cuban-American accord of any sort since Castro came to power in 1959.

The agreement would seem to enable each country to grant asylum to individuals it characterizes as political refugees and to require both countries to prosecute or extradite individuals who commit violence in their flight or escape. The language, deliberately ambiguous, presumably is reinforced by understandings which are not yet part of the public record. Experience will show the precise meaning and effectiveness of the agreement. Until then, one can hope it works.

In a *macho* spirit which (fortunately) he is too intelligent to apply to big adversaries, Mr. Nixon has insisted that he would not change American policy toward little Cuba until Cuba changed its policy "toward Latin America and the United States." Well, the new agreement is concrete evidence of a change of Cuban policy in a matter of special import for Americans. It should allow Mr. Nixon to unbend towards Cuba and seek out further paths of accommodation: how silly to deal with Peking and Moscow but not Havana.

The new agreement is also concrete evidence of a change of American policy towards Cuba: Mr. Nixon found it necessary and fruitful to deal with one of Cuba's serious grievances in order to have Havana deal with one of the United States own. We salute the President for his insight and initiative in taking this first crucial step toward ending a policy of isolation whose bankruptcy should have been officially recognized years ago. What a pity it took 87 hijackings.

NEW YORK TIMES
25 February 1973

CUBA LETS PUBLIC JUDGE NEW LAWS

'Say What You Think' Gets
an Eager Response

HAVANA, Feb. 24 (Reuters)—In factories, canefields and offices, Cubans can be seen these days arguing heatedly about what the penalty should be for negligence at work, corruption, rape and cattle thieving.

Several years ago Cuba's revolutionary government created the "people's tribunals," where the judges are respected neighbors who deal with petty crimes.

It has now gone one step further in the "democratization" of justice and turned every Cuban into a legislator.

Millions of copies of draft laws that deal with crimes as varied as the illegal use of military uniforms and homosexuality were issued recently.

Cubans were urged to study the texts carefully and to propose amendments if they did not agree with their contents or the proposed penalties.

A Legal Dictionary

The drafts were simply written so that anyone could grasp their meaning.

But to make sure that nothing remained obscure, Granma, the official party newspaper, published a kind of dictionary that gives the exact meaning of such words as "bigamy," "accessory" and "fraudulent."

Cubans are urged in the introduction to the drafts to

"really say what they think." The Commission of Juridical Studies, which drafted the laws, said, "We do not want a formal approval." It added:

"Discuss the texts, vote in their favor if you think they are right, vote against when you think they are inadequate, and if so, propose amendments."

Discuss them the Cubans certainly did. Heated arguments took place in every Committee of Defense of the Revolution, the vigilante organizations that boast a membership of 2.5 million.

Some of those taking part in the debates argued, for example, that in a socialist society those guilty of corruption while holding important administrative posts should get heavier penalties.

TV Program on Laws

When a few weeks ago Cubans were asked to put questions about the proposed laws to a television panel, there was a flood of calls.

The program also showed how misinformed most people were about the laws already in force.

Granma said that in the course of the debates within the Committees of Defense of the Revolution, thousands of changes to the drafts were proposed.

After being examined by the people, the drafts will be returned to the Commission of Juridical Studies, which will amend them when necessary.

They are part of a far-reaching reform of the whole juridical system, and, at a later stage, of the Constitution itself.

In Cuba, laws dating back to colonial times still coexist with revolutionary tribunals, 14 years after Fidel Castro toppled the dictator Fulgencio Batista and established a Communist regime.

NEW YORK TIMES
22 February 1973

Paradox in Brazil

Brazil, riding the crest of remarkable economic development, continues to be a country of paradox. The more it advances economically the more its military rulers feel compelled to resort to repression and censorship. As a recent dispatch to The Times has pointed out, Government pressures have been steadily increasing against newspapers that stoutly refuse to impose self-censorship on the basis of official guidelines.

This is not simply a crackdown on publications alleged to be leftist or revolutionary. A main target has been O Estado de São Paulo, the country's leading and eminently respectable newspaper, and conservative enough to have welcomed the military coup that turned out the civilian government in 1964. Because O Estado refuses on principle to "conform to totalitarian practices," a police censor comes to its plant each evening and decides which news stories and editorials can be printed.

Why a regime so well-entrenched as Brazil's should require any censorship at all remains a mystery; but some of the prohibitions are ludicrous. When General Médici became President in 1969, he said he hoped to restore democracy before his term expired in 1974. But discussion of a successor is now banned, along with speculation about political relaxation or the possibilities for a democratic system. Even comment on Brazil's economic and financial situation is censorable.

Brazil's economic performance continues impressive. The gross national product reached \$50 billion for 1972 on a 10.4 per cent growth rate. Inflation was cut to 15 per cent, astronomical for some countries but Brazil's lowest rate for fourteen years.

But censorship may be invoked against anyone who tries to present the other side of the ledger: Brazil's \$50-billion foreign debt, its per capita income of only \$500 a year, the fact that a fourth of its 100 million people remain at subsistence level. O Estado de São Paulo notes that "without criticism, debate and controversy, there can be no true understanding of national needs." How long will it take the military rulers—already in power for nearly nine years—to recognize that obvious truth?

WASHINGTON POST
26 February, 1973

Mission in Argentina Criticizes Post Story

Washington Post Foreign Service

BUENOS AIRES, Feb. 24 — Max V. Krebs said the embassy "ordinarily would not state today denouncing dignity with comment" a reas "wholly without foundation an article appearing in last Sunday's Washington Post on Ambassador John Davis Lodge, the U.S. envoy to Buenos Aires.

The article by Washington Post correspondent Lewis H. Diuguid said Lodge was looked upon along the diplomatic circuit as an ineffectual curiosity and that many at the embassy hoped he would retire.

Deputy Chief of Mission said

WASHINGTON POST
16 February, 1973
*Prize-Winning Poet
Hits Nixon in Verse*

SANTIAGO, Feb. 15 (UPI)—Pablo Neruda, Chile's Nobel prize-winning Marxist poet, published a new volume of poetry today calling President Nixon "blood-thirsty," "illiterate," an "indifferent jackal" and "a cornered rat."

Attacks on Mr. Nixon are the theme of the 44 poems in "Invitation to Nixonide and Praise of

The Chilean Revolution," in which Neruda condemns the U.S. President for "inhuman atrocities" in Vietnam and accuses him of trying to overthrow Chilean Socialist President Salvador Allende.

The state Quimantu publishing house printed 60,000 copies of Neruda's book. Neruda, 68, resigned this month as Chilean ambassador to France because of ill health. He has also written poems in praise of Mao Tse-tung, Joseph Stalin and Fidel Castro.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, February 21, 1973

Panama Relations Reviewed on Hill

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star-News Staff Writers

Chairman Dante Fascell of the House Inter-American Affairs subcommittee has suggested that members of Congress be invited to take part in the stalemated negotiations between Panama and the United States on the future status of the Panama Canal.

The Florida Democrat broached the idea yesterday while questioning Robert A. Hurwitch, deputy assistant secretary of State for inter-American affairs, on the Panamanian situation and the Cuban hijacking agreement. He said any new treaty with Panama would require enabling legislation and ratification by both houses of Congress and suggested that participation in

WASHINGTON POST
20 February, 1973

operation of the canal or application of Panamanian police powers and justice to the American enclave.

Noncommittal Response

Hurwitch was noncommittal on the Fascell suggestion.

He was questioned closely by subcommittee members on whether the United States expects violence when the United Nations Security Council meets in the Isthmian republic March 15-21. Hurwitch testified he had good reason to anticipate no violence. He dodged questions about whether he had such assurances from Panama's strongman, Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos, but indicated he was nearly certain Panama was not interested in a violent confrontation.

"We had reservations about the U.N. meeting being held in Panama but we're not sulking," Hurwitch declared. "We believe the rhetoric could get out of hand, not necessarily by Panama but by some of our not-so-good friends at the expense of the U.S. We felt the atmosphere would not be conducive to the talks."

The bilateral talks, he said, have been suspended since January when a Panamanian official publicized the secret positions of both governments. Washington informed Panama how it felt about that, Hurwitch said. Now, he said, the United States is so caught up in preparations for the Security Council meeting that negotiations probably will not resume until afterward.

Agreed in Principle

He said the United States has agreed in principle to almost all aspects of the new treaty but that now the problem lies in specifics, such as the time schedule for handing over portions of the zone and giving up police and court powers. The defense of the

canal, he said, obviously must be geared either to counter sabotage or some kind of uprising in Panama itself. There is not enough U.S. manpower there to prevent sabotage, he added, and the Guardia Nacional is better equipped to handle local uprisings.

On the Cuban situation, Hurwitch said the recent hijack agreement has changed nothing about U.S. conditions for normalization of relations. He said Havana is still unremittingly hostile to the United States. There was never any indication given by the Cubans to the Swiss go-betweens of any change of mind, Hurwitch said.

The U.S. position, he said, is generally that we are willing to have relations with other countries if they are willing. Cuba has not abandoned its anti-U.S. policy, he added, and is still training Latin subversives for activities against the governments of other hemisphere countries.

U.S. Rep. Murphy on 'Political Blackmail and Extortion' in Panama Negotiations

The letters of Colonel St. Clair (Washington Post 1/31) and Panama's Ambassador Nicolas Gonzalez-Revilla (Washington Post 2/7) combined with the Post editorial of Jan. 27, indicate a lack of perspective and, in some cases, ignorance of the events that preceded the current status of United States-Panama relations. I feel such unchallenged statements have done a disservice to those of us in the Congress who have been trying to work out a solution to the problems attendant to the American presence in Panama. For one thing, as a member of the Panama Canal Subcommittee for 10 years, and as the chairman for the past two years, I have had the opportunity to speak with many Americans in and out of the Canal Zone, and contrary to what Mr. Gonzalez-Revilla claims, they do not support Colonel St. Clair's position. The truth is, our military people do not view the Canal Zone as a "forced colonial enclave" and "that there is 'armed enforcement'" by the United States over part of the Republic of Panama. For Colonel St. Clair to have made such a statement is absurd.

The superficial reasoning behind the Post's editorial concerning the advisability of the United Nations Security Council meeting in Panama completely overlooks the serious nature of developments in the relations between our two countries. And when the Post opines that it is "fine" for the Panamanians to use the Security Council

meeting to "make a disproportionately large reach for support in its Canal dispute with Washington," I feel the writer was oblivious to the internal situation that exists in the Panamanian government.

Doesn't the Post editorial writer realize that the "Canal" is not at the root of Panamanian discontent? The factors on which negotiators on both sides spent the bulk of their time concerned such things as legal jurisdiction over the United States inhabitants of that area and police jurisdiction in the Zone, increased participation of the Republic of Panama in the operation of the Canal; increased annuity payments to Panama by the United States for use of the Canal and other enormous economic benefits for Panama.

Doesn't the Post know that the negotiations which were being carried on in good faith by the United States and the Government of Panama were breached by a group of Panamanian "hard liners" headed by Foreign Minister, Juan Tack, and his adviser Jorge Illueca. Senor Illueca's first stroke was to publish in the press the negotiating positions of both Panama and the United States, which all but wrecked the negotiations for a time. Foreign Minister Tack then decided in January, to blackmail the United States by warning President Nixon that if Panama didn't get its way in the treaty

negotiations, the Panamanian Government would resort to violence.

If, as claimed by Aquilino Boyd, Panama's Ambassador to the United Nations, the purpose of the Security Council meeting in Panama is to persuade United States public opinion that the Panama Canal should be given to Panama by 1994, I submit that threats of violence, vilification of United States leaders and duplicity on the part of a few Panamanian government officials will have the opposite effect. As the chairman of the House Panama Canal subcommittee for two years, I have received literally thousands of letters from citizens in every walk of life from most of these United States, and virtually all have voiced strong support for continued United States sovereign control over the Canal Zone and Canal.

As for myself I have argued and fought to bring the United States presence in the Canal Zone into the 20th century and for an adjustment by the United States to the needs of the Panamanian people in a variety of areas in the Zone, including the criminal justice system, educational opportunities, equal employment, and legal jurisdiction. I do not feel that these things will be brought about by the reckless change in direction by certain of Panama's leaders who are now resorting to political blackmail and extortion.

JOHN M. MURPHY,
Chairman, House Panama Canal Subcommittee,
Washington.

NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1973

Brazil Imposes Sweeping Press Curbs and Installs Censors in Newsrooms of the Few Papers That Resist

By MARVINE HOWE
Special to The New York Times

SAO PAULO, Brazil, Feb. 10 —Every night around 11, a censor from the Brazilian federal police goes into the newsroom of O Estado de São Paulo, the country's most influential newspaper, reads all the proofs and cuts any material that deals with taboo subjects or appears "inconvenient."

Government pressures against the São Paulo morning newspaper have increased steadily since permanent censorship of it began last August, according to its publisher, Julio de Mesquita Neto.

"We will not conform to totalitarian practices," Mr. Mesquita Neto declared in a recent interview. "We will not censor ourselves. We make up the paper as if there were no censors. If they cut, it's not our responsibility."

O Estado de São Paulo is the leader of a small group of newspapers that refuse to comply with official press prohibitions. The others that have defied the Government, and as a consequence suffer the presence of policemen in their offices, are the Mesquita family's afternoon newspaper Jornal da Tarde, the Rio de Janeiro sensation sheet Tribuna da Imprensa, and three outspoken weeklies: Opinião, Politikan and O Pasquim.

Some Censor Themselves

Other newspapers, magazines and television stations have generally accommodated themselves to the official rules and exert self-censorship, which at times is more severe than the Government censors.

The censors regularly telephone them with the latest orders on forbidden subjects. The list varies from week to week and can include minor incidents as well as important policy issues.

A growing number of people inside and outside the Administration question whether this censorship, which darkens the image of Brazil's military regime, is worthwhile.

Many supporters feel that the military commanders who took power in 1964 have long since eliminated dangerous opposition and won respect for the country's financial and economic progress and therefore do not need to hide behind censors.

Opponents on the other hand hold that the regime has achieved its economic success

through the suppression of workers' demands and the protests of intellectuals and consequently needs to maintain censorship.

The censors' rules, issued a few months ago and constantly amended, cover a vast field and if strictly applied would leave the press little to discuss. In practice, however, much depends on the whims and suspicions of the local censors.

The Banned Subjects

General prohibitions include protests against censorship, any discussion of a successor to President Emílio Garrastazu Médici, whose term is up in 1974, campaigns against the Government's special powers by decree and sensational news that might hurt the image of Brazil.

Others are campaigns to discredit the national housing program, the financial market or other matters of vital importance to the Government, the playing up of assaults on banks or credit establishments, tension between the Roman Catholic Church and the state, agitation in union and student circles, and publicity for Communist personalities and nations. Criticism of state government and "exaltation of immorality" through news of homosexuality, prostitution and drugs are also barred.

The most controversial order, issued by the Minister of Justice last September, bans all news, comment or interviews on a political relaxation of the regime, on democracy for Brazil, and on the economic and financial situation in general.

This blanket interdiction brought an angry letter to the Minister of Justice from Ruy Mesquita, brother of Julio and publisher of Jornal da Tarde. Expressing "profound humiliation and shame" over the arbitrary action, Mr. Mesquita denounced the military for "abandoning their original direction and going the way of military caudillos now out of fashion even in Hispano-American republics."

Most Papers Comply

Others less financially independent than the Mesquita family newspapers privately expressed resentment over the Government's curbs but complied with them.

"We obey the censors' orders but are viscerally opposed to censorship and feel it is not

necessary because the regime is strong enough," says Manoel Francisco de Nascimento Brito, publisher of Jornal do Brasil.

Many times Jornal do Brasil, which ostensibly supports the military regime, succeeds in publishing articles on delicate issues. The newspaper recently carried a devastating survey of censorship in the arts, various appeals for the restoration of habeas corpus for political offenses, a speech by an opposition senator defending press freedom and even an editorial on the succession issue.

The careful reader of the Brazilian press has the feeling that a few of the principal organs such as Jornal do Brasil and the weekly news magazine Veja are still struggling at every opportunity to get around the censors but that most of the newspapers and magazines and radio and television stations have given up the fight.

"The greatest danger for the country now is the institutionalization of self-censorship," says Raimundo Rodrigues Pereira, a seasoned journalist who is now editor in chief of the liberal weekly Opinião.

The Miracle's Other Side

Opinião has been as critical of the administration as the censors permit. The newspaper's primary concern is to show the other side of Brazil's economic miracle: the heavy dependence on foreign loans and the faulty distribution of wealth.

"Censorship is necessary for this type of regime because it fears the reaction of the public if they found out what abuses were being committed in the name of stability," Mr. Pereira said in a recent interview.

The regime's chief target is undoubtedly O Estado de São Paulo, which surprisingly is not left-wing but liberal in the classic sense and virulently anti-Communist.

In fact, the Mesquita press supported the 1964 military coup that brought the present regime to power.

"We believed the country was on the verge of a Communist takeover attempt and so we worked actively with the military to prevent it," Ruy Mesquita said. "We thought it would take the military two or three years to clean up the situation, make reforms and organize elections to turn the country back to civilians."

Differences between the Mesquitas and the military arose almost immediately when the

first military President, Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco, began to "institutionalize" the regime with the creation of two artificial parties and later a new constitution, according to the publisher of Jornal da Tarde.

O Estado do São Paulo has a voluminous file of articles slashed by the censors. Most of them deal with the taboo subjects: charges of torture, censorship, dictatorship, disputes between the ministers and the succession issue.

Some cuts, however, seem to have resulted from excessive zeal by the censors: references to Amnesty International, the London-based body that fights for the rights of political prisoners throughout the world, reports that Pope Paul VI had received the Most Rev. Helder Câmara, archbishop of Recife and outspoken critic of the regime's social policies, and praise from Chile for Julio de Mesquita Neto's report on press restrictions in Brazil before the Inter-American Press Association.

But O Estado do São Paulo is suffering other pressures, according to its publisher. The police, he says, have discriminated against the paper, withholding official reports on anti-terrorist activity given to other newspapers.

The newspaper's national correspondents are increasingly subject to official intimidation, Mr. Mesquita Neto said. In recent months the correspondent in Natal was called in by the police for a critical article on the trans-Amazon highway, the São Luis correspondent was told by the governor to keep out of politics and report on public works, armed gunmen pursued the Porto Alegre correspondent openly while he was preparing a report on cattle smuggling.

Even the publisher was called in by the army and interrogated for three hours about the source of a report on a doctor in Brasília who had been picked up by the police and treated roughly.

Questioned about who was responsible for the report and the editorials appearing in O Estado do São Paulo, Mr. Mesquita replied: "In normal times, I'm responsible for all unsigned material. But since August 1972, it is the Minister of Justice, Alfredo Buzaid, who has censors in our newsroom."

Sunday, Feb. 13, 1973

THE WASHINGTON POST

Politics Comes to Patagonia

By Lewis H. Diuguid

Washington Post Foreign Service



The Washington Post

TRELEW, Argentina — Six months ago, this wool town on the southern shank of the hemisphere witnessed a startling jailbreak-hijacking, followed by the gunning down of 19 revolutionaries who had surrendered.

The consequences shook Trelew from its political apathy, transforming it into the first center of antimilitary activism in the long-ignored region known as Patagonia.

By official accounts of the military government, guards shot the 19 prisoners — killing 16 of them — to foil a second escape attempt. But interviews with a cross-section of Trelew's 25,000 inhabitants produced no one who believed other than that the captives were slain in cold blood.

"It was the most important political event in the history of this province," said lawyer Mario A. Amaya, who was jailed for two months after having helped negotiate the surrender of the fugitives.

While such violence is new to the sparse population of the south, clashes pitting the military against guerrillas and even ordinary citizens have occurred with increasing frequency in Argentina's bigger northern cities. These conflicts were a main cause of the decision by the military chiefs to end six years of dictatorship and return the nation to civil rule.

General elections are scheduled for March 11. Because of censorship imposed after the slaying of the prisoners, the incident last August cannot become an open issue in the desultory local campaigning. But the topic is discussed privately by many who say they never paid much attention to revolutionaries before. It is on the walls, too, slightly camouflaged. "Elections without Political Prisoners," say the painted slogans.

Lawyer Amaya, nominated by the Radical Party for deputy to the national congress while he was still imprisoned, is an odds-on favorite for election. "If they'd kept him in jail another month, he'd be senator," said an opponent.

Peronists and Trotskyites

CONVERSATIONS here permit the following reconstruction of the events that radicalized Trelew.

The prelude to the August disaster came two years ago with the decision of the national government to house some of the increasing number of captive revolutionaries at the jail in the provincial capital of Rawson (pop. 8,000), 10 miles east of Trelew.

Adolfo Samyn, 37, second in command of the daily *El Chubut*, recalls a general concern at the time that to bring in prisoners from the north could bring on the conflicts common there, too.

The choice seems to have been made on the basis of the Patagonia's isolation. But lawyers flew down from Buenos Aires, 800 miles to the north, to consult clients who turned out to be jailed without charge in many cases. The local gentry took note.

Torture of prisoners became a topic in the Gaelic teashops which are a last memory of the immigrants who settled the region in the last century. So tight-knit are Rawson and Trelew that everyone seems to know someone who works at the jail.

Yet the jailbreak last August, according to Samyn, was a surprise. Captured leaders of three terrorist organizations collaborated for the first time in the attempt. They represented two groups claiming allegiance to former

President Juan D. Peron, and a Trotskyite band.

The jail held 163 alleged revolutionaries — 108 men and 57 women — and 83 common prisoners. Using arms brought in past bribed guards, the plotters took over the compound and called in transport to the airport at Trelew.

Precise planning went awry when the Argentine Airlines flight marked for hijacking was later than usual. A first carload, the six main guerrilla leaders, went on to the airport anyway.

The guerrillas had put on stolen army uniforms. One of them, Fernando Vaca Narvaja, son of a prominent politician from the industrial city of Cordoba, was halted by an army colonel at the entrance to the terminal.

"Straighten your insignia, lieutenant," demanded the colonel. Vaca Narvaja, 24, saluted, aligned his epaulet while apologizing that he had been up late the night before, and hurried on to help hijack a plane that had pulled in.

Vaca Narvaja, his five fellow escapees and three outside collaborators were flown to Chile and thence to Cuba. (The Argentine government recently issued new calls for their capture, saying they had slipped back into the country.)

All-Night Bargaining

NO SOONER had the hijacked plane left Trelew than the airport was seized by the second wave of escapees, 14 men and five women heavily armed with weapons from the jail arsenal.

As airports always are in Latin America, this one was crowded with families and friends to embrace arriving passengers and weep for the departing. All were held as hostages.

Words of the escape had now reached the naval air station a mile away. The incoming Argentine Airlines flight was warned off and marines surrounded the airport.

It was a tense hour for the hostages. One of them, lawyer Amaya, knew several of the escaped revolutionaries, having worked with them as the local representative for their lawyers in Buenos Aires.

When the guerrillas saw no likely escape they permitted an ad hoc committee of hostages, including Amaya, to talk to the commander of the surrounding troops.

The guerrillas asked that a judge, a doctor and newsmen, including the local TV camera crew, be brought from Rawson. There followed a red tape ritual that seemed almost a parody of Latin custom: The entourage from Rawson had to run the gauntlet of two document checks, first by the marines and then by guerrillas.

From that point on, the night in Trelew airport was recorded on a remarkable TV tape—which, indeed, had been

the intent of the guerrillas in calling for the newsmen.

At times, the troops threatened to come in shooting, but the negotiations went ahead. Women and children were allowed to leave. The guerrillas' principal demand was that they be returned to the civil jail in Rawson, in the company of the judge and newsmen, and not turned over to the military at the base. (The doctor had been called to testify to the escapees' physical condition, a hedge against eventual torture.)

The negotiators now included provincial government ministers, one of whom, according to Amaya, at a critical juncture denounced him as being in fact one of the guerrillas. Amaya was then excluded from the talks, to be arrested a couple of days later while lunching with lawyers from Buenos Aires.

The all-night bargaining finally ended in the marine commander's acceptance of the guerrillas' terms.

With the TV camera as witness, the 19 calmly defiant escapees surrendered their guns to the troops and boarded a bus for the return to Rawson. A girl of 23, later to die, paused on the steps, clenched her fist and shouted: "Viva la revolucion!"

The bus did not go to Rawson. The high military command for Patagonia declared a state of emergency, broke the agreement and ordered the bus to Trelew air base.

The newsmen, protesting that they had promised to stay with the prisoners, were separated, as was the judge. Via the tape shown on the local television the next day, the people of Trelew and Rawson formed their own opinions of the bargain first struck and then stricken.

Shootout or Massacre?

A WEEK AFTER the 19 prisoners disappeared behind the barrier of the naval air station, editor Samyn received frantic calls from Buenos Aires asking confirmation of an escape attempt.

That was the initial version that passed through military channels. And it remained the core of the official account: that during a lineup of the prisoners at 3:30 a.m. on Aug. 22, one of the prisoners disarmed a guard and attempted to lead an escape. The first

couple of official statements said a shootout occurred, with one guard injured and 15 of the prisoners killed. The other four were severely wounded and one subsequently died.

Later accounts read on monopolized national TV and radio by President Alejandro A. Lanusse and by a top admiral, dropped the allegation that a guard had been wounded. Nor was there reference to a shootout. The official accounts were inconsistent in various other respects.

Versions that leaked out through personnel at the base, though, were identically harsh: that the prisoners were lined up and mowed down, guards then passing from body to body administering the coup de grace — with one survivor saved by ill aim and the two others simply overlooked.

No wounded guard ever appeared.

For most people here, the only mystery is who ordered what is commonly referred to as "the massacre."

That afternoon, Lanusse forbade publication of any statements by subversive groups. That closed off showing of the TV tape that documented the compact with the military for surrender of the 19. But the film is still shown privately around Trelew.

Censorship also cut off the public from statements issued by the three survivors who, remarkably, were allowed to see their lawyers two weeks later. These statements were detailed, mutually consistent, and virtually identical to the version passed out by word-of-mouth from the air station. They were handed around locally.

"With this," said Samyn, "public opinion here was overwhelmingly with the guerrillas. 'Imagine killing women!' was a typical reaction."

Roundup and Protest

ON OCT. 11 BEGAN what until now is the final act of the Trelew tragedy, this time with the massive participation of the citizenry.

That day, 1,000 troops, on orders from the high army command of the zone, carried out lightning searches of houses, set up barrier checks on all roads, and arrested 16 residents without charge. The 16, including a journalist, lawyer, two doctors, a teacher, two union men and two public servants, were held in a tent at the airport

and then flown to a jail in Buenos Aires for questioning.

Until then, the Radical Party had maintained a mild public protest against the continued imprisonment of candidate Amaya. Now all political parties joined in spontaneous demonstrations and strikes. Commerce closed down.

Luis Montalto, who works for the provincial development agency, and his wife, who is a doctor, were among the 16 arrested. He says the troops woke them, gave them time only to arrange care for their infant, and carried them off without explanation.

To this day, the pair profess not to know why they were singled out. She is from La Plata, to the north, and a member of her family previously was charged with subversion. Montalto has worked in the campaign for one faction of the province's divided Peronist Movement.

After six days of increasingly strident strikes and public denunciations, the 16 prisoners — and candidate Amaya — were released.

Some of the 16 were Peronists, others associated with the political left, others conservatives or apolitical. The army's only explanation of the arrests was that they were intended to prevent incidents on the Oct. 17 anniversary of a Peronist uprising in the '40s.

It is known that the army was determined to find local participants in the jailbreak. According to a theory floated by members of the more militant faction of the divided Peronists, their adversaries in the movement cooked up a convenient list of suspects and submitted it to the army. The question of collaboration with the government was one of the issues that had split the movement initially. By this theory, some non-Peronist names were listed, too, to make it less obvious.

Such matters as the responsibility for the arrests of the Trelew residents and for the death of the 16 revolutionaries are not open to public discussion today in Argentina. For this reason, the local politicians do not feel "the massacre" will itself make a visible impact on the March elections — "if they are held," they usually add.

"Someday, if the army is ever under control instead of in power, these issues will be raised again," said one of the new dissidents of Trelew.